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This thesis addresses a major problem facing any attempt to account for language
structure through a cultural mechanism: The processes required by such a mechanism
are only possible if we assume the existence of a range of  preconditions.  These
preconditions are not trivial, and themselves require an explanation.  In this thesis I
address the nature and origin of these preconditions.  
I approach this topic in three stages.  In the first stage, I pull-apart the functioning of
one prominent cultural account of language evolution—the Iterated Learning Model
—to identify the preconditions it assumes.  These preconditions cluster into two main
groups.   The  first  concerns  the  traditional  transmission  of  the  communication
system.  The second relates to the emergence of particular skills of social cognition
that make learned symbols and language-like communication a possibility.
In  the  second  stage,  I  turn  to  comparative  evidence,  looking  for  evolutionary
analogies that might shed light on the emergence of these preconditions.  Two case
studies—the Bengalese finch and the domestic dog—are considered in detail, both of
which  show  aspects  of  one  of  the  preconditions  emerging  in  the  context  of
domestication.  In each case I examine what it is about the domestication process that
led to this outcome.
In the final stage, I consider whether this same context might explain the emergence
of these preconditions in humans.  The claim that humans are a self-domesticated
v
species has a long history, and is increasingly invoked in contemporary discussions
of language evolution.  However, it is often unclear exactly what this claim entails.  I
present a synthesis and critique of a range of empirical and theoretical perspectives
on  self-domestication.   I  conclude  that  human  self-domestication  is  a  coherent
concept, and that there are several plausible accounts of how it might have occurred.
The realisation that humans are a self-domesticated species can, therefore, provide
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Introduction
Self-domestication and Language Evolution
This thesis is motivated by the conviction that two old ideas, both now enjoying
something of a renaissance, have much to say to each other.  The first of these ideas
is  that  language  is  the  product  of  an  evolutionary  process.  The  second  is  that
humans are a  self-domesticated  species.   The  link  to  be  explored  between them
concerns  how  the  behavioural,  cognitive  and  temperamental  outcomes  of  self-
domestication might have formed the preconditions for the emergence of structured
language through a cultural process.
In making this link, the thesis informally divides into three sections.  The first section
focuses  on  one  particular  cultural  account  of  language  evolution,  the  Iterated
Learning Model (ILM).  This section aims to get really clear about how the ILM
functions, both internally and in a wider evolutionary context.  The purpose of this
exercise is to make clear what it is that the ILM has to assume in order to work at all,
what  you  might  call  its  necessary  preconditions.   The  second section  presents  a
detailed  exploration  of  two  comparative  case  studies,  which  suggest  that  those
preconditions might emerge in the evolutionary context of domestication.  Finally,
the third explores the idea that humans might be a self-domesticated species, thereby
opening up the possibility that domestication might also account for the emergence
of those preconditions in humans.
In this introduction, however, I want to say something briefly about each of the two
ideas themselves.  In the case of language evolution, I will attempt to situate this
thesis  in the wider context both of language itself—as the phenomenon requiring
2
evolutionary explanation—and of other approaches to language evolution. I will then
address the question of why cultural accounts of language evolution, such as work in
the ILM, are particularly in need of the kind of approach adopted in this thesis.  In
the case of self-domestication, I focus on the lack of clarity surrounding the concept,
together with how it might relate to the evolution of language.
3
I – Language evolution
It has been suggested that the evolution of language might be amongst the hardest
problems  in  science  (Christiansen  &  Kirby,  2003).   Initially,  this  may  seem
somewhat hyperbolic. However, regardless of what one thinks of this suggestion, its
twin rhetorical motivations are clear1.  The first concerns the diversity of questions—
and therefore disciplinary perspectives—that are inevitably drawn-in when thinking
about language evolution (for a flavour of just how wide the disciplinary net needs to
be cast see MacWhinney, 2005 and the contributions to Christiansen & Kirby, 2003).
The second motivation concerns the nature of language itself, as revealed by work in
linguistics (e.g. Jackendoff, 2002; O'Grady et al., 1997). The nature, that is, of the
language  phenotype—in  all  its  phonological,  syntactic,  semantic  and  pragmatic
complexity—that stands in need of evolutionary explanation in the first place.  No
single  work  can  ever  hope  to  address  everything  that  falls  under  the  rubric  of
'language evolution'.  It will be useful, therefore, to say something about the scope of
the present thesis.
i. The scope of the thesis
As noted above, the focus of this thesis is on one particular account of the emergence
of language structure, the ILM, and how the effects of domestication might account
for its necessary preconditions.  I present a lengthy discussion of the ILM in chapter
one.  For now, however, it will be sufficient to say that work in the ILM explores
how aspects of language structure can be seen to emerge as a result of language itself
adapting to the circumstances of its transmission.  This kind of approach has been
successfully  applied  to  a  range  of  linguistic  phenomenon.  These  include  the
emergence  of  compositionality  (Kirby, 2002;  Brighton  et  al.,  2005;  Kirby et  al.,
2008);  regularity  and  irregularity  (Kirby,  2002);  recursive  syntax  (Kirby,  2002);
subjacency (Christiansen et al., 2002); the emergence of arbitrary signals (Theisen et
1 Indeed, it is in just this kind of rhetorical spirit that I take the original suggestion to have been
made.
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al., 2010) and discrete phonological units (Oudeyer, 2005, 2006); and even duality of
patterning (Roberts & Galantucci, 2012).
This  is  by no  means  an  insignificant  list  of  linguistic  phenomena.  However, we
should not be misled into thinking that this even begins to cover the full scope of the
complexity of the language phenotype. Indeed, this can be seen even if we restrict
ourselves solely to aspects of language structure.  For example, the iterated learning
approach currently has no compelling account of the emergence of the contentive-
functional split (Kirby, 2013).  The spilt, that is, between contentful or  open-class
words—such  as  'dog',  'run'  and  'green'—the  meaning  of  which  can  stand
independently  of  more  complex,  sentence-like  constructions;  and  functional  or
closed-class words—such as 'the', 'to' and 'if'—the meaning of which is tightly bound
to the grammatical role they play in those complex constructions (Lyons, 1995).
Many of the intricacies of syntax2 are also not directly addressed by this approach.
For example, it provides no account of the rule-like nature of movement in language,
such as in the formation of questions. Work in iterated learning currently offers us,
therefore, no explanation as to why forming the question in (2) is grammatical, but
the question in (4) is not:
(1) John likes Sally
(2) Whoi does John like ti?
(3) John is unhappy when Sally hits Molly
(4) *Whoi is John unhappy when Sally hits ti?
Finally, although the iterated approach does address some aspects of phonology, it
provides no real account of the hierarchical nature of phonological structure above
the level of the individual segment. This includes the division of syllables into onset
2 See Bickerton (2003) and (2007) for a forceful presentation of how many of these intricacies are
often overlooked in discussions of language evolution, especially by non-linguists.  In addition,
Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) present a useful,  evolutionarily oriented, overview of the major
classes of syntactic phenomena.
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and rhyme (with the latter further subdivided into a nucleus and a coda) but also the
grouping of syllables into metrical patterns, and the relationships between the two
levels, such as syllables with heavy rhymes 'wanting' to be associated with heavy
metrical stress (Jackendoff, 2003)3.
Moving beyond purely structural considerations, an even larger range of questions
can  be  discerned,  reflective  of  the  deeply  interdisciplinary  nature  of  language
evolution research, about which work in the ILM has little to say.  Some of these are
physical in nature; for example,  the necessary changes to the brain (e.g.  Deacon,
1997) and to the structure of the vocal tract (e.g. Lieberman, 1968; Fitch,  2002).
Others  are  related  to  aspects  of  cognition,  such  as  the  nature  of  reference  and
meaning in language (Jackendoff, 2002) and its evolution (Hurford, 2007).  Others
still, concern the social environment in which a language-like system might likely
evolve (e.g. Dunbar, 1995). 
ii. Approaches to language evolution
The complexity evident in the language phenotype has lead, quite naturally, to a wide
variety of perspectives not only on how language might have evolved but also on
how best to characterise language itself.  The differences between these perspectives
can be seen, at least in part, as a reflection of the different aspects of the language
phenotype upon which they have been mainly focused.  In this section I will briefly
discuss some of these perspectives, as part of the necessary background for a more
specific comparison of cultural and biological approaches to language evolution.
One  particularly  prominent  view,  primarily  associated  with  the  work  of  Noam
Chomsky  (e.g.  1968,  1988,  2005),  characterises  language  in  extremely  abstract
terms.  The details of this conception have varied over the years.  In earlier forms,
this  view  emphasised  the  role  of  a  Universal  Grammar:  a  set  of  grammatical
principles underlying all languages, whose parameters—the specifics of a particular
3 It should be noted that much of this analysis also applies to sign languages.
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language—were  set  during  developmental  experience  (e.g.  Chomsky,  1968).   In
more recent revisions, the emphasis has shifted to the role played by a small number
of computational routines, such as Merge (e.g. Chomsky, 2005).  What has remained
constant,  however,  is  the  close  identification  of  ‘language’  with  the  complex,
generative,  rule-like  regularities  of  syntax,  with  other  features,  including  various
motor, cognitive and articulatory capabilities, regarded as somewhat peripheral (see
Hauser et al., 2002 for a wider discussion).
While evolutionary considerations have never been central to Chomsky’s own work,
many  others  have  approached  the  topic  of  language  evolution  with  a  similarly
abstract  and  syntactic  conceptualisation  of  language.   For  some,  the  complex,
seemingly  arbitrary,  rule-like  systems  of  syntax  totally  defy  any  attempt  at  an
adaptive evolutionary explanation (e.g. Piattelli-Palmarini, 1989).  How, for example,
might subjacency possibly be  adaptive for our primate ancestors?  How, in other
words, might arbitrary structural rules have any impact on differential reproductive
success?  This is the view of much of the emerging field of biolinguistics (Di Sciullo
& Boeckx, 2011), in which the origins of syntax are sought not in adaptive evolution,
but in its emergence from the fundamental regularities of physics and mathematics
(e.g.  Uriagereka,  1998)4.   Others,  however, have taken the Chomskyian  abstract-
syntactic conception of language and attempted to construct an adaptive account of
its emergence (e.g. Pinker & Bloom, 1990; Pinker, 2003).  On this position, then, the
rule-like regularities of Universal Grammar are encoded in the genome, and have
been gradually accumulated over evolutionary time as part of a much wider complex
adaptation for communication (Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005)5.
The close identification of language with  rule-like syntax central to the approaches
discussed above is  not,  however, universally accepted.   Some, for example,  have
argued that the key innovation in language is not syntactic structure but the crossing
of a 'symbolic threshold6'  (e.g. Deacon, 1997), and that many aspects of syntactic
4 See chapter one, section 1.4.5.2, for further discussion of this perspective.
5 See chapter one, section 1.2.2, for further discussion.
6 That is, the emergence of a system based on symbolic relationships between sign and signified,
rather than indexical or iconic relationships, in the sense of Peirce (1931-1958).
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structure actually fall out of the ‘semiotic constraints’ embodied in such a symbolic
system  (Deacon,  2003a).   Others  have  focused  on  the  cognitive  dimension  of
language, particularly those capacities of social cognition that stand as prerequisites
both  for  its  evolutionary  emergence  (Tomasello,  1999,  2008)  and  its  acquisition
during  development  (Tomasello,  2003).   From  this  perspective,  then,  the  key
innovation  is  not  the  structural  or  semantic  properties  of  language itself,  but  the
cognitive skills that allow us to utilise such a system for communicative purposes.
Others  still  have  taken  a  comparative  approach,  in  which  they  attempt  to  break
language  down  into  a  suite  of  component  traits  and  look  for  parallels  of  those
components in other species (e.g. Fitch, 2005, 2010).  From this perspective, there is
little  reason  to  assume  a  single,  unified  adaptive  account  for  all  aspects  of  the
language phenotype; rather, each component of the wider language faculty may have
had very different origins.
One feature of language not emphasised by any of the perspectives discussed so far,
but  which  is  at  the  core  of  the  ILM  approach,  is  the  fact  that  it  is  culturally
transmitted.  In recent years, a large body of work has emerged that places the fact of
cultural  transmission at  the heart  of understanding many aspects  of the language
phenotype (Kirby, 1999;  Kirby & Hurford,  2002;  Galantucci,  2005;  Kirby et  al.,
2008; Swarup & Gasser, 2009; Theisen et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 2010; Fay et al.,
2010;  Scott-Phillips  & Kirby, 2010;  Roberts  & Gallantuci,  2012;  Verhoef  et  al.,
2014).  On this view, which includes all the work discussed above under the ILM,
many aspects  of  the  language  phenotype  can  be  related  to  facts  about  the  way
language is transmitted between generations of language users.
iii. Cultural and biological accounts
One  dimension  on  which  approaches  to  the  evolution  of  language  differ—a
dimension that is of central importance to the present thesis—concerns the contrast
between those explanations that point primarily to  biological  evolution (e.g. Pinker
& Bloom, 1990), and those explanations that focus on cultural evolution (e.g. Kirby
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et  al.,  2008).   The  question  of  what  primarily  distinguishes  these  two  kinds  of
accounts  is  interesting  in  itself7.   As  a  first  approximation,  however,  biological
accounts posit that aspects of language structure are encoded in the genome, whereas
cultural accounts suggest that structure emerges as a result of language itself adapting
to the circumstances of its transmission.  The general position adopted in this thesis
is  that  cultural  accounts  have  much  to  recommend  them.   However,  biological
accounts  do have one significant  advantage over their  cultural  rivals:  the genetic
mechanism  they  posit  is,  in  evolutionary  terms,  a given.   All  known  life  is
underpinned by genetic  inheritance.   If  the mechanism responsible  for delivering
structured  language consists  solely in  the  encoding of  that  structure  itself  in  the
genome, then we face no further task in terms of accounting for the mechanism itself.
Cultural accounts, on the other hand, suggest that structure emerges as a result of a
particular kind of iterated transmission, in which a communication system is not just
learned but learned  from others.  This mechanism is  not a given.  Indeed the  very
possibility of this mechanism itself requires explanation.  In the absence of such an
explanation,  cultural  accounts  fail  to  offer  a  complete  alternative  to  biological
accounts.  Instead,  they jump in 'half way through',  assuming the possibility of a
mechanism that itself needs explanation, and proceeding from there.  Present cultural
models  of  language  evolution  assume,  in  other  words,  the  existence  of  certain
preconditions.  Once these preconditions are in place, the process of transmission can
deliver structured language as described in the models.  However, cultural accounts
cannot constitute a full alternative to biological accounts until they are paired with an
explanation  of  how such  preconditions  themselves  are  possible.   Those  working
within this framework are clearly aware of this problem (e.g. Smith & Kirby, 2008),
but it still needs to be addressed in a more systematic way.
7 For example, should they be distinguished by whether they invoke natural selection, or by their
appeal to different mechanisms whereby natural selection influences the emergence of structured
language?  I will return to this question towards the end of chapter one.
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II – Self-domestication
If domestication is to play an explanatory role in the human case, it is necessary to
get clear about what 'self-domestication' might mean.  However, this clarity is often
absent  in  many  discussions  that  invoke  the  concept  of  self-domestication.   For
example, consider the following quotation, from (Deacon, 2009: 750):
We are in many ways a self-domesticated species.  Would it  be too humbling to see
ourselves as a somewhat genetically degenerate, neurologically dedifferentiated ape?
Despite suggesting that humans are a self-domesticated species, Deacon provides no
clear account of what this claim might mean.  This is problematic for two major
reasons.   Firstly,  one  could  be  forgiven  for  thinking  that  the  notion  of  self-
domestication  is  inherently  nonsensical.   After  all,  doesn't  domestication
definitionally require a domesticator?  Isn't it, in other words, something done by one
species  to  another species?  If so, who is 'doing it' to humans?  The question here,
then, is whether the concept of self-domestication is one that can be talked about
with any coherence at all.
Secondly, even if we assume that self-domestication is a coherent concept, we are
still left with the question of  how such a process could possibility have occurred.
Domestication  is  often  seen  as  the  outcome  of  artificial  selection  and  selective
breeding.   Yet  who  or  what  has  been  selectively  breeding  human  beings?   One
possibility, is that humans have been practising something akin to selective breeding
on themselves.  Another is that domestication is a much more complicated and multi-
faceted process than its equation with selective breeding would have us believe.  We
need  also,  then,  to  get  clear  about  what  'domestication'  itself  means  and  how it
works.
In the quotation above, Deacon likens domestication to a form of  'degeneracy'.  As
we  shall  see,  there  is  much  to  recommend  this  view, with  many  of  the  typical
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outcomes  of  domestication  reflecting  the  breakdown  of  previously  adaptive
structures and behaviours under conditions of relaxed selection.  However, it  will
also become apparent that this only forms a partial account of how domestication
functions.
Consider, also, the following quotation from Hare and Tomasello (2005: 443):
...one might seriously entertain the hypothesis that an important first step in the evolution
of  modern  human  societies  was  a  kind  of  self-domestication  (selection  on  systems
controlling emotional reactivity) in which a human-like temperament was selected...
Again,  while Hare and Tomasello talk about 'self-domestication'  in general terms,
they  don't  address  in  any  detail  the  question  of  how this  could  possibly  have
occurred.  Where Deacon related it to degeneracy, Hare and Tomasello seem to relate
domestication to changes in systems governing emotional reactivity.  This, too, is a
view that has much to recommend it, as we shall see, particularly in chapter three.
However, once again, there is reason to think that selection on emotional reactivity is
also an insufficient characterisation of domestication,  at  least  when considered in
isolation.
One  further  question  that  arises  in  connection  with  both  the  quotations  above,
concerns the degree to which 'self-domestication' should be understood literally or
figuratively.  Should it be seen as a metaphor, as a concept that is useful tool for
thinking about human evolution?  Or, should it be seen much more literally, as a
description  of  human  evolution?   In  other  words,  are  there  merely  some useful
parallels  to  be  drawn,  or  does  it  make  sense  to  say  that  humans  are  actually
domesticated in much the same way as cows, pigs, and dogs?  At the very least, it
would be useful to have some criteria by which this decision could be made.
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III – Self-domestication and language evolution
Despite their lack of clarity about how it might occur, both Deacon (2009) and Hare
and Tomasello (2005) explicitly link their  discussion of  self-domestication to  the
evolution  of  language.   For  Deacon,  the  key link  concerns  the  breakdown—the
degeneration—of  previously  constraining  communicative  biases.   Deacon  argues
that the emergence of a complex, learned system of communication like language
first requires the breakdown of biases that had previously prevented learning from
having an influence on the communication system.  For Hare and Tomasello, the key
link is between selection on temperament and the emergence of a range of skills of
social  cognition.   These  cognitive  skills,  largely  centred  on  the  capacity  and
motivation to  engage in  co-operative,  joint-attentional  activities,  are  seen as  vital
because  linguistic  communication  is  itself  just  such  an  activity,  involving  the
recognition  of  communicative  intent  and  the  inference  of  meaning  against  the
backdrop of mutually shared knowledge (see chapter one 1.4.3 and 1.4.5).
Each of these perspectives captures something important.  It is clear, for example,
that language is learned.   It is also clear that linguistic communication is a process of
co-operative inference.  What is less clear, however, is how these two perspectives
might link to the emergence of language itself.  How they might link, that is, to the
emergence  of  the  highly structured  system of  signal-meaning  associations  which
constitute language.  The aim of this thesis is to explore the possibility that the ILM
provides  just  such  a  link.   Or,  to  re-frame  the  point  more  clearly,  that  the  two
consequences  of  self-domestication  identified  by  the  authors  quoted  above—an
increased role for learning and the emergence of key socio-cognitive skills—together
form the preconditions for a structured language to emerge via the process described
by the ILM.
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IV – Chapter plan
In chapter one I present a critical examination of the ILM, in an attempt to get clear
about how it functions to produce a structured language.  Based on this examination,
I then consider the preconditions it would require to function in that manner.  Two
preconditions  are  identified:  the  importance  of  traditional  transmission and  the
sensitivity to communicative intent.
In chapter two I present a detailed account of how the first of these preconditions—
an  increased  role  for  traditional  transmission—appeared  in  the  Bengalese  finch
following domestication.  
In chapter three I discuss the emergence of the second precondition—a sensitivity
to communicative intent—in the domestic dog.  In both cases I examine what it is
about domestication that brought about these specific preconditions.
In chapter four I consider the general coherence of the claim that humans are a self-
domesticated species.  This involves an examination of the evolutionary processes
and typical outcomes associated with domestication, together with a review of the
concept of domestication itself.  
In chapter five I try to make the concept of self-domestication more concrete.  This
involves  the  critical  examination  of  three  different  accounts  of  how  self-
domestication might actually have occurred.
Finally, in  chapter six I provide a summary and discussion of the argument as a
whole,  together  with  an  exploration  of  some  possible  wider  implications,  some
potential criticisms, and some ideas for future work.
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Chapter 1
The Iterated Learning Model and its Preconditions
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the possibility that the preconditions for a
cultural  account  of  language structure  may have  emerged in  the  context  of  self-
domestication.   In  order  to  do  this,  however,  it  is  first  necessary to  get  a  clear
understanding of what those preconditions might be.  In this first chapter, I present a
detailed examination of one prominent cultural account of language structure, the
Iterated Learning Model (ILM).  This examination will have two main aims.   The
first  is  to  explore how the  ILM account  of  language structure works.   This  will
require a clear understanding of the internal dynamics of the iterated cultural process
itself.  The second is to pinpoint the preconditions required for it to work in that
manner.  This will require situating the cultural process as a whole in a much wider
evolutionary context.  In order to fulfil these aims, however, it will be useful first to
situate the ILM against the backdrop of some issues to which it can be seen as a
response.
1.1 – Formalism, functionalism and the ILM
Historically, the question of language structure has been approached from two major
perspectives,  which,  broadly  speaking,  can  be  labelled  as  formalism  and
functionalism (Newmeyer, 1991; Hawkins, 1988; Jackendoff, 2002).  The formalist
approach,  most  closely  associated  with  the  work  of  Noam Chomsky (e.g.  1968,
1988),  views  linguistic  structure  as  reflecting  a  set  of  autonomous  syntactic
primitives, collectively referred to as Universal Grammar (UG) (Newmeyer, 1991).
From this perspective, language has the structure it does because language learners
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come to the task of language acquisition with this  set of primitives.  In contrast,
functionalist  approaches relate language structure to language use.   Functionalists
view language structure as a reflection both of its communicative function and the
processing, memory and general cognitive constraints of language users (Hawkins,
1990, 1999).
As we shall see, the ILM can be seen as a species of functionalism.  Nevertheless, it
is clearly distinguished from previous functionalist perspectives in terms of stressing
the  explanatory  importance  of  cultural  transmission in  accounting  for  linguistic
structure (e.g. Kirby, 1999; Kirby & Hurford, 2002).  Central to this approach is the
concept of iterated learning, which has been described as:
...a process in which an individual acquires a behaviour by observing a similar behaviour
in  another individual who acquired it in the same way 
(Kirby et al., 2008: 10681).
The ILM is an attempt to model this process.  In particular, to examine how the
nature  of  individual  learners  interacts  with  the  circumstances  of  cultural
transmission, and the population-level results of that interaction.  As noted in the
introduction,  work  within  the  ILM  paradigm has  examined  a  range  of  different
linguistic  phenomena.   However,  the  property  of  language  that  has  been  most
thoroughly explored using the ILM is  compositionality (e.g. Kirby, 2002; Kirby et
al., 2008).  A language can be described as compositional when:
...the meaning of a signal is a function of the meaning of its parts and the way in which
they are combined 
(Brighton et al., 2005: 222).
I shall discuss the nature of compositional structure and the ILM account of how
such structure might have emerged in greater detail below.  For now, however, it
should be noted that the ILM can be seen as something of a reaction to a problematic
aspect of many previous functionalist (and indeed formalist) accounts of language
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structure, the problem of linkage.
1.2 – Biological accounts and the linkage problem
1.2.1 – The linkage problem
One of  the  early  motivations  behind  work  on  the  ILM was  the  insight  that  the
existing explanations of language structure,  formalist  and functionalist  alike,  both
shared a common defect, which has been described as the problem of linkage (Kirby,
1999).   Various  discussions  of  the  linkage  problem have  seemingly  emphasised
different factors, with some focusing on the link between form and function (e.g.
Kirby, 1999) and others on the explanatory link between data sets (e.g. Kirby et al.,
2004).  This difference in emphasis reflects the fact that the problem actually occurs
in two forms, which we might call the special and the general problems of linkage,
respectively.
The  special problem of  linkage  concerns  the  close  fit  shown by some language
universals between their  form and their  function—that they  appear to be designed
with particular functions in mind, in ways that are adaptive for the language user
(Kirby,  1999).   More  broadly,  Hurford  (2002)  has  argued  that  many  aspects  of
language—from phonology to syntax—exhibit complex properties that make them
well suited to the function of communication.  In addressing this problem, formalist
and  functionalist  approaches  reveal  complementary  weaknesses.   The  formalist
approach has an account of how universals emerge—as a reflection of the shared set
of syntactic primitives—but fails to provide any account of why any such universal
should so neatly dovetail  with function.   The functionalist  approach, by contrast,
explicitly relates language universals to function, but fails to explain how—fails to
provide a mechanism—whereby a functional constraint might come to be embodied
in a linguistic universal (Kirby, 1999).
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The  general problem of linkage concerns the question of how one set of data can
serve as explanatory for another: put simply, is it sufficient to explain data set A by
pointing to data set B?  In its functionalist form this involves pointing to the context
of use, processing constraints and other factors and citing them as explanatory of
linguistic structure.   In its  formalist  guise it  involves pointing to the autonomous
syntactic primitives and citing those as explanatory of linguistic structure.  As Kirby
et al. (2004) observe, however, both approaches do exactly the same thing: point to
some feature of individuals—whether that be facts about processing and use or an
autonomous Universal Grammar—and then declare that feature to be an explanation
for an aspect of language structure.  This is problematic because facts about language
structure  are  abstract  generalisations  over  data;  whereas  facts  about  processing
constraints or innate autonomous syntax concern aspects of individual psychology.
Neither the functionalist nor formalist approach provides a mechanism connecting
these two data sets.
It should be clear, then, that the special problem is a subset of the general problem.
To solve the general problem we only need to find a mechanism which relates facts
about  A (aspects of individual cognition) to facts about  B (language structure).  To
solve  the  special  problem we  also  need  to  show  why this  particular  mechanism
should produce language structure (B)  that  was  adaptive from the perspective of
language users (A).  These two tasks, while related, are distinct.  To be successful,
therefore,  explanations  of  linguistic  structure  need  to  address  both forms  of  the
linkage problem.  I shall return to this point repeatedly below.
1.2.2 – Natural selection and the linkage problem
The  issues  raised  by  both  forms  of  the  linkage  problem  are  not  restricted  to
linguistics.   Similar  questions  are  also  important  in  evolutionary  biology.   In
biological  terms,  the  special  problem concerns  how to  explain  the  emergence  of
adaptive complexity—the close fit of form to function, or the appearance of design—
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in  many  of  the  structural  and  behavioural  traits  of  organisms.   The  accepted
explanation for this in biology is natural selection.  The general problem, in contrast,
concerns how we might account for the presently observed pattern of relationships
between organisms (data set A) and the environment (data set B).  Natural selection is
part of the explanation here, too, but any full account of this pattern needs to factor in
other  processes  like  genetic  drift,  and  historical  contingencies  such  as  mass
extinction events (Gould, 1996, 2002; Jablonski, 2005).
It  is  perhaps  not  surprising,  then,  that  some  might  be  tempted  to  draw  on  the
resources  of  evolutionary  biology  in  order  to  address  the  linkage  problems  in
linguistics.  Or, more precisely, that some might identify those linkage problems as
the  same.  The now classic statement of this view was put forward by Pinker and
Bloom (1990), who attempted to bring together the formalist account of autonomous
syntax with the synthetic theory of evolution.  Looked at from the perspective of the
two linkage problems, Pinker and Bloom's proposal is not entirely successful, but its
pattern of success and failure will be instructive when we come to discuss the ILM.
Pinker  and  Bloom  argued  that  language,  too,  exhibits  adaptive  complexity,  the
appearance of design.  They then went on to observe that only three explanations for
the appearance of design have ever been proposed: (i) an extremely unlikely chance
event;  (ii)  the  existence  of  an  actual  designer;  and  (iii)  the  process  of  natural
selection.   Leaving  the  first  two  options  to  the  gambler  and  the  theologian,
respectively, Pinker and Bloom concluded that the adaptive complexity of language
was good evidence that it was the product of natural selection.  
In addition, however, Pinker and Bloom also identified the evolutionary function that
they  believed  this  adaptive  complexity  to  be  fulfilling.   Language,  they  argued,
represents  a  cognitive  adaptation  for  communication,  in  particular  the
communication of propositional utterances through a serial channel.  In identifying
this  function,  Pinker  and  Bloom  tacitly  adopted  the  code  model of  linguistic
communication.  As we shall see (1.4.5.3), taking this of this view of communication
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has  serious  consequences  for  our  thinking  about  language  evolution.   For  now,
however, it  is  enough to note that in identifying code-like communication as the
relevant evolutionary function, Pinker and Bloom also had to adopt a particular view
about  what was  being  selected.   This  view  is  well  illustrated  by  the  following
quotation:    
Every detail of grammatical competence that we wish to ascribe to selection must have
conferred a reproductive advantage on its speakers, and this advantage must  be large
enough to have become fixed in the ancestral population (Pinker & Bloom, 1990: 721,
my emphasis).
As this quotation makes clear, Pinker and Bloom were arguing that the specifics of
language structure—the “detail[s] of grammatical competence”—must themselves be
under selection.  This follows from the adoption of the code model, because code-
like communication is heavily dependent on all  involved sharing the same set of
encodings (Origgi & Sperber, 2000;  1.4.5.3),  making it natural to assume that an
evolved  system  of  coded  communication  would  require  selection  to  act  on  the
production and maintenance of the code itself.
Pinker and Bloom's argument, then, can be summarised in the following three points:
(1) Language exhibits adaptive complexity, the appearance of design in order to
fulfil  some function.   Therefore language structure is  the result  of natural
selection,  the  only natural  process  able  to  account  for  that  appearance  of
design.
(2) The function in question is the “communication of propositional structures
over a serial channel” (p. 712).
(3) The  specific  details of  language  structure  have  themselves  been  under
selection and are encoded in the genome.
In point (1) they identify the  fact of adaptive complexity, and thus invoke natural
selection.  In point (2) they pinpoint the exact function that complexity is adapted to
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perform, propositional communication over a serial channel.  Finally, in point (3)
they identify  what  was under  selection:  variation encoding the specific  details  of
language structure.  There are, then, multiple ways in which Pinker and Bloom might
be wrong.  
Regarding point (1), they might be wrong that language exhibits adaptive complexity
at all, although this would seem a hard argument to make.  Alternatively, they might
be right about that adaptive complexity, but wrong to invoke natural selection in
order to explain it.  To argue in this vein would require proposing an alternative to
natural selection as a solution for the special problem of linkage.  Regarding point
(2),  they  might  have  incorrectly  identified  the  relevant  function.   This
misidentification  might  be  total,  such  that  communication  was  not  the  relevant
function at all (e.g. Bickerton, 1990).  Such claims are, however, unconvincing on a
number of grounds (Hurford, 2002, 2007).  Alternatively, they might be correct in
pointing to communication, but wrong to characterise that communication in terms
of the serial transfer of propositional utterances (Sperber, 1990; Scott-Phillips, 2010).
Finally,  as  point  (3)  follows  closely from point  (2),  if  they were  found to  have
misidentified the function,  they would likely be wrong regarding what was being
selected.   
So how does  Pinker  and Bloom's  proposal  fare  as  a  solution  to  the  two linkage
problems?   Regarding  the  special  problem they do  rather  well.   By linking  the
formalist syntactic primitives to the theory of evolution by natural selection, they
provided  a  principled  explanation  of  why  formalist  syntactic  primitives  should
exhibit  the  appearance  of  design.   Regarding  the  general  problem,  Pinker  and
Bloom's position essentially represents a denial of its existence.  For them, language
is a cognitive trait underpinned by a genetically encoded UG.  The languages we see
in  the  world  are  merely  a  reflection  of  this  evolutionary  adaptation  for
communication.   Although  they  do  not  say  so  explicitly,  Pinker  and  Bloom's
argument  entails  the  assumption  of  an  isomorphism between  the  properties  of
individuals (UG) and the pattern of languages we see in the world.
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On Pinker and Bloom's own terms, this position is entirely coherent: if language is a
biologically evolved trait of the type they suggest, then this isomorphism is what we
should expect.  However, this position has two further implications.  The first is that
it should be possible to 'read off' the properties of language(s) from the properties of
individuals.  The second is that there should be a large range of strong universals
across the world's languages, as the UG which they reflect is an adaptation shared by
the  whole  human  species.   Both  these  implications  can  be  increasingly  seen  as
problematic.  The direct link between cognition and language has been called into
question  by  recent  work  showing  that  cultural  transmission—which  is
uncontroversially  how  languages  are  passed  on—can  have  a  strong  mediating
influence on the resulting language structure (Smith & Kirby, 2008; Smith, 2010).  In
addition, the very existence of the kind of universals that would be expected under
Pinker and Bloom's analysis is being called into question (e.g. Evans & Levinson,
2009;  Dunn  et  al.,  2011).   As  a  result,  Pinker  and  Bloom's  assumption  of
isomorphism,  and  thus  denial  of  the  general  problem  of  linkage,  has  become
increasingly difficult to accept.  
It is useful to note that what works about Pinker and Bloom's proposal derives from
their point (1): by appealing to natural selection they are able to provide a principled
account of why form and function should match, thus solving the special problem.
By contrast, what doesn't work derives from their points (2) and (3): the emerging
picture of what language is appears inconsistent with it being the kind of adaptation
envisaged by Pinker and Bloom.
In sections  1.3  and  1.4 I  will  undertake detailed examination of the ILM and its
necessary preconditions.  One outcome of that discussion will be to totally reject
Pinker and Bloom's point (3): the specific details of language structure do not need to
be encoded in the genome because they emerge as a result of language adapting to
the circumstances of its transmission.  It will also be argued that in point (2) they
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mischaracterised the nature of linguistic communication, and therefore misidentified
the  relevant  evolutionary function  of  language.   Point  (1),  however, will  emerge
supported:  natural selection does indeed play an important  role in  accounting for
language structure, although not at all in the way Pinker and Bloom envisaged.  In
short,  while they were right to invoke natural selection, they mischaracterised the
function of language to which it related, and as a result were wrong about what was
being selected.  
Before turning to the ILM, however, it will help us to consider one more background
issue, which will serve a vital role in getting clear where Pinker and Bloom went
wrong.
1.2.3 – Extra-biological regularities in evolution
One important characteristic of Pinker and Bloom's point (3) is its focus on natural
selection acting to encode the specific details of a trait—language structure—into the
genome.  There is no reason, however, to assume that natural selection must always
operate in this way.  This is particularly true where evolution is able to exploit the
extra-biological  regularities  of  other  systems,  such  as  the  laws  of  physics  or
mathematics  (Kauffman,  1993;  Goodwin,  1994;  Stewart,  1998).   Consider  the
following example.  Stewart (1998) describes the embryological development of the
frog, which exploits physical regularities relating to symmetry and shape.  Briefly, by
the blastula stage the developing embryo is a symmetrical, spherical mass of about
one thousand cells.  During the next stage of development—stomach formation or
gastrulation—one area of the surface collapses in on itself, and breaks the symmetry
of the thus-far symmetrical embryo.  What Stewart highlights, however, is that the
manner in which this symmetry breaks need not be genetically encoded, because it is
the same way that the symmetry of all spherical objects—ping pong balls as well as
frog  embryos—tends  to  break  when  subjected  to  certain  pressures.   Frog
embryological development simply exploits this pre-existing regularity.
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It is worth comparing Stewart's account with one cast in the mould of Pinker and
Bloom's view of language.  This alternative would first cite the adaptive complexity
of  the  symmetry breaking as  evidence  that  it  arose  through natural  selection.   It
would then go on to argue that the specific details of how the symmetry breaks must
itself be encoded in the genome.  It should be clear that this second point need not
necessarily follow from the first.  In other words, even with something as delicate
and vital as early embryological development there is not necessarily a warrant to
assume  that  every  feature  of  the  process  is  encoded  in  the  genome.   Crucially,
however, this does not imply that natural selection has nothing to do with the process
of  symmetry breaking.   The manner  in  which  the  symmetry breaks  need not  be
genetically encoded, because it arises from a system of extra-biological regularities;
but it is the result of natural selection, because what has been selected is the capacity
to exploit those regularities.
This last point is well illustrated by the mechanics of human bipedal locomotion.
The raising of the leg in the up-step requires a system of muscular and neural control
that has clearly been honed by natural selection.  In contrast, the down-step simply
exploits the extra-biological regularity of gravity (McGeer, 1990).  Indeed, once the
forward motion of walking has been established the interplay between two physical
factors—the potential energy of gravity and the kinetic energy of forward motion—
results in less additional energy being required for each successive step (Capaday,
2002).   Bipedal  locomotion  exploits,  therefore,  a  range  of  extra-biological
regularities.   However, the  gravity-exploiting down-step is  as  much a product  of
natural selection as the bodily-powered up-step, because selection has put in place a
system capable of exploiting this gravitational regularity.
Frog  embryology,  bipedal  locomotion  and  language  structure  are  clearly  very
different cases, but the insights from the first two might well illuminate the third.  In
particular, and to anticipate somewhat the later discussion, if the ILM were to be seen
as describing and exploring a system of extra-biological, informational regularities—
potentially  exploitable  by natural  selection—then  this  might  provide  grounds  for
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questioning  Pinker  and  Bloom's  point  (3).   Rather  than  acting  directly  on  the
specifics of language structure, natural selection could instead have put in place the
capacity to exploit those informational regularities.
1.3 – Cultural accounts and the linkage problem
The last section examined the strengths and weaknesses of one prominent biological
account of language structure, particularly as regards its success in addressing the
two problems of linkage.  In this section I will ask much the same questions of the
ILM approach to language structure,  with a view to getting clear about how this
particular cultural account actually works.  We can then begin to ask what kind of
preconditions might be required for an account of this kind to be possible in the first
place.
To really uncover how the ILM operates, it is necessary to ask the following two
questions, each of which represents one of the two linkage problems cast in terms
specifically for the ILM.
1. What are the processes and pressures involved in the ILM account of language
structure?
This first question requires an examination of how the ILM works internally.  In
particular, it requires an account of how the balance between various pressures on the
language can cause structure to emerge through an iterated cultural process.  This
question is a form of the general problem of linkage, because it concerns the details
of the mechanism linking facts about learners (data set  A) to facts about languages
(data set  B).  Many discussions of the ILM (e.g. Kirby et al., 2008), concerned as
they are with the internal details of the cultural system, remain firmly focused on this
first question.  For the purposes of this thesis, however, the answer to this question,
whatever it might be, immediately raises a second one.
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2. Why does the ILM involve  those particular processes and pressures and not
other ones?
This question concerns the  origin of the pressures identified in answer to the first
question.  If language structure is the result of language itself adapting to certain
pressures, then we are owed an account of why it is those pressures in particular to
which language has to adapt.   This is particularly pressing if  the outcome of the
process  is  also  adaptive  from the  perspective  of  language  users.   As  such,  this
represents a particular instance of the special problem of linkage.  If the mechanism
linking A and B also produces an outcome that is adaptive for A, what is it about that
mechanism that explains this, and how did it get there?  
In the following sections, these two questions will be addressed through a critical
comparison  of  two  instantiations  of  the  ILM,  one  computational  and  one
experimental.
1.3.1 – Iterated learning I: simulations
Most  of  the  early  work  in  the  iterated  learning  paradigm  took  the  form  of
computational  work  with  simulated  agents  (e.g.  Kirby,  1999;  Kirby  &  Hurford,
2002).   The  main  focus  was  to  tease  apart  the  subtle  relationships  between  the
circumstances of cultural transmission, the biases of individual learners, and a range
of other factors that might influence the resulting linguistic structure.   This work had
two major findings, both of which are well illustrated by Brighton et al., (2005), on
which the rest of this section is primarily based.
The first finding concerns the importance of a transmission bottleneck, in which each
individual learner is only exposed to a subset of the possible utterances in a language.
This  mirrors  the  situation  in  natural  languages,  in  which  a  system  capable  of
expressing an infinite number of meanings has to be acquired on the basis of a finite
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number  of  utterances.   The  importance  of  the  bottleneck  lies  in  the  pressure  it
generates on the learner to be able to generalise from the subset of utterances to
which they are exposed to  the full  set  of all  possible  utterances.   The following
simple examples illustrate the nature of compositional structure and show why that
structure is such a good solution to the pressure to generalise.
{1, 1}, DeeLoo;  {1, 2}, DeeMoo;  {2, 1}, DooLoo;  {2, 2}, DooMoo
The simple language above is fully compositional, and consists of meanings (1 and
2)  and  signals  (Dee, Doo, Loo  and  Moo).   Notice  how  an  initial  1 is  always
associated with the signal Dee, while a final 2 is always associated with signal Moo,
etc.  The meaning of the signal  DeeMoo is, then, a function of the meaning of the
signal Dee (initial 1) and the meaning of the signal Moo (final 2).  Given this pattern,
a language learner does not need to be explicitly exposed to the signal for  {1, 2},
DeeMoo, in order to realise that it should begin with Dee and end with Moo, as this
could be generalised from an exposure to the signals for  {1, 1}  DeeLoo and {2, 2}
DooMoo.  It is this property of generalisability that makes compositional languages
such an effective solution to the problem of the bottleneck.
In contrast, this second simple language is holistic:
{1, 1}, FooTaa;  {1, 2}, BeeZuu;  {2, 1}, HooPaa;  {2, 2}, ViiDaa
Each meaning is represented by its own unique signal.  The structure of those signals
bears no relation to the structure of the meanings with which they are associated: for
example, it is clearly impossible to generalise in any way at all from the signal for
{1, 1} to the signal for {1, 2}, even though both meanings have a  1 in the initial
position.  To learn this holistic language it would be necessary to be exposed to every
single item.
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The  first  finding,  then,  is  that  once  there  is  a  bottleneck  on  transmission,  any
language which cannot be successfully reconstructed from a subset will simply not
be transmitted.  In other words, what changes in these simulations is not the agents'
genomes—perhaps  by  encoding  an  ever  more  compositional  language  as  the
simulation  proceeds—but  the  language itself.   The  language becomes  structured,
therefore,  simply  as  a  result  of  responding  to  this  pressure  to  pass  through  the
transmission bottleneck, thereby turning the Chomskyian notion of the 'poverty of
the  stimulus'  on  its  head (Zuidema,  2003).   This  first  pressure can  be  described
variously as a pressure to be generalisable (from the subset to the whole), a pressure
to be  compressible (with the structure of the whole describable by a subset) or the
pressure to be learnable (such that the whole can be acquired simply by acquiring the
subset).
Of  course,  this  kind  of  generalisability  is  only  an  advantage  for  compositional
languages if language learners are actually capable of generalising.  This point leads
neatly into the second finding of the computational ILM studies, which relates to the
kinds  of  biases  required  of  individual  learners  in  order  for  compositionality  to
emerge.  The biases explored by Brighton et al. are a subset of those examined by
Smith (2002; 2004), with regard to agents' ability to learn, maintain or construct an
'optimal' (by which Smith means unambiguous) communication system.  However,
the simulations reported in Brighton et al. extend this work to explore the interaction
between these learning biases and the presence of a bottleneck on transmission.
The  first  bias  relates  to  a  preference  for  componential  analysis  over  atomistic
analysis, without which the agents are incapable of generalisation at all.  However, as
Brighton et al. show, the emergence of compositional structure also depends on two
further biases.  The first of these is a bias against many-to-one mappings of signals to
meanings,  without which even a perfectly compositional system is  always at  risk
from being corrupted through the introduction of noise (Brighton et al., 2005).  The
second  is  a  bias  against  one-to-many  mappings  between  signals  and  meanings.
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Agents without this  bias are  actually unable to learn a system of signal-meaning
mappings in the first place (Smith, 2002; 2004).  The cumulative effect of these three
biases is a bias in favour of one-to-one mappings.
These biases constitute the second pressure in the system.  They play an extremely
important  role,   because  it  is  the  interplay of  the  bottleneck and the  biases  that
produces a language with a high degree of communicative accuracy8 (Brighton et al.,
2005).  In other words, the resulting language is not only compressible, and therefore
easy  to  learn,  but  is  also  highly  expressive,  allowing  the  unambiguous
communication of its associated meanings.  What makes this particularly interesting
is that there is no communicative dimension to these simulations and no selection for
communicatively  successful  agents.   In  other  words,  by  adapting  in  ways  that
benefited  itself—that  enabled  its  continuing  transmission—the  language  also
changed, quite inadvertently, in such a way that also benefited  language users, by
becoming structured in a way that facilitated communication.  For Brighton et al.
(2005: 202, my emphasis), this suggests a fairly radical interpretation:
...our explanation for linguistic structure also offers an explanation for linguistic function
—the model results presented here suggest that the prerequisites for compositionality
also  deliver  communicative  function  as  a  side-effect,  without  the  necessity  for  any
explicit pressure for communication.  
To understand the alternative account provided by Brighton et al., it is necessary to
review the answers they provide to the two questions posed above, and thereby to the
two  linkage  problems  outlined  in  section  1.2.1.   In  terms  of  the  first  question,
concerning the processes and pressures in the ILM, Brighton et al.'s findings suggests
that the major dynamic at work is between the pressure to become compressible—in
order to be successfully transmitted through a bottleneck—and the pressure to be
unambiguous, or  expressive, which arises as a consequence of the agents having a
bias  for one-to-one mappings.   Compositionality emerges as a result  of language
8 As defined  in terms of the probability, over all encounters, of a signal produced by one agent
being interpreted by a second agent in the way intended by the first.
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having to adapt to these two pressures in order to be successfully transmitted.  The
interplay  between  these  two  pressures  begins,  then,  to  supply  the  details  of  a
mechanism linking facts about individuals (data set A) to facts about language (data
set  B).  In doing so, it provides a clear answer to the general problem of linkage,
something Pinker and Bloom conspicuously failed to do.
The picture becomes more complicated,  however, when we begin to consider the
second  question,  concerning  the  origin  of  these  pressures.   Why  it  is  that  the
language finds itself having to adapt to these pressures rather than other ones?  The
first  step  in  answering  this  question  is  to  note  that  there  is  one  very  important
difference between the two pressures.  The pressure to be compressible is actually a
kind  of  informational  regularity.   General  models  of  cultural  transmission  (e.g.
Brighton, 2003; Brighton et al., 2005) suggest that this pressure will, if unchecked by
any other pressures, result in culturally transmitted systems becoming increasingly
simplified and compressed.  As a result, and this will be of great importance later,
cultural transmission is an inherently structure-producing process.  The pressure for
compressibility is, then,  inherent  to the process of cultural transmission9.  As such,
the fact that culturally transmitted languages face a pressure to compress needs no
further explanation.
9 There are two possible ways in which this claim might be read.  The first, emphasised here and in
this thesis more generally, focuses on the role of a bottleneck, and thereby on the cognitive and
temporal limitations of learners.  Languages that fail to adapt to those limitations, by becoming
more structured and thus easier to learn, simply do not get passed on.   The second focuses on the
finding that repeated instances of transmission can serve to amplify the effects of weak biases
(Smith & Kirby, 2008; Reali & Griffiths, 2009).  In this view, each learner comes to the language-
learning  task  with  a  weak  bias  in  favour  of  structure.   The  cumulative  effect  of  repeated
transmission  between  multiple  generations  of  weakly  biased  learners,  is  that  the  language
becomes much more structured than might be expected from the strength of the bias of any given
learner.  There are two reasons why the choice between these options is not crucial in the present
context.  Firstly, in any real case both these factors are likely in operation.  There are, as far as we
know, no omniscient learners, so for large systems such as language all learners likely face some
kind of bottleneck.  Furthermore, some kind of structure-assuming bias is likely necessary for
learners to be able to make any kind of inductive inferences at all (Mitchell, 1980).  Such biases
simply represent the condition of being an inductively capable learner.  Secondly, even if the two
options could be entirely divorced, the role played by cultural transmission is essentially the same
in each.  In both cases it serves to amplify the effects of some aspect of individual learners—
whether  that  be  their  cognitive  limitations,  or  biases  that  are  required  simply to  function  as
learners—such that the learned material becomes progressively more structured over time.  It is
for this reason that cultural transmission can be described as inherently structure-creating.           
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In contrast, the pressure to be expressive is not inherent to cultural transmission, it is
contingent, and therefore stands in much greater need of explanation.  To account for
the expressivity pressure, we need to identify a factor external to the cultural system
that can 'check' its inherent tendency to compress (Kirby, 2012).  In this case, that
factor is the pre-existing learning biases of the agents.  Here, then, is Brighton et al.'s
answer to the special problem of linkage.  Their mechanism produces languages that
are  adaptive  for  language  users because,  in  addition  to  the  need  to  compress,
transmitted languages also find themselves having to adapt to a set of pre-existing
biases, favouring one-to-one mappings.  The language still takes on a simpler, more
compressible structure, as would be expected given cultural transmission, but it does
so in such a way so as to remain unambiguous and thus, as a side-effect, adaptive for
communicating agents.
For Brighton et al., then, the special problem of linkage is solved through a fortuitous
side-effect  of  some  pre-existing  cognitive  bias.   To  some,  this  will  seem  less
satisfying than the answer provided by Pinker and Bloom.  The power of natural
selection  as  an  answer  to  the  special  problem of  linkage  lies  in  its  providing  a
principled account not only of how such form-function matches might occur but also
why we should expect  them to occur.  This latter component is missing from the
account just discussed.  Nevertheless, the modelling work suggests that this account
is plausible: the bottlenecked transmission of a system of signal-meaning pairs, in a
population already biased, for whatever reason, towards one-to-one mappings, could
produce  a  compositional,  communicatively  adaptive  language.   In  terms  of
accounting for the origin of the pressure for expressivity, this might be termed the
pre-existing bias explanation.
Of course, this invocation of a pre-existing bias has lead some to wonder where the
bias itself might have originated.  One suggestion, put forward by Smith (2004), was
that  the  presumption  in  favour  of  a  one-to-one  mapping  between  meanings  and
signals originates in aspects of theory of mind, and in particular the understanding of
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communicative acts that it allows.  In exploring this idea, Smith observes that:
Armed with such an understanding, children should expect language to exhibit a one-to-
one mapping between meanings and signals, and this indeed appears to be their initial
expectation.  In  other  words,  the  human  vocabulary  acquisition  bias  may  not  have
evolved specifically and exclusively for the acquisition of communicatively functional
vocabulary, but  rather be  a consequence of a more general cognitive capacity which
evolved due to a raft of benefits it provided, including perhaps communication. 
(p. 141, my emphasis)
As we shall see, Smith may well have been on to something quite significant here.  It
will  not,  however,  be  possible  to  appreciate  the  true  significance  of  Smith's
observation until later in the chapter.
1.3.2 – Iterated learning II: experiments
Computational  simulations  provide  an  extremely flexible  way to  examine all  the
different combinations of learner biases and transmission bottlenecks, and as such
have made a valuable contribution to the development of the ILM.  However, there
remains one major concern about the validity of such work:
...skepticism remains as to how well computational models of learning match the abilities
and biases of real humans. 
(Kirby et al., 2008: 10681)
Confronting  this  challenge  directly,  Kirby  et  al.  outline  a  framework  for
implementing the ILM with human participants rather than simulated agents.  The
results of this work represent an important confirmation, extension and clarification
of the previous computational studies.  Most revealing, however, are the differences
between the two sets of findings.  To get a clear picture of how the ILM explanation
for  compositionality actually works—and thus  to  be  in  a  position  to  pinpoint  its
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necessary  preconditions—it  is  important  to  reconcile  the  computational  and
experimental results.
Kirby et al. implemented a transmission-chain design in which the input for each link
of the chain consisted of the output of the last link, thereby implementing the central
logic of the modelling work.   The input of each link (participant)  consisted of a
3x3x3 meaning-space of shape (square, circle, triangle), movement (straight line, zig-
zag, circular motion) and  colour (grey, blue, red), and an (initially random) set of
signals distributed across that meaning space.  So, for example, a red square moving
in a straight line might be represented by the string kihemiwi, with each of the other
27 possible combinations of meaning being represented by a similarly random string
of syllables.
The procedure for each participant was divided into two sections, a training phase
and a testing phase.  In the training phase, the language (the set of 27 picture-syllable
string pairs) was split into roughly equal sets of  seen  and  unseen items, with the
participant only being trained on the seen set.  In the testing phase, participants were
presented with a  picture  and asked to  produce the  syllable  string for  that  shape;
crucially, participants were tested on pictures from both the  seen and  unseen sets.
For the first participant this procedure was carried out with the original, randomly
generated set of strings paired with the meanings.  However, subsequent participants
were trained using the final output of the previous participant's testing phase.
It should be clear, then, that this procedure closely mirrors that used with simulated
agents.   The first  participant  is  asked to  learn a  random language,  but there is  a
bottleneck on transmission (as implemented through training being restricted to the
seen set).  As a result, when that participant is tested on the unseen items, they are
required to generalise from the subset of the seen items to the language as a whole.
As the language moves along the transmission chain, therefore, the extent to which
the input language of participant n+1 resembles the input language of participant n
will depend in large part on how easy it was for participant n to generalise from the
32
subset of the language to which he or she was exposed (the seen set) to the rest of the
language (the unseen set).  In other words, for a language to survive it has to adapt to
pass through the bottleneck.
Kirby et al.'s first experiment was conducted exactly as described above, and thus
implemented the logic of Brighton et al.'s computational study in human participants.
Intriguingly, however, the results showed both similarities and differences with those
of the simulations.  As in the simulations, the language adapted to cope with the
pressures  it  found  in  its  environment;  however,  the  form of  this  adaptation  was
different.   Whereas  in  the  computational  study  the  language  had  adapted  by
becoming  compositional,  in  the  experimental  study  the  language  adapted  by
becoming  systematically underspecified.  In other words, one signal came to stand
for many different meanings.  For example, the signal tuge might come to refer to all
shapes, of whatever colour, moving in a straight line; whereas,  poi  might come to
refer to all shapes, of all colours, moving in a circle.
The first point to note here, is that, much like in the simulations, iterated cultural
transmission resulted in a more structured language10.  This confirms the finding that
the  very fact  of  cultural  transmission has  structure-creating powers.   The second
point,  however,  is  that  this  structure  was  not  compositional.   This  is  intriguing,
especially given that  this  first  experiment  should have included all  the necessary
ingredients to replicate completely the findings of the simulations.  There was an
iterated process of cultural transmission; a bottleneck on that transmission, such that
learners in each generation were not exposed to the entire system; and a group of
human participants,  whose biases  were  supposedly approximated by those of  the
simulated  agents.   Given all  this,  why did  this  first  experiment  have  a  different
outcome than the earlier simulations?  
10 It  might  seem misleading,  especially in  the context  of  language,  to  describe  a systematically
underspecified system—the limiting case of which is a system with only a single signal that was
mapped to every meaning—as being 'structured'.  This is clearly not what is usually meant by
'structure'  in  relation  to  language.   However,  relative  to  a  random  system,  a  systematically
underspecified system—much like a compositional system—is far more constrained, ordered and
predictable.  In both cases, it is this increased order and predictability—something which I think
reasonable to term 'structure'—that allows these systems to pass through the bottleneck.  
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One possible answer is that the language was simply faced with a different set of
pressures  to  those  it  had  faced  in  the  simulations.   This  experiment  included  a
bottleneck,  and thus  the  pressure  to  be compressible  was definitely in  operation.
This  leaves  the  pressure  for  expressivity.   The  simulations  showed  that  such  a
pressure could, quite plausibly, follow from pre-existing biases.  What had yet to be
demonstrated was that those biases would have that effect in humans.  The results of
this first experiment might be taken to suggest that those biases—the reality of which
are well attested more generally (e.g. Markman & Wachtel, 1988; Mazzocco, 1997)
—were not,  in  fact,  capable of  accounting for the expressivity pressure.   This  is
particularly significant given Smith's proposal that the biases originated in theory of
mind,  as  this  was  certainly  a  capacity  shared  by  all  the  participants.   More
importantly, where might this leave our account of the expressivity pressure?
Kirby et al.'s second experiment was largely the same as their first except that they
added a filter for homonymy.  In other words, before passing one participant's output
as the input for the next participant, they filtered the seen set such that if any string
was assigned to more than one meaning then all  but one of those meanings was
removed from the training data.  The results of this second experiment once again
confirmed the importance of adaptation by the language itself, however this time,
with the homonymy filter preventing the language from adapting through systematic
underspecification, that adaptation took a compositional form, in which each string
came to consist  of  three  identifiable  syllables  representing  the  shape,  colour  and
movement of its associated picture.  So, for example, a grey square moving in a
straight  line  was  represented  by  the  string  (here  split  into  syllables  for  ease  of
exposition) n-ere-ki, whereas a grey circle moving in a straight line was n-ehe-ki.
The homonymy filter is the only difference between Kirby et al.'s first and second
experiments.  It is the addition of this filter that makes the difference between the
emergence  of  a  systematically  underspecified  language  and  a  compositional
language.  What, then, are we to make of this filter?  How might it relate to the
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expressivity pressure?  The answer to this question emerges in three passages,  in
which Kirby et al. describe the filter, its function and its motivation.
filtering ensures that underspecification is an evolutionary dead end. 
(p. 10684, my emphasis)
This  reference  to  'evolution'  cannot  be  biological  evolution,  because  this
experimental work does not feature any biological evolution, the participants did not
'evolve'.  The only evolution in these experiments is cultural, and so this must refer to
the  cultural  evolution  of  the  language.   But  if  this  is  the  case,  why should  we
consider underspecification to be an 'evolutionary dead end'?  In fact, the results of
experiment  one  indicate  that  underspecification,  far  from being a  dead end,  is  a
perfectly viable way for the language to adapt.
As the following quotation indicates, however, Kirby et al. view the introduction of
the homonymy filter as posing an additional adaptive challenge for the language:
[filtering introduces] a new adaptive challenge for the evolving language...a language in
this experiment must be both learnable and unambiguous. 
(p. 10685, my emphasis)
This seems to signal something of a fundamental shift from the earlier computational
work.   In  the  simulations,  the  pressure  to  be  unambiguous—to  be  expressive—
derived, as we have seen, from the learning biases of the agents.  However, Kirby et
al.'s  first  experiment—essentially  a  replication  of  those  simulations  with  human
participants—seemed to suggest that while the  pre-existing bias explanation of the
expressivity pressure might work in principle, it did not seem to work with human
participants.  In this second experiment, the role previously played by an  internal
learning bias has come to be taken over by an external homonymy filter.  What might
this filter be meant to approximate?  A final quotation supplies the answer:
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[filtering]  is  an  analogue  of  a  pressure  to  be  expressive  that  would  come  from
communicative need in the case of real language transmission. 
(p. 10684, my emphasis)
It should be clear that it is not the language  that is faced with this communicative
need, but rather language users.  If the language has to adapt in relation to this need,
then it is as a knock-on effect of the use which language is serving for its users.  It is
clear, too, that this relates to the origin of the expressivity pressure.  The homonymy
filter—in  its  role  of  eliminating  one-to-many  and  many-to-one  mappings—
constitutes a direct analogue of the biases built into the agents in the simulations11.
Only this  time it  is  operating not as a learning bias  but as a proxy for language
needing to be used communicatively.  In terms of accounting for the expressivity
pressure, this might, therefore, be termed the functional explanation.  
The experimental instantiation of the ILM shows both similarities and differences to
the computational instantiation.  In terms of the internal functioning of the ILM, they
are  in  complete  agreement.   Both  cite  the  interplay  between  the  pressures  of
compressibility  and  expressivity as  crucial  in  terms  of  how cultural  transmission
functions to create language structure.  As such, both provide the same answer to the
general  problem  of  linkage:  it  is  the  structure-creating  process  of  cultural
transmission  that  links  learners  and  languages.   Both  also  see  the  pressure  for
compressibility as something that is inherent to the cultural system itself.   Where
they differ, however, is in terms of accounting for the expressivity pressure.  The
computational  work  saw this  as  arising  from the  pre-existing  biases  of  learners.
While this was possible in principle, the evidence does not support this explanation
in humans.  The experimental work, however, traces the expressivity pressure to the
functional  use  of  language  in  communication.   In  the  work  cited  above
11 The formal identity of the agents' biases on the one hand and the homonymy filter—as a proxy for
'communicative need'—on the other, means that one might equally describe the simulated agents
as having an in-built need to communicate.  At the very least, the choice between this description
and one couched in terms of 'biases' is a matter of taste. 
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communication was implemented by a proxy (the homonymy filter).  However, the
link between communication and the expressivity pressure has been confirmed by
more recent work, explicitly involving communication (Kirby et al., in prep, personal
communication).
1.3.3 – Summary
We are now in a position to answer the two questions posed at the beginning of this 
section.  
Question 1: What are the processes and pressures involved in the ILM account of
language structure?
Language  structure  emerges  as  a  result  of  the  interplay between  the  pressure  to
become compressible, which drives language to become ever simpler and easier to
learn,  and  the  pressure  to  be  expressive,  which  checks  that  drive  to  simplicity.
Compositionality  can  be  seen  as  a  compromise  between  these  two  pressures.
Compositional languages are much more compressible, and thus easier to learn, than
holistic languages, but they achieve that compressibility in such a way as to avoid
collapsing to completely ambiguous underspecification.
Question 2:  Why does the ILM involve those particular processes and pressures and
not other ones?
The  pressure  to  be  compressible  is  a  kind  of  informational  regularity,  which  is
inherent to the process of cultural transmission.  Systems that are transmitted in this
way will tend towards compressibility and simplicity.  It is clear, therefore, why a
culturally  transmitted  language  should  face  this  pressure.   The  pressure  to  be
expressive, however, is  not inherent to cultural transmission.  It is contingent.  It
requires an explanation.  The evidence suggests that the expressivity pressure derives
from the use to which learners put language.  The previous explanation, based on the
co-option of general, pre-existing biases, was not supported by work with human
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participants.  Instead, the evidence seems to favour the  functional explanation: the
pressure to be expressive derives from the fact that language has to function as a tool
for communication.
Given these answers, how does the ILM fare in terms of answering the two linkage
problems discussed at the beginning of the chapter?  In terms of the general problem
—how to link data on learners and languages—the ILM does very well.  The process
of cultural transmission, with its interplay between the pressures for compressibility
and  expressivity,  outlines  a  mechanism whereby the  capacities  and  behaviour  of
individuals is linked to language structure.  This is in marked contrast to Pinker and
Bloom who failed to provide any answer to the general problem, beyond an assumed
isomorphism between UG and language.  
In terms of the special problem—how to account for the resulting language structure
also being adaptive, from the perspective of language users—the outcome is more
mixed.  It  is clear that a major role is played by the expressivity pressure.  This
provides a countervailing influence to the inherent tendency for cultural systems to
simplify.  Or rather, it ensures that when the language does simplify, it doesn't do so
in a way that limits expressivity.  It is the influence of the expressivity pressure, then,
that accounts for why the process of cultural transmission not only links learners and
languages, but does so in a way that is also adaptive for learners.  Despite this vital
role, however, there is no reason to expect cultural transmission per se to involve a
pressure for expressivity.  
Given this, no understanding of how the ILM works can be complete without an
account of origin of the expressivity pressure.  As noted above, the best account of
this origin relates it to the communicative use of language—to its communicative
function.   This  takes  us  some  way  towards  providing  an  answer  to  the  special
problem of linkage.  The cultural process produces language that is adaptive for its
users because a pressure for expressivity forms part of the adaptive environment of
the language.  This pressure, in turn, derives from the communicative function to
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which language is put by its users.
There  is  still  one  serious  problem,  however,  which  is  finds  expression  in  the
following two questions:
(a) What determines that  communication is the function to which the language
has to adapt, why not some other function12?
In  an  experiment  or  model  it  is  the  experimenter  or  modeller  who  decides  the
relevant parameters, but who or what decides them in the real case?  The functional
account of the expressivity pressure, at least as described so far, seems to provide no
clear  answer  to  this  question.   Here  Pinker  and  Bloom  still  have  a  significant
advantage, because in their account it is natural selection that determines the relevant
function: Language structure is adaptive for communication because it is in relation
to  that function that it has been subject to selection.  However, this first question
immediately gives rise to a second.
(b) What is meant by 'communication' here?
'Communication' is an incredibly broad term.  All living things communicate, using a
dazzling  array  of  mechanisms,  media  and  signals.   But  what  is  meant  by
'communication' in relation to language?  The natural starting point would be to look
at how linguistic communication itself operates.  When Pinker and Bloom did just
that, their conclusion was that linguistic communication was primarily code-like, that
its  function  was  the  “communication  of  propositional  structures  over  a  serial
channel”.   It  is  highly doubtful,  however,  whether  this  represents  how linguistic
communication actually works (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).  Given the centrality of the
expressivity pressure to the ILM account of language structure,  it  is necessary to
address  these  two  questions,  so  I  will  return  to  them both  when  I  consider  the
expressivity pressure in greater detail below (1.4.5).
12 Why is the relevant function not structuring cognition (e.g. Bickerton, 1990), or to provide the
'narrative centre of gravity' required for consciousness (e.g. Dennett, 1991)?  The list of potential
functions could be elaborated indefinitely.  However, the question remains, why, out of all the
possible  functions  that  could have  played  a  role  shaping  the  adaptive  environment  of  the
language, is communication the one that did so?
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1.4 – Evolutionary preconditions of the ILM
The  previous  section  presented  a  critical  discussion  of  the  ILM  account  of
compositionality.  However, the account of the ILM presented there requires that a
range of preconditions be in place for the iterated process to get started in the first
place.  In this section I shall attempt to detail just what those preconditions might be.
I have taken the brief discussion in Smith and Kirby (2008) as a starting point, and
combined it with the critical assessment of the ILM presented above.  In all, there
appear  to  be  five  necessary  preconditions,  which  can  be  split  into  two  groups:
individual preconditions and systemic preconditions.
The three individual preconditions concern the abilities of individual learners:
I. The ability to acquire new signals
II. The ability to acquire and produce new signal-meaning associations
III. The ability to infer communicative intent
The  two  systemic  preconditions concern  the  nature  of  the  communicative
environment:
IV. The existence of a bottleneck
V. The existence of the expressivity pressure
It should be noted that the first four of these preconditions constitute an expanded
version of those discussed by Smith and Kirby, and are relatively uncontroversial in
discussions of the ILM.  The fifth precondition, however, derives from the preceding
critical  discussion  of  how the  ILM works,  and  is  not  something  that  is  usually
emphasised in publications on the ILM.  Its inclusion is motivated by the fact that
while the first four preconditions explain why and how structure might emerge that is
adaptive  for the language,  they fail  to  explain why that  structure should also be
adaptive for language users.  To account for that we need to examine the origin of
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the  expressivity  pressure,  and  to  do  that  we  need  to  address  the  two  questions
outlined above.  Why was communication the relevant function?  And, what do we
mean by 'communication'  in  this  instance?   Overall  then,  in  terms  of  the  earlier
discussion,  preconditions  I-IV provide  the basis  for  a  mechanism that  solves  the
general  problem  of  linkage,  whereas  the  inclusion  of  precondition  V  alters  the
balance of pressures in that mechanism, such that it also solves the special problem.
In the sections that follow I shall discuss each of these preconditions in turn, making
some  necessary  distinctions  and  briefly  reviewing  comparative  work  regarding
examples of these preconditions in other species.
1.4.1 – The ability to acquire new signals
The ILM account of compositionality sees it as emerging from a process in which
language itself adapts to the combined pressures of compressibility  (or learnability)
and expressivity.  It is obvious, however, that the first of these pressures requires that
the individuals actually be capable of learning.  More particularly, that learning play
a  role  in  the  acquisition  of  their  communication  system.   This  is  no  trivial
requirement given the sparsity of such examples in nature (Janik & Slater, 1997).
However, in order to clearly understand this  first  precondition it  is vital  to make
some distinctions between different kinds of learning.  In particular, to make a three-
way distinction  between  comprehension learning,  usage learning  and  production
learning (Janik & Slater, 2000; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2010).
Comprehension learning occurs when an individual is able to extract a new meaning
or inference from a signal, as a result of their experience of that signal being used by
other individuals.  This capacity is widespread amongst mammals, with species as
varied as primates,  dogs,  squirrels  and bats  exhibiting an open-ended capacity to
learn  the  meanings  associated  with  new  signals  (Seyfarth  &  Cheney,  2010).
Examples of this phenomenon include: the comprehension of other species'  alarm
calls by several species of monkey (Hauser, 1988; Fichtel, 2004); the recognition of
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the calls of the adoptive species in cross-fostering experiments (Seyfarth & Cheney,
1997, cited in Seyfarth & Cheney, 2010); and experimental work with dogs in which
hundreds  of  associations  between  completely  arbitrary  sounds  and  objects  are
successfully  acquired  (Kaminski,  et  al.,  2004).   Sometimes  the  meanings  and
inferences  extracted  can  be  impressively  detailed  and  complex.   For  example,
playback experiments with baboons have shown that they acquire information about
identity, relative rank and matriline from sequences of calls (Bergmann et al., 2003).
Usage learning occurs when an individual learns to modify the production of a signal
based on the current situation or context.  This capacity is somewhat less common
and where it does occur is very restricted in comparison to the open-ended nature of
comprehension learning (Seyfarth & Cheney, 2010).  One well-known example is the
alarm calls of vervet monkeys, which are often glossed as leopard, eagle and snake
warning signals.  Young vervets initially use these calls in an over-extended manner,
for example by issuing an  eagle  call in response to any aerial stimuli.  Over time,
however,  they  fine-tune  the  use  of  the  calls,  eventually  only producing  them in
response to the appropriate threat (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1990).  One further example
concerns  the  modification  of  recruitment  screams  by  chimpanzees  based  on  the
composition of the audience, particularly in relation to the presence or absence of
dominant individuals (Slocombe and Zuberbühler, 2007).  Usage learning also occurs
when an existing call is used in a novel context.
Production  learning  occurs  when  an  existing  signal  is  modified  or  a  new signal
acquired, and is the rarest of the three forms of learning under consideration.  The
pattern across mammals, at least as far as vocal communication is concerned, is that
most species have a limited repertoire of signals which are generally tied to specific
contexts and which are present in their adult form from birth (Seyfarth & Cheney,
2010).  The only known exceptions to this generalisation are some species of whales
and  dolphins  (Rendall  &  Whitehead,  2001;  Reiss  &  McCowan,  1993),  bats
(Boughman, 1998), seals (Ralls et al., 1985), and possibly elephants (Poole et al.,
2005).  In terms of other species, the most unequivocal evidence of vocal production
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learning is in songbirds (Nottebohm & Liu, 2010), parrots (Pepperberg, 2010) and
hummingbirds (Baptista & Schuchuman, 1990).
While  communication  through  vocal  signals  is  very  widespread  in  nature,
communication  through  brachiomanual  gesture—that  is,  through  “manual
communication without touching another individual or a substrate”—is found almost
exclusively in  apes  and humans (Pollick  & de Waal,  2007:  8184).   The gestural
communication  of  apes  is  significantly  more  flexible  and  less  tied  to  emotional
reactions or specific contexts than either their vocal or facial expressions (Pollick &
de  Waal,  2007).   As  such,  it  exhibits  all  three  of  the  forms  of  signal  learning
described above, with both the comprehension and usage of gestures in  the wild
shifting between contexts (Hobaiter & Byrne, 2011) and new, non species-typical
gestures appearing in captivity (Leavens et al., 2005).
From this brief survey, it should be fairly clear that the kind of learning required as a
precondition of the ILM is signal production learning.  The changes in the language
observed in both the computational and experimental instantiations of the ILM are
crucially dependent on the capacity of each generation to produce variations on the
language that they were exposed to as learners.  Of course, in any real world instance
comprehension and usage learning would also constitute vital skills; however, these
forms of learning are far more widespread throughout mammals as a whole, and so
present much less of an explanatory challenge.  What does need to be explained,
however, is how humans might have shifted from the typical primate pattern of very
little production learning, at least as far as vocal signals are concerned, to a state in
which  production  learning  was  typical.   At  least  some  of  this  shift  must  have
occurred prior to the process modelled by the ILM, because the ILM depends on a
capacity for production learning.
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1.4.2  –  The ability  to  acquire  and produce new signal-meaning
associations
The comprehension learning of new signal-meaning associations is widespread, and
the  ability  to  acquire  new signals,  although  quite  rare,  is  found  in  a  number  of
different species.  However, these capacities considered separately are not sufficient,
because what is required as a precondition for the ILM is the production learning of
new signal-meaning associations.  This second precondition represents a subset of
the first; it is no surprise, therefore, that it  is even less commonly found in other
species.
There seems little evidence, for example, that any of the vocal production learners
discussed above are learning new signal-meaning associations,  or  even that  their
signals have any semantic content at all (Fitch, 2005).  Most of the examples consist
of either the vocal mimicry of ambient sounds (Poole et al., 2005; Ralls et al., 1985)
or of vocal traditions within populations, in which the variation is simply one of
acoustic properties (Sanvito et al., 2007; Boughman, 1998; Rendall & Whitehead,
2001).  Even in one of the clearest examples of vocal production learning, that of the
songbirds, there appears to be no evidence that there is any semanticity to the learned
song, or that song elements can be rearranged to yield changes in meaning (Berwick
et al., 2011). 
The production learning of signal-meaning associations is, however, present in the
gestural communication of apes.  Apes are known to create new signal-meaning pairs
through  the  process  of  ontogenetic  ritualisation  (Tomasello,  1996),  whereby new
gestural signals emerge through the shaping and anticipation of behaviour between
individuals in repeated interactions.  For example, an infant may begin to initiate
feeding  by grabbing  directly  for  its  mother's  nipple  whilst  moving  her  arm.   In
subsequent interactions the mother may anticipate the infant's desire before this full
process has occurred, with eventually a simple touch on the arm being sufficient to
initiate feeding (Tomasello et al., 1994).
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One final example of the production learning of new signal-meaning associations
comes from the findings of ape-language research.  The most prominent example of
this work is that with the bonobo Kanzi (e. g. Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998).  Much
of the hype surrounding this study has focused on Kanzi's ability to comprehend and
appropriately respond to spoken English sentences, at a level comparable to that of a
three year-old child (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993).  However, the most important
feature  of  this  work  for  present  purposes  is  that  Kanzi  can  use  lexigrams
communicatively  (Savage-Rumbaugh  et  al.,  1986;  Lyn,  2007).   This  clearly
represents  an  example  of  the  production  learning  of  new  signal-meaning
associations.  Kanzi is also not an isolated case in this regard, with various other
bonobos and chimpanzees (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 2005) and a gorilla (Tanner et
al., 2006) having acquired similar sets of lexigrammatic or gestural signal-meaning
pairs.
1.4.3 – The ability to infer communicative intent
Language is unusual in that it is both learned and symbolic (Deacon, 1997), with the
result  that  the  link  between  form and  meaning  is  neither  innately  specified  nor
inherent in the form of the signal (Oliphant, 2002).  This greatly complicates the task
of  acquiring  new  signal-meaning  pairs,  because  it  requires  not  just  associative
learning  between  items,  but  also  the  capacity  to  infer  one  from  the  other.   In
philosophical terms, this has been cast as the Gavagai problem (Quine, 1960).  Quine
considers the situation of a naïve linguist attempting to understand what is meant by
a speaker of an alien language, who on pointing to a rabbit utters  gavagai.  Does
gavagai  mean 'rabbit',  'furry thing',  'running animal',  'dinner',  or  any other  of the
potentially  infinite  number  of  possibilities?   This  is  a  problem  of  determining
reference, of working out the meaning associated with a given signal.  Furthermore,
this problem must be solved in a way that scales to making large numbers of such
inferences, otherwise there will be no bottleneck on transmission and no pressure to
generalise. 
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The examples of signal-meaning production-learning in the previous section fail to
meet these criteria.  Impressive as the results of ape-language research are, they still
only demonstrate the acquisition of around 250 or so lexigrams.  More importantly,
the acquisition of these signal-meaning pairs takes place in an environment that has
been structured and scaffolded by another organism, humans, that is already heavily
involved in learned symbolic communication.   This environment—understandably
described as a hybrid pan-homo culture (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 2005)—is one that
greatly lightens the 'inferential burden' of acquiring learned symbols.  As a model for
the emergence of language in humans, ape-language research is more of a 'skyhook'
than a 'crane' (Dennett, 1995).  Our solution to the Gavagai problem cannot appeal to
the near-miraculous structuring of our environment by an external agency.
Ontogenetic ritualisation, on the other hand, might be seen as a method of preventing
the Gavagai problem from arising at all.  There is no doubt as to the referent of a
particular signal because the signal-meaning association grows out of a history of
shared interaction between the individuals concerned.  However, for this very reason,
ontogenetic ritualisation may simply be the wrong kind of process.  Rather than the
inferential learning of a new signal-meaning pair, ontogenetic ritualisation represents
something of  a  constructive process,  whereby two individuals  shape  each other's
behaviour through repeated interactions (Tomasello,  1997).  Neither ape-language
research nor ontogenetic ritualisation can stand, then,  as examples of the kind of
inferential capacity required by the ILM.
In  language,  the  inferential  acquisition  of  signal-meaning pairs  is  probably most
clearly exemplified by word learning.  Many different processes are likely involved
in word learning, including simple associative learning (Samuelson & Smith, 1998),
pre-existing  cognitive  constraints  (Markman,  1994),  statistical  learning  (Saffran,
2003) and cross-situational learning (Smith et al., 2006).  However, in this section I
will focus on the social-pragmatic account (e.g. Tomasello, 2000), because it has a
great deal to say about Quine's gavagai problem and because the core cognitive skills
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it requires will be of great importance when we come to consider precondition V,
regarding the expressivity pressure (1.4.5).
From around the age of one, children come to understand others as intentional agents
(Tomasello, 1999).  As development proceeds, this capacity is built upon, such that
children come to be able to engage others in joint-attentional activities (Tomasello et
al.,  2005).   That  is,  to  engage in  activities  with  others,  against  a  background of
mutually shared knowledge, expectations and goals.  In this context, the range of
potential referents, and therefore the potential scope of the Gavagai problem, for a
given utterance is drastically reduced.  Note briefly, too, that this is much the same
nexus of capacities cited by Smith (2004) in his account of the pre-existing bias (see
1.3.1), a point I will return to later.  The following account provides a good example
of how this works:
In the context of a finding game, an adult announced her intentions to "find the toma"
and then searched in a row of buckets all  containing novel  objects.   Sometimes she
found it in the first bucket searched.  Sometimes, however, she had to search longer,
rejecting unwanted objects by scowling at them and replacing them in their buckets until
she found the one she wanted. Children learned the new word for the object the adult
intended to find (indicated by a smile and termination of search) regardless of whether
or how many objects were rejected during the search process 
(Tomasello et al., 1996, cited in Tomasello, 2000, emphasis in original).
The familiar context here is obviously that of a 'finding game'.  The mutually shared
knowledge relates to how such games are played: that there is something to find; that
it might be in a variety of locations; that the goal, and thus the end of the game, is
reached when that thing is found; etc.  Given this joint attentional situation, the child
is able to infer that the adult's utterance is interpretable in light of both participants'
shared understanding of that situation.   This allows the child to make the simple
inference that the signal toma refers to the focus of the joint-attentional situation, the
to-be-found object.  These skills allow one individual to infer the communicative
intent of another, to infer the meaning associated with a particular signal.  As a result,
they  permit  just  the  kind  of  rapid  and  reliable  signal-meaning  pair  acquisition
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required by the ILM.   
This third precondition seems to be exceedingly rare—perhaps even entirely absent
—in  non-human  animals.   There  is  little  evidence  that  any of  the  known vocal
learners, for example, are able to engage in joint attentional activities, although some
of the component skills have been found in some vocal learning species (Tomasello
et  al.,  2005;  Pack  & Herman 2006).   With  regard  to  the  great  apes,  a  previous
consensus that they are unable to conceptualise others as intentional agents (Heyes,
1998) has been altered by a wide variety of new studies suggesting that they do in
fact  understand  some  mental  and  perceptual  states  (Call  &  Tomasello,  2008).
However, the balance of the evidence still suggests that they are unable to engage in
joint attentional activities (Tomasello  et al., 2005), although suggestive hints of such
abilities have been observed in the wild (Boesch, 2002, 2005).
There is, however, an even more basic form of this precondition, which stands as a
requirement  for  the  social-pragmatic  account—or  indeed  any  account  of  learned
symbols—to be possible in the first place.  This concerns the recognition that an
action or behaviour was meant communicatively at all  (Scott-Phillips et al., 2009).
In  contrast  to  inferring  the  meaning of  a  particular signal,  we might  call  this  a
general sensitivity to communicative intent.  This form of social-pragmatic awareness
is the key starting point for the wider set of socio-cognitive skills that underpin the
capacity  to  infer  the  communicative  intent—the  meaning—of  learned  symbolic
signals.
1.4.4 – The existence of a bottleneck
The  examples  of  the  ILM  discussed  in  1.3 used  toy  languages  with  artificially
imposed bottlenecks.  In real language learning, however, the bottleneck stems from
the  infinite  number  of  possible  utterances  and  the  very  large  number  of  signal-
meaning pairs.   The existence of a  bottleneck is  of vital  importance to  the ILM,
because it is this that creates the pressure for the language to compress, to become
more learnable.
48
The  existence  of  the  bottleneck  is  dependent  on  all  three  of  the  preconditions
discussed above.  It is necessary that signals be learned (precondition I), because the
bottleneck  is,  by  definition,  related  to  limitations  on  learning:  either  the  logical
limitation  of  needing  to  learn  an  infinite  set  from  a  finite  subset,  or  cognitive
limitations  of  memory and processing  capacity.  More  specifically, however,  the
bottleneck  is  dependent  on  those  learned  signals  being  paired  with  meanings
(precondition II), because the crucial pressure to generalise is a pressure to generalise
from a subset of the signal-meaning pairs to the (potentially) infinite full set of all
such pairs: if the signals had no semantic content, as with birdsong, there would be
nothing to generalise about13.  However, it is not enough simply that there be a few
signal-meaning pairs to learn.  The emergence of a bottleneck depends on there being
a large enough number of signal-meaning pairs that the learning limitations described
above come into play.  This, in turn, requires that there exist a rapid and reliable
process for the acquisition of such pairs (precondition III).
1.4.5 – The existence of the expressivity pressure
The  four  preconditions  discussed  so  far  set  up  the  possibility  of  a  culturally
transmitted  system of  signal-meaning pairs.   The  combined effects  of  these four
preconditions  is  to  produce  a  system  in  which,  in  order  to  be  successfully
transmitted, language would have to adapt to be compressible.  What they fail to do,
however,  is  provide  an  account  of  why  that  resulting  language  should  also  be
expressive, and thus adaptive from the point of view of language users.  The first
four preconditions fail to address the special problem of linkage.  
The ILM solution to  the special  problem of  linkage depends on the  expressivity
pressure,  which  in  turn  derives  from  the  communicative  function  of  language.
However, this functional explanation, at least considered alone, provides no account
13 It  should  be  noted  that  the  important  point  here  is  not  meaning  per  se  but  the  pressure  to
generalise that meanings introduce.  There is no reason to think that semanticity is the only way in
which this pressure to generalise could be introduced.
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of why communication happened to be the relevant function.  One possible solution
might be to take the best aspect of Pinker and Bloom's argument—their appeal to
natural selection—and ground the choice of communicative function in that.  I will
argue that this is indeed the correct solution, but that it needs to be applied carefully
otherwise we run into seemingly insurmountable theoretical difficulties.
In addition, it was left unclear what was meant by 'communication'.  Here, too, we
might  simply follow Pinker  and Bloom in adopting  the  code-model  of  linguistic
communication.   However,  we  shall  see  that  many  of  the  difficulties  faced  in
appealing to natural selection actually derive from problems inherent in  the code
model.  Once we shed the code model of communication, it becomes much clearer
how selection can account for the expressivity pressure.
1.4.5.1  –  Why  communicative function?   Natural  selection  as  a
seductive solution.
The  question  of  why  language  has  to  adapt  to  pressures  arising  from  its
communicative  function—rather  than  some  other function—is  not  a  problem for
Pinker  and  Bloom.   For  them,  language  structure  comes  to  reflect  its  role  in
communication because it is in relation to  that function that it has been subject to
selection.  As another example, the heart both pumps blood around the body and
makes thumping sounds.   However, the  structure of  the heart  reflects  the former
pressure  and  not  the  latter,  because  its  functional  role  in  circulation  is  the  one
relevant to selection (Wright, 1976).  To reverse the point, the reason the functional
demands of producing thumping sounds are irrelevant to the structure of the heart, is
that its capacity to fulfil that function has been largely, perhaps entirely, irrelevant to
selection.  Natural selection provides, then, a powerful solution to the question of
determining the relevant function: The structure of a trait will come to reflect those
functions for which it is under selection.  This is what is meant by the phrase 'form
follows function'.  The application of this logic, integrated into the ILM account of
compositionality, would, at first blush, go something like this:
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The ILM account relies on the interplay between the pressure to be compressible and
the pressure to be expressive.  The first one of these pressures is inherent to cultural
transmission.   As  a  result,  cultural  transmission  also  has  an  inherent  structure-
creating  capacity.   Unchecked,  however,  the  resulting  structure  will  become
continually more simplified and compressed.  In the case of language, it is the second
pressure—expressivity—that serves to check the first, such that simplification does
not occur at the expense of communicative efficacy.  The expressivity pressure is not
inherent to cultural transmission—it is contingent—and an account of its origin is,
therefore, required.  The functional explanation links the expressivity pressure to the
communicative use of language by its learners.  The reason that communication is the
relevant function in this connection is because, like with the heart pumping blood,
that is the function under selection in language learners.
1.4.5.2.  –  Problems  with  that  seductive  solution:  bootstrapping  and
foresight
The problem with invoking natural selection is that it  is not clear exactly  what is
being selected.  Natural selection requires heritable variation.  If the relevant function
is  set  by  natural  selection,  then  there  must  be  some  kind  of  heritable  variation
underlying  language's  role  in  communication.   We might  call  this  variation  the
language faculty.  Such a faculty might take the form of highly specified UG (Pinker
& Bloom, 1990), a language-specific bias (Smith, 2004), or certain computational
processes (Hauser et al., 2002; Di Sciullo & Boeckx, 2011).  Regardless of the form
that faculty takes, however, it is vital to remember that we are not talking about a
faculty for the production and comprehension of a set of signals, but rather a faculty
to acquire a culturally transmitted language (Origgi & Sperber, 2000).  This leads to
a kind of 'bootstrapping' problem: what use is a faculty to acquire something that
does not yet exist?
This same problem can also be recast in terms of natural selection lacking foresight.
Natural  selection  is  'blind'  and  algorithmic  (Dawkins,  1986;  Dennett,  1995).   In
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modelling terms, it represents a hill-climbing process (Beasley et  al.,  1993), each
step of which must produce an increase—in the here and now—of the quantity which
it tries to maximise, inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964; Grafen, 2009).  Theoretically
speaking, then, natural selection cannot put something in place today with a view to
its being adaptive  tomorrow.  More specifically, modelling work indicates that, in
situations with no established form of communication, a benevolent period of genetic
drift is required in order for a language faculty to emerge (Smith, 2004).  Selection
simply cannot favour a language faculty unless the population is already converged
on a language.
The bootstrapping problem arises because the language faculty is one of a class of
adaptations whose 'proper domain'  does not  exist  in the environment  before they
appear  (Origgi  & Sperber,  2000).   This  contrasts  with  things  like  vision,  whose
proper domain—the information available in light—was present in the environment
long before the first  eye ever  developed.   Unsurprisingly, then,  this  problem has
arisen in connection with many different approaches to language evolution.  It will be
useful to consider some of those examples here, together with how they attempt to
solve or avoid the bootstrapping problem.
Recall, firstly, the computational instantiation of the ILM, discussed in 1.2.1.  In this
work the expressivity pressure was argued to derive from the influence of a  pre-
existing  set of learning biases, which were later co-opted for language.  This co-
option hypothesis side-steps the need to account for language-specific biases—that
is, for the language faculty—in the absence of language itself.  The relevant biases
need not arise 'today' in order to be used for language 'tomorrow', because they were
already present for some other reason.  In this way, the bootstrapping problem is
avoided.   However,  while  this  explanation  works  in  principle,  it  has  not  been
supported by work with human participants.  
Consider  next  Pinker  and  Bloom's  view  of  the  language  faculty  as  an  innately
specified UG.  How might this faculty have got there in the absence of language?
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Pinker and Bloom's solution consists of a combination of the parity thesis—the idea
that for many aspects of language it doesn't matter which form is chosen, as long as
we all  choose  the  same form—and the  Baldwin  effect  (Baldwin,  1896,  Godfrey-
Smith, 2003), a process by which traits that were once learned become nativised.
This two-step process means that the language faculty is actually a collection of now-
nativised,  but  once-learned,  signal  co-ordinations.   Such a  faculty does  not  have
appear  prior to language but instead appears  because of language, thus solving the
bootstrapping problem.  The weak link in  this  solution,  however, is  the Baldwin
effect, which remains a largely theoretical notion, that can only function under a very
restricted set of circumstances (Yamauchi, 2001, 2004).
The final example comes from biolinguistics (see Di Sciullo & Boeckx, 2011), and
concerns the role of  self-organisation and  emergence in accounting for a language
faculty  comprised  of  various  computational  routines.   These  computational
competencies are argued to arise as a consequence of self-organising regularities in
the laws of physics, mathematics or developmental biology (Uriagereka, 1998).  This
approach takes the conventional evolutionary position that 'form follows function'
and  turns  it  on  its  head,  arguing  that  'function follows  form'.   Self-organising
processes produce a computational form, which only later goes on to 'find' a function.
This inversion of the form-function relationship solves the bootstrapping problem in
a similar way to the co-option of pre-existing biases, by removing the need for form
to  emerge  in  order  to  fulfil  a  function  that  only  appears  later.   What  remains
somewhat obscure, however, is why such self-organisation should consistently result
in  adaptive outcomes,  unless  paired,  in  some  way  or  other,  with  a  process  of
selection (Weber & Depew, 1996).
The bootstrapping problem presents, then, as a challenge to any evolutionary account
of language, yet none of the solutions just considered are wholly adequate.  This
leaves us in something of a dilemma.  The expressivity pressure is a key component
of the ILM account of compositionality.  It seems to derive from the use of language
for communication.  Yet the clearest naturalistic explanation of why  that  function,
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rather than another, should be the one that mattered—natural selection—seems to
lead inexorably into the bootstrapping problem.  
The key to  solving  this  apparent  dilemma is  the  realisation that  it  is  not  natural
selection per se that leads us into the bootstrapping problem, but the combination of
natural selection and a particular conception of linguistic communication—the code
model.   In  order  to  see  how  selection  on  communication  can  give  rise  to  the
expressivity  pressure,  then,  it  is  necessary  to  first  get  clear  what  we  mean  by
'communication' in this instance.
1.4.5.3 – Models of linguistic communication I: The code model
The code model, most explicitly formulated by Shannon and Weaver (1949), views
communication  in  terms  of  the  bi-directional  mapping  of  meanings  and  signals.
Under this model, communicators map the concepts they wish to convey onto an
external, shared code.  This encoded message is then transmitted to their audience,
who then perform the process in reverse, by decoding the message and recreating the
encoded conceptual content.  
There are many reasons to think the code model a wholly inadequate conception of
linguistic communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).  Despite this, many approaches
to  language  evolution  have  adopted  the  code  model,  if  only  for  methodological
reasons (Scott-Phillips, 2010).  In the present context, however, I want to describe
two problems arising out of this conception of language, which together account for
the subsequent slide into the bootstrapping problem.
• Problem  1 -- The  code  model  alienates  language  from  other  aspects  of
communication: The view that linguistic communication consists, in essence,
of the successful manipulation of a shared language-code tells us very little
about how language relates to other aspects of communication.  This matters
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because  human  communication  is  fundamentally  multi-modal  (McNeill,
2000).   These  other  modalities,  including  co-speech  gesture  and  facial
expression,  are  tightly  coupled  with  linguistic  communication  temporally
(Mayberry  &  Jaques,  2000),  semantically  (McNeill,  2005)  and  neurally
(Hubbard et al., 2009).  None of these modalities function like a code, and
their tight relationships to language suggest that language, too, should be seen
primarily as part of this wider communicative whole, rather than an isolated,
one-off system of code.
• Problem 2 -- The code model makes the ongoing evolution of a language
faculty difficult to account for: Simply put, what use is a faculty that permits
the acquisition of a more elaborate code if that code is not shared by others
(Origgi  &  Sperber,  2000)?   Evolution  is  unable  to  'experiment'  with
additional  codes  (Sperber  &  Origgi,  2012),  as  code  mismatches  cause
communication to fail.
The bootstrapping problem arises from the conjunction of these two points.  If the
language faculty is the capacity to acquire a code, then its emergence and subsequent
elaboration is difficult  to account for.  This is  further exacerbated by the opaque
relationship between language-as-code and other aspects of communication, as we
cannot appeal to them to bootstrap language either.  Finally, it is no co-incidence that
many  of  the  unsatisfactory  solutions  to  the  bootstrapping  problem  come  from
perspectives that endorse a code model of language.  This is certainly true of Pinker
and  Bloom,  who  characterise  language  as  the  “communication  of  propositional
structures over a serial channel.”  Similarly, the computational routines emphasised
by biolinguistics represent computations over the code.  Much work in the ILM also
assumes the code-model, if only as a methodological simplification.
The effect of the code model, then, is to obscure the relationships between language
and other aspects of communication and between language and the evolution of the
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language faculty.  These outcomes are likely in any approach to language evolution
that adopts the code model, and go some way to explaining the ILM's apparently
inevitable slide into the bootstrapping problem when attempting to account for the
expressivity pressure.  What is needed, therefore, is another conception of language
that avoids the problems associated with the code model.
1.4.5.4  –  Models  of  linguistic  communication  II:  The  ostensive-
inferential model
The ostensive-inferential conception of communication sees it as a process in which
senders  provide evidence—ostensions—from which receivers can draw  inferences
regarding the sender's intended meaning.  On this view, a linguistic utterance is not
primarily something to be decoded (although some decoding is involved), but a piece
of  evidence  from which  inferences  can  be  made regarding  the  sender's  intended
meaning.  Consider the following example, from Sperber and Wilson (2012a: 11):
a. ALAN JONES: Do you want to join us for supper?
b. LISA: No, thanks.  I've eaten.
Some decoding is, of course, required in order to understand Lisa's reply.  However,
taken simply as a target for decoding it is a total non sequitur.  Taken as a target from
which inferences can be drawn, however, it makes perfect sense.  For example, Lisa
is assuming that her reply will be interpreted in light of their shared awareness that
people normally only eat once on any given evening.  In contrast to the code model,
it is uncontroversial that linguistic communication is well characterised as ostensive-
inferential.   Indeed,  language has been described as the “archetypal  example” of
ostensive communication (Scott-Phillips & Kirby, 2013: 429).        
This  view of  communication  is  based on the  foundational  work of  Grice  (1957,
1968)  and  has  since  been  elaborated  by  a  range  of  work  in  philosophy  and
pragmatics (e.g. Levinson, 1983; Horn, 1984).  For the rest of this section, however, I
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want  to  focus  on  one  particular  account  of  ostensive-inferential  communication,
relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), because it not only grounds language in
the  broader  context  of  human communication  (addressing  problem one)  but  also
grounds communication in cognition, and cognition in evolution (thereby addressing
problem two).
1.4.5.5 – Relevance theory
The 'relevance' in relevance theory is a potential property of external stimuli, internal
representation, or indeed anything that might serve as an input to cognitive processes
(Wilson & Sperber, 2006).  The relevance of an input represents a trade-off between
its  positive  cognitive  effects—the  extent  to  which  it  enhances  an  organism's
representation of the world—and the processing cost—the cognitive effort—involved
in deriving those effects.   The main claims of relevance theory are stated in  the
following two principles (Sperber & Wilson, 1995):
Cognitive Principle of Relevance:— 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.
Communicative Principle of Relevance:—
Every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal
relevance 
To flesh out  these principles  and to see how relevance theory grounds language,
communication and cognition in evolution, it helps to lay out the argument in such a
way as to 'work forwards' from basic biology to complex linguistic utterances.
● The brain is metabolically expensive: The brain is the organ of cognition.  It
also  very  metabolically  expensive  (Mink  et  al.,  1981).   Evolution  will,
therefore,  favour anything that reduces the brain's  energy demands or that
makes it more efficient. 
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● Evolution will favour cognitive efficiency: Cognitive efficiency is a matter
of  the  balance  between costs  and benefits.   The  cost  is  the  mental  effort
required to process inputs, retrieve memories, make connections, etc.  The
benefits are the cognitive effects of this processing: the extent to which such
processing  enriches  and changes  an  organism's  knowledge,  understanding,
beliefs and plans (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).  Cognitive efficiency is a matter
of  being  able  to  select  what  information—from the  environment  or  from
memory—is worth processing at any given time (Sperber & Wilson, 2012b).  
● The Cognitive Principle of Relevance is the generalised case of cognitive
efficiency: The most relevant inputs to cognition are those that provide the
greatest  cognitive effects  for the least  processing cost  (Sperber  & Wilson,
2012b).  If cognitive efficiency is a matter of selecting which inputs to attend
to,  relevance  is  the  quality  being  maximised  in  that  selection  (Sperber  &
Wilson, 2012b).  The tendency to maximise relevance is a universal feature of
human cognition,  with  perceptual,  mnemonic  and inferential  processes  all
focused towards this end (Sperber & Wilson, 2012a).  The maximisation of
relevance presents, then, as a kind of 'cognitive regularity'.        
● Ostensive-inferential  communicative  exploits  this  cognitive  regularity:
For communication to be successful, communicators require the attention of
their audience.  If the attention and processing efforts of the audience are
generally directed to relevant stimuli, then communication can best succeed
by being relevant (Sperber & Wilson,  2012a).   As a result,  and assuming
communicators  wish to  succeed,  the  very  act  of  communicating  itself
indicates that a communicator desires the audience to see the communication
as relevant.  The Communicative Principle of Relevance can, therefore, be
seen as a consequence of the Cognitive Principle.  Communicators will make
their  ostensions  as  relevant  as  possible  in  order  to  succeed,  while  their
audience  will  seek  to  make  the  most  relevant  inferences  from  those
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ostensions (Sperber & Wilson, 2012a).     
● Ostensions can take almost any form: Ostensions need not be linguistic,
they can take the form of gestures, facial expressions, deictic points, etc.  This
fact should be seen in light of the tight coupling of language and other forms
of communication discussed above (1.4.5.3).   Indeed,  any  alteration to the
shared environment has the potential to act as an ostension.  Consider the
following two examples, extracted from Sperber and Wilson, (2012b):
(1) Peter opens the latest issue of Time Out, intending not only to see what films are
on but also to provide Mary with evidence he would like to go out that evening.
(2) Peter  establishes eye-contact  with Mary and then taps the issue of  Time Out
before opening it, to indicate that he would like to go out that evening.
In both these examples, Peter is providing ostensive evidence—opening or
tapping the magazine, gaining eye contact—from which he wishes Mary to
draw certain communicative inferences.  These inferences depend, amongst
other things, on a shared knowledge of the environment (the content of the
magazine)  and of  its  role  in  their  life  (that  they use  that  content  to  plan
evening activities).
● Language  is  an  enhancement  of  ostensive-inferential  communication:
Language is simply one further tool of inferential communication (Sperber &
Wilson, 1995).  However, language is capable of providing uniquely precise
and  unambiguous  evidence  of  a  communicator's  meaning.  Consider  these
linguistic counterparts to the examples above:
(3) PETER: Shall we do something this evening?
(4) PETER: Shall we go and see the 8:30 screening of the new Steven Spielberg film?
The evidence provided in both (3) and (4) differs from that in (1) and (2), in
that it comes in the form of a linguistically coded utterance.  I shall return to
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this distinction below, when I consider what the ILM and relevance theory
have to offer one another.  For now, however, it is enough to note that any
decoding done here—the retrieval of utterance meaning—simply  serves  to
provide  one  more  piece  of  evidence  for  a  wider  inferential  process,  the
retrieval of  speaker meaning (Sperber & Wilson, 2012b), a process which
also draws on shared aspects of background knowledge.  For example, by 'do
something'  in  (3)  Peter  likely  means  'leave  the  house  and  engage  in  an
activity we both enjoy', rather than, say, 're-arrange the cutlery'.  However, in
both cases, and especially (4), it is possible to draw much more precise and
detailed inferences than it is from either (1) or (2).  It is this potential for
greater  precision  that  renders  language  an  enhancement  of  this  type  of
communication, rather than simply an additional modality.  
● This  enhancement  requires pre-existing  ostensive-inferential
communication: Much like money could only have emerged in the context
of  a  pre-existing  economic  system,  language—as  an  enhancement  of
ostensive-inferential communication—only makes sense in the context of a
pre-existing system of such communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).  As
Sperber (1990: 758) puts it: 
...a  language  faculty  and  languages  are  of  adaptive  value  only  for  a
species already deeply involved in inferential communication. 
In other words, the general form of inferential communication has to be in
place  prior  to  its  subsequent  enhancement  through  the  emergence  of  a
linguistic  code.   Indeed,  it  may well  be  that  this  embedding  in  the  pre-
existing, non-arbitrary aspects of inferential communication, such as gesture,
represents  a  necessary  condition  for  the  emergence  and  integration  of  a
system of arbitrary, learned symbols like language (Garrod et al., 2007; Fay
et al., 2010; Brown, 2012).
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The relevance theory approach solves both of the problems that seemed to follow
from the code model.  Firstly, it provides a clear account of the relationship between
language and others aspects of human communication.   Language, gesture,  facial
expressions, etc., form one general system of ostensive-inferential communication.
That  system is  also  grounded  in  aspects  of  human  cognition,  which  in  turn  are
grounded in fundamental  evolutionary considerations.   The expressivity  pressure,
then, can be seen as the pressure on language to function expressively within this
wider system of communication and cognition.  Secondly, it also solves the apparent
problem of how a language faculty might become more complex.  Under a code
model,  changes  to  the  faculty  that  allowed  the  acquisition  of  a  larger  or  more
complex code would be useless, and likely detrimental, because mismatches in the
code cause communication to fail.   On an inferential model, there is no need for
individuals' representations to coincide, as different decodings may provide evidence
for the same inferential interpretation (Origgi & Sperber, 2000; Sperber & Orrigi,
2012; Smith, 2005).
1.4.5.6 – The expressivity pressure in light of relevance theory
It  is  now  time  to  revisit  the  origin  of  the  expressivity  pressure,  in  light  of  the
ostensive-inferential model of language as exemplified by relevance theory.  To recap
briefly, the ILM account of language structure emphasises the interplay between the
pressure to be  compressible  and the pressure to be  expressive.   The first of these
pressures is inherent to cultural transmission and thus needs no further explanation.
The second, however, is not, and so an account of its origin is required.  The best
supported of these accounts links the expressivity pressure to the use of language for
communication.  The problem with this functional explanation, however, was that it
provided  no clear  account  of  why  communication,  and  not  some other  function,
should be the one that influenced language structure.  The obvious solution to this
problem, in evolutionary terms, seemed to be that natural selection determined the
relevant function.  However, this also seemed to leave us in the unrealistic position of
proposing that a language faculty could be favoured by selection before there was
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any language to learn.
The  clear  problem here  lies  in  the  conception  of  'communication'  that  is  being
employed.   Much  of  the  work  on  the  ILM implicitly  assumes  a  code-model  of
communication,  if  only as a  sensible methodological simplification.   As we have
seen, however, the adoption of the code model has consequences.  One of these is to
obscure  the  relationship  between  language  and  other  aspects  of  human
communication.  Once linguistic communication is ghettoised as operations over a
code,  it  becomes easy to view the evolution of language as the evolution  of  that
particular code—or, more properly, the faculty that permits its acquisition.  From
here, it is but a short step to the bootstrapping problem, and the question of how
selection might come to favour a code-acquiring language faculty in the absence of
the code itself. 
The  ostensive-inferential  model  of  language  avoids  this  problem  by  situating
language  in  the  wider  context  of  a  multi-modal  system  of  inference-based
communication.   This allows for the possibility that selection might act not on a
code-acquiring  faculty,  but  on  the  wider  capacities  underlying  inferential
communication in general.  In doing so, it would favour anything that might enhance
the power of that form of communication.  As we have seen, language represents just
such an enhancement.  Another way of looking at this is that it changes the functional
question from “Is language well designed for information transfer?” to “Is language
well  designed to  provide  the  evidence  necessary to  convey the  intended speaker
meaning?” (Scott-Phillips, 2010: 297).   In other words,  we should expect natural
selection  to  influence  the  specific  details  of  language  structure—the  code—only
inasmuch  as  it  impinges  on  its  capacity  to  convey  evidence  for  inferential
communication.  As I shall argue in section 1.5, this is exactly what we see on the
ILM account of structure.
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We are now in a position to trace fully the origin of the expressivity pressure.  As the
iterated  models  and  experiments  suggest,  its  initial  source  lies  in  language's
communicative function.  The reason, however, that language structure had to adapt
to fit  this  function rather than another one is, indeed, traceable to natural selection;
but  not  selection  for  a  language-specific,  code-acquiring  faculty,  but  rather  for
enhanced ostensive-inferential  communication.   This  should  not  be surprising,  as
from an inferential,  relevance-theoretic viewpoint this is simply what language  is:
one further tool of inferential communication, tightly coupled with other modalities
such as gesture, which serves as an enhancement of inferential communication by
virtue of the specificity of ostensions and inferences  it  supports.   It  is  from this
source  that  the  expressivity  pressure  originates,  and its  influence  on  the  cultural
system—countering  the  pressure  for  compressibility—is  to  ensure  that  language
remains sufficiently expressive to serve its function as an enhancement of that wider
system of inferential communication.  The arguments made here should be seen as
echoing other calls for the inferential nature of linguistic communication to be more
fully integrated into the ILM approach to language evolution (e.g. Scott-Phillips  &
Kirby, 2013).
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1.5  –  The role  of  natural  selection  in  cultural  accounts  of
language structure
The juxtaposition  of  relevance  theory and the  ILM brings  out  one  further  point,
which gets to the heart of what Pinker and Bloom got wrong: our understanding of
language structure can be partially decoupled from our understanding of language
function.   This  decoupling  means  that  natural  selection  should  not  be  seen  as
determining the  specifics of language structure, but rather as setting the 'boundary
conditions' under which structure is produced by the cultural system.  To better see




Sc S1 S2 S3
S4 S5 S6 S7
S8 S9 S10 S11
S12 S13 S14 Sn
Table 1.1: Natural selection in
Pinker and Bloom's model
The set of all possible language
structures.   Natural  selection
picks between structures based
on functional considerations.
Table 1.1 approximates the picture provided by Pinker and Bloom.  There is one
overall set of possible language structures, A.  Natural selection determines which of
these  structures  language  takes  on.   If  language  ends  up  with  a  compositional
structure (Sc), this must be because that structure serves language's communicative
function better than the other available structures (S1...Sn).  As a direct corollary, that
structure itself must be encoded in the genome.  There is, in other words, a very tight
coupling between language structure and language function, with the specific details
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of the former following directly from the latter.  This tight coupling is required for
the code-like communication hypothesised by Pinker and Bloom, because even small







U U1 U2 U3 C C1 C2 C3
U4 U5 U6 U7 C4 C5 C6 C7
U8 U9 U10 U11 C8 C9 C10 C11
U12 U13 U14 Un C12 C13 C14 Cn
Table 1.2: Natural selection in a combined ILM and
inferential model
Language structures fall into two possible sets. Those that
are  ineffective  for  communication  (B)  and  those  that  are
communicatively effective (C).  Natural selection determines
the  choice  of  set  C over  set  B,  but  has  no  role  in
determining  which  of  the  specific  structures  in  set  C
language comes to exhibit.
In contrast, table 1.2 illustrates the picture provided by the union of relevance theory
and the ILM.  The set  of possible  language structures  is  divided in  two.  Set  B
contains all the communicatively ineffective structures (U...Un).  Set  C contains all
the  communicatively  effective  structures  (C...Cn).   This  second  set  includes
compositional structure (C), but also any other structure (C1...Cn) that might serve an
inferential  system  of  communication  equally  well.   As  we  have  seen,  cultural
transmission  is  capable  of  delivering  either  communicatively  effective  (e.g.
compositional) or ineffective (e.g. systematically underspecified) structures.
The role of natural selection, via the expressivity pressure, is to influence the cultural
process such that the resulting structure comes from set C, rather than set B.  This is
what is meant by 'setting the boundary conditions'.  However, natural selection has
no direct  influence at  all  on  which  of the structures  in  set  C language comes to
posses.   If  language  ends  up  with  a  compositional  structure  (C),  rather  than  an
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equally  effective  alternative  (Cn),  then  this  is  simply  a  reflection  of  the  overall
dynamics of the cultural process.  
The only influence on this process that natural selection can possibly have is the
functional  demands  of  the  expressivity  pressure.   If  those  are  satisfied,  there  is
simply no way for selection to determine the outcome in more detail.  As a corollary,
there is no reason to assume that the specifics of linguistic structure be genetically
encoded.  This partial decoupling of function and structural details is possible for an
inferential  system,  because  its  success  is  not  dependent  on  the  genetic
micromanagement of the linguistic code.  Indeed, one might suggest that it is this
very fact that makes the offloading of control to a system of cultural transmission
possible in the first place (see chapter two, 2.6).   
It  is  now  possible  to  bring  some  clarity  to  the  distinction  often  made  between
'biological' and 'cultural' accounts of language structure.  Pinker and Bloom's account
is 'biological' not because they invoke natural selection, but because of  what  they
thought was being selected.  They assumed that the specifics of language structure—
the choice of structure from set A—had a biological base.   This assumption follows
directly from their code-like view of linguistic communication. Pinker and Bloom's
account  is  'biological',  then,  because  of  their  appeal  to  an  exclusively biological
mechanism.  Conversely, the ILM is a 'cultural' account not because it doesn't involve
natural  selection,  but  because it  ascribes  the  specifics  of  language structure—the
choice of structure from set  C—to the overall  dynamics of cultural  transmission.
The role of natural selection—by introducing a pressure for expressivity—is simply
to bias those dynamics towards the set  of communicatively useful structures (C),
rather  than  the set  of  communicatively ineffective structures  (B).   The ILM is  a
'cultural'  account,  then,  because  it  posits  a  largely  self-organising  cultural
mechanism.
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1.6  –  The  complementarity  of  the  ILM  and  pragmatic
approaches to language
The major  contribution that  a  pragmatic  conception  of  language—as exemplified
here by relevance theory—can offer the ILM, then, is to place language in a wider
communicative, cognitive and evolutionary context.  This is vital, because without
this wider context we are unable to think clearly about the interrelationships between
communication,  cultural  evolution  and natural  selection.   The difficulty  the  ILM
faced in providing a comprehensive account of the expressivity pressure is a direct
testimony to the need for this wider context.  That difficulty stemmed, fundamentally,
from the tacit adoption of the code model of communication.  This was done, I think,
largely for methodological reasons.  The good news, however, is that there is nothing
about the ILM that requires it to adopt the code model of communication (e.g. Smith,
2005).  
However, the ILM also has something of great value to offer relevance theory.  The
central insight of pragmatic approaches to linguistic communication is that language
forms one part of a larger, multi-modal system of inferential communication.  This
system includes gestures, facial expressions, and non-linguistic vocalisations, as well
as language itself.  Nevertheless, language still stands out because, although the code
model is an inadequate characterisation of linguistic communication, language itself
is a code.  This fact in itself is not a problem for relevance theory: decoded utterances
simply represent one potential piece of evidence from which inferences can be drawn
(Sperber  & Wilson, 1995, 2012a).  However, relevance theory itself has nothing to
say about how this code might have come into existence.  The ILM, in contrast, most
definitely does: the code is the product of an iterated process in which language has
to adapt to the circumstances of its transmission.
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1.7 – Conclusions
This chapter had two principle aims.  The first was to assess the ILM with a critical
eye, to try and tease apart exactly how it functions to deliver compositional structure.
The second, bearing that critical assessment in mind, was to clarify the necessary
evolutionary preconditions for the ILM.
1.7.1 – How does the ILM work?
This question can be given two different readings.  The first concerns how the ILM
works  internally.   The  results  of  both  models  and experiments  suggest  that  the
principle dynamic here is the interplay between the pressure to be compressible and
the pressure to be expressive.  Language has to adapt to both these pressures in order
to be successfully transmitted.  Language has to compress, therefore, in such a way
so  as  not  to  sacrifice  its  expressive  power.   Compositionality  represents  a
compromise  solution  that  delivers  a  language  that  is  both  compressible  and
expressive.  
However, this kind of internal account is simply not sufficient from the perspective
of the present thesis.  It shows us how such a system of interacting pressures might
operate  to  produce  language structure,  but  it  does  not  tell  us  why  the  system is
composed of those particular pressures and not other ones.  The second reading, then,
is external and concerns the origin of the two pressures identified above.
First  consider  the  pressure  to  be  compressible.   Language  faces  the  pressure  to
compress as an inevitable consequence of it being culturally transmitted.  This is a
general result of models of cultural transmission (Brighton, 2003; Kirby, 2012) and
applies to birdsong (Ritchie, 2008) as much as language.  One outcome of this result
is that cultural transmission is itself an inherently structure-creating process.  Given
a random system, the sheer fact of cultural transmission will itself impose structure,
such that it becomes simpler, more compressed and thus easier to learn.  To reiterate,
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this is a point that goes well beyond language, it is something fundamental about
cultural  transmission  itself.   This  fact  constitutes  a  powerful  extra-biological,
informational regularity.  This regularity should be seen as something akin to the
regularities of physics and mathematics discussed in relation to frog embryology and
human locomotion in 1.2.3.  Like those regularities, it stands as something ripe to be
exploited by the evolutionary process.  
Unlike the regularities of physics, however, the informational regularities of cultural
transmission do not exist independently of organisms with the capacity to implement
them.  However, once such organisms appear and begin culturally transmitting their
communication  systems,  those  systems  can  become more  structured  simply  as  a
result of the regularities of cultural transmission.  The language will face the inherent
cultural  pressure to compress.  There is no guarantee, however, that the resulting
structure will be adaptive from the organism's point of view.  Unless, that is, there is
also a countervailing influence in the system, such that the structure it produced also
had to meet some other criteria.  
The  expressivity  pressure  constitutes  just  such  a  countervailing  influence.   This
pressure does not arise simply from the nature of cultural transmission.  Work in the
ILM suggests that it traces to the communicative function of language.  This still left
open the question of why language had to adapt to a pressure stemming from that
function rather than another one.  The clear evolutionary solution here would be to
appeal to natural selection.  However, under the code model this answer seemed to
lead inexorably into the bootstrapping problem.  Once we recognise, however, that
language is best conceptualised in inferential terms this problem disappears.  Natural
selection can be seen to act on this wider system of inferential communication, rather
than on an implausibly prescient code-acquiring faculty.  Potential language users
are,  therefore,  under  selection  for  enhanced  ostensive-inferential  communication.
This  is  why  language  has  to  adapt  to  a  pressure—expressivity—relating  to
communication, rather than some other function.        
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For the ILM, then, the role of biological evolution and natural selection is firstly to
create  organism's capable of  culturally transmitting their  communication systems.
And,  secondly,  to  pair  the  regularities  that  emerge  from such  transmission  with
another influence, the expressivity pressure, that sets the boundary conditions within
which those regularities operate.  Once this is in place, the cultural mechanism—the
internal workings of the ILM—can deliver a structured language.
1.7.2 – What are its necessary preconditions?
In section  1.4,  five preconditions for the ILM account of language structure were
identified:
I. The ability to acquire new signals
II. The ability to acquire and produce new signal-meaning associations
III. The ability to infer communicative intent
IV. The existence of a bottleneck
V. The existence of the expressivity pressure
The final task of this chapter is to recognise that these five preconditions are actually
reducible to two underlying factors.  The first of these is that the communication
system must be learned—be  traditionally transmitted—rather than unlearned and
present from birth (preconditions I and II).  In many respects, this precondition is
obvious: iterated  learning can only have an influence on systems that are actually
learnt.  
The second concerns the presence of certain skills of social cognition: the ability to
conceptualise  others  in  intentional  terms,  to  share  intentions  with  others  in  joint
attentional situations, and, most basic of all, the sensitivity to communicative intent.
These abilities underpin the acquisition of large numbers of signal-meaning pairs,
and  thus  the  creation  of  the  bottleneck  (preconditions  III  and  IV).   Importantly,
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however, these  very same abilities also underpin a general  capacity to engage in
ostensive-inferential communication.  Indeed, the inference of communicative intent
is  the inferential  half  of ostensive-inferential  communication.   In other words, an
organism capable of precondition III—inferring communicative intent—would also
likely be capable of some kind of inferential communication, perhaps non-linguistic
in form.  As we have seen, language itself only makes sense against the  backdrop of
such pre-existing inferential communication.  
The cognitive skills  underlying precondition III,  then,  also bring about the wider
functional  context  which  explains  the  existence  of  the  expressivity  pressure
(precondition  V).   Finally,  note  how this  is  also  the  same set  of  skills,  relating
broadly to theory of mind, that were invoked by Smith (2004) to account for a pre-
existing bias in favour of one-to-one mappings (1.3.1).  We can now see, however,
that the relationship between language structure and theory of mind is somewhat less
direct  than  Smith  envisaged.   The  importance  of  theory  of  mind  lies  not  in  its
introduction of a domain-general pre-existing bias,  but in its  underpinning of the
form of communication—inferential communication—of which language constitutes
an enhancement.  Language faces the pressure to be expressive, then, to the extent
that  its  users  are  under  selective  pressure  for  enhanced  ostensive-inferential
communication.
In conclusion, the ILM account of compositional structure itself requires an account
of the following two factors:
1. The evolutionary conditions in which traditional transmission might come
to play a greater role in a species' communication system
This  first  precondition  puts  in  place  the  structure-creating  regularities  of  cultural
transmission.  Assuming learners with finite time and cognitive resources, a system
of signals transmitted in this way will inevitably become more structured over time.
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2. The evolutionary conditions which might favour the emergence of those skills
of social cognition, most basically the sensitivity to communicative intent
This second precondition is important in two different ways.  Firstly, it enables the
inferential association of signals with meanings, such that the culturally transmitted
system is  a system of signal-meaning  pairs.   This is  what distinguishes language
from other culturally transmitted systems such as birdsong.  Secondly, it underpins
the wider capacity for inferential communication.  Language is part of that system of
inferential communication.  The expressivity pressure is the pressure on language to
function  expressively as  part  of  that  wider  system.   It  arises  to  the  extent  that
communicating  organisms  are  under  selective  pressure  for  enhanced  ostensive-
inferential communication.
The  combined  effects  of  these  two  preconditions,  then,  is  that  a  culturally
transmitted system of  signal-meaning pairs becomes progressively more structured
in such a way so as not to sacrifice expressivity.  In the next two chapters I will take
each of these two factors in turn and explore in detail a comparative example with




Traditional Transmission and the Bengalese Finch
Chapter one presented a critical examination of the Iterated Learning Model (ILM), a
body of work which shows that language structure can emerge as an outcome of
repeated instances of cultural transmission.  The key advantage of the ILM over other
accounts of linguistic structure is that it provides an explicit mechanism linking facts
about language to facts about individual learners.  The major problem for the ILM
account,  however, is  that  the  very possibility  of  that  mechanism—change in  the
language  itself  through  a  cultural  evolutionary  process—stands  in  need  of
explanation.   How might  this  process  have  got  going  in  the  first  place?   What,
minimally, does a cultural account of linguistic structure such as the ILM need to get
started?  In addressing these questions, the discussion in chapter one identified two
key preconditions.  It may be useful to briefly recap these here.
The first precondition is that the communication system needs to be  traditionally
transmitted.   The structure  of  a  communication system cannot  emerge through a
process of iterated learning unless it is actually learned from a previous generation,
and yet in most species, including our closest great ape relatives, the communication
system is  not  learned  in  this  way.  This  raises  the  question  of  the  evolutionary
conditions  under  which  cultural  transmission  might  come  to  take  on  a  greater
influence on a species' communication system.  The second precondition concerns
the emergence of the socio-cognitive skills that underpin the possibility of acquiring
a large system of signal-meaning pairs, most fundamental among these skills is the
sensitivity to communicative intent.  The importance of this second precondition is
twofold.  Firstly, it is crucial that it be a system of signal-meaning pairs—as opposed 
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to a system merely of signals, such as birdsong—to permit a generalisation to be
made, on the basis of meaning, from the subset of the system that makes it through
the  bottleneck  to  the  system as  a  whole.   Secondly,  those  same socio-cognitive
capacities underpin the possibility of inferential communication, of which language
is  an  enhancement.   Under  what  conditions,  then,  might  these  cognitive  skills
emerge?
In this chapter and the next I will take each of these in turn and discuss in detail a
comparative example in which aspects of one of these preconditions can be seen
emerging over evolutionary time.  The context in which these preconditions emerged
in other species may then illuminate how and why they emerged in humans, and
thereby begin the process of filling in the 'missing half' of the cultural account of
linguistic structure, as discussed in the introduction.  In this chapter I will focus on
the first of these preconditions, relating to traditional transmission, and consider the
case of the Bengalese finch.  In chapter three I will turn to the second precondition.
First,  however, it  is  necessary to  say something about  the logic of these kind of
evolutionary comparisons.
2.1 – The logic of evolutionary comparisons
Comparative studies search for similarities between organisms.  Such similarities fall
into  two broad categories.   The  first  category concerns  those that  derive  from a
shared ancestry, which are known as homologies.  Opposable thumbs, for example,
are shared by humans, the great apes and old-world monkeys, all of which also share
a relatively recent common ancestor.  The value of homologies lies in their being a
clue  to  the  relatedness  of  different  species,  for  the  purpose  of  reconstructing
phylogeny (Gould,  1976).   The main limitation  of  homologies  is  that  any set  of
related similarities only constitutes a single data point (Fitch, 2010).  We can learn
nothing  about  why humans  came  to  have  opposable  thumbs  by  looking  at  the
opposable thumbs of chimpanzees: in both cases they were simply inherited from a
common ancestor.
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The second category of comparative similarity concerns resemblances in form or
behaviour that emerge in distantly related species, in what is known as convergent
evolution.  These similarities are known as analogies14.  The camera eyes shared by
vertebrates  and cephalopods,  for  example,  were  not  present  in  their  very distant
common ancestor, but evolved independently in the two lineages.  The similarities
between  the  vertebrate  and  cephalopod  eye  reflects  similarities  in  the  'design
problem' (Dennett, 1995) to which those eyes present as a solution.  In this case the
detection  and  processing  of  information  available  in  a  certain  form  of
electromagnetic radiation—light.  The weakness of analogies lies in their potential to
mislead in terms of relatedness.  It would clearly be a mistake to see the similar eyes
of humans and octopuses as indicating close evolutionary kinship.  The strength of
analogies, however, lie in the separation of data points that they provide.  Crucially,
this  means  that  the answer to  the question of  how and why the cephalopod eye
evolved  can shed light on how and why the vertebrate eye evolved, because their
functional  similarity  suggests  they likely evolved  in  response  to  a  similar  set  of
selective pressures.  
To complete a cultural account of linguistic structure along the lines laid out in the
introduction, it  is necessary to explain  how and  in what context the preconditions
discussed in chapter one are likely to emerge.  It is evolutionary analogies that will
prove most enlightening in providing this  explanation.   As such, the comparative
studies described in this chapter and the next are both analogies.  In both cases, the
broad context in which the relevant precondition emerges is during the process of
domestication.  The purpose of this chapter and the next is to explore how and why
domestication might lead to the emergence of these analogous preconditions.
14  The distinction between homologies and analogies, at least as utilised in the present chapter, is
unaffected by the notion of deep homology (Shubin et al., 1997, 2009), in which seemingly analogous
structures  or  behaviours  turn  out  to  be  based  on  similar,  and  thus  homologous,  genetic  and
developmental mechanisms.  This is because what deep homology really represents is the idea that
structures or behaviours that evolved independently can be based on shared developmental resources,
pathways and genetic bases (Fitch, 2010).  It should be clear, of course, that the value of evolutionary
analogies lies in their ability to shed light, in a way that homologies cannot, on the shared conditions
leading to that independent evolution.  The concept of deep homology leaves this unchanged.
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2.2 –  The Bengalese finch and the white-rumped munia:  the
differences
2.2.1 – Brief historical account
The Bengalese finch is a domesticated strain of the white-rumped munia (Okanoya,
2002).  To appreciate the interest in this particular domestication it helps to have
some historical background on the Bengalese finch itself.  Its naming in English as
the  Bengalese finch  is  thought  to  derive  from the  fact  that  the  traders  who first
bought the birds to Britain picked them up in India.  The birds are not, however,
Indian in origin,  with the original domestication tracing to  either  China or Japan
(Svanberg, 2008).  One clue suggesting a Japanese origin is the fact that Chinese
bird-breeders have historically favoured good singers—not, as we shall see, a trait
possessed by the wild munia—whereas Japanese breeders have long favoured white
plumage (Svanberg, 2008), a trait for which the white-rumped munia is named, and
which had come to be much exaggerated in the domesticated finches. 
Whatever its origin, it is known that the Bengalese finch has been bred in Japan for at
least 250 years, primarily for its white colouration (Okanoya, 2004).  What is most
interesting, however, is that despite being bred for its plumage, and not as a singer,
the song of the Bengalese finch has also changed significantly relative to its wild
ancestor (Okanoya, 2002).  The song has become more complex, less predictable
and, most importantly in the present context, learning has come to play a greater role
in  determining song structure.   Learning,  that  is,  from members  of  the  previous
generation, or traditional transmission.  However, because 'learning' is such a broad
term, it is useful to place the differences between the two species in the context of a
wider discussion of the role of learning in birdsong.
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2.2.2 – Dimensions of learning in songbirds
In this section I will describe six dimensions along which song learning differs across
species (Beecher & Burt, 2004; Beecher & Brenowitz, 2005; Beecher et al., 2010;
Soma,  2011).   For  each  dimension  I  will  give  a  brief  overview of  the  range of
observed variation, together with a comparison of the domesticated Bengalese and
wild munia.
2.2.2.1 – When song is learned
The first dimension concerns the time-frame in which songs can be learnt.  The basic
distinction here is between closed learners, who can only acquire their song during a
limited sensitive period early in development, and open learners, who can continue
to learn during adulthood (Brainard & Doupe, 2002).  Within this basic distinction
sits a range of variation.  Some closed learners, such as many species of sparrow
(Brainard  & Doupe,  2002),  have  a  two-phase  sensitive  period:  a  first  phase  for
exposure  to  conspecific  song  (the  sensory  phase),  and  second  for  practice  and
auditory feedback (the sensorimotor phase).  In other closed learners, such as Zebra
finch, the sensory and sensorimotor phases overlap.  
The sensitive period is not tied to chronological age as such, but rather to the extent
of experience.  Once a certain level of exposure to conspecific song has occurred the
bird then becomes 'fixed' and subsequent exposure has little effect.  Among open
learners, some, such as the canaries (Brainard & Doupe, 2002), exhibit a seasonal
pattern, acquiring a new song every year; whereas others, such as European starlings
(Hultsch & Todt, 2004), can acquire new songs at any time of the year, and can even
acquire songs as adults having been reared in isolation as chicks (Chaiken & Böhner,
2007).   Finally,  the  closed-open  dichotomy  is  probably  better  thought  of  as  a
continuum,  as  even  closed  learners  are  able  to  modify  aspects  of  song  such  as
amplitude during adulthood (Hultsch & Todt, 2004), despite being unable to acquire
new song elements.
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Finch vs. Munia: Both the Bengalese finch and the white-rumped munia are closed
learners (Okanoya & Yamaguchi, 1997; Soma et al., 2006), as indeed are most other
species of Estrilid finch (Soma, 2011).  Therefore, while much of the discussion in
this chapter focuses on the differences in the roles of learning in the two species, this
does not imply that one continues to learn throughout life while the other does not.
2.2.2.2 – The necessity of early experience
The  second  dimension  concerns  the  importance  of  early  experience  to  the
development  of normal  song.   There are  two forms of  early experience,  each of
which is associated with one of the two phases described above.  The first concerns
the auditory exposure to conspecific song, which is usually investigated by rearing
birds  in  isolation  and  thus  disrupting  the  sensory  phase.   The  second  concerns
auditory feedback during the  sensorimotor phase, and can be investigated through
experiments  in  which  birds  are  deafened.   If  reared  in  isolation  most  species  of
songbirds develop an abnormal 'isolate'  song, which differs significantly from the
song of their conspecifics (Beecher et al., 2010).  In some species, however, such as
the grey catbird (Kroodsma et al., 1997) and the European sedge warbler (Leitner et
al., 2002) normal song repertoires are generated even when the birds are reared in
isolation.  As far as I am aware, all birds, including those who develop normal song
in  isolation  (although  this  has  not  been  explicitly  tested;  Beecher  et  al.,  2010),
require auditory feedback to develop normal song.
Finch vs. Munia: Members of both species also require some exposure to conspecific
song (during  the  sensory phase)  and the  auditory feedback of  their  own singing
(during the sensorimotor phase) in order to develop normal species-typical song (Bao
et al., 2003; Peng et al., 2012).  It is not the case, therefore, that one species learns
while the other one does not.  This similarity brings out an important point.  Namely,
that the focus of this case study is not the emergence of vocal learning per se—both
species are vocal learners—but rather the conditions under which such learning, and
the channel of cultural transmission it enables, comes to play a more important role
in determining the structure of a species' communication system.
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2.2.2.3 – The importance of social experience
The third dimension concerns the nature of that early experience.  Much of the work
regarding the role of experience and the duration of the sensitive period has been
carried out within the 'tape tutor' paradigm (Beecher & Burt, 2004), in which birds
learn from recordings of conspecific song.  This allows precise experimental control
over what learners are exposed to, but omits any social dimension.  This omission is
important.  Some birds, such as the white-crowned sparrow will happily learn from a
tape tutor, while others, such as the sedge wren will not (Baptista & Gaunt, 1997).
The presence of a live tutor has also been found to influence the duration of the
sensitive period.  For example, although, as just noted, white-crowned sparrows will
learn from a tape tutor, they fail to learn any new song presented after about fifty
days, but if presented with a live tutor they can continue learning beyond this point
(Baptista & Petrinovich, 1984).
Finch  vs.  Munia:  Both  species,  again  like  Estrilid  finches  more  generally,  are
considered 'social' learners (Eales, 1989; Soma, 2011) in that they learn better from
socially interacting with a tutor than they do from tape-tutoring, although it is not
clear exactly what it is about the social interaction that accounts for this difference
(Soma, 2011).  The difference between the two species is not, then, that one needs
the social interaction with a tutor while the other does not.
2.2.2.4 – The number of songs learned
The  fourth  dimension  concerns  the  size  of  the  song  repertoire.   This  varies
enormously between species.  Some, such as the white-crowned sparrow, only have a
single song; others, such as the sedge wren have several hundred songs, while the
brown thrasher has over 1000 (Kroodsma, 2004).  It should be noted, however, that
there  are  two  widely  used  methods  to  quantify  the  size  of  any  given  species'
repertoire (Gil & Gahr, 2002).  In some species songs can be classified into distinct
types, and so the repertoire size is given by the number of these song types.  In other
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species, songs consist of sequences of elements that are repeated in multiple orders,
and the total number of these elements is used as a measure of repertoire size.  This
gives rise to what has been termed the 'comparability problem' (Gil & Gahr, 2002), in
which  the  repertoire  size  given  for  one  species  may be  the  result  of  measuring
something completely different than the repertoire size given for another species.
Finch vs.  Munia:  The Bengalese finch  and white-rumped munia  do not  differ  in
absolute  repertoire  size under  either  of  the  measures  discussed  above  (Honda &
Okanoya, 1999), with both species only learning a single song type and differing
little regarding the number of elements—with 9.3 and 8.4,  respectively.  What is
interesting, however, is that they differ significantly in terms of the complexity and
unpredictability of the transition  between notes  and note groups (Okanoya, 2002,
2012).  In other words, while the number of elements has remained unchanged the
complexity of the relationships between those elements has greatly increased in the
Bengalese finch.  Bengalese finches are, in effect, doing much more varied things
with  the  same amount  of  material.   This,  then,  is  the  first  significant  difference
between the two species.
2.2.2.5 – Copying fidelity of learners
The fifth dimension concerns the degree to which birds faithfully copy the song of
the  particular  model  to  which  they  are  exposed.   Species  lie  somewhere  on  a
continuum  that  ranges  from  the  complete  and  total  imitation  of  a  tutor's  song,
through  improvisations  based  on  the  tutor's  singing,  right  up  to  the  individual
invention of a species-typical song-type that has no clear connection with the details
of any individual tutor (Beecher & Brenowitz, 2005).
Finch vs. Munia: The differences in copying fidelity represent the second significant
difference  between  the  two species.   The  clearest  evidence  for  these  differences
comes  in  the  form of  cross-fostering  experiments  (Takahi  & Okanoya,  2010),  in
particular from the comparison between the two species when reared by conspecific
parents.  Munia chicks learning to sing from munia fathers display a very high degree
81
of fidelity.  In contrast, the Bengalese chicks are much less accurate in their copying
of  Bengalese  song.   The  song  of  Bengalese  chicks  still  resembled  that  of  their
particular tutor, but not in the form of an exact replica.  In the white-rumped munia,
then, song learning is characterised by the very close and faithful copying of a tutor;
whereas  in  the  Bengalese  finch  aspects  of  the  tutors  song  are  combined  with
improvisations and variations introduced by the learner.
2.2.2.6 – Degree of canalization
The final dimension concerns the degree of canalization, in particular the range of
possible  songs that  a  species  is  able  to  copy.  Some species,  such as  the white-
crowned sparrow, will  only copy songs  that  fit  within  a  narrow, species-specific
range (Beecher et al., 2010); whereas others—most famously the mynah bird—are
able  to  mimic  any number  of  environmental  sounds  (Kelley  et  al.,  2008).   The
concept of canalization is going to be important throughout the rest of this chapter, as
such it will be useful here to provide a more detailed discussion of what it means to
say that something is canalized.     
A phenotypic trait  is said to be canalized to the extent that it  appears during the
course of development regardless of conditions, and thus exhibits a robustness in the
face of developmental perturbations (Flatt, 2005).  Another way of putting this is that
organisms can arrive at similar phenotypes despite variation in either their genotypes
or developmental environments.  As  a result,  the concept of canalization can be
further subdivided into genetic canalization and environmental canalization (Wagner
et al., 1997).
Genetic  canalization  refers  to  the  insensitivity  of  the  phenotype  to  genetic
perturbations, such as mutations, that might otherwise have had a phenotypic effect
(Meikeljohn & Hartl, 2002).  As such, genetic canalization can be seen as an epistatic
phenomenon (Flatt, 2005), in the sense of interactions between genes, and especially
the blocking of the effect of one allele by an allele at another locus (Phillips, 2008).
The factors involved in genetic canalization are numerous and varied (see Flatt, 2005
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for an extensive list); however, a few examples will serve to illustrate the general
principle.  For instance, in cases where there is a fully dominant allele, the phenotype
of heterozygous and the homozygous-dominant individuals will be identical despite
differences in their  underlying genetics.   Another  example concerns the so-called
'protein chaperones' that act to mask the effect of mutant polypeptides by assisting in
the  process  of  protein  folding  (Rutherford,  2003).   This  assistance  allows
polypeptides with incorrect amino acid sequences, as the result of a mutation in the
coding  segment  of  DNA,  to  successfully  fold  into  the  correct  three-dimensional
structure to function as a protein, for example an enzyme.  Again, this mechanism
ensures phenotypic similarity despite genotypic differences.
Environmental canalization, by contrast, refers to the insensitivity of the phenotype
to variations in the environment.  These can either be macroenvironmental variations
such as  climactic  conditions,  or  random fluctuations  in  an organism's  internal  or
external  microenvironment  (Flatt,  2005).   In  many  cases  this  environmental
insensitivity is mediated by some of the same mechanisms as genetic canalization.
For example, the protein chaperones described above are also involved in the repair
of  proteins damaged by environmental stress (Rutherford, 2003).  This overlap in
mechanisms has led some to argue that there is only a single 'mode' of canalization
(Meikeljohn & Hartl, 2002), which serves to buffer development from all kinds of
variation in conditions that might otherwise result in deleterious outcomes.  
Finch vs. Munia: This is perhaps the most important way in which song-learning
between the two species differs.  The white-rumped munia exhibits a much greater
level  of  canalization  in  respect  to  song  learning  than  the  Bengalese  finch.   The
evidence for this is, again, drawn from the cross-fostering experiments, but this time
the  best  illustration  comes  from  what  happens  when  chicks  are  raised  by  non-
conspecific  parents.   Munia's  are  very  faithful  copiers  of  munia  song,  but  poor
copiers of Bengalese song (Takashi & Okanoya, 2010).  Fostered Bengalese chicks,
however, are just as faithful in their copying of munia song as they are of Bengalese
song.  This difference suggests that munias are more constrained—exhibit a greater
83
degree of environmental canalization—in what they will copy than are Bengalese
finches  (Takashi  &  Okanoya,  2010).   Munias,  it  seems,  are  highly  constrained
learners who will only learn from a narrow range of species-specific songs.  In the
Bengalese finch, however, this constraint seems to have somewhat broken down.
2.2.3 – Summary
There are, then, three ways in which the song-learning of the Bengalese finch differs
from that of its wild ancestor, the white-rumped munia: Bengalese finches, although
working with the same number of elements, order those elements in more complex,
less predictable ways; they also copy their models less faithfully, often introducing
their own variations; and are much less constrained in terms of what they are able to
copy, their song-learning is less canalized.  
Three important points follow from these differences.  The first is that the reduction
in  learning  constraints  seen  in  the  Bengalese  finch  means  that  the  specifics  of
experience during development (e.g. particular tutor used as model) have a much
greater  influence  on  the  structure  of  the  resulting  song.   The second is  that  the
reduction  in  high-fidelity  copying  combined  with  the  broader  range  of  what
Bengalese chicks will copy has resulted in a much greater variation in song between
different finches than is seen in their munia ancestors.  Finally, all three of these
differences combined have meant that many Bengalese finches have come to sing
songs of much greater complexity than seen in white-rumped munias (see Okanoya,
2012:  46,  for  an  account  of  how  this  sequential  complexity  was  measured),
especially  in  terms  of  the  decreased  predictability  of  how  elements  are  ordered
within a song.  
In the wild-living white-rumped munia, we have an example of a stereotypic, highly
canalized  communication  system in  which  learning plays  a  minimal  role.   In  its
domesticated descendent, the Bengalese finch, song learning is less canalized, the
songs themselves are less stereotypic and the influence of traditional transmission on
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song structure has increased.  We see in this example, then, a parallel with the first of
the  preconditions  identified  in  chapter  one:  an  increase  in  the  role  of  traditional
transmission in relation to the communication system.  This change occurred in the
context of domestication.   Recall,  however, that despite  this  context it  cannot  be
attributed to artificial selection for more complex song.  
In the next section I will explore two hypotheses which attempt to account for why
this  change occurred under domestication.   Both the hypotheses  discussed below
place the shift to a domesticated environment at the centre of the explanation, but
they  differ  as  to  what  the  key  effect  of  that  shift  was  likely  to  be.   The  first,
associated  with  the  work  of  Kazuo  Okanoya,  places  the  emphasis  on  sexual
selection, and the female preference for more complex song.  The second, associated
with Terrence Deacon, places the emphasis on the global lifting of selective pressure
afforded by the domesticated environment and the subsequent shift in the role of
epigenetic15 processes in the context of development.
15 Throughout this thesis the term 'epigenetic' is used very generally to refer to all non-genetic inputs
to the process of development, rather than in its more specific usage denoting a particular kind of
non-genetic, physical inheritance, such as patterns of DNA methylation (e.g. Jablonka & Lamb,
1995).
85
2.3 – Okanoya's hypothesis: sexual selection
The first hypothesis concerns the role of sexual selection, and is outlined in Okanoya
(2002: 56) in the following way:
...females of the ancestor species [white-rumped munia] preferred more complex songs,
but the ability of males of the ancestor species to develop and sing complex songs was
limited by constraints in nature, including predation risk and foraging costs
...[white-rumped munias] developed a finite-state syntax after domestication freed them
from predation pressure and other pressures associated with life in the wild.  In such a
protected environment, song structure can develop as a result of female choice.
The core of this hypothesis is that once the white-rumped munia had shifted to a
safer, domesticated environment, the only pressure influencing song structure was
sexual selection, in the form of a female preference for more complex song.  As a
result, the song of the domesticated strain became more complex.
It  should be clear, however, that  this  hypothesis  actually requires  two strands of
evidence  to  be  fully supported.   The first  is  evidence  that  Bengalese  and munia
females actually prefer more complex songs.  This is a claim about mate choice.  It
needs to be demonstrated that song complexity constitutes a proximate mechanism of
mate-choice.   The  second  is  evidence  showing  why mate  choice  based  on  song
complexity might have evolved in the first place.  What is the ultimate explanation
for the existence of this female preference?  Does, for example, song complexity
function as a signal of mate quality, and if so how?
2.3.1  –  Do  Bengalese  females  use  song  complexity  in  mate
choice?
The first question to explore in examining Okanoya's hypothesis is whether females
actually use song complexity in choosing a mate.  One line of evidence that suggests
they might concerns differences between male and female finches in their responses
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to song.  Ikebuhci et al. (2003) compared the heart rate responses of male and female
finches to novel songs.  When presented with a novel song the heart rate of female
finches increased, whereas that of male finches did not.  Neither males nor females
showed  any  heart  rate  increase  when  presented  with  a  novel  zebra  finch  song,
suggesting  that  the  female  response  is  to  species-specific  novelty  and  not  novel
sound per se.  This result is certainly consistent with the sexual selection hypothesis,
but as it deals with song novelty rather than complexity it says nothing about whether
female finches respond more to songs of greater complexity.  Several studies have,
however, investigated this directly.
Okanoya and Takashima (1997; cited in Okanoya, 2004) compared the effects  of
song complexity on the nest building behaviour of female finches.  Three groups of
finches were caged separately with a supply of nest building materials.  One group
was stimulated with a complex song, consisting of a shifting pattern of phrase units;
a second group was stimulated by a simple song, consisting of one repeated phrase,
while a control group received no stimulation.  The females stimulated with complex
song retrieved significantly more nesting material than either those stimulated with
simple  song or  the  control  group.   A random ordering  of  notes,  that  sometimes
produced complex sequences, also failed to elicit the increased nesting behaviour.
Okanoya and Takashima also measured levels of the sex hormone estradiol in the
three groups.  Females stimulated with complex song showed a far greater increase
in estradiol levels than the other two groups.  There is evidence, then,  that more
complex song has a greater stimulating effect on female reproductive behaviour and
physiology.  However, interesting as these findings are,  they concern the passive
reaction of females to hearing song stimuli.  What is needed is evidence that active
female mate-choice is influenced by song complexity.
Morisaka et al.  (2008) conducted an experiment in which females had to make a
choice between perches.  Picking one perch caused the playback of a complex song;
picking  the  other  resulted  in  the  playback  of  a  simple  song.   Given  the  results
discussed  above,  it  might  have  been  expected  that  the  birds  would  exhibit  a
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significant preference for the perch associated with the more complex song.  The
actual results, however, were somewhat less clear.  While half the birds did exhibit a
preference for the complex song, most of the rest appeared to choose between the
perches randomly, with one bird showing a preference for the simple song.  As the
authors conclude, the overriding finding of this study was that there was considerable
variability in the preferences of female finches.  Kato et al. (2010) also examined the
active  choices  made by females.   They used an operant  selection task,  in  which
touching  a  response  key  resulted  in  the  playback  of  a  song  stimulus.   Females
showed  a  significant  preference  for  their  father's  song  over  an  unfamiliar  song.
However, they showed no such preference for a complex over a simple song.  The
finding here, then, was that females preferred familiar rather than complex song.  
It should be noted, of course, that neither of these studies replicated the naturalistic
choice  of  a  mate,  however  both  do  involve  females  actively  choosing  between
alternatives, and so it is interesting to observe how their results differ from those
studies that recorded physiological responses.   The major distinction between the
two, at least on present evidence, seems to be that there is a much less clear and
direct  link  between  female  choice  and  song  complexity,  than  between  song
complexity and certain physiological reactions that likely contribute to that choice-
making process.  This assessment fits with the wider literature on song complexity
and repertoire size, which has many findings  consistent with the notion that song
complexity is sexually selected, but lacks much clear evidence that females actually
use complexity as a criteria in the selection of a mate (Kroodsma, 2004).  Soma and
Garamszegi  (2011)  conducted  a  meta  analysis  of  studies  into  the  relationship
between song complexity and reproductive success, finding as small but significant
effect.  This effect was reduced in studies that controlled for confounding factors
through the use of multivariate analyses, suggesting that many apparent associations
between  reproductive  success  and  song  complexity  might  actually  reflect  other
variables such as age or quality of territory.
In  terms  of  the  proximate  question,  then,  there  seems  to  be  good  evidence  that
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hearing  complex  song  is  associated  with  some  sexually  related  physiological
changes.  The evidence that female Bengalese finches use complex song in mate
selection is less secure, but this is in line with the wider literature on sexual selection
and song complexity.  It is quite possible that the Bengalese finch fits the pattern
identified  by  Soma  and  Garamszegi,  with  song  complexity  playing  a  small  but
significant role in determining mate choice.
2.3.2  –  Why do Bengalese females have a preference for  more
complex song?
Female Bengalese finches seem, then, to exhibit some level of preference for more
complex  song.   But  the  demonstration  of  this  preference  is  only  one  half  of  a
complete account in terms of sexual selection.  It is still necessary to explain why it
is that females have these particular preferences in the first place.  Why should song
complexity have come to play a role in mate choice?  
There exist some disagreement about how best to divide up the various models of the
evolution of mate choice, with 'lumpers' suggesting that many of the distinctions are
illusory (Kokko et al., 2003) and 'splitters' pointing to the heuristic value of dividing
up the various models (Jones & Ratterman, 2009). In this section I will be something
of a splitter, as the distinctions seem useful in the context of the present argument.
Perhaps  the  key  distinction  is  between  condition-dependent  and  condition-
independent models  (Jones  &  Ratterman,  2009).   In  the  former,  mate-choice
preferences  are  explained  by  the  preferred  trait  serving  as  a  reliable  signal,  or
indicator, of mate quality—in terms of genotype, capacity to invest in offspring, or a
combination of the two (see below for further discussion).  In the latter, there is no
necessary connection between mate quality and the preferred trait.  I will first briefly
discuss  condition-independent  models,  before  turning to  one particular  condition-
dependent  model  that  has  received  considerable  attention  in  relation  to  song
complexity.
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2.3.3 – Sexual selection I: Condition-independent models
One potential  explanation  for  mate  preferences  is  that  the selected  sex comes to
exploit certain sensory biases of the selecting sex (Ryan, 1990), biases which may
have evolved for reasons other than mate selection (Fuller et al., 2005).  In such a
situation  female  preference  may be  unrelated  to  mate  quality.   Another  possible
condition-independent  explanation  for  mate  preferences  is  the  Fisherian  runaway
process, in which preferences emerge as a result of a genetic correlation between a
preference and a trait (Andersson, 1994).  The key point here is that females with a
preference for a certain trait are likely to have offspring that exhibit both the trait and
the preference (depending on the sex of the offspring).  This sets up a spiralling,
runaway process in  which both the preference and the trait  are  exaggerated until
impinged  upon  by  some  other  selective  pressure  (Andersson,  1994;  Jones  &
Ratterman, 2009).    
It should be noted, of course, that both these models are only potentially condition-
independent.  For example, Fisherian-style correlations between trait and preference
are also an inevitable part of any condition-dependent model, and sensory biases may
play a role in enabling any kind of preference-trait cycle of evolution to get going in
the first place (Kokko et al., 2003).  The heuristically valuable point, however, is that
such condition-independent explanations only posit two factors, a preference and a
trait (Jones & Ratterman, 2009), with no necessary link to genetic quality or viability.
2.3.4 – Sexual selection II: Condition-dependent models
In contrast, condition-dependent models posit three factors: a preference, a trait and
differences in mate-quality for which the trait  functions as an indicator (Jones &
Ratterman, 2009).  The central question in these kind of models—indeed, the central
question in the whole field of animal signalling—is how such indicators are kept
reliable,  how  is  honesty in  signalling  maintained?   This  question  relates  to  the
evolutionary stability of the system.  There needs to be some mechanism by which
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the link between the favoured trait and the genetic quality of its bearer is maintained.
Without such a mechanism every individual might come to exhibit the favoured trait
and  it  would  then  cease  to  function  as  an  indicator  of  quality,  resulting  in  the
breakdown of the signalling system.
Maynard  Smith  and Harper  (1995)  survey three  mechanisms that  are  capable  of
maintaining honesty in animal signalling.   The first  is  what they term a  minimal
signal, which owes its stability to the fact that signaller and receiver have aligned
interests, and there is, therefore, no pressure for the signal to become dishonest.  The
second  is  when  the  signal  is  an  index,  which  they  define  as  a  “signal  that  is
physically associated with a quality of interest”.  For example, when tigers mark their
territory by scratching as high as they can on a tree, the height of the scratches is
physically linked to their size.  The third mechanism is when signals are cost-added,
which they define as a signal that is “more costly to make than the minimum required
to transmit the information”, this is an idea that goes back to Zahavi's (1975) concept
of a handicap.  The honesty of cost-added signals is maintained because only those
individuals of sufficient quality are able to afford the cost of producing the signal.
The most famous example of this is the tail of the peacock: only males of the highest
quality are able to sustain the cost of maintaining the most impressive tails.  As a
result, an impressive tail serves as a reliable indicator to peahens of a potential mate's
quality.
Which of these mechanisms might be relevant in the case of the Bengalese finch?
Minimal  signals  are  an  unlikely explanation  because  of  the  inherent  conflicts  of
interest  between males and females in any sexually reproducing species.   Indices
may be relevant to some aspects of birdsong, for example differences in fundamental
frequency correlate with body size (Ryan & Brenowitz, 1985).  However, by far the
most investigated possibility is that birdsong can serve as an honest signal of quality
because of the costs associated with its production.  But what might those costs be in
relation to learning and song complexity?  Gil and Gahr (2002) survey a variety of
different costs that are likely to be associated with various features of birdsong.  For
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example, aspects of song performance such as singing louder or for longer periods
carry increased energetic costs and put birds at greater risk of predation.  It seems
unlikely, however, that repertoire size or song complexity incur the same kind of
costs as singing loudly (Gil  & Gahr, 2002).  One potential mechanism that might
maintain  the  honesty of  song complexity as  an  indicator  concerns  its  relation  to
stressors during development.  This view has been termed the developmental stress
hypothesis.
2.3.5 – The developmental stress hypothesis
Unlike  many of  the  proposed  costs  associated  with  birdsong,  the  developmental
stress hypothesis links the honesty of song complexity as an indicator to costs paid in
early development  rather  than at  the time of singing as an adult.   This idea was
initially put forward by Nowicki et al. (1998: 179):
...learned features of song can provide an accurate indicator of male quality because they
reflect variation in the development of brain areas mediating the learning process, which
in turn reflects variation in the response of individuals to nutritional stresses faced early
in life.       
In this original formulation it was termed the 'nutritional stress hypothesis', but it has
since  been  expanded  to  include  other  potential  stressors  during  development
(Buchanan et al., 2003), hence the more general name.  The central idea, however,
remains the same: exposure to stressors during early life affects brain development,
which in turn impacts on song-learning capacity.  In this way adult song provides an
honest indicator of male quality.  The central logic of this hypothesis has recently
been generalised to other examples—such as musical production in humans—where
the capacity to acquire complex behaviours through learning might signal something
about mate quality.  This extended form has been termed the investment in learning
hypothesis (Kirby, 2012).             
Returning to the specific case of birdsong, if the developmental stress hypothesis
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were correct it should be possible to demonstrate the following:
1. That developmental stress impacts adult song
2. That developmental stress affects the development of the song system in the
brain 
In  the  sections  that  follow  I  will  take  these  two  points  in  turn  and  discuss  the
evidence in relation to them both from songbirds more generally.  I will then turn to
studies investigating whether the developmental stress hypothesis works in the case
of the Bengalese finch.
2.3.5.1 – Developmental stress and adult song structure
There is a range of evidence showing that early developmental stress does seem to
affect the nature of adult song.  Nowicki et al.  (2002) found that food restriction
during the development of the swamp sparrow resulted in reduced copying accuracy.
Buchanan  et  al.  (2003)  found  that  European  starlings  raised  under  a  regime  of
unpredictable food deprivation started singing later, spent less time singing and sang
fewer bouts as adults.  Zebra finches raised under conditions of dietary stress or with
elevated levels of the hormone corticosterone have been found to produce shorter
songs (Spencer et al., 2003).  And European starlings, again raised in conditions of
food deprivation or increased corticosterone levels, show shorter song motifs and
reduced complexity of song (Spencer et al., 2004).
2.3.5.2 – Developmental stress and the avian song system
A comprehensive  survey of  the neural  underpinnings  of  bird song is  beyond the
scope of the present thesis; however, it will be necessary to have a rough idea of the
overall  architecture of the avian song system.  This system comprises two major
pathways: the song motor pathway (SMP, shown in red in figure 2.1, below) and the
anterior forebrain pathway (AFP, shown in blue), finally there are a series of sensory
and  motor  feedback  connections  (shown  in  green)  (Mooney,  2009;  Olveczky  &
Gardner,  2011).   Typically,  lesions  to  the  SMP disrupt  or  destroy  song  entirely,
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whereas lesions to the AFP have little effect on established song but destroy vocal
plasticity, and with it the capacity to learn new song (Mooney, 2009).
Figure 2.1: The avian song system
(Taken from  Ölveczky & Gardner, 2011)
Much of the detail in figure 2.1 can be safely ignored; however, there are three areas
I will especially flag up here because they are referred to in the discussion below.
• HVC (acronym used as a proper name): this is common to both pathways and
is also a target for much of the sensory and motor feedback
• RA (Robust  Nucleus of the Arcopallium):  an important  part  of  the motor
pathway
• Nif (nucleus interfacialis): an important part of the circuits sending auditory
and motor feedback to the HVC     
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Nowicki  et  al.  (2002) found that  food restrictions  during development  in  swamp
sparrows were associated with an absolute reduction in size of the HVC, together
with a general reduction in the size of the telencephalon (the avian equivalent of the
mammalian neocortex).  Furthermore, the reduction in size of the RA was greater
than that seen in  the telencephalon as a whole.   In other  words,  the song nuclei
seemed to be disproportionately affected.  This finding is echoed by work with zebra
finches that also found a disproportionate reduction in the volume of the HVC in
response to food restrictions and also to raised levels of corticosterone (Buchanan et
al., 2004), together with an association between fledgling weight and the mass of the
adult HVC.  MacDonald et al. (2006) found that food restrictions in song sparrows
resulted in the size of the HVC being reduced at the beginning of the song-learning
period in both males and females.  Similar findings of reduced HVC volume have
been found in canaries (Spencer et al., 2005a) following early parasitic infection, and
in zebra finches following raised levels of corticosterone (Spencer et al., 2005b).
2.3.5.3 – Developmental stress in the Bengalese finch
Soma et al. (2006) conducted a study into the effects of early rearing experience in
the  Bengalese  finch.   However,  unlike  earlier  studies  that  used  experimental
manipulations—such as food restrictions or raised levels of stress hormones—Soma
et  al.  examined  the  effect  of  different  brood  sizes  and  brood  sex-ratios  on  the
subsequent adult song in semi-naturalistic conditions (breeding pairs monitored in a
large indoor aviary).  Song length was found to be related to body size (itself causally
related to brood size).  The total number of notes used was also related to brood size.
However, the most intriguing result in the present context was that song complexity
was related to brood size.  Soma et al. (2009a), in a similar semi-naturalistic setting,
also found that song complexity varied with laying order within a clutch, with those
earlier in the sequence having more complex song, a finding the authors suggest may
reflect differences in maternal investment.  Finally, Soma et al. (2009b) found some
evidence that chicks' tutor selection is influenced by song complexity.
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2.3.6 – Summary
It seems, then, that there is a good level of evidential support for both the predictions
of the developmental stress hypothesis.  In the interests of completeness, however, it
should be mentioned that there have been some negative results.  Gil et al. (2006)
and Naguib et  al.  (2006, 2008) both found that  brood-size manipulations  had no
effect  on  song  complexity  or  neural  development.   Brood-size  is,  however,  a
somewhat  indirect  developmental  stressor  (MacDougall-Shackleton  &  Spencer,
2012), and other manipulations of brood-size have found an effect on subsequent
song (e.g. Holveck et al., 2008; Soma et al., 2006).
Finally, it is important to realise that the developmental stress hypothesis interacts in
complex ways with the dynamics of cultural transmission.  As discussed in chapter
one, models suggest that culturally transmitted systems will tend towards simplicity,
or compressibility (Brighton, 2003), in response to the requirement to be learnable,
and thus successfully passed between generations (Kirby, 2012).  These results, in
principle  at  least,  apply  to  any  kind  of  culturally  transmitted  system,  including
birdsong.   When culturally transmitted systems fail  to  simplify in  this  way, it  is
necessary to explain why.  
In chapter one we saw just this dynamic in relation to linguistic structure and the
ILM, especially in those examples where there was no pressure on communication,
or a proxy thereof, and in which the language became systematically underspecified.
In the case of language, it is the functional demands of communication that explain
why  the  system  doesn't  simply  collapse  to  its  most  compressed  possible  state.
Models of the developmental stress hypothesis (e.g. Ritchie et al., 2008) indicate that
complex,  hard-to-learn  songs  are  evolutionarily  stable—despite  being  culturally
transmitted, and thus expected to simplify—because it is the very fact of their being
hard to learn that allows them to function as reliable indicators of mate quality.  In
both  cases,  it  is  these  functional  demands  that  prevent  the  culturally  transmitted
system from collapsing to its simplest form.
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2.3.7 – Developmental stress: some issues
It seems, then, that a sexual selection account of the differences between munia and
Bengalese song—based proximally in female preference, and ultimately in indicators
of  developmental  stress—has  much to  recommend it.   In  the  next  section  I  will
consider a second, possibly compatible, explanation proposed by Terrence Deacon.
However, before considering Deacon's proposal it should be acknowledged that there
are  a  number  of  unanswered  questions  surrounding  the  developmental  stress
hypothesis  (see MacDougall-Shackleton & Spencer, 2012 for a wider discussion),
one of which in particular stands out as important in the present context: Does adult
song reflect good genes or good upbringing? 
This question arises because an adult bird's song is a reflection of both its inherited
genotype and its developmental conditions (plus the interaction between the two).
However, the relative influence of these two factors remains unclear.  To see why this
matters it is important to realise that all models of sexual selection posit, in varying
proportions,  two kinds of benefits associated with mate-choice (Andersson, 1994;
Jones & Ratterman, 2009).   The first  are termed  direct  benefits,  and concern the
immediate  help  that  a  selected  mate  can  provide,  such as  defending  territory or
provisioning food.  Variation in the capacity to provide direct benefits may relate to
genetic differences, differences in developmental experience, or a combination of the
two.  
The second concerns indirect benefits, where the selected sex—typically the male—
provides  nothing but  their  sperm.   In  these  circumstances  the  female's  fitness  is
increased as a result of her offspring inheriting the genes of the favoured male.  It
should be clear, therefore, that indirect benefits only reflect genetic differences.  The
important point in the present context, however, is that for any species in which the
developmental stress hypothesis is invoked it is going to be unclear to what extent
adult  song constitutes  an  honest  signal  of  conditions  of  upbringing,  and to  what
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extent an honest signal of a good genotype.  While it is likely that both are important
in most cases, it is also true that the relative importance of each—and the balance of
direct and indirect benefits—may well vary between species.  
This point is well illustrated by the case of the European sedge warbler, which has
one of the largest, most complex song repertoires of all songbirds, a trait that has
been driven by sexual selection (Leitner et al., 2002; Kroodsma, 2004).  As noted
above, however, the European sedge warbler doesn't need to be exposed to singing
models during development to acquire this song, and can reach, and even exceed,
normal repertoire sizes when raised in isolation (Leitner et al., 2002).    Furthermore,
there is no difference between the sizes of song system nuclei such as the HVC and
RA between  warblers  reared  in  isolation  and  those  exposed  to  singing  models.
Intriguingly, the great variety of song produced by isolate sedge warblers suggests
that, rather than inheriting whole song repertoires, what they inherit is a powerful
capacity to improvise (Leitner et al., 2002).  
The  original  formulation  of  the  developmental  stress  hypothesis  particularly
emphasised  learned  features of song as an indicator of condition, but in the sedge
warbler no learning is required.  Instead, song complexity reflects the condition of
the highly heritable song system, and its potential to support improvisation.  In the
European sedge warbler, then, while song complexity and variety certainly serve as
honest signals of genetic quality, they fail to differentiate between individuals with a
normal developmental experience and those whose experience was as aberrant as
total isolation.  It seems, then, that a demonstration of a capacity to learn is not the
only way in which song complexity can serve as an honest signal of condition.  I
shall return to this point at the conclusion of the chapter. 
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2.4  –  Deacon's  hypothesis:  relaxed  selection  and
degeneration
Deacon (2003b, 2009) has proposed an alternative hypothesis to explain the changes
in  the  song of  the  Bengalese  finch.   Like  Okanoya's  hypothesis,  Deacon's  has  a
central role for domestication.  Where it differs, however, is that Deacon argues that
the  changes  in  song  could  occur  in  the  absence  of  positive  selection,  which  in
Okanoya's account is driven by female preference.  Indeed,  for Deacon the song of
the Bengalese may have changed as a result of  that absence of positive selection.
The  thinking  here  is  that  much  of  the  action  of  natural  selection  concerns  the
maintenance  of  current  structures  and  behaviours  through  the  elimination  of
mutations  (Powell,  2011),  a  process  known  as  purifying  or  stabilising  selection
(Barton et  al.,  2007).  As such, natural selection can often act as something of a
conservative  force,  which  actually  prevents  the  emergence  of  novel  structural  or
behavioural configurations.
Deacon's  arguments  raise  a  range of  issues  relevant  to  this  thesis:  including,  the
relationships between natural selection,  external regularities and self-organization;
how to best think about multiple forms of evolutionary inheritance; and the contexts
in  which  new  complex  behaviours  are  likely  to  emerge.   As  such,  this  section
presents a detailed description, investigation and evaluation of Deacons views.  In
order to provide a target for that wider discussion, I shall begin with a condensed
presentation of Deacon's hypothesis:
The shift from the wild to the domesticated environment introduced a wide-ranging
relaxation  of  selection  on  the  structure  of  the  munia  song,  this  included  sexual
selection as birds were now exclusively paired up by breeders.  In other words, many
of  the  selective  pressures  influencing  song structure  in  the  wild  were  no  longer
relevant under domestication.  Selection had, in effect, ceased to operate on song
structure.   In  this  context,  mutations  affecting  the  munia's  song-learning  biases,
which would previously have been eliminated by selection, would now be free to
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accumulate, resulting in the breakdown, or  degeneration, of those biases.  Another
way of looking at this is that the shift to a domesticated setting caused variation in
the biases to be masked, to become invisible to selection.  
For Deacon, this breakdown of previously constraining biases is the key part of the
explanation.  If, following this breakdown, song learning becomes less canalized—
less restricted to a narrow, species-specific range—then a variety of factors that had
previously only had a minor influence on song structure might be free to increase in
importance.  These might include early auditory experience, social context, general
learning biases or the propensity to improvise.  This shift in influences would then
come to be reflected in changes in the brain, with areas that had previously had little
role in the song system, coming to have a greater involvement in song formation.
Finally, there is likely to be a redistribution of selection away from the maintenance
of strong biases and towards capacities related to those new influences.  
The changes in Bengalese song following domestication are,  on this account,  not
explained by any selective pressure in favour of greater variation and complexity, but
instead result from a lifting—a relaxation—of selective pressures that had previously
maintained  the  song  as  simple  and  stereotypic,  through  the  exclusion  of  other
potentially complexifying and diversifying influences.   Maintained, that is,  munia
song  in  its  highly  canalized  form.   The  rest  of  this  section  presents  a  detailed
breakdown of this  hypothesis,  with a  particular  emphasis  on the terms in italics,
above.
2.4.1 – The visibility of variation: masking and unmasking 
Deacon's argument starts from two basic facts of evolution.  The first is that natural
selection  can  only act  on  phenotypes,  meaning that  selection  can  only eliminate
variation if  it  is  phenotypically expressed.   The second is  that  selection operates
through differential reproductive success, meaning that only variation that actually
influences reproductive success can be selected for or against.  As a result, variation
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is only  visible to selection—that is, can spread or be eliminated through selective
processes—if it is both phenotypically expressed and has an influence on fitness.  Of
course, evolution per se can still  occur in relation to variation that does not meet
these two criteria, through processes such as genetic drift, but what cannot occur is
evolution by natural selection.  
It  follows,  then,  that  there  are  two  ways  in  which  variation  can  be  invisible  to
selection.  The first is for variation to have no phenotypic effect.  This is part of the
phenomenon of developmental canalization, discussed above, in which many of the
processes  operate  by  preventing  variation  from  finding  phenotypic  expression.
Recall the example of dominance relationships among alleles, which mean that the
phenotypes  of  homozygous-dominant  and  heterozygous  individuals  are  identical,
despite underlying variation in their genotypes.  
The second way for variation to be invisible is for it to be phenotypically expressed
but have no effect on fitness.  This is related to an organism's environment and the
selection pressures it faces in that environment.  For example, it is quite possible that
the precise size and shape of the human earlobe is of so little consequence in terms of
reproductive success that the genetic variation underlying it is practically invisible to
selection.  However, perhaps the most interesting possibility concerns shifts from one
situation to the other:   Either from a position in which visible variation becomes
invisible,  a process Deacon terms masking; or from a position in which invisible
variation becomes visible, which Deacon terms unmasking.  Deacon considers the
move from the wild to domesticated environment to have initiated just such a shift.
2.4.2 – Masking through functional redundancy
These kind of shifts, in which masking or unmasking occurs, can be found in relation
to both of the ways that variation can be invisible to selection, but the consequences
of the shift differ between the two.  In both cases the possibility for such shifts derive
from the existence of functional redundancy.  The different consequences depend on
101
whether that redundancy is internal or external to the organism in question.   The
following examples, taken from Deacon (2009), illustrate this distinction.    
Consider  first  the  phenomenon  of  gene  duplication  (Zhang,  2003),  in  which  a
segment  of  DNA  is  accidentally  copied,  often  by  being  inserted  into  another
chromosome as a result of an error during meiosis.  Prior to the duplication event,
any  mutations  affecting  the  single  copy are  liable  to  have  serious  phenotypic
consequences, perhaps resulting in the organism being unable to synthesise a vital
species of protein.  After the duplication event, however, the existence of two copies
mean that any mutations that might accumulate in one of them are actually invisible
to selection, they are masked by the presence of the second copy, which can ensure
they have no phenotypic effect.  
This masking is the result of a kind of functional redundancy: there are now two
genes performing the same function.  Intriguingly, this functional redundancy can
actually be an  important  step towards  the  production  of  new kinds  of  functional
complexity.   Perhaps  counter-intuitively,  this  possibility  exists because  of the
potential  build-up of mutations such redundancy allows.  In most instances these
mutations  are  likely  to  be  neutral  or  deleterious,  eventually  resulting  in  the
production of a non-functioning pseudogene.  However this need not always be the
case,  especially  as  the  duplicated  segment  begins  as  a  fully  functional  coding
sequence of DNA.  Indeed, just this kind of process is thought to account for the
existence  of  multiple  forms  of  haemoglobin  (Storz  et  al.,  2013).   In  this  case,
however, the redundancy is internal to the organism.  This is important because it
means that the organism does not lose the original function.  The end result is either
one functional copy plus a pseudogene, or a functional copy of the original gene plus
a novel functional configuration in the second copy.  
In contrast,  consider the case of vitamin C acquisition in primates.   Unlike most
mammals, primates, including humans, are unable to endogenously synthesise their
own vitamin C (Ha et al., 2004).  Primates are entirely dependent on exogenously
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obtained, dietary vitamin C.  This is not the result of any dramatic genetic difference
between  primates  and  other  mammals;  all  the  required  genes  are  present  in  the
primate genome.  However, the gene for one vital enzyme involved in the later stages
of  vitamin C synthesis,  known as  GULO, has  degenerated to  pseudogene status.
Such a vital biochemical pathway would, presumably, be under strong selection to be
maintained, so how have these mutations managed to accumulate?  
Deacon's (2009) answer is that the availability of dietary vitamin C in food items
such as fruit masked variation in the effectiveness of endogenous synthesis.  Note
that this variation would still be phenotypically expressed: some individuals would
still  synthesise  vitamin  C  endogenously,  whereas  others  would  not.   But  with
adequate dietary vitamin C, this phenotypic difference would cease to have fitness
consequences.  With this variation thus invisible to selection, there would be no way
for  any  mutations  to  be  eliminated,  resulting  in  an  eventual  degradation  to
pseudogene status.   
This example also involves functional redundancy, in the form of two sources of
vitamin C.  The key difference, however, is that one of these sources is  external to
the organism.  The importance of this is that once the ability to synthesise vitamin C
endogenously had been lost,  primates effectively became 'addicted'  to food items
such as fruit, with diet now the only source of the still-necessary vitamin.  When the
redundancy is external there is the possibility that the internal function can be lost
entirely.  A further corollary is that this internal loss can result in the unmasking of
variation related to the capacity to exploit the external source.  In terms of vitamin C,
this might include variation underlying traits associated with the acquisition of fruit,
such as colour vision, digestive tolerance and foraging techniques.
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2.4.3 – The two faces of Deacon's hypothesis:  degeneracy and
parsimony
It should be clear now that Deacon's hypothesis regarding the Bengalese finch shares
some  similarities  with  both  the  gene-duplication  and  vitamin  C  examples,  just
discussed.  As in gene-duplication, the emergence of new complexity was initially
dependent  on  variation  coming  to  be  invisible  to  selection.   However,  like  the
vitamin  C  example,  this  variation  was  masked  extrinsically  by  a  change  in  the
environment.   In relation  to  vitamin  C,  the  environmental  change  related  to  the
supply of the vitamin in the diet,  which specifically masked variation underlying
endogenous synthesis.  As such, the degeneration observed was also specific.  In the
Bengalese finch case, however, the relevant environmental change is the shift to the
domesticated setting.  
Domesticated  environments  differ  in  a  wide  variety  of  ways  from  their  wild
equivalents (Price, 1999, 2002; chapters four  4.5.1.3 and five  5.1), presenting the
possibility of a  more wide-ranging relaxation of selection.   Deacon (2010: 9004)
terms this phenomenon global redundancy, but it might be better thought of in terms
of domesticated environments  buffering organisms from a wide range of selective
pressures (Price, 1999, 2002).  One way of reading Deacon's account, then, is that the
Bengalese  finch  is  actually  a  degenerate white-rumped  munia,  whose  species-
specific song-learning biases have broken down in the highly buffered context of
domestication, with increased complexity following as a kind of side-effect of this
degeneration.
There is, however, a more positive way to read Deacon's hypothesis, which connects
it  with the  discussion  in  chapter  one (1.2.3)  of  how evolution  can exploit  extra-
biological regularities.  This involves what Deacon terms an  epigenetic parsimony
principle, which he (2009: 742) describes in the following way:
...we should not assume genetic micromanagement of epigenetic processes, but rather
only genetic  regulation of  the  boundary conditions  affecting  processes  that  have the
potential of arising by self-organization
104
Epigenetic biases and constraints that are reliably present or that reliably emerge during
development, due to adaptive flexibility or extragenomic influences, will tend to mask
selection maintaining corresponding genetically inherited information.  Thus the genome
will tend to offload morphogenetic control, in the course of evolution, in a way that takes
advantage of the emergent regularities that characterise many epigenetic processes.
On this view, the Bengalese finch could be described as a munia that has offloaded
the control of the details of its song structure to epigenetic processes; offloaded them,
that is, to a non-genetic, cultural form of inheritance.  The role of genetic inheritance
could then be seen to have shifted away from tightly controlling song structure and
towards setting the boundary conditions under which those epigenetic processes self-
organize.  The differing role of learning in the munia and Bengalese might be seen,
then,  as reflecting the differing degrees to which each species'  song was open to
being shaped by non-genetic, heritable influences.  In the highly canalized munia, the
tight genetic control of song structure restricts the role of non-genetic influences such
as  cultural  transmission.   In  the  less  canalized  Bengalese,  those  aspects  of  non-
genetic inheritance are free to have a much greater influence.  Rather than a simple
case of degeneration, might the breakdown of biases be seen instead as an example
of evolution exploiting the properties of cultural transmission?    
This question opens up a range of issues that are important not just in understanding
the  Bengalese finch but  also in  relation  to  the  role  of  culture in  evolution  more
generally.  This relationship was a major theme of the last chapter, as part of a very
focused discussion  of  the  ILM.  The conclusion  there  was  that  the  ILM is  best
viewed  as  exploring  a  set  of  extra-biological,  informational  regularities,  whose
structure-creating dynamics can be exploited by evolution, in much the same way as
can regularities deriving from the laws of physics.  It is time now to return to that
line of thought, but with a much wider focus.  Once this survey is completed, I will
apply its conclusions to the Bengalese finch.
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2.4.4 – Epigenetic parsimony: evolution and multiple inheritance
To fully  appreciate  Deacon's  position  it  helps  to  view  it  in  the  light  of  other
perspectives  on  evolution,  inheritance  and development.   Like  all  discussions  of
evolutionary theory, this has to begin with the union of Darwinian natural selection
and Mendelian genetics known as the Modern Synthesis (see Mayr & Provine, 1980
for a historical overview).  The outcome of this synthesis, stated in a single line, is as
follows:
adaptation is the result of natural selection on Mendelian variation
(Barton et al., 2007: 32).
A fuller unpacking of this terse statement, cast in present-day terminology, might go
something like this (drawn from Futuyama, 2005; Barton et al., 2007): 
With regard to evolution, a clear distinction can and should be made between an
organism's observable characteristics—its phenotype—and its complete set of genes,
its genotype.  Phenotypic variation between organisms is attributable to both genetic
differences and environmental influences, plus the interaction of the two.  However,
the  kind  of  variation  required  for  adaptive  evolution,  hereditary  variation,  is
underpinned by the transmission between generations of particulate Mendelian units
of inheritance, or genes.  The influence of the environment on the phenotype, and the
changes  the  phenotype  undergoes  during  its  lifetime,  often  termed  acquired
characteristics,  are not inherited.   The source of evolutionary variation is  genetic
mutation.  Mutation  is  random  with  respect  to  adaptation:  appropriate  beneficial
mutations do not arise in response to need. This variation is further amplified, at least
in  sexually  reproducing  species,  through  the  processes  of  recombination  during
meiosis. As a result, populations of organisms contain a large amount of diversity in
their genotypes.  Evolutionary change is the result of alterations in the frequencies of
different genotypes in the population.  This can occur either as a result of random
fluctuations (e.g. genetic drift), or as a result of non-random changes resulting from
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the differential reproduction of some variants rather than others (selection).   This
non-random process  of  selection is  what  accounts  for  the  emergence of  adaptive
complexity, the appearance of design.
This summary illustrates three important aspects of the modern synthesis view of
evolution.  The first is that inheritance is identified solely with genetic material, with
DNA.   The  second,  following  from  the  first,  is  that,  from  the  perspective  of
evolution,  development  can be 'black boxed'  (Hall,  2012).   If  genes are the only
developmental resource that is also heritable, and thereby relevant to evolution, then
the rest of the developmental process can be ignored, can be viewed as an example of
the 'internal', functional biology of an organism, in contrast to the 'external' biology
of evolution in the lineage over time (Mayr, 1982).  Finally, evolution can be seen as
consisting  of  two  distinct  phases:  an  entirely  random phase—of  mutation  and
recombination—by which variation arises;  and an entirely  non-random phase—of
natural  selection—by  which  the  relative  proportions  of  different  variants  in  the
population  change  over  time.   All  three  of  these  points,  and  by  extension  the
adequacy of the modern synthesis, have come under increasing attack in recent years
(e.g. Pigliucci, 2007; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; Rose & Oakley, 2007).    
There is insufficient space here to consider all of these attacks.  However, one point
made by many of those critical of the modern synthesis is that the heritable inputs to
development are more than simply DNA—and also include non-genetic forms of
physical inheritance16 (Jablonka & Lamb, 1995), together with behavioural (Avital &
Jablonka, 2000), cultural (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; Richerson & Boyd, 2005) and
ecological (Odling-Smee et al., 2003; Mameli, 2004) kinds of inheritance.  Given
this variety of inputs to development, and the fact that it is the developmental process
itself that produces the phenotypes that undergo selection (West-Eberhard 2003), the
idea that development can be black-boxed has come to seem less and less tenable, a
view that has contributed to the rise of evolutionary developmental biology, or evo-
16 In  much  of  the  literature  this  is  referred  to  as  epigenetic  inheritance,  however  as  the  term
'epigenetic' is beset with multiple uses—one of which has already been employed in this thesis—I
thought it best to avoid confusion.
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devo (Carroll, 2008; Hall, 2012).  These developments need to be taken seriously.
The question  is  not  whether  they are  going to  be  incorporated  into  evolutionary
thinking, but what form that incorporation is going to take (Hall,  2012, Pigliucci,
2007).  What, in other words, is the best way to conceive of the relationship between
genetic and other forms of inheritance?  This question is important because both
language  and  birdsong  represent  forms  of  non-genetic  inheritance,  and  Deacon's
concept of epigenetic parsimony directly concerns the relationship between different
forms of inheritance.
One  potential  answer  to  this  question  would  be  to  treat  all  the  inputs  to  the
developmental process equally, and not to 'privilege' one input—typically the genetic
—over any of the others.  This is the answer advocated by developmental systems
theory  (DST)  (Griffiths  &  Gray,  1994;  Oyama,  2000).   According  to  the  DST
approach it is not possible to identify particular units, or 'replicators', as specially
responsible for variation being  heritable  variation.  Instead, what replicates is the
developmental  system  as  a  whole,  including  the  full  range  of  inputs  and  their
interactions (Griffiths & Gray, 1994, 2005).  The various inputs to the developmental
system, while not seen as necessarily identical or equally important, are viewed as
being similar in kind, such that no major distinctions, metaphysical or otherwise, can
be made between them (Griffiths & Knight, 1998).     
This view has been criticised for its commitment to a vague holism and for failing to
provide criteria for what does and does not belong to any particular developmental
system (Sterelny et  al.,  1996).   I  want to pursue a somewhat  different  objection,
however,  because  it  presents  a  challenge  not  just  to  DST but  to  any attempt  to
incorporate non-genetic inheritance into evolutionary theory. 
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2.4.5 – Intrinsic and extrinsic inputs to development
This  challenge  concerns  the  distinction  between  intrinsic and  extrinsic
developmental inputs (Dickins & Dickins, 2008).  At the core of this distinction is
the fact  that  inputs can only function as such for systems whose intrinsic design
prepares  them to make use  of  those inputs.   For  example,  infra-red light  cannot
function as an input to human vision—although it can for various insect species—
because the intrinsic design of the human ocular system does not permit it.  This
same  logic,  argue  Dickens  and  Dickens  (2008:  47),  applies  to  the  process  of
development as well:
Genes are not only intrinsic features but they are also inherited, and they are consistently
brought to each developmental situation, and therefore consistently set the agenda for
other inputs.
It  should  be  noted  how this  parallels  Deacon's  position  outlined  above.   Where
Dickens and Dickens have 'set the agenda', Deacon has 'regulation of the boundary
conditions'.  Indeed, a further quote from Deacon (2009: 743) illustrates that he was
thinking along very similar lines:
This does not mean, however, that we should treat genetic and epigenetic inheritance as
simply  parallel...Although  gene  expression  depends  upon  epigenetic  processes  and
epigenetic processes depend on conditions produced by genes, the genetic information is
embodied in a structural artifact whereas epigenetic information is dynamical in origin
and must emerge anew in each developing organism.
In both these views,  then,  the role  of genetic  inheritance,  embodied as  it  is  in  a
'structural artifact', is to set up the conditions—based on some aspects of intrinsic
design—that permit the influence of other inputs to development.  
Following  this  line  of  argument,  Dickens  and  Dickens  discuss  claims  made  by
Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003: 823) regarding the role of various factors, including
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the light-dark cycle, in determining levels of gene expression.  It should be obvious
how the argument applies to this example: the light-dark cycle can only serve as an
input to development—exercising, as it does, some influence on gene expression—
because of the intrinsically inherited preparedness of the system to respond to this
input.   As such, it  makes little sense to consider genes and cyclical variations in
illumination as equivalent kinds of input to the process of development.
2.4.6 – Intrinsic and extrinsic forms of inheritance
Some have claimed that the existence of multiple forms of inheritance requires, in
and  of  itself,  that  our  understanding  of  evolution  needs  to  be  reformulated  (e.g.
Mameli, 2004; Jablonka & Lamb, 2005; Bonduriansky & Day, 2009).  Bonduriansky
and Day (2009) present a survey of non-genetic forms of inheritance17,  including
non-genetic  forms  of  physical  inheritance,  behavioural  inheritance  and  cultural
inheritance.   They  argue  that  the  evolutionary  importance  of  these  forms  of
inheritance lies in the 'decoupling' they introduce:
nongenetic  inheritance decouples phenotypic change from genotypic change and, in so
doing, can overcome some of the limitations of genetic inheritance.
(Bonduriansky & Day, 2009: 120)
At first sight this may seem persuasive.  However, the distinction explored above
between intrinsic and extrinsic inputs to development should make us wary of this
position.  It is not enough simply to demonstrate that there are multiple forms of non-
genetic  inheritance,  it  is  also  necessary  to  show  that  these  various  forms  of
inheritance are similar in kind to genetic inheritance, that they play a similar role.  A
consideration of the forms of non-genetic inheritance discussed by Bonduriansky and
Day shows, however, that this is not the case, that they do not play a similar role to
genetic inheritance.
17 Bonduriansky and Day (2009: 106) define non-genetic inheritance as: “any effect on offspring
phenotype brought about by the transmission of factors other than DNA sequences”.  
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The first step in making this clear lies in the realisation that all the forms of non-
genetic  inheritance  listed  above  are  actually  aspects  of  phenotypic  plasticity.
Ironically, this point is made rather well by Bonduriansky and Day themselves (2009:
108):
Nongenetic  inheritance  can  be  viewed  as  a  transgenerational  form  of  phenotypic
(developmental) plasticity...Indeed, because variation in the expression of a nonplastic
trait can reflect only genetic variation by definition...only phenotypically plastic traits are
susceptible to nongenetic inheritance.
I  will  return  to  the  question  of  transgenerational  transmission  below.  For  now,
however, the most  important  point  is  that  the mechanisms underlying phenotypic
plasticity are  themselves  the  product  of  adaptive evolution (Schmitt  et  al.,  1995,
1999; De Jong, 2005).  Phenotypic plasticity allows organisms to respond to changes
in  their  environments  that  occur  during  their  lifetime,  to  respond  to  novel
environments and to modify and adjust aspects of their physiology and behaviour in
light of experience.  While the precise changes and challenges an organism is likely
to face in its lifetime are not predictable ahead of time, the fact that it will face such
changes is predictable.  Phenotypic plasticity is an evolutionary response to this fact.
Phenotypic  plasticity  represents,  then,  the  mirror  image  of  the  concept  of
environmental  canalization  discussed  above  (2.2.2.6).   Where  environmental
canalization describes the insensitivity of the phenotype to environmental variations,
phenotypic plasticity refers to the sensitivity of the phenotype, its ability to respond,
often but not always adaptively to variations in the environment (Flatt, 2005).  This
last point is vital and is worth elaborating further.  The following quote from West-
Eberhard (2003: 36) sums up the situation nicely:
While...we  should  not  assume  that  observed  phenotypic  plasticity  is  adaptive,  both
continuously variable and discrete plasticity are products of switches whose thresholds
are subject to genetic variation and adaptive adjustment by natural selection
This  quotation  makes  two points  very clearly.   Firstly,  the  notion  that  plasticity
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represents an adaptation to the predictability of unstable environments in no way
entails that every plastic response should itself be adaptive.  The various mechanisms
of  phenotypic  plasticity  (discussed  below)  are  favoured  because  statistically—on
average—they produce adaptive responses,  but neutral  and maladaptive responses
should be expected in relation to all aspects of plasticity.  Secondly, while natural
selection is not directly responsible for the details of any particular plastic response,
it is responsible for the mechanisms that deliver those responses.  
This last point represents the distinction between the direct and derived functions of
a trait  (Millikan,  1984).   The direct  function of  phenotypic plasticity is  to  allow
organisms to respond to changes in their environments.  The derived functions are all
the particular plastic responses to particular environmental changes or experiences.
For example, the direct function of learning mechanisms is to allow us to acquire
knowledge and skills during our lifetime.  My particular instance of learning to play
tennis  in  this  particular lifetime  represents  an  example  of  a  derived  function.
Derived functions, then, are particular instantiations of direct functions.  
Phenotypic  plasticity  serves,  therefore,  to  'tailor'  the  phenotype  in  light  of
environmental  circumstances  (Dickens  &  Rahman,  2012).   The  'decoupling'  of
genotypic and phenotypic change noted by Bonduriansky and Day is thus a natural
consequence of this tailoring.  The mechanisms by which this phenotypic tailoring
occurs are many and varied.   The following represents a partial  list,  drawn from
West-Eberhard's (2003) major overview of the topic.
• Exploratory  growth  in  plants,  for  example  growing  towards  light  or
phototropism
• Response of skin pigment cells to light
• Remodelling of bone and muscle
• Somatic  selection,  as seen in  the overproduction and then culling of  both
neurons and antibodies 
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• Behavioural flexibility
• Learning both individually and from others18   
Crucially, however, these mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity are only possible at all
because  organisms  are  intrinsically  structured  in  such  a  way  as  to  permit  their
tailoring role.  This intrinsic structuring includes the capacity of aspects of the body,
such as the musculature, to alter in response to experience, the capacity to produce a
range of flexible behavioural responses and the capacities that permit learning both
individually  and  from  others.   All  these  capacities  have  a  genetic  basis—the
'switches' noted by West-Eberhard—and it is only as a result of that genetic basis that
phenotypic plasticity is possible at all. 
Nothing about this last point is changed in any way by the fact that some aspects of
phenotypic plasticity can be inherited.  Heritable aspects of phenotypic plasticity are
only heritable  at  all  because  organisms are  intrinsically structured  to  permit  that
inheritance.   That  intrinsic  structuring  is  provided  by genetic  inheritance.   Non-
genetic inheritance is, then, extrinsic inheritance, and shares much in common with
developmental influences such as the light-dark cycle.  In both cases they can only
influence development  to  the extent  that  the intrinsic  structuring of the organism
permits that influence.  
It  should  be  made  clear  that  I  am  not  denying  the  existence  of  non-genetic
inheritance, nor am I denying the possibility that it can have very interesting effects
on  development  and  possibly  evolution  (West-Eberhard,  2003).   What  is  being
argued,  however,  is  that  it  is  simply  untenable  to  treat  genetic  and  non-genetic
inheritance as similar in kind.  Genetic inheritance is intrinsic.  It is responsible for
structuring organisms in such a way as to 'pick out' which aspects of the environment
18 Culture, or more properly, the capacity to learn culturally transmitted behaviours, should also be
seen as part of phenotypic plasticity, both in humans and other species.  I will discuss cultural
inheritance in more detail below, as I think it represents a particularly complex instance of non-
genetic inheritance.
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and which forms of extrinsic inheritance to which an organism is able to respond.  
Indeed, the balance between canalization and plasticity struck by different genotypes
can be seen, in part, as differing responses to the question of how much and what
kind of influence extrinsic, non-genetic inheritance should have on the phenotype.
Selection  acting  on  genes,  therefore,  influences  not  only  those  aspects  of  the
phenotype that are strongly canalized and thus under close genetic control, but also
the extent to which other non-genetic aspects of plasticity are able to modify the
phenotype.  It is for this reason that genetic inheritance can be seen as the place
where the 'buck stops' (Dickens & Rahman, 2012).  
To put this  point more broadly, the rejection of a strongly constraining innate or
modular explanation does not in and of itself entail that natural selection is no longer
relevant.  Strongly constraining innate modules are simply one  mechanism natural
selection can use to bring about adaptive outcomes.  Similar adaptive outcomes can
also  be  produced  through  the  enabling,  biasing  and  'boundary  setting'  influence
natural  selection  can  have  on  non-genetic  inheritance  and  other  self-organising
developmental influences.  While it makes sense, therefore, to distinguish between
plastic and 'hard coded' responses, it makes little sense to distinguish between aspects
of  plasticity and natural  selection.   The mechanisms of  plasticity are  themselves
produced  and—just  as  crucially—maintained through  a  process  of  'adaptive
adjustment by natural selection' (West-Eberhard, 2003: 36).  It is this adjustment that
accounts  for  why  plastic  responses,  heritable  or  otherwise,  are  statistically—on
average—non-random with respect to adaptation.  Phenotypic plasticity represents,
then, an alternative mechanism whereby adaptive outcomes can be produced.
In the next section,  I  shall  argue that  exactly this  same analysis  applies to  those
aspects of plasticity associated with culture.  It is for this reason that the ILM should
not  be  viewed  as  an  alternative  to  natural  selection.   Rather,  it  presents  as  an
alternative to the kind of innate, highly modular  mechanism  outline by Pinker and
Bloom.
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2.4.7  –  Cultural  inheritance  as  a  complex  example  of  extrinsic
inheritance
It  is  likely  that  some  who  accept  the  wider  characterisation  of  non-genetic
inheritance  outlined  above,  as  extrinsic  and  best  considered  part  of  phenotypic
plasticity, will baulk at the idea that cultural inheritance19 should be considered in the
same way.  The likely basis for this objection is that culture has its own temporal and
historical dimension, in which it exhibits many aspects of an evolutionary process
(Mesoudi et al., 2006).  However, I want to suggest that this objection is rooted in a
failure to  distinguish clearly between the process  of cultural  evolution—in  which
cumulative  culture  emerges  through  the  differential  spread,  reproduction  and
elaboration of cultural variants—and the role played by cultural  inheritance  as one
form of non-genetic inheritance passed between generations of organisms.
2.4.7.1  –  Cultural  inheritance  vs.  cultural  evolution:  the  seeming
dilemma
Considered in the wider perspective of evolution, cultural  inheritance is clearly a
form of extrinsic inheritance and an aspect of transgenerational phenotypic plasticity.
Much  like  the  other  forms  of  non-genetic  inheritance  discussed  above,  the  very
possibility of cultural inheritance is itself dependent upon certain aspects of intrinsic
design, such as particular cognitive processes (Tomasello, 1999; Boyd & Richerson,
1996).  Only those organisms whose intrinsic, genetically based structuring permits
the  kind  of  social  learning  required  for  cultural  transmission  can  possibly  be
influenced by cultural inheritance.  As we have seen, these learning capacities are
one mechanism of phenotypic plasticity.  This point remains unchanged by recent
arguments suggesting that social  learning capacities may themselves be culturally
19 Some have objected that culture is not really inherited at all, but rather inferentially reconstructed
(e.g. Sperber, 2000).  For present purposes, however, I will continue to treat cultural inheritance as
falling under the umbrella of non-genetic inheritance, in the sense advocated by Bonduiransky
and Day (2009; see footnote 17).
115
acquired (e.g. Heyes, 2012).  Even if accepted, this would simply alter what we took
that intrinsic structuring to consist in—directly encoded social learning capacities vs.
the preparedness  to  acquire  those capacities during development—rather  than the
role played by that intrinsic structuring per se.
The fact that culture is part of phenotypic plasticity can be seen most clearly through
a  consideration  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  the  variation  involved  in  cultural
inheritance.   The  generation  of  genetic  variation  through  mutation  is  an  entirely
random process, at least with respect to adaptation (2.4.4).  In contrast, there is no
analogue to this random process in the generation of cultural variants (Henrich et al.,
2008;  Dickens  &  Rahman,  2012).   Instead,  the  possible  variation  in  cultural
inheritance is always related to aspects of intrinsic design.  Cultural variants that fit
the  model  and  content  biases  of  human  learners  (Henrich  &  McElreath,  2003),
together  with  those  that  fit  other  kinds  of  'attractors',  including  those  related  to
memory and other  cognitive capacities  (Henrich et  al.,  2008),  are  more likely to
appear and spread than other variants.
The argument here is not that the content of culture can simply be 'read off' from
human cognition (indeed, see below), but rather that the composition of the pool of
cultural variants is skewed from the outset by the biases and capabilities of cultural
organisms.  This is quite unlike the random origin of genetic variants, but exactly
what we should expect if culture is part of phenotypic plasticity.  As discussed above,
mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity are calibrated as a 'best guess' at how to respond
to the certainty of some change without any foreknowledge of what that change will
be.  This is precisely the role played by the biases and attractors associated with the
social learning of cultural variants.  In some cases these will reflect strategies that
statistically—on average—provide adaptive outcomes, such as 'copy the majority' or
some aspects of content biases.  In other cases they will reflect more general memory
or cognitive limitations.
However, if our analysis were to stop here, we would miss something very important.
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While  the  capacities  and biases  underlying  social  learning in  humans are  indeed
mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity, they can have results unlike those of the other
aspects  of  plasticity  or  extrinsic  inheritance  discussed  above.   By  enabling
cumulative transgenerational transmission, they set up a new process with its own
historical dynamics.  This is the process of cultural  evolution.  It concerns the way
that cultural variants themselves change in response to repeated acts of transmission
and can have a range of surprising and powerful effects.  
To  take  an  example  from  the  study  of  language  evolution,  the  evolutionary
plausibility  of  a  strongly constraining,  innate  language faculty is  reduced by the
presence of cultural transmission, whose internal dynamics can amplify the effects of
weak biases, thereby masking the strength of those biases from selection (Smith &
Kirby, 2008).   In  other  words,  the  process  of  cultural  transmission  can  produce
variants  that  while  consistent  with  the  biases  of  learners,  could  not  possibly  be
deduced or 'read off' from those biases.  More generally, cultural evolution can be
seen as Darwinian in its own right, exhibiting many parallels to biological evolution
(e.g.  Mesoudi  et  al.,  2004).   There  are,  for  example,  large  numbers  of  cultural
variants that compete for space in human brains and exhibit differential reproduction.
Once again,  the outcome of this  process is  not  one that  can be 'read off'  from a
consideration of the properties of individuals.
This leaves us with what might be taken as something of a dilemma.  When we look
at cultural evolution, its temporal nature and the fascinating, unpredictable outcomes
it can produce have suggested to some that culture should occupy a similar position
to genetics in a 'dual inheritance' model of evolution (e.g. Richerson & Boyd, 2005).
However, when we step back and look at the role of cultural  inheritance, the view
that it is similar in kind to genetic inheritance is unsustainable.  It is clearly an aspect
of  phenotypic  plasticity  and clearly a  form of  extrinsic  inheritance,  and yet  this
position seems to ignore the importance of cultural evolution.
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2.4.7.2 – Epigenetic parsimony resolves this dilemma
Deacon's conception of epigenetic parsimony provides an insightful resolution to this
dilemma.   Under  this  view, genetic  inheritance—as  intrinsic  and  embodied  in  a
structural artefact—sets the agenda regarding which other potential inputs can and
cannot have a developmental  influence.   Some of those other inputs,  particularly
cultural  inheritance,  will  themselves  derive  from temporally extended,  dynamical
processes that can be exploited by evolution, and lead to results that could not have
been predicted without a consideration of the nature of those systems.  This allows us
to see why there should be such an apparent mismatch between the status of culture
as seen from the perspective of cultural evolution as compared to that seen from the
perspective of cultural inheritance and its wider role in evolution.  The modification
of  the  phenotype through cultural  inheritance  represents  an  aspect  of  phenotypic
plasticity, much like  the  other  forms  of  non-genetic  inheritance  discussed  above.
However, this particular aspect of plasticity also creates an emergent system with its
own evolutionary dynamic.  
The temporal dynamics of cultural evolution should be thought of as a system of
informational  regularities,  regularities that  derive from the way in which cultural
variants themselves have to change in order to be transmitted.  These regularities can
then be exploited by evolution—much like physical or mathematical regularities—
through the production of organisms whose intrinsic design permits such regularities
to function as inputs to development, and whose biases steer those regularities in
particular directions.  The generationally repeated exploitation of these regularities
can produce something that resembles a kind of 'cumulative phenotypic plasticity', in
which individuals can draw on the flexible responses of previous generations as well
as  their  own.   Thus  while  cultural  inheritance  differs  in  kind  from  genetic
inheritance,  it  also  differs  in  kind  from developmental  inputs  such as  gravity or
temperature, because it derives from a process that has its own historical dimension
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with  its  own  dynamics.   Nevertheless,  these  extra  complexities  aside,  cultural
inheritance  is  just  as  much  a  form  of  extrinsic  inheritance  as  the  other  kinds
discussed above.  While the mechanism may be more complex, exhibiting its own
historical dynamics, it is unmistakably a facet of phenotypic plasticity.  Indeed, the
fact that this aspect of plasticity gives rise to such self-organising dynamics is one of
the consequences that can bear on the adaptive adjustment of the 'switches' described
by West-Eberhard (2003).
2.4.8 – Epigenetic parsimony as a general organising principle of
multiple inheritance
Deacon's  notion of  epigenetic  parsimony, in  which genes  regulate  the  “boundary
conditions affecting processes that have the potential of arising by self-organization”,
is actually an alternative way of characterising the exploitation of extra-biological
regularities,  discussed  in  chapter  one.   It  is  worth  revisiting  some  examples
considered there,  but  recast  in  Deacon's  terminology.  In  human locomotion,  the
down-step is delivered 'for free'—is self-organized—as a result of a minimal setting
of the boundary conditions by genes in order to exploit the physical regularities of
gravitation.  This view allows for the fact that gravity constitutes an input to the
human developmental system, but avoids the mistake of treating very different kinds
of  inputs  as  the  same.   Similarly,  the  form  of  symmetry  breaking  seen  in  the
embryological  development  of  the  frog  depends  upon  a  genetically  co-ordinated
exploitation of self-organization arising from the laws of physics.
The discussion of the ILM in chapter one also concluded that it was best understood
in similar terms.  The specifics of language structure are the outcome of a process of
cultural evolution.  This process is a self-organizing dynamical system of structure-
creating informational regularities.  The boundary conditions under which this self-
organizing process operates are set by the intrinsic design of language learners, in the
form  of  the  genetically  inherited  pragmatic  capacities  and  biases  underlying
inferential communication.  These boundary conditions ensure that the language has
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some structure  that  is  communicatively useful,  but  have  no direct  influence over
exactly what structure eventually emerges.  
Deacon's perspective also allows us to situate in a wider evolutionary context the
finding  that  cultural  transmission  amplifies  weak  biases,  and  thus  prevents  the
emergence of strong ones (e.g. Smith & Kirby, 2008).  This outcome is sometimes
glossed as culture acting to 'shield' the strength of the bias from selection.  However,
the  discussion in  this  chapter  and the last  provide  an alternative viewpoint  from
which to describe this same result.  Strong biases fail to emerge because they are
unnecessary, given that the same outcome can be produced more easily through the
exploitation  of  regularities  inherent  in  cultural  transmission,  an  exploitation  for
which  weak  biases  will  suffice.   Once  the  environment  includes  cultural
transmission,  weak biases that set  the boundary conditions for the self-organising
properties of cultural transmission, can come to be preferred over strong biases that
micromanage the details genetically.  
The 'shielding' and 'regularity exploitation' views are not mutually exclusive, but the
alternative  presented  here  allows  us  recognise  that  the  presence  of  cultural
transmission—and thus the regularities with which it is associated—itself forms part
of the environment in which adaptation occurs.  In an environment with gravity, there
is  no need to genetically encode much of the details  of the down-step in human
locomotion.  Similarly, if the plasticity of an organism permits cultural transmission,
there is no need to encode strong biases if weak biases will produce the same result
through cultural amplification.  In each case, selection is putting in place the capacity
to exploit a reliably present extra-biological regularity, rather than tightly encoding
the trait in the genome.
The concept of epigenetic parsimony can be seen, then, as the general form of the
account of the ILM presented in chapter one.  Before moving on to apply this line of
reasoning to the Bengalese finch, it may be useful to place this general form beside
the more specific argument made in the last chapter.
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Epigenetic parsimony: General form
Evolution will favour the exploitation of reliably present, non-genetic regularities in
order to produce an adaptive outcome over the 'hard coding' of that same outcome in
the genome.  The role of genetic inheritance is to set the boundary conditions under
which those non-genetic regularities can successfully self-organize to deliver  that
adaptive result.
Epigenetic parsimony: Language structure
Once  there  are  organisms  engaged  in  the  cultural  transmission  of  their
communication  system,  the  structure-creating  capabilities  of  cultural  transmission
represent  a  reliably  present,  non-genetic  regularity.   If  the  genetically  inherited,
intrinsic  structure  of  those  organisms  also  renders  them  capable  of  and  under
selection  for  inferential  communication,  then  this  acts,  through  the  expressivity
pressure,  to  set  the  boundary conditions  such that  the  self-organizing  process  of
cultural evolution delivers a language that is not only structured but structured in
such a way as to also be communicatively useful.
2.4.9  –  Epigenetic  parsimony  and  regularity  exploitation  in the
Bengalese finch
We are now in a position to apply this reasoning to the Bengalese finch:  The shift to
the  domesticated  environment  provided  a  context  in  which  something  that  had
previously been  tightly specified  intrinsically  by the  genome—song  structure,  as
limited  by  tightly  constraining  biases—was  partially  offloaded  onto  an  extrinsic
channel of inheritance, namely learning during early auditory experience.  Something
that had once been transmitted through the genetic inheritance system, came to be
transmitted through the behavioural inheritance system (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005),
with  song  structure  coming  to  be  much  more  determined  by  early  auditory
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experience.   Or, to be more precise,  the relationship between the two inheritance
systems shifted: rather than tightly constraining song structure, the role of genetic
inheritance came to be to set the boundary conditions that enabled the exploitation of
the possibilities inherent in cultural transmission.  
In  Deacon's  terms,  there  was  a  redistribution  of  selection,  away  from  the
maintenance  of  strongly  canalizing  biases  and  towards  an  intrinsic  design  that
facilitated  the  exploitation  of  the  extra-biological  regularities  in  cultural
transmission.  Rather than create a degenerate munia, domestication may have laid
the grounds for the epigenetically parsimonious offloading of the control of song
structure.  I shall return to this argument towards the end of the chapter, where I will
outline  a  Bengalese  counterpart  to  the  general  and  language-structure  forms  of
epigenetic parsimony described above.  For now, however, with Deacon's hypothesis
fleshed out in some detail, it is time to consider a range of evidence relating to its
plausibility in the case of the Bengalese finch.
2.4.10 – Evidence for Deacon's hypothesis
Several lines of evidence bear on the plausibility of Deacon's hypothesis.  The first
concerns other contexts in which selective pressure might come to be relaxed.  For
Deacon, the role played by domestication centres on the breakdown of wild-type
biases in a buffered context where selective pressure was relaxed.  By this logic,
similar changes to song structure should also occur in other contexts where selective
pressure becomes relaxed.  Kagawa et al. (2012) compared the songs of three wild
populations  of  white-rumped  munia  on  the  island  of  Taiwan.   The  syntactical
complexity of munia song was found to vary in relation to the number of sympatric,
closely related species.  One of the key functions of song is  species recognition,
which is important in order to avoid the infertile hybrids that often result from cross-
species matings.   This is best achieved through the use of simple, stereotypic songs
that  exhibit  little  variation.   In  locations  with  fewer  sympatric  close  relations,
however, the selective pressure on species recognition is relaxed.  The greater song
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complexity  found  in  areas  with  fewer  sympatric  species  could  well  be  another
example of song complexification following a relaxation of selective pressure.  
The  second strand  of  evidence  relates  to  the  levels  of  stress  hormone  in  white-
rumped munia and Bengalese finches.  Suzuki et al. (2012) report measurements of
fecal corticosterone, a hormone known to be directly involved in the development of
the song system (Suzuki et al., 2011).  Bengalese finches were found to have lower
levels of corticosterone than white-rumped munia, regardless of whether the munia
had been wild-caught  or  captive  raised,  indicating  that  it  is  domestication  of  the
lineage that matters here and not simply the conditions in which an individual bird
was raised.  Indeed, changes in hormonal regulation are known to commonly follow
from domestication more generally (Price, 2002; Trut et al., 2009; chapters three and
five, this thesis).  As discussed above, a range of work shows that higher levels of
corticosterone negatively affect the development of the song system and can reduce
the complexity of the resulting song (Spencer et al., 2003; Buchanan et al., 2004).  If
this  is  the  case,  then  the  finding  that  domestication  can  reduce  levels  of
corticosterone in finches—perhaps through consistently reduced levels of stress in a
buffered  environment—might  well  provide  a  physical  mechanism  whereby  the
relaxation of selection following domestication could induce song complexification.
A third line relates to  the impact  of  lesions  to various  parts  of  the song system.
Bilateral lesions to the Nif (see figure 2.1) in the Bengalese finch have been found to
significantly  disrupt  their  ability  to  sing  more  complex  songs  (Okanoya,  2004;
Hosino & Okanoya, 2000), rendering the songs of lesioned birds more like that of the
white-rumped munia.  Similar lesions performed on Bengalese finches that already
sang simpler, munia-like songs failed to produce this disruption.  This finding echoes
work with zebra finches  (Vu et  al.,  1995, cited in  Okanoya,  2004),  whose fairly
simple song showed no detectable changes following bilateral lesions of the Nif.  The
Nif is part of the auditory and motor feedback circuits and is, therefore, just the kind
of  brain  area  that,  on  Deacon's  hypothesis,  should  be  expected  to  become more
involved in the song system in a situation where strong, species-specific biases had
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begun to degenerate, and learning and auditory experience become more important.
Finally, Ritchie and Kirby (2007) present modelling work that supports the logical
coherence of the idea that  increased complexity can follow simply as a result  of
relaxing selective pressure.  The formal support for Deacon's view provided by the
modelling work combines well with the identification of an actual selective pressure
(species recognition) that might be relaxed; a mechanism (reduced levels of stress
hormone)  that  could produce increased song complexity following domestication;
and neural changes (the recruitment of new areas to the song system) that might
reflect  that  complexification.   There  is,  then,  good  evidence  that  song
complexification could have occurred simply as a result of the relaxation of selection
following  domestication.   However,  there  is  one  major  problem  with  Deacon's
hypothesis.
2.4.11 – A weakness in Deacon's hypothesis: sexual selection and
breeding efficiency
Perhaps  the  greatest  weakness  of  Deacon's  hypothesis  is  the  claim  that  sexual
selection was also relaxed following domestication, as a result of birds being paired
up by breeders.   If  this  claim were  true,  then  all  the  evidence  regarding female
preference and developmental stress, while independently valid, could not possibly
apply under  domestication.   There are,  however, two arguments  that  suggest  this
claim cannot  be  supported.   Firstly, the  idea  that  humans  have  controlled  every
Bengalese finch mating over the last 250 years seems both unrealistic and impossible
to  verify.  Secondly, even if  we assume that  human breeders  did  have  complete
control over all matings since domestication, this would still  not eliminate sexual
selection as a possible explanation.  If female finches prefer more complex song,
then a female paired with a male who sings a complex song will be more receptive
and aroused than a female paired with a male singing a simple song.  There are, in
other  words,  differences  in the 'breeding efficiency'  (Okanoya,  2004) of  different
pairings that could permit a role for sexual selection even if all those pairings were
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entirely determined by human breeders.
It is not possible, therefore, to rule out a role for sexual selection on the grounds that,
once domesticated, all pairings were made by breeders.  This means that although
there is good evidence supporting a role for relaxed selection, those who hypothesise
such  a  role  have  to  find  an  accommodation  with  arguments  relating  to  sexual
selection.   The obvious question arising from this,  of course,  is  whether the two
hypotheses should be seen as alternatives or as complementary.
2.5 – How compatible are the two hypotheses?
In recent  publications,  Okanoya seems to have begun integrating aspects of both
hypotheses,  arguing  that  domestication  masked  various  selection  pressures,
particularly  species  recognition,  thereby  permitting  increased  variation  and
complexity, and that this process was then reinforced by female preferences (e.g.
Kagawa et al.,  2010; Okanoya, 2012).  In other words, the two explanations  just
happen to be pushing in the same direction.  This is a reasonable union of the two
positions.   However, the logic behind the evolutionary exploitation of regularities
discussed in chapter one, and Deacon's concept of epigenetic parsimony discussed
above, hints at a more intriguing relationship between the two hypotheses.  To make
this  possible  relationship  clearer,  consider  the  following  simple  question:  Why
should  a  demonstration  of  fitness  through  song  complexity  necessarily  involve
learning?
To appreciate the force of this  question,  consider again the case of the European
sedge warbler, discussed several times previously in this chapter.  These birds sing
complex  songs  with  large  repertoire  sizes  that  are  the  result  of  sexual  selection
(Kroodsma, 2004).  However, as discussed above, sedge warblers reared in isolation
are able to develop full song repertoires (Leitner et al., 2002).  Quite obviously, then,
the complexity of an adult warbler's song does not reflect its capacity to  learn, but
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rather, as Leitner et al. report, its capacity to  improvise, which in turn is related to
highly  heritable  aspects  of  the  neural  song  system.   It  is  true  that  the  original
formulation  of  the DSH referred to  'learned features  of  song',  but  it  did  so with
reference to nutritional and other stressors that might impair the development of the
neural structures that underpin that learning.  
What matters is not learning per se, but the  capacity for which learning serves as
evidence,  a capacity which is  dependent  upon the healthy development of neural
structures.  But in the sedge warbler, the evidence for this capacity is not provided by
learning  but  by  improvisation.   As  Leitner  et  al.  point  out,  this  has  important
implications for our understanding of how sexual selection works in relation to both
birdsong and brains.  However, the immediate question here is, why, when the song
of the Bengalese finch complexified after domestication, did it not do so in a way
similar to the sedge warbler?  Why did the female preference for complexity not
drive male Bengalese finches to become virtuoso improvisers?  Why, instead, did
song complexity come to reflect the capacity to learn, rather than the capacity to
improvise?
One  potential  answer  to  this  question  seems  to  follow  directly  from  Deacon's
hypothesis,  in  particular  its  emphasis  on  relaxed  selection.   If  the  wide-ranging
relaxation of selective pressure following domestication were sufficient to cause an
increase in song variation and complexity—and there is evidence that it  is—then
selective pressure stemming from female preference might be most easily satisfied
by exploiting the breakdown of biases, reduction in canalization, and the increased
role of learning and traditional transmission thereby enabled.  Put simply, did the
complexity of song in the Bengalese finch—serving as an honest indicator of neural
condition—come  to  be  demonstrated  through  a  capacity  to learn,  rather  than  to
improvise, because the relaxation of selection accompanying domestication had  in
and of itself  already provided the conditions under which learning might come to
play a greater role?
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This  question  allows  us  to  present  a  Bengalese  counterpart  to  the  general  and
language-structure forms of Deacon's epigenetic parsimony principle:
Epigenetic Parsimony: Bengalese finch
Once cultural transmission, as a result of relaxed selection under domestication, had
come  to  play  a  more  prominent  role  in  the  birds'  communication  system,  the
structure-creating  capabilities  of  cultural  transmission  also  represented  a  reliably
present,  non-genetic  regularity.  If  the  genetically inherited,  intrinsic  structure  of
those (female) birds also makes them favour complex song, then this acts, contra the
tendency  for  culturally  transmitted  systems  to  simplify,  to  set  the  boundary
conditions such that the self-organizing process of cultural evolution delivers a song
that is not only structured but also complexly structured.
2.6 – Comparison with the ILM and language
This view of the Bengalese finch has some intriguing parallels with the discussion of
the ILM account of language structure in chapter one.  Consider first the Bengalese
finch.  Once domesticated, it would have been quite possible for selection to have
favoured an increased capacity to improvise and then utilise the complexity of song
produced by improvisation as the signal  of  mate quality, much like in  the sedge
warbler.  Deacon's arguments suggest, however, that song complexity came instead
to  reflect  the  capacity  to  learn—the capacity that  is,  to  engage with  a  culturally
transmitted form of inheritance—because domestication had already introduced the
circumstances where such cultural transmission could take on a more prominent role.
In other words, the increased complexity of Bengalese song was achieved through
the  exploitation  of  the  structural  possibilities  and regularities  inherent  in  cultural
transmission.  Recall, however, that the structure produced by cultural transmission
tends  towards  simplicity  and  compressibility,  at  least  if  unchecked  by  some
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countervailing pressure.  It is the female preference for complex song that provides
this  counter-pressure.   Once this  female preference is  'plugged in'  to  the cultural
dynamic,  cultural  transmission  not  only  creates  structure,  but  complex  structure
directed towards a particular functional end.
Next consider the case of language, which exhibits some striking parallels.  Work in
the ILM sees language structure emerging through a cultural process.  In this case,
too, the inherent regularities of cultural transmission are able to generate structure.
However, the same caveat applies:  unless the inherently simplifying dynamics  of
cultural transmission are balanced by some counter-pressure, that structure will tend
towards increasing simplicity and compressibility.  As argued in chapter one, in the
case of language this counter-pressure derives from its use in communication.  In
particular, from the demand that language function effectively as an enhancement20
of the wider, multi-modal system of inferential communication of which it forms a
part (Sperber, 1990; Sperber & Wilson , 1995).  This functional demand could have
been  satisfied,  at  least  in  logical  terms,  through  the  kind  of  detailed  genomic
specification of a UG advocated by Pinker and Bloom (1990).  Instead, however,
work in the ILM suggests that this same functional outcome can be achieved simply
through 'plugging in' the functional pressure for enhanced inferential communication
into the cultural dynamic.  Once this union has occurred, cultural transmission not
only creates structure, but complex structure directed to some functional end.  
The most intriguing aspect of the parallel,  however, is that in neither case do the
specifics  of  that  structural  complexity  actually  matter  that  much,  at  least  when
viewed from a functional standpoint.  For language, as long as the structure produced
by the cultural system forms an effective enhancement to inferential communication,
the details of the structure produced by the cultural process don't matter that much.
In  the  terms  used  in  chapter  one  (1.5),  it  doesn't  matter  whether  the  language
becomes structured in line with compositionality as we know it (C) or in line with an
20 As  discussed  in  chapter  one,  language  can  be  seen  as  an  enhancement of  inferential
communication by virtue of the high degree of precision it grants its users with regard to the
ostensions and inferences that can made using linguistic evidence.
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alternative (Cn) that provides an equally good compromise between the pressure for
learnability, deriving from the sheer fact of cultural transmission, and the pressure for
expressivity, deriving from communicative need.  The fact that language is structured
to reflect the need for expressivity at all, and not just learnability, is down to natural
selection introducing the competing pressure into the cultural system; the form taken
by that compromise structure is the result of the overall dynamics of the cultural
process.  
Equally for birdsong, the exact pattern of notes and note transitions that together
make a given song complex really don't matter; as long as the song is complex, then
the capacity to learn it can serve as a reliable indicator of quality.  The fact that
culturally  transmitted  birdsong  is  complex  at  all is  down  to  natural  selection
introducing a pressure which competes with the simplifying tendency inherent  in
cultural  transmission;  the  form  of  that  complexity  reflects  the  dynamics  of  the
cultural process that gave rise to a particular song.  
This point about the exact form of structure not mattering is important.  It makes
sense of why evolution was able to produce these systems—language and birdsong—
by exploiting the potentialities  inherent  in  a  set  of  extra-biological  regularities—
cultural transmission—over which it could have only ever have had limited control.
This works because, in Deacon's terms, all evolution by natural selection needs to do
is set the boundary conditions under which the exploitation of such regularities can
occur; the self-organizing nature of the regularities themselves does the rest.  In the
case of language those boundary conditions might be glossed, following arguments
in chapter one, as, 'the resulting system has to possess sufficient expressive power to
enhance the capacity to  provide evidence,  in  the form of  ostensions  from which
others can draw inferences'.  In the case of birdsong, the boundary conditions might
be glossed as, 'the system must be complex enough that the capacity to learn it can
serve as an honest indicator of quality'.  Within these wide remits, the exact form of
the system can be left to the dynamics of the self-organising cultural process.
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2.7 – Conclusions
Two preconditions were identified in chapter one for the very possibility of a cultural
account  of  linguistic  structure.   In  this  chapter  a  comparative  case  study  was
examined  which  saw  the  first  of  these  preconditions—an  increased  role  for
traditional  transmission—emerging in  a  species  of  songbird,  the Bengalese finch.
Both the major hypotheses for how and why this change is likely to have occurred
put the concept of domestication central to their explanation.    In particular, both
focus on the buffered nature of domesticated environments,  which allows for the
relaxation  of  various  selection  pressures  that  may  have  prevented  traditional
transmission from increasing in importance in the wild.  The buffering provided by
domesticated environments  and the relaxation of  selection it  enables  will  form a
major theme in later chapters of this thesis.   It is also likely that this process was
further  driven  by  selective  pressure  from female  preferences.   Furthermore,  the
degeneration  of  biases  permitted by the buffering  under  domestication may have
interacted with this pressure from female preference in interesting ways.  Or, to put it
another  way,  such  pre-existing  pressure  may  have  been  satisfied  by  exploiting




Sensitivity to Communicative Intent and the Domestic
Dog
Chapter one identified two preconditions for the possibility of a cultural account of
linguistic structure: an increased role for traditional transmission and the emergence
of the sensitivity to communicative intent.  The possible conditions surrounding the
first of these were examined in chapter two, through an extended discussion of the
domesticated Bengalese finch and how its song has changed in comparison to its
wild  ancestor.   In  this  chapter  I  will  turn  to  the  second  precondition,  with  an
examination of how domestication may have lead to the emergence of a sensitivity to
communicative intent in dogs.
Before turning to this task, however, it may be helpful to consider some differences
between the two preconditions.  Considering the first, it is easy to see how traditional
transmission might be important: if structure is produced through iterated instances
of learning, then it is necessary that the communication system actually be learned,
rather than simply present from birth.  In the case of the sensitivity to communicative
intent, however, the relationship is somewhat less direct.  This second precondition
relates to the need for signals to be paired with meanings, specifically the learning of
a large system of  arbitrary signal-meaning associations.  Such a system cannot be
acquired without the capacity to infer the meaning associated with a given signal.  
As discussed in chapter one (1.4.3), this kind of inference relies on a wide-range of
socio-cognitive skills, such as theory of mind and the capacity to engage in joint-
attentional activities, many of which may be unique to humans.  This full suite of
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skills  is  unlikely  to  be  found  in  other  species,  making  it  hard  to  identify  any
analogous cases.  As a result, the focus of this chapter is on one specific skill—the
ability to recognise that an action was meant communicatively at all—that represents
a necessary foundation for all the more advanced inferential capabilities.
3.1 – The domestic dog and communicative intent
Starting in the late 1990s a number of studies appeared describing how domestic
dogs were particularly adept at using human communicative cues, such as pointing
(e.g. Hare et al., 1998; Soproni et al., 2001).  Of particular interest was the fact that
dogs seemed to outperform chimpanzees and other apes (Miklósi et al., 1998; Hare et
al., 2002), and indeed seemed more similar to human children in this respect (see
Povinelli et al., 1999).  Of course, these findings immediately raised a whole range of
questions.  
• How might we explain the presence of this ability in dogs?  
• In  what  way  did  dogs  utilise  these  cues,  did  they  understand  them  as
communicative  or  did  the  cues  merely  function  as  a  form  of  stimulus
enhancement?  
• To what extent is this ability present in other species?  
In the discussion that follows I will address these questions amongst many others.
However  before  moving  on  to  this  discussion  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  clear
understanding  of  the  methodology used in  these  experiments,  for  much  of  what
follows will  depend on the details  and subtle variations of this  methodology, the
object-choice task.
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3.1.1 – The object-choice task
The basic procedure of the object-choice task is very simple.  Out of sight of the
subject,  a piece of food or other desirable item is  placed in one of two or more
locations.   The  location  with  the  food  is  then  indicated  to  the  subject,  through
pointing or some other cue, and the subject is then allowed to choose between the
locations (Miklósi & Soproni, 2006).  The question of interest, of course, is whether
the  subject  can  use  the  cues  to  select  the  correct  location.   The  details  of  the
implementation vary between studies in ways that will be referred to as and when
they arise.   However, before  moving  on to  a  thorough discussion  of  the  studies
themselves it is necessary to have at least an overview of the various pointing cues.
This is because the differential patterns of success between species in utilising the
various  cues  is  important  in  comparing  their  abilities  and  the  nature  of  their
comprehension of the cues.
The pointing cues used in these studies vary along three dimensions: (1) the distance
from the target; (2) the relationship between the pointer and the target; and (3) the
kinds of arm movements used in the pointing (Miklósi & Soproni, 2006).  Figure 3.1
provides  a  representative,  although  not  exhaustive,  sample  of  the  variety  found
amongst the first two dimensions.
Figure 3.1: The object-choice task.
(Taken from  Miklósi & Soproni, 2006)
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There are three factors to take away from figure 3.1. The first is that pointing cues
can be delivered by an experimenter who is equidistant between two locations, in
which case it is referred to as  symmetric pointing, or by an experimenter closer to
one location than the other, in which case it is asymmetric pointing.  The second is
that the experimenter  can be either close to the locations while  giving the point,
known as proximal pointing, or further away, known as distal pointing.  Finally there
is the way in which the arm is used, with either the ipsilateral arm fully extended, or
the contralateral arm used in so-called cross-body pointing.
The third dimension—the kind of movement used—divides into the following three
categories.   Static  pointing,  in  which the  experimenter  is  already in the  pointing
position when the subject enters the test area and remains pointing until the choice is
made.  Dynamic pointing, in which the point is produced in full view of the subject
and, again, the arm remains in position until the choice is made.  And,  momentary
pointing, in which the experimenter points in full view of the subject but withdraws
their arm after a few seconds (Miklósi & Soproni, 2006).  In addition to pointing,
many of  the studies  discussed  below also utilised  a  range of  other  cues  such as
touching  or  placing  a  marker  on  the  correct  location,  shifting  gaze  towards  the
location, and even iconic representations and photographs.  
This dry march through the methodology is necessary because the interpretation of
the studies that follow depends on the combinations of cues and actions that various
species are  able  to utilise.   The most  important  point  here,  and one that  will  be
repeatedly  returned  to  in  the  discussion  below,  concerns  the  extent  to  which  a
comprehension of the communicative nature of the cues is necessary for success on
the task.  It is quite possible, for example, to be successful with some cues, such as
tapping or sustained proximal pointing, purely as a result of stimulus enhancement.
As a result, that is, simply of attention being drawn to one location over the other,
without any need to recognise the communicative nature of the attention-drawing
action.  Other cues, however, such as iconic representations and momentary distal
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points, are much less salient in this regard.  
The real test, however, lies in the pattern of success and failure exhibited by a given
species.  If that pattern relates closely to the salience of the cue as a form of stimulus
enhancement, then it becomes difficult to ascribe communicative comprehension.  If,
however, a species were to be successful across a range of different cues, regardless
of their stimulus-enhancing saliency, then this would serve as much better evidence
that they recognised their communicative nature.  Finally, such a recognition is even
more strongly confirmed if a species not only utilises cues of varying forms, but also
modifies  that  utilisation  in  response  to  the  ostensive  content  of those  cues.   For
example,  by responding differently to intentionally given communications than to
very similar physical actions produced 'by accident'.
3.1.2 – Three initial hypotheses
In terms of accounting for this capacity in dogs, Hare et al. (2002) put forward the
following three hypotheses:
(a) The canid generalisation  hypothesis:  that  this  ability  is  common  across
canids, and that dogs simply inherited it from their ancestor, the grey wolf.
(b) The human exposure hypothesis: that dogs' skills at utilising communicative
cues should vary in line with their degree of experience with humans, with
the corollary that younger dogs should be less skilful than older dogs.
(c) The  domestication hypothesis:  that  dogs  acquired  this  capacity  during  the
process of domestication, with the corollary that dogs should be more skilful
than wolves, and that variations in experience with humans should not affect
the performance of either species.
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Hare  et  al.  then  conducted  a  series  of  experiments  to  examine  the  differing
predictions of these three hypotheses.  In their first experiment they replicated the
finding that dogs outperform chimpanzees in the use of communicative cues.  In their
second experiment they compared the performance of dogs and wolves on the use of
three communicative cues: Gaze+Point+Tap (GPT), in which the experimenter gazed
at the correct location, extended their (contralateral) arm and gave the location a tap;
Gaze+Point (GP), the same as GPT except that the tap was replaced by a (dynamic,
proximal, cross-body) point; and Point (P), in which no gaze was used, only pointing
alone.   There  was  also  a  control  condition  in  which  no  cue  was  used.   Dogs
significantly  outperformed  wolves  on  their  use  of  all  the  cues.   In  their  third
experiment there was no difference between dogs and wolves on a non-social food-
finding game.  Finally, in experiment four they tested puppies aged 9 to 26 weeks
under the same conditions described for experiment two.  The puppies were able to
utilise all the communicative cues above chance, and showed no effect of learning
over the trials, or differences dependent on rearing history.  
The findings reported by Hare et al. relate to two major issues: the differing abilities
of  dogs  and  wolves  and  the  presence  of  these  abilities  in  even  young  puppies.
Subsequent studies have gone on to explore both these points.
3.1.2.1 – Dogs compared with wolves
Turning first to the dog-wolf difference, Miklósi et al. (2003) compared dogs and
wolves that had been socialised with humans to a comparable level.  They found that
wolves socialised with humans could use touching and, to a limited extent, pointing
cues  in  a  food-finding  task,  although  there  was  significant  individual  variation
between wolves, and they were still inferior to dogs.  They then went on to test how
dogs and wolves react when faced with a similar but insoluble task.  Here a striking
difference emerged.  The dogs initiated and maintained face and eye contact with the
human experimenter to a much greater extent than the socialised wolves.  Miklósi et
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al. argue that this difference goes some way to explaining the inferior performance of
wolves, as a reluctance to engage with the human hampered the extent to which the
wolves were able to extract information from any communicative cues.  
Virányi et al. (2008) related this difference in eye contact to differences in the object-
choice task.  They compared hand-reared wolves that had been intensively socialised
and displayed no wariness of humans, hand-reared dogs that had been specifically
bred for the purposes of the experiment and pet dogs recruited from local owners.  At
age four months both hand-reared and pet dogs were able to utilise a momentary
distal pointing cue in order to find food.  Hand-reared wolves, however, were unable
to utilise this cue.  In addition the wolves showed far greater reluctance to engage in
eye-contact with humans than either group of dogs.  
Virányi  et  al.  then went  on to re-test  the group of hand-reared wolves at  regular
intervals.   Initially the wolves still  failed to utilise distal  pointing (momentary or
dynamic)—although, again, the wolves exhibited high levels of individual variation
—but they were able to use cues where the human hand got much closer to the target,
such as touching or proximal pointing.  However, over the course of the study their
performance on distal pointing gradually improved.  Finally, Virányi et al. compared
a  subset  of  these highly trained wolves,  each  of  which had by now experienced
hundreds of distal pointing trials, with a group of age-matched naïve pet dogs.  The
highly trained wolves and naïve pet dogs were both able to utilise distal pointing
equally  well,  and  both  were  equally  willing  to  engage  the  experimenter  in  eye-
contact.  The overall finding of this study, then, is that wolves that have been hand-
reared, intensively socialised and given months of training can utilise the same kind
of cues as four month old dog puppies.
3.1.2.2 – Ontogenetic emergence
Turning now to the ontogenetic emergence of these abilities in dogs, Riedel et al.
(2008) compared the ability of puppies aged 6, 8, 16 and 24 weeks to use gestural
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and other communicative cues in a food-finding game.  Puppies in all age groups
were tested on their ability to utilise various forms of dynamic cross-pointing and to
use a marker placed near the correct location as an indicator of where the food was.
Six week-old puppies used all of the communicative cues correctly, as indeed did
puppies in the other three age groups.  Furthermore, apart from the marker cue, there
was no significant difference between the age groups.  In the marker condition the
only significant difference was that 24 week-old puppies outperformed those aged 6
weeks.  In follow-up experiments, Riedel et al. limited the possible role of stimulus
enhancement by manipulating the trials so that the puppies couldn't simply select the
correct location by approaching the experimenter's hand.  These follow-up tests also
confirmed  the  findings  of  Virányi  et  al.  (2008)  that  very  young  puppies  could
effectively use dynamic distal cross-body pointing.
3.1.2.3 – Non-pointing cues
Dogs have also been tested using a range of other, non-pointing cues.  In an early
study, Agnetta et al. (2000) found that dogs could utilise the placing of a marker as a
communicative  cue  to  the  location  of  food.   Perhaps  even  more  intriguingly,
Kaminski  et  al.  (2009a)  found  that  dogs  could  also  successfully  use  iconic  3D
representations and photographs as cues for objects to retrieve.  Most impressively,
when  shown a  photograph,  dogs  were  able  to  successfully  retrieve  the  depicted
object in preference to a second photograph of that object.  Their success in utilising
this range of cues is important, because it suggests that there is nothing specific about
pointing to which dogs are responding, and that this might represent a more general
capability.  Finally, these last few studies also indicate that dogs can utilise a wide




It may be useful at this point to make a brief summary of the findings just reviewed.
In addition to multiple replications of the original work regarding their sensitivity to
human  communicative  cues,  the  following  points  emerge  from  the  studies  just
discussed:
(1) Dogs outperform great apes in tasks that require utilising a communicative
cue
(2) Dogs also outperform their ancestors, grey wolves, in these kind of tasks
(3) Dogs are able to utilise these communicative cues from a very young age, and
don't (unlike wolves) seem to be reliant on experience with humans for the
ability to emerge
To return to Hare et al.'s (2002) three possible hypotheses, point (2) suggests that the
canid generalisation hypothesis is incorrect: if this ability is not found in wolves then
dogs cannot simply have inherited it.  Point (3) suggests that the  human exposure
hypothesis  is  also  incorrect:  the  fact  that  very  young  puppies  show  such  good
performance  indicates  that  exposure  to  humans  is  not  what  explains  this  ability.
However, points (2) and (3) do provide support for the  domestication hypothesis.
The ability to utilise these communicative cues is a derived trait in domestic dogs,
not present in wolves, although, interestingly, testing reveals significant variation in
wolf capacities that might have provided the basis for selection during domestication
(Virányi et al., 2008).  Furthermore, it seems that its emergence in dogs is not the
result of their developing in a human-intensive setting, as even very young puppies
with limited exposure to humans can demonstrate this skill.  Taken together, these
two arguments indicate that dogs' skills at interpreting human communicative cues
are likely to have arisen during domestication.
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3.1.3 – Challenges to the domestication hypothesis
All three of the points listed above have been contested.  I will return to point (1),
regarding great apes, in section 3.2, when I discuss the studies of the object-choice
task in other, non-canid species.  For now, however, I will focus on points (2) and (3)
—the  claims  that  dogs  outperform wolves,  and  that  exposure  to  humans  during
development is unnecessary for the emergence of these skills in dogs.
3.1.3.1 – Challenge I: Dogs don't outperform wolves
The claim that the sensitivity to communicative intent is absent in wolves has been
challenged by Udell et al. (2008).  Udell et al. cite several methodological problems
with previous studies, many of which have been discussed above (e.g. Hare et al.,
2002;  Miklósi  et  al.,  2003;  Virányi  et  al.,  2008).    In  particular, that  the  testing
conditions for wolves and dogs have often differed, with wolves being tested outside
—in some instances while inside a fenced enclosure—and dogs being tested inside,
with no barrier between them and the experimenter.  In an attempt to correct for these
methodological  flaws,  Udell  et  al.  compared  the  performance  of  human-reared,
socialised  wolves,  pet  dogs,  and  rescue  dogs  living  in  a  shelter.   With  these
methodological problems corrected for, they found that both wolves and dogs could
use communicative cues equally.  They also found that the performance of pet dogs
varied depending on the nature of the testing location, whether indoors or outdoors,
and with or without a dividing fence.  Finally, the shelter dogs were found to perform
significantly worse than both pet dogs and wolves.
3.1.3.2 – Challenge II: Dogs do require developmental experience
The claim that the emergence of these skills is not dependent on experiences during
ontogeny has also been challenged.  Wynne et al. (2008) presented a re-analysis of
the data from Riedel et al. (2008; discussed above), and argued that, contrary to the
its  original  interpretation,  the  study  did show  that  the  older  dogs  outperformed
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younger dogs.  Wynne et al. focused on Riedel et al.'s first experiment, comparing
puppies at four different age groups.  In particular, they argue that a much stronger
main  effect  of  age  could  be  observed  if  the  (non-cued)  control  condition  was
eliminated from the analysis, with the reasoning being that no improvement with age
would be expected in the control condition.  With this alteration made, Riedel et al.'s
data show a significant improvement with age.  In addition, Wynne et al. argue that
the performance of 6 week-old puppies was significantly better in the second half of
the experimental trials than the first, suggesting a learning effect.  Dorey et al. (2010)
tested the comprehension of momentary proximal pointing in puppies aged 9-12, 13-
16, 17-20 and 21-24 weeks, and found an improvement with age, with only the two
oldest groups showing above-chance performance.
3.1.3.3 – An alternative: The two-stage hypothesis
Putting both these sets of results together, Udell et al. (2010) present an alternative to
the  domestication  hypothesis,  the  two  stage  hypothesis.   This  states  that  the
sensitivity to human communicative cues depends on two kinds of experience during
development.   The  first  kind  of  experience  is  the  exposure  and  interaction  with
humans during the canids'  sensitive period of  socialisation (see section  3.4 for  a
fuller  discussion of the canid socialisation period),  in  which they learn to  accept
humans  as  social  companions.   The  second  kind  of  experience  consists  in  their
lifelong learning to use aspects of human limb movement as cues to locate food and
other desired items.  
The  two  stage  hypothesis has  several  interesting  features.   Firstly,  it  emphasises
developmental experiences and not phylogeny, in other words any canid socialised to
humans during the sensitive period and then subsequently exposed to human cues
will, according to this hypothesis, learn to utilise those cues.  As such, it presents as
something of a more domain-general explanation than the domestication hypothesis,
which  suggests  that  dogs  have  become  attuned  specifically  to  the  kind  of
communicative cues produced by humans.  Secondly, the second component of the
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two-stage hypothesis involves very low-level learning mechanisms, indeed Udell et
al.  (2010)  explicitly  refer  to  both  classical  and  operant  conditioning  playing  the
major  role  in  this  second  stage.   Finally,  the  two-stage  hypothesis  makes  some
interesting predictions: for example, that dogs socialised to other species, such as
sheep or cats, should be more sensitive to the social stimuli of those species than of
species to which they are not exposed (Udell et al., 2010; 338).
3.1.3.4 – Responses to these challenges 
Hare et al. (2010) present a methodological critique of Udell et al.'s (2008) claim that
dogs and wolves performed equally well.  The centre of this critique is that Udell et
al.  bundled  together  non-responses  with  incorrect  responses,  such  that  failure  to
participate was classified together with incorrect participation.  Once this confound
was removed no significant difference between wolves and dogs remained, in fact
the  wolves  performed  much  like  the  adult  wolves  in  Virányi  et  al.  (2008).   In
addition, the removal of this same confound showed that the presence of a fence or
other barrier between the dog and the experimenter affected participation and not the
number  of  correct  choices  made  by those  who did  participate;  dogs  tested  from
behind a barrier were more likely simply not to participate in the experiment at all.  
However, even after re-analysis, the shelter dogs tested by Udell et al. (2008) were
still not utilising the cues significantly above chance.  Hare et al. suggest that this
may have  been  the  result  of  the  small  sample  size  (N=8),  and report  their  own
experiment with a larger group of shelter dogs, who were found to be skilled at using
human cues.  Finally, Hare et al. point out that the dogs and wolves used by Udell et
al. were not bred for the experiment and so their rearing and developmental histories
were  unknown.   This  is  important  because  for  reliable  conclusions  to  be  drawn
regarding  the  influence  of  genes  on  behaviour  it  is  necessary  to  keep  the
environmental conditions as similar as possible (Miklósi & Topál, 2011).           
Hare et al. (2010) also question the re-analysis of Riedel et al (2008).  Wynne et al.
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(2008) argued that if the control condition was excluded then a main effect of age
became apparent.  But as Hare et al. (2010) point out, this main effect is entirely
dependent on the marker condition, with there being no difference between the age
groups on either of the two pointing cues.  However, even with the marker condition
this main effect was driven entirely by the difference between 6 and 24 month old
puppies.   In  other  words,  even  after  excluding  the  control  condition,  the  only
significant difference between age groups was that reported in the original paper.
3.1.3.5 – Conclusion
We have, then, two theoretical accounts of dogs' sensitivity to human communicative
cues:  the  domestication  hypothesis and  the  developmental,  two-stage  hypothesis.
Rather than continue with the methodological wrangling, I will now turn to two other
sources of evidence that bear directly on the choice between these two hypotheses.
The  first  concerns  whether  there  are  differences  between  the  various  breeds  of
domestic dog.  The domestication hypothesis would predict that a similar kind of
sensitivity to communicative cues should be found across all breeds.  In contrast, the
two-stage  hypothesis,  focused  as  it  is  on  developmental  experience,  should
seemingly predict much greater variation.  The second concerns the question of the
manner in which dogs understand human cues.  This will be investigated through an
examination of some of the similarities and differences between the use of cues by
dogs and human infants.  The domestication hypothesis, in positing a more domain-
specific account,  might expect to see some similarities,  given that we are talking
about  the  same  domain  in  both  cases.   However,  the  two-stage  hypothesis,  in
focusing  on  canid-typical  mechanisms  of  socialisation  and  general  associative
learning, provides little reason to expect similarities with human infants.
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3.1.4 – Differences between dog breeds
Present-day domestic dogs exist in a profusion of hundreds of different breeds, some
of which have been bred as working dogs,  others  as companions,  and each with
varying degrees of relatedness to their wolf ancestors.  It is important to ask, then,
whether there are any differences between breeds in their use of communicative cues.
Wobber et al. (2009) compared the New Guinea Singing Dog (NGSD), a primitive
breed that is thought to have had little contact with humans for thousands of years,
with two groups of more conventional breeds representing those that had been bred
as working dogs (e.g. golden retrievers) and those that had been bred as companions
(e.g.  toy  poodles).   All  breeds  were  able  to  utilise  the  cues—cross-body  distal
pointing and a placed block—at above chance levels.  The working and companion
dogs outperformed the NGSDs on the pointing cue, while the NGSDs outperformed
the other two groups in utilising the placed block.  These results are re-enforced by
work  showing  that  Australian  dingoes—a close  relative  of  the  NGSD—are  also
capable  of  successfully  utilising  these  communicative  cues  (Smith  &  Litchfield,
2010),  including the  'benchmark'  momentary distal  point,  which  goes  furthest  to
eliminating  low-level  explanations  such as  stimulus  enhancement  (Miklósi  et  al.,
2003).  Much like the NGSDs, dingoes have an early history of domestication but
have lived as free-ranging, essentially wild, animals for the last few thousand years.
In a second experiment, Wobber et al. divided both the working and companion dogs
into  more  wolf-like  (e.g.  huskies/basenji)  and  less  wolf-like  (e.g.  German
shepherds/toy  poodles)  groups,  to  compare  the  relative  contributions  of  genetic
distance  from  wolves  and  breed-purpose  to  the  ability  to  utilise  cues.   As  in
experiment one, all breeds were able to use the cues above chance.  There was no
evidence that genetic distance from wolves made any difference, and the working
dogs outperformed the  companion breeds  overall.   It  seems,  then,  that  the  basic
sensitivity to communicative intent is shared across all breeds—even those with little
human contact in historical times—but that those breeds subsequently selected to
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work and co-operate with humans exhibit an enhancement of this basic capacity.   
What might explain the differences between breeds?  One possibility is related to the
findings of Miklósi et al. (2003) that the superior performance of dogs compared to
wolves  may  be  related  to  a  greater  willingness  to  direct  their  gaze  at  humans.
Jakovcevic  et  al.  (2010)  compared  the  willingness  of  three  breeds—retrievers,
German shepherds and poodles—to gaze at the human face.  Retrievers showed a
greater willingness to initiate gaze and slower rates of extinction once gaze had been
established than poodles, perhaps suggesting that this might underlie the difference
between  working  and  companion  dogs.   This  conclusion  has  to  be  tempered,
however, by the fact that no such difference was found between German shepherds
and poodles.  Helton and Helton (2010) found that large dogs performed better than
small dogs in their use of human pointing cues.  They provide several suggestions as
to why this might be so, one of which is that working dogs tend to be larger than
those bred for companionship, although by itself this fails to tease apart whether it is
being bred to work or larger size that's making the difference.
3.1.5 – What do dogs know about communicative cues: parallels
with human infants?
In this section I turn to the question of what dogs know about communicative cues.
This is approached through a comparison between dogs and human infants.  Three
main topics are considered in this comparison.  The first concerns the situations in
which human cues are most likely to be utilised.  The second concerns the ostensive
indicators  influencing  the  perception  that  an  action  was  meant  communicatively.
Finally, I will consider some parallels between the mistakes made by dogs and those
made  by human  infants  that  may relate  to  similarities  in  their  understanding  of
communicative cues.
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3.1.5.1 – Use of cues in competitive and co-operative situations
One interesting question concerns the kinds of situations in which dogs are best able
to utilise communicative cues.  It is known, for example, that chimpanzees perform
better at competitive than co-operative cognitive tasks (Hare & Tomasello, 2004).
Herrmann  et  al.  (2006)  compared  the  performance  of  chimpanzees  and  human
infants  in  using  human  gestures  driven  by  either  a  competitive  or  co-operative
communicative motive.  Chimpanzees succeeded in the competitive but not the co-
operative  condition,  whereas  children aged 24 months  only succeeded in  the co-
operative, informing condition.  
Pettersson et al. (2011) compared dogs' success in two similar conditions—asking, in
effect, whether dogs are more like chimpanzees (better in competitive situations) or
more  like  human  infants  (better  in  co-operative  situations).   In  the  co-operative
context dogs utilised the gesture at above chance levels, whereas in the competitive
trials they were not significantly different from chance.  Furthermore, the latency
time before a choice was made was significantly lower in the cooperative condition.
It  seems,  then,  that  dogs—much  like  humans  infants,  but  unlike  chimpanzees—
exhibit a particularly high sensitivity to human cues in co-operative situations.
3.1.5.2 – Ostensive indicators to the communicative nature of cues
Of course,  the  question remains  as  to  whether  the similarities  between dogs and
human infants are based on the same underlying processes.  This comes back to the
question of what dogs understand about communicative cues and, indeed, how they
know such cues are communicative in the first place.  Kaminski et al. (2012) report a
series of experiments probing this question.  In their first experiment they established
that dogs respond differently to intentionally given communicative points and gazes
than to similar unintentional movements, with only the former being utilised to select
the correct location in an object-choice task.  It is this sensitivity to the  ostensive
content of  a  cue—that  is,  to  whether  it  was  provided  intentionally  and
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communicatively—that  marks  dogs  out  as  unusual  in  comparison  to  most  other
species tested on the object-choice task (see 3.2 below). 
The ostensive cues used in their first experiment all involved initially establishing
eye-contact with the dog.  However, in a second experiment, Kaminski et al. found
that dogs could successfully use cues provided by somebody facing away from them
who called their name (or indeed  any name in the relevant high-pitched manner).
This suggests both that eye-contact is not always necessary for dogs to recognise the
communicative nature of human cues and, further, that a human's inability to see the
dog, something previous studies have shown dogs can understand (Schwab & Huber,
2006), is no barrier to cues being communicatively interpreted.  
In a third experiment, Kaminski et al. compared dogs' responses to gazes and points
with  and  without  eye-contact  and  name-calling,  and  whether  dogs  could  utilise
communicative acts directed at a third party.  Eye-contact was found to be the most
significant factor, with name-calling being relatively unimportant.  However, taken
together with the findings of experiment two, it seems that dogs are capable of using
a number of different features to diagnose the communicative intent of a human cue.
Importantly, many of the ostensive indicators used by dogs are the same as those
used by human infants (Kaminski et al., 2012).  One difference, however, was that
unlike human infants, dogs seem comparatively poor at utilising cues directed at a
third party.  Finally, they also found that puppies used a similar set of features to
discriminate  intentionally  given,  communicative  cues  from  unintentional,  but
physically similar, non-communicative actions.
3.1.5.3 – Similar kinds of errors in dogs and human infants
One of the most striking parallels between the use of communicative cues by dogs
and human infants is the occurrence of similar kinds of errors in both groups, with
the most notable example being the so-called A-not-B error.  This error refers to the
curious behaviour of human infants (aged 6-12 months), first uncovered by the work
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of Jean Piaget, whereby after having successfully retrieved a hidden object from one
location (A) the infant will continue to search for the object at that location, even if
they see it hidden, right in front of them, at another location (B).  In Piaget's (1954)
original  formulation,  this  strange  error  was  explained  in  terms  of  infants'
underdeveloped model of the physical world, in particular their failure to grasp the
concept of object permanence.  
Recently, however, Topál et al. (2008) have shown that the rate at which this error
occurs is  related to  the degree to which the task is  social  and communicative in
nature.   Infants  make  a  much  greater  number  of  errors  when  object-hiding  is
accompanied  by  a  range  of  ostensive-communicative  cues,  such  as  eye  contact,
pointing and gaze alteration (which Topál et al. term 'communicative context'), than
when the hiding occurs without such cues (non-communicative context) or by an
experimenter outside the infant's view (non-social context).  The A-not-B error can
be  seen,  then,  as  kind  of  'pragmatic  misinterpretation',  with  infants  taking  the
communicative cues in the A-trials as being meant to convey general information
about where this  class of objects are to be found in the world, rather than just as a
physical indicator of where this individual object happens to be right now (Topál et
al., 2008).
Topál et al. (2009a) tested both dogs and wolves for the occurrence of the A-not-B
error  and  examined  whether  the  frequency  of  errors  differed  between
communicative, non-communicative and non-social conditions.  Dogs showed very
much the same pattern of results as human infants, with their continuing to search at
location A, even after having seen the object moved to location B, but only in the
communicative  conditions,  and not  in  non-communicative  or  non-social  controls.
Human-reared wolves,  on the other hand,  showed no sign of this  search error in
either communicative or non-communicative conditions, and no difference between
the two conditions.  These differences complement those between dogs and wolves
on the object-choice task,  discussed above, and would seem a better  fit  with the
domestication hypothesis than the two-stage hypothesis.  However, Topál et al. also
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found an interesting difference between infants' and dogs' use of the cues.  When the
identity of the experimenter changed between the A- and B-trials, infants continued
to search in location A, whereas dogs did not.  In other words, infants seemed to
generalise  beyond  the  specific  communicative  situation  and  partner  more  readily
than dogs.
Of  course,  these  findings  with  dogs  have  not  gone  unchallenged.   Fiset  (2010)
pointed out that Topál et al.'s (2009a) implementation of the A-not-B search task was
somewhat  atypical.   In  particular, that  the  B-trials  also  involved an  initial  'sham
baiting' of the A location, as a result of the experimenter taking a  'zig-zag' path that
first moved the object to the A location and then finally to B.  This more complex
route  might  place  greater  attentional  demands  on  the  dogs  than  the  A-trials.
Furthermore, this difference was more pronounced in the communicative than non-
communicative conditions.  In addition, there is also the possibility that the errors
may stem from failure to inhibit a previously rewarded motor act.
Kis et al. (2012) directly addressed these concerns with an experiment designed to
control for these procedural and motor-inhibition explanations.   They found that the
kind of approach on the B-trials—whether zig-zagging and sham baiting, or direct
like on the  A-trials—made no difference to  the occurrence  of  the A-not-B error,
suggesting that this wasn't simply an artefact of the experimental procedure.  In a
second, watch-only, condition they found that whether the dog searched on the A-
trials, or merely watched what the experimenter was doing, made no difference to the
frequency  of  their  errors  on  the  B-trials,  suggesting  that  such  errors  are  not
explicable in terms of a failure to inhibit a motor response.  
In  a  further  experiment,  Kis et  al.  found that  the error-rate  could be reduced by
varying the level of ostensive cues in the B-trials.  In particular, if location B was
ostensively enhanced—through eye contact, gaze-shifting, etc.—then this reduced,
but did not eliminate, the appearance of the A-not-B error.  This finding is very much




It  seems, then,  that  dogs resemble human infants in  a number of different ways.
Firstly, they appear more adept at using human cues in co-operative situations than in
competitive contexts.  Secondly, they are not only capable of utilising a wide range
of communicative cues, but are also sensitive to a range of ostensive indicators, such
as eye contact and name calling, that those cues have been given intentionally as
communications.  This sensitivity seems to parallel that seen in humans infants and
to  be  present  from birth.   Furthermore,  dogs  seem to  make  many  of  the  same
mistakes as human infants and to do so for some of the same reasons of pragmatic-
ostensive misinterpretation.
3.1.6 – Conclusion
It  is  now possible  to draw some conclusions  regarding the relative merits  of the
domestication  hypothesis  and  the  more  developmentally  oriented  two-stage
hypothesis.  The bulk of the early experimental work (discussed in  3.1.2) suggests
that dogs outperform wolves on the object-choice task and that dogs, unlike wolves,
do  not  require  developmental  exposure  to  humans  in  order  for  these  abilities  to
emerge.   Both  these  claims  have,  of  course,  been  disputed.   However,  the  real
evidence  that  distinguishes  between  the  two  hypotheses  relates  to  the  expanded
discussion of these capacities undertaken in the previous few sections.
Firstly, the presence of these capacities across a huge variety of different breeds—
from working dogs, through companion dogs, to now-feral species such as the dingo
—does  not  fit  well  with  the  developmental  account  provided  by  the  two-stage
hypothesis.  The developmental conditions of these breeds vary greatly; what they
share  is  a  history of  domestication.   Secondly, dogs'  capacities  seem to  go  well
beyond the kind of simple, learned responses to particular human action envisaged
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by the two-stage hypothesis.  Dogs are able to utilise a wide range of human cues,
including  novel  ones  to  which  they  have  not  previously  been  exposed  (e.g.  3d
replicas or photographs).  Furthermore, dogs are not simply using human actions as
cues, but seem to be sensitive to whether those actions were meant communicatively.
Finally,  the  ostensive  indicators  they  use  to  discern  whether  a  cue  was  meant
communicatively, together  with the pattern of errors they produce,  exhibits  some
striking parallels with human infants.  All this makes it difficult to accept that the
capacities exhibited by dogs simply represent the outcome of the socialisation period
occurring around humans and subsequent re-enforcement learning, as argued by the
two-stage hypothesis.  It seems, then, that the domestication hypothesis provides the
best account of the emergence of these capacities in dogs.
3.2 – Sensitivity to communicative cues in other species     
So far the discussion has been almost entirely focused on dogs and their ancestor the
grey wolf.  In this section, however, I turn to studies examining the sensitivity to
communicative intent in other species.   These will be dealt with in two groups: non-
canid domesticates and  non-domesticated species,  including great apes.   Findings
with  both  these  groups  will  obviously  have  some  important  bearing  on  the
relationship  between  domestication  and  the  emergence  of  a  sensitivity  to
communicative intent.
3.2.1 – Non-canid domesticates
One obvious question raised by the domestication hypothesis is the extent to which a
similar  sensitivity  to  communicative  cues  might  be  found  in  other  domesticated
animals.  Is it something common across many species, and so potentially part of the
domestic phenotype (see chapter four, section 4.2), or is it peculiar to dogs?  As far
as I am aware, only three other domesticated species—goats, horses and cats—have
been tested on their ability to utilise human communicative cues.  The results lend
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limited support to the generality of the domestication hypothesis, but are very far
from conclusive.  
Kaminski et al. (2005) tested domestic goats on an object-choice task similar to those
used with dogs.  Like dogs, the goats managed to use both a touching/tapping cue
and, to a lesser extent, a pointing cue.  Also like dogs, young goats were just as adept
as  adults.   However,  the  goats  failed  to  utilise  a  gaze  cue,  despite  having
demonstrated the ability to follow gaze in an initial experiment.  Two further points,
both discussed by the authors, need to be made in relation to this study.  The first is
that this pattern of results is easily explained as a result of simple learning processes
such as stimulus enhancement, with the goats' success at using the cues varying in
step with the extent to which they drew attention to the correct location.  This is
unlike the results  with dogs who have been shown to use a  wide range of  cues
equally successfully and to be sensitive to their ostensive content in a way difficult to
account for in terms of simple stimulus enhancement.  The second point is that it is
impossible  to  carry  out  the  ideal  comparison  because  the  wild  ancestor  of  the
domestic  goat  is  now extinct.   This,  unfortunately, is  true  of  a  great  number  of
present-day domesticated species, and one of the reasons why dogs, with a living
ancestor  in  the  grey  wolf,  make  such  ideal  subjects  for  comparative  studies
concerned with domestication (Topál et al., 2009b).   
Another domesticated species that has been tested on its use of cues is the horse.
Earlier work (McKinley & Sambrook, 2000) found little sign that horses were able to
use communicative cues.  More recently, Proops et al.  (2010) report horses to be
successful at using a marker cue and a distal sustained pointing cue in selecting a
food bucket.  They failed, however, to use momentary tapping, body orientation and
gaze alternation cues.  Much like the findings with goats, the authors interpret this
pattern of results in terms of stimulus enhancement, rather than as evidence that the
horses grasped the communicative nature of the cues.  This is supported by their
observation  that  all  those  horses  that  used  the  marker  cue  to  choose  the  correct
location inspected the marker itself before going to the bucket.
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Miklósi et al. (2005) compared the performance of domestic cats with that of dogs.
The cats  were found to  perform as  well  as  dogs at  utilising  distal  and proximal
pointing  cues  made  either  momentarily  or  dynamically.   While  these  results  are
intriguing, the limited range of cues tested with cats makes it difficult to claim full
equivalence with dogs.  In particular, there is no way to tell the nature of the cats'
understanding of the cues, whether it is rooted in stimulus enhancement, as seems the
case for goats and horses, or shows a greater sensitivity to ostensive content as seems
the case in dogs.  Miklósi et al. report one further difference between dogs and cats
that lends weight to a more cautious interpretation.  When faced with a similar, but
insoluble, object-choice task, dogs showed a greater willingness than cats to gaze at
humans  and  a  greater  level  of  gaze  alternation  between  the  target  and  the
experimenter.  This,  recall,  is  exactly  the  difference  Miklósi  et  al.  (2003)  found
between dogs and wolves, which they argued might go some way to accounting for
their  differential  levels of success.  It  may be that cats'  reluctance to gaze at  the
human face could hamper their ability to use more subtle and complex cues.
3.2.2 – Non-domesticated species
Of course, the flip side of the last section is that if evidence of the capacity to utilise
human communicative cues were found in species that had never been domesticated,
then this would, at the very least, show that domestication was not necessary for the
emergence of this ability, even if it might still be associated with it in certain cases.
This section will be further subdivided into studies with non-domesticated mammals,
particularly  dolphins  and  seals;  non-domesticated  birds,  particularly  parrots  and
various species of corvid; and apes.
3.2.2.1 – Mammals
Perhaps the best evidence for the use of communicative cues in a non-domesticated
mammal—indeed, the best evidence from any species outside of dogs—comes from
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work with dolphins  (Pack & Herman,  2004, 2006, 2007).   Dolphins have shown
spontaneous, first trial, understanding of ipsilateral and cross-body points, and gaze
direction as communicative cues to a  location.   Given the necessarily large-scale
aquatic  nature  of  the  testing  environment,  all  these  cues  have  obviously  been
presented distally.  Furthermore, dolphins are able to take a point to an object as a
cue to fetch a similar object, a task that has at least a passing resemblance to the
iconic cues successfully used by dogs (Kaminski et al., 2009), and also to show an
understanding of the geometry of pointing by grasping that a point refers to a distal
object rather than a proximal one along the same line of sight.
The results  with dolphins  are  clearly very impressive,  however  several  points  of
difference between the work with dolphins and that with dogs needs to be borne in
mind.  The first concerns the very small number of subjects used in the studies.  For
example,  the  results  reported  in  Pack  and  Herman  (2007)  come  from only  two
individuals.   Furthermore,  these  individuals  tend  to  have  had  intense,  long-term
contact with humans in captivity, often having taken part in numerous other studies
or having been engaged in some form of display work.  It would, for example, be
very interesting to know how young dolphins, or those with much more minimal
human contact—perhaps even wild ones—might perform in object-choice tasks.  It
should  be  acknowledged,  of  course,  that  many  of  these  points  derive  from
inescapable facts about the biology and habitat  of the species concerned, and the
associated costs and difficulties inherent in their  being kept in captivity and thus
amenable to experimental investigation.  I would also stress that none of this means
I'm casting any doubt on the findings with dolphins.  The evidence clearly suggests
that  dolphins  can utilise  a  range of  human  communicative  cues  with  impressive
sophistication.  Rather, and I shall return to this point below, it is not entirely clear
how or why the tested dolphins have come to exhibit this ability.  This is particularly
important given the findings that socialised wolves can learn how to utilise cues over
time (Virányi et al., 2008), eventually reaching comparable levels to domestic dogs,
and the relatively better performance of enculturated apes (see below, Itakura et al.,
2001).
155
Several  species  of  seal  have  also  been  tested  for  their  ability  to  comprehend
communicative cues.  Shapiro et al. (2003) report on a specially captured grey seal
pup, who demonstrated the ability to utilise a variety of ipsilateral and cross-body
points, given both symmetrically and asymmetrically, in order to select the correct
location.  However, as the authors acknowledge, this was not a capacity that emerged
spontaneously, but rather followed from an extensive period of training, in which the
seal learned first to follow a pole, and then a human point, to the correct location.
The seal's pattern of success and failure also reflect this early training, with a failure
to utilise head turning and gaze cues, and a seeming inability to generalise from a
right-or-left  pointing  task  to  one  in  which  there  were  three  possible  locations
(Shapiro  et  al.,  2003).   Overall  the  authors  concluded  that  the  results  were  best
explained as a result of simple conditioning rather than any comprehension of the
communicative nature of the cues.
Scheumann and Call (2004) report a study with South African fur seals.  In contrast
to the grey seal study just described, the fur seals had not been specifically trained to
utilise communicative cues.  All the tested fur seals were, from the first trial, able to
utilise  a  point-and-gaze  cue,  delivered  symmetrically  and  asymmetrically,  and  a
point-only cue.  In addition, all but one of the seals successfully used a gaze-only cue
from the first trial onwards.  The seals failed, however, to utilise glance, hand point,
or  iconic replica cues,  several  of  which have been successfully utilised by dogs.
These  findings  are,  outside  of  dogs  and  dolphins,  probably  the  most  impressive
demonstration of the use of communicative cues by a non-human species.  It should
be noted,  however, that  many of the caveats  identified in  relation to  the dolphin
studies also apply here.  The fur seals were housed in a zoo and took part in twice-
daily public demonstrations, in which they had to respond to the instructions and
directions of their caretakers.  Although, as the authors state, these seals had never
been specifically trained to respond to points, it seems very possible, much like the
dolphins, that prolonged exposure to humans is likely to have played a role in their
acquisition of this ability. 
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3.2.2.2 – Birds
Giret et al.  (2009) tested the use of cues in African grey parrots.  The pattern of
results is in many ways similar to that seen in horses and goats.  From the first trial,
or within 15 or so trials,  all  the birds managed to use the most salient,  stimulus
enhancing cue in the experiment, a sustained proximal point.  One bird learned to use
a sustained proximal gaze cue, although the rest did not.  None of the birds ever
managed to successfully utilise momentary points or distal points or gaze.  In other
words, the more obviously the cue drew attention to the target the more easily the
birds managed to use the cue, but there seems little reason to conclude that they
understood the communicative purpose of the cues.
The most thoroughly studied group of birds, however, are the corvids.  Overall the
results from this group are mixed and difficult to interpret.  Schloegl et al. (2008)
found that ravens could use a touch cue, but that they failed to utilise pointing or
gaze cues even after over 150 trials.  Tornick et al. (2011) found stronger results with
Clark's  nutcracker's,  who could  use  a  touch  cue  from the  first  trial  and  quickly
learned to use proximal point and gaze alternation cues, although the order of cues
from most to least successfully utilised—touch > point > gaze alternation—is, as the
authors point out, fully in line with a stimulus enhancement account.  
Schmidt  et  al.  (2011)  found  that  rooks  as  a  group  could  not  utilise  gaze  cues,
although one bird did learn to use such cues during the experiment.  Perhaps the most
impressive results  come from Jackdaws,  who were able  to  successfully use  both
proximal  cross-body pointing  and  gaze  alternation  from the  first  trial,  but  were
unable to use gaze or a gaze and head-turn combination.  None of these studies show
comparable results to seals or dolphins, let alone dogs.  They all show a greater effect
for  proximal,  active cues  (e.g.  repeated gaze alternation vs.  single-instance gaze)
compared to distal, one-time cues.  And, perhaps with the partial exception of the
jackdaws, seem quite adequately accounted for in terms of stimulus enhancement.
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3.2.2.3 – Apes
Earlier in this chapter I laid out three broad conclusions that followed from the initial
work on the use of communicative cues by dogs.  Two of these conclusions—that
dogs outperform wolves, and that dogs require very little exposure to humans for
these abilities to emerge—have been dealt with above.  In this section, I will deal
with the third conclusion: that dogs are better than great apes in tasks requiring the
sensitivity to communicative intent.  
To recap, numerous studies (Hare et  al.,  2002; Hare & Tomasello, 2005; Gomez,
2005; Miklósi, 2007) have found that, unlike dogs, great apes are not particularly
skilled at using human communicative cues to locate food or other desired items.
Further, it  seems that  dogs only outperform apes  in social  tasks that  involve co-
operative communication and not in social tasks more generally, at which apes seem
the more skilled (Wobber & Hare, 2009).  This pattern of results fits neatly into the
wider view of ape cognition, which suggests that apes are both highly socially skilled
(Byrne & Whiten, 1992)—perhaps exhibiting some aspects of theory of mind (Call
& Tomasello, 2008)—but also seem to perform better in competitive rather than co-
operative versions of the object-choice task (Hare & Tomasello, 2004).  However,
recent work suggests that the situation as regards apes and the object-choice task may
be somewhat more complex.  Three factors seem to have emerged that need to be
taken  into  account  when  assessing  the  performance  of  apes:  the  nature  of  the
experimental design; the level of contact with humans; and the use of multiple cues,
such as a combined pointing and vocal gesture.
The experimental design used with apes seems to play a role in determining their
level  of  success.   In  particular,  it  has  been  found  that  chimpanzees,  bonobos
(Mulcahy & Call,  2009) and orangutans (Mulcahy & Suddendorf,  2011) perform
better given a peripheral version of the object-choice task—with the two locations
placed some distance either side of the subject—than with a central version of the
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same task, in which the two locations are placed in front of the ape, perhaps on a
table.  Mulcahy and Hedge (2012), in a review of published studies of the object-
choice task with apes,  found that the majority of these studies, unlike those with
dogs, used the central form of the task.  In addition, they also found that most studies
with apes failed to establish eye-contact prior to issuing the cue.   
Mulcahy and  Hedge's  explanation  for  the  difficulty  apes  seem to  have  with  the
central version of the object-choice task is that containers, associated as they are with
food rewards, are more salient than the cue being issued by the experimenter, with
which  they  share  the  visual  field.   As  a  result,  apes  choices  become  somewhat
random, relating to their  failure to inhibit a motor response to these more salient
stimuli.  Of course, this fails to address the question of apes' better performance in
competitive  versions  of  the  object-choice  task  (e.g.  Hare  &  Tomasello,  2004).
Mulcahy and Hedge suggest that this is because competitive cues exceed the salience
of the containers in a way in which cooperative cues do not.  The problem with this is
that apes' greater attunement to competitive rather than cooperative cues is, as we
have  seen,  one  of  the  very  things  argued  to  contribute  to  their  relatively  poor
performance  on  the  object-choice  task.   Similarly,  as  Mulcahy  and  Hedge
acknowledge, many of the studies with dogs have also failed to elicit eye-contact
prior  to  issuing the  cue.   They suggest  that  this  may be less  important  for  dogs
because they are more willing to initiate eye-contact themselves.  It is, however, this
very willingness that has been cited as a possible part  of the explanation for the
superior performance of dogs as compared with, say, wolves (Miklósi et al., 2003).
Mulcahy and Hedge's  most  important point,  however, is  probably that  statements
about the relative capabilities of different species require that those species be tested
with comparable versions of the same task,  leaving aside unavoidable differences
dictated by their biology.  Part of this should include testing dogs on a central version
of the object-choice task, something not yet reported to date (Mulcahy & Hedge,
2012).   The  other  half  involves  comparing  apes  and other  species  on  peripheral
versions of the task.  In this respect it should be noted that not all studies utilising a
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peripheral method have found positive results (e.g. Herrmann et al., 2006).  Recently,
Kirchhofer et  al.  (2012) compared chimpanzees and dogs in a task in which two
(widely  spaced)  objects  were  placed  behind  the  subject,  who  faced  the  human
experimenter.  The experimenter then delivered a distal sustained point, combined
with gaze alternation and a vocal cue.  The dogs as a group performed above chance
on this task, whereas the chimpanzees did not.  Findings such as this make it hard to
ascribe the difficulties great apes seem to have with the object-choice task entirely to
their inability to inhibit responses in central versions of the task.
Despite the general finding that apes are poor at the object-choice task, there have
always been a few positive results (e.g. Ikatura & Tanaka, 1998), generally involving
apes that have been enculturated; that is, raised in an environment of intensive social
interaction with humans.  This kind of exposure is known to have a large effect on
their cognitive and social development (Call  & Tomasello, 1996) and to result in
abilities not seen in the wild (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998).  Lyn (2010) conducted
an object-choice study comparing enculturated,  nursery-reared,  mother-reared and
wild-caught  chimpanzees  and  bonobos.   The  enculturated  group  massively
outperformed the other three groups, who showed no significant differences.  
Finally, some studies have shown that the performance of apes increases if multiple
cues are given.  For example, Herrmann et al. (2006) found that apes could use an
iconic cue (a picture or replica) paired with a spatial/indexical cue to locate food, but
returned  to  chance  performance  when  the  iconic  cue  was  presented  alone.   Lyn
(2010) also found that chimpanzees and bonobos performed better when a pointing
cue was accompanied by a vocal cue.
3.2.3 – Conclusions
This brief survey of object-choice studies conducted with non-canid species, both
domesticated and non-domesticated, reveals two important conclusions.  The first,
echoing the work with dogs,  is that it  is necessary to go beyond the question of
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whether a given species has 'passed' the object-choice test.  If the question of interest
is the sensitivity to communicative intent, then it is also necessary to examine which
cues are being successfully utilised, and whether it is variations in their  ostensive
content  that  is  making  a  difference.   The  work  with  horses  and  domestic  goats
provides some minimal support for the domestication hypothesis.  However, in both
cases the pattern of success and failure is perhaps most simply explained as a result
of stimulus enhancement.  This same explanation can also be applied to most of the
work with birds, which, like that with horses and goats, exhibit a pattern of results
largely explicable in terms of stimulus enhancement, and that seems to show little of
the varied and flexible capabilities of dogs
The  second  conclusion  concerns  those  cases  in  which  an  explanation  based  on
stimulus enhancement or some form of conditioning seems inadequate.  The major
example of this is the work with dolphins, together with some of the work with seals.
The first thing to note, of course, is that neither of these is a domesticated species.
Having an evolutionary history of domestication is not, then, a necessary condition
for the sophisticated utilisation of human communicative cues.  The second thing to
note, however, is that, for both dolphins and seals, the individuals that were tested
have  intensive,  long-term  contact  with  humans,  often  participating  in  research
programs,  demonstrations  or  shows  for  many years.   This  is  reminiscent  of  the
finding that socialised wolves      could acquire the use of human cues after a lengthy
period of training.  It also fits with the advantage seen for enculturated apes over
their mother-reared or wild-caught contemporaries.  
Taken  together,  these  findings  suggest  that  there  may  be  multiple  routes,  each
comprised of different  proportions of  phylogenetic  and ontogenetic  contributions,
that  can lead to  similar  phenotypic outcomes (Miklósi  & Topál,  2011).   Broadly
speaking, the  ontogenetic route, taken by dolphins, seals and intensively socialised
wolves,  consists  of  heavy  long-term  exposure  to  humans.   In  contrast,  the
phylogenetic route, seemingly taken by the domestic dog, means it requires little or
no exposure to humans for comparable capacities to become manifest (Miklósi &
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Topál, 2011).  
The  next  question  to  address,  then,  concerns  what  it  is  about  domestication  that
might  explain  the  emergence  of  these  capacities  in  dogs?   The  history  of  dog
domestication would seem like the natural place to start looking for an answer.
3.3 – The history of dog domestication: a brief sketch
If domestication has played a role in the emergence of these capacities in dogs, then
the obvious next question to ask is how or why domestication might have had this
effect.   What  is  it  about  domestication  that  has  lead  to  the  emergence  of  these
capacities?  In this section I will provide a very brief overview of what is known
about when and how dogs were domesticated.
The consensus emerging from genetic studies is that the domestic dog is likely to
have originated somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000 years ago (Pang et al., 2009;
vonHoldt  et  al.,  2010;  Ding  et  al.,  2011),  although  there  is  disagreement  as  to
whether the locus of that origin was the Mesopotamia (vonHoldt et  al.,  2010) or
south-east Asia (Pang et al., 2009; Ding et al., 2011).  The archaeological evidence in
the form of both skeletal remains (Galibert et al., 2011) and in relation to dog burials
(Morey, 2006, 2010), a key indicator of the importance of domestic dogs in the lives
of  prehistoric  peoples,  is  broadly in  line  with the  genetic  evidence,  suggesting  a
figure  of  14,000-16,000 years  ago.   Collectively, the  evidence  suggests  that  dog
domestication began subsequent to the last  glacial  maximum (LGM), the time at
which global ice-sheets were last at their maximum extension (26,000-19,000 BP:
Clark et al., 2009).  There has, however, been a series of findings in recent years
(Germonpré  et  al.,  2009;  Pionnier-Capitain  et  al.,  2011;  Ovodov et  al.,  2011)  of
remains dating from 35,000-30,000 BP, and thus prior to the LGM, that differ from
wolves  in  ways  similar  to  the  domestic  dog.    It  has  been  suggested  that  these
remains constitute an incipient or 'proto-dog', although it is unclear to what extent, if
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at all,  these very early dogs are ancestral to later post-LGM dogs (Ovodov et al.,
2011).
Current thinking on dog domestication suggests, then, that it may have proceeded in
three discernible stages (Galibert et al., 2011).  The first stage, starting c35,000 BP,
was  a  form  of  proto-domestication,  which  is  likely  to  have  been  unconscious,
perhaps with self-selecting groups of wolves hanging around human settlements and
adapting to their new niche.  The second stage, starting around 14,000 BP, represents
the start of domestication as conventionally understood, in which dogs were starting
to be actively kept and bred for human purposes.  It is this stage that is reflected in
the dog-burial findings.  Finally, the third stage occurred much more recently, with
the first evidence of distinct 'breeds' dating from within the last 3000-4000 years, and
the major explosion in breed number from the last 500-1000 years (Clutton-Brock,
1995).
The key point to take from this very brief overview of dog domestication is that it
has been a very long process, which took place under an extremely diverse variety of
conditions.  As such, the task of working out when, why and how a particular trait is
likely to have emerged—particularly a behavioural trait that leaves no fossil traces—
seems  pretty  much  impossible.   Fortunately,  however,  there  is  a  long-running
experiment, expressly designed to investigate the origins of the domestic dog, which
provides a very clear indication of just why this capacity is likely to have emerged
during domestication.  The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to a discussion
of this work, which has come to be known as the farm-fox experiment.
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3.4 – The farm-fox experiment: domestication and selection
against aggression
The farm-fox experiment (Belyaev, 1979; Trut,  1999) was started in 1959 by the
Russian geneticist Dmitry K. Belyaev.  The experiment took the Siberian silver fox—
a regional variant of the more familiar red fox—as its model animal, and began a
selective  breeding  program,  still  running  today,  to  investigate  the  origins  of  the
physical  and  behavioural  characteristics  typical  of  domesticated  species,  often
referred to as the domestic phenotype (see 4.2).  Belyaev's hypothesis was that this
suite  of  phenotypic  characteristics  emerged  as  a  consequence  of  selection  for
tameness (Belyaev, 1979)—or, to put it another way, selection against aggression.  
The key to this hypothesis, as noted by Trut (1999), lies in the fact that behaviour is
rooted in biology.  This means that selecting against a certain behaviour, such as
aggression, really means selecting for a whole suite of physiological changes that
underlie the control of that behaviour.  This nicely captures the essence of Belayev's
original argument regarding how selection against aggression might result in a range
of  other  physiological  and  behavioural  changes,  which  he  termed  destabilizing
selection  (Belyaev,  1979).   The  key  element  of  destabilizing  selection  is  the
breakdown of previously co-adapted groups of traits and ontogenetic trajectories in
the face of a new environmental stressor.  According to Belyaev, the stressor relevant
to domestication was the presence of humans, in particular the change in the social
environment of other species that followed from that human presence.
At  the  core  of  the  experiment  is  the  breeding  of  three  lines  of  foxes,  tame,
aggressive, and a control group.  In this account of the work I will focus mainly on
the tame line, but mention will be made of the other two groups where necessary.
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3.4.1 – Selection criteria
The first important thing to note is that selection in both the tame and aggressive
lines was entirely based on the level of defensive or aggressive behaviour exhibited
by the foxes towards humans.  This was tested monthly for the first six or seven
months of the fox kits' development.  The experimenter would offer the fox food and
try to stoke and handle the animal.  Once the foxes had reached maturity, at about
eight months, they were classified based on the level of tameness they exhibited into




Fox eager  to  establish  human  contact,  whimpering  to  attract
attention  and  sniffing  and  licking  experimenters  like  a  dog.
Behaviour begins to be displayed before one month old.
I Fox  shows  emotionally  positive  response  to  experimenter,
wagging tail and whining.
II Fox lets itself be petted and handled, but shows no emotionally
friendly response to the experimenter.
III Passive-protection response; fox avoids experimenter or bites if
stroked or handled.
Table 3.1: Classification system for tame-line foxes.
(Adapted from data in Kukekova et al., 2006)
The aggressive line was selected using a different system of classification,  based
largely  on  how  close  the  experimenter  could  get  to  the  fox  before  eliciting  an
aggressive response (see Kukekova et al., 2006 for details).  The control group was
not selected.  
 
It  should be noted that this somewhat subjective set of criteria has recently been
supplemented by an approach based on the binary yes/no assessment of objectively
observable  behaviours—such  as  'fox  touches  cage  door  with  nose'—that  can  be
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coded from recordings of fox-experimenter encounters (see Kukekova et al., 2008 for
full details).  The full set of such observations are then subject to statistical tests,
such as  principal  components  analysis  (PCA),  which  allows  the  identification  of
correlated behavioural variation and provides a more objective method of classifying
foxes into groups such as tame or aggressive.  This approach has served to confirm
the validity of classifications based on the earlier, more subjective criteria; and, for
the first time, allowed a single system to be used in the assessment of both tame and
aggressive foxes (Kukekova et al., 2008, 2012).
3.4.2 – Behavioural changes
The selective pressure applied to the tame line of foxes was very strong indeed, with
only the top 10% of most tame individuals being used as the parents of the next
generation (Trut et al., 2009).  This resulted in very fast changes.  Within two or three
generations of this selective regime all aggressive and defensive behaviours had been
eliminated from the tame population (Trut et al., 2009).  By the fourth generation
foxes began to appear who behaved in many ways like dogs, for example by wagging
their tails.  The subsequent shifts in behaviour observed as the experiment proceeded
are  well  illustrated  by  the  percentage  of  foxes  classified  as  belonging  to  the
'domesticated elite' in each generation, as shown in table 3.2, below.






Table 3.2: Percentage of the 'domesticated elite' in selected generations
(Extracted from Trut et al., 2009)
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As can be seen, the shift in behavioural responses was rapid and dramatic, with Trut
et al.  (2009) reporting that by 2006 almost all the population of tame foxes were
classified  as  belonging  to  the  domesticated  elite.   The  genetic  basis  of  this
behavioural change has been demonstrated though a series of experiments.  These
have  included  the  cross-fostering  of  newborn  tame and  aggressive  pups  and  the
transplantation of embryos from tame to aggressive lines and vice versa (Trut et al.,
2001; Kukekova et al., 2006).  The temperament of the resulting fox has reflected its
selected  linage—tame  or  aggressive—rather  than  its  individual  circumstances  of
gestation and/or development.  More recently, this has been confirmed by the cross-
breeding of tame and aggressive foxes, which results in hybrid offspring intermediate
between  the  two  lineages  (Gogoleva  et  al.,  2009;  Kukekova  et  al.,  2006).   In
addition, foxes in all lineages spent the majority of their time in cages and were only
allowed  brief,  'time  dosed'  contact  with  humans,  to  ensure  that  any  changes  in
behaviour were not the result of training or developmental experience (Trut, 1999).
3.4.3 – Other correlated changes
This rapid shift towards tame behaviour should not, however, have been unexpected:
very strong selective pressure was, after all, being applied to just this trait.  What was
perhaps less expected was the range of other changes that also occurred in the tame
line of foxes.  In addition to their loss of aggressive behaviours towards humans the
tame foxes also came to differ from the aggressive and control lines in the following
ways (see Trut, 1999; Kukekova et al., 2006; Trut et al., 2009; Bidau 2009 for more
details):
• earlier response to sound
• eyes opened earlier
• delayed development of fear response
• extended socialisation period
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• play extended into adulthood
• piebald coat 




• smaller cranial height and width
• decrease in sexual dimorphism
• earlier sexual maturity
• breakdown of strict mating seasons, with some foxes mating twice a year
The most striking thing about this list of changes is how many of them are typically
found in other species that live in close association with humans (Trut, 1999; Price,
2002).  Indeed, many of these changes—increased variation in coat colour, shifts in
cranial  size,  breakdown  of  seasonal  mating,  accelerated  sexual  maturation,  and
reduced  sexual  dimorphism—form  part  of  what  has  been  termed  the  domestic
phenotype,  that  suite  of  characteristics  that  typifies  many  domesticated  species
(Price, 1999; chapter four, 4.2).  One remarkable finding of the farm-fox experiment,
then,  is  that  many of  these  typical  outcomes  of  domestication  can  be  produced
simply as a by-product of selection against aggression.  I shall return to this point at
some length in chapter five in relation to humans.  In the present context, however, I
want to focus on one further change: that the tame line of foxes, like domestic dogs,
also came to exhibit a sensitivity to communicative intent.
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3.4.4 – Sensitivity to communicative intent in domesticated foxes
Hare et  al.  (2005) conducted  an object-choice task,  similar  to  those described at
length with dogs and other species above, comparing the abilities of dog pups, tame-
line domesticated fox kits and control fox kits.  The three groups were tested on their
ability to use a point-and-gaze cue to select the correct location of some hidden food.
The  two  major  findings  were  that  tame-line  fox  kits  performed  as  well  as  dog
puppies,  and that  the  tame-line  kits  outperformed  kits  of  the  control  population.
There was also no evidence of learning during the experiment, as the tame-line kits
performed as well in the initial trials as in later ones.  
This  finding  is  remarkable  and  provides  the  strongest  support  yet  for  the
domestication  hypothesis  regarding  the  emergence  of  these  capabilities  in  dogs.
However two caveats need to be mentioned.  The first is that while the tame-line
foxes did significantly outperform the control foxes, the control foxes were able to
utilise the human cues at an above-chance level.  The second is that only one cue,
point-and-gaze,  was  used  in  the  experiment.   As  discussed  above,  the  most
impressive finding with dogs concerns the range of cues they can utilise and their
apparent sensitivity to the ostensive content of those cues,  neither of which were
explored in the experiment with foxes.
However, these caveats aside, the finding that tame foxes also show sensitivity to
communicative intent is important in the context of the present chapter because it
provides an insight into what it is about the domestication process that might explain
the  emergence  of  this  capacity  in  dogs.   It  had  previously been argued that  the
capacities  exhibited  by  dogs  had  been  directly  selected  for:  that  selection,  both
natural and artificial, following domestication could have favoured those individuals
best able to read human communicative cues (e.g. Coppinger & Coppinger, 2001).
And, indeed, this may be part of the story, as suggested by the differences between
working, companion and now-feral breeds such as the dingo (3.1.4).  
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The foxes in this  long-running experiment have not,  however, been bred for this
purpose.   As  described  above,  their  contact  with  humans  has  been  carefully
controlled, and their response to cues formed no part of the criteria for selection.  The
fact that the sensitivity to communicative intent has emerged in the tame fox line, on
which the only active selection was against aggression, lends support to what has
been  termed  the  emotional  reactivity  hypothesis (Hare  et  al.,  2005;  Hare  &
Tomasello,  2005).   This  is  the  view  that  cognitive  changes,  particularly  those
involving co-operative behaviour, may not always requires direct selection, but can
appear as a by-product of selection acting on systems of emotion or aggression that
had previously prevented the use of pre-existing skills in these kinds of co-operative
contexts.21
Recall  the  question  in  section  3.3:  how  and  when  in  the  long  course  of  dog
domestication is the sensitivity to communicative intent likely to have emerged?  The
answer arising from the farm-fox experiment is that such capacities are likely to have
emerged as a by-product of selection targeting defensive and aggressive behaviours,
and that this could, dependent on the strength of selective pressure, have happened
very rapidly, although it  is almost certain to have taken longer than the 45 years
between the start of the farm-fox experiment and the tests conducted by Hare et al.
(2005).
21 This kind of view is exemplified by the work of Melis et al. (2006), who found that chimpanzees
that were seemingly unable to solve a co-operative dyadic task could do so if dyad-pairing was
manipulated  such  that  individuals  with  mutually high  tolerance  were  placed  together.  When
subsequently  placed  with  a  less  tolerant  partner,  these  same  individuals  reverted  to  being
seemingly unable to solve the task.  The case of dogs and foxes—and indeed bonobos (see 5.2.1)
and humans (see 5.2.5)—may represent a similar kind of 'freeing' of cognitive potential from its
temperamental shackles, but on a permanent, species-wide basis. 
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3.4.5. – Underlying physical basis for these changes
How might we explain the emergence of this correlated group of seemingly unrelated
changes that appeared in the tame line of foxes?  One possible answer lies in the fact
that many of these changes relate to shifts in the timing of development (Trut, 1999;
Trut et al., 2004).  In some instances this is obvious.  For example, the earlier age for
sexual  maturity  and  the  extension  of  the  juvenile  socialisation  period  represent
changes that are themselves shifts in developmental timing.  In other cases the link is
less obvious but still present.  The appearance of a piebald pattern on the coats of
tame-line foxes has been related to the action of a particular gene, termed Star, which
delays the development of pigment cells (Trut, 1999).  Other examples include the
retention into adulthood of traits that are typical of newborn kits, such as floppy ears
(Trut, 1999).  I will return to the discussion of shifted developmental trajectories, or
heterochrony, in the next chapter (4.3.3); for now, however, I will consider some of
the physiological changes that are likely to have mediated the developmental shifts
seen in the farm-fox experiment.  
One key physiological change relates to levels of hormone activity, particularly that
of the glucocorticoids, a class of steroid hormones known to play a role in stress and
arousal.  A rise in the levels of cortisol in the blood has been shown to correlate with
the  end  of  the  socialisation  period.   In  tame-line  foxes,  with  their  extended
socialisation  period,  this  rise  occurs  later  in  development  (Trut  et  al.,  2009).
Glucocorticoid levels are also implicated in the developmental changes leading to
piebald colouration (Trut et al., 2009).  Comparative studies of the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA)—a major part of the neuroendocrine system, involved
in  stress  and  emotional  control  Gulevich  et  al.,  2004)—found  that  by  the  10 th
generation (the first  for which data was collected)  levels of glucocorticoids were
significantly reduced in tame foxes (Gulgevich et al., 2004), a shift that mirrors the
behavioural  changes  discussed  above.   By  the  45th generation  basal  levels  of
glucocorticoids were three-to-five times lower in tame foxes than controls (Trut et
al.,  2009).   Furthermore,  levels  of  the  same  hormones  have  also  found  to  be
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decreased in tame foxes during pregnancy and lactation (Trut et al., 2000).  In other
words,  the  entire  developmental  process  of  a  tame  fox  kit  proceeds  against  the
backdrop of lower levels of glucocorticoid hormones.  
Turning now to the role of neurotransmitters,  tame foxes exhibit  higher levels of
serotonin in a variety of different brain regions, together with increased levels of
various enzymes and other molecules involved in the synthesis of serotonin (Trut et
al., 2009).  Serotonin is known to play a role in the inhibition of aggression in many
animals, including the fox, (Popova, 2006), and to be involved in the regulation of
gene expression during development (Côté et al., 2007).  
The most recent developments concern the identification of genes associated with
domesticated  behaviour  in  foxes  (e.g.  Lindberg  et  al.,  2007),  together  with  the
mapping  of  the  entire  fox  genome  (Kukekova  et  al.,  2007;  Spady & Ostrander,
2007).   Using  the  PCA approach  to  behavioural  classification  described  above,
Kukekova et al. (2011) have identified a genetic locus that seem to be associated with
the differences between tame and aggressive foxes, and is orthologous—is identical
by  descent—to  a  genomic  region  implicated  in  the  domestication  of  the  dog
(vonHoldt et al., 2010).  This work is, of course, in its early stages, but it provides
another  piece  of  evidence  that  the  changes  observed  in  domesticated  foxes  may
really parallel those seen in dogs.      
This brief survey of the physical basis underlying the changes seen in domesticated
foxes  serves  three  useful  purposes.   Firstly,  it  puts  some  flesh  on  Belyaev's
hypothesis  of  destabilizing  selection,  by  showing  what  it  is  that  is  destabilized:
previously adapted and integrated neuroendocrine systems.  Secondly, it shows how
selection against aggression can come to have such wide-ranging effects: because the
neural  and  hormonal  systems  that  form  the  biological  basis  of  aggression  also
influence a wide variety of other developmental and physiological systems.  Finally,
it goes some way to explaining why similar changes are found across such a broad
spectrum  of  domesticated  species  (see  4.2).   The  neuroendocrine  systems  just
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discussed are evolutionarily ancient, and are highly conserved across species (Bidau,
2009).  They provide,  then,  a shared physiological mechanism to account for the
shared phenotypic changes.
It is notable, therefore, that a similar reduction in levels of stress hormone has also
been observed in the Bengalese finch, as compared with the wild munia (see 2.4.10).
In  chapter  five  (section  5.2.3.4),  a  similar  difference  will  be  described  between
bonobos and chimpanzees, as part of a wider discussion as to whether bonobos, like
humans, might represent an instance of self-domestication.  These kind of regulatory
changes to the neuroendocrine system appear to be a major mechanism in bringing
about typical domesticated outcomes.
3.4.6 – Discussion
It seems, then, that the results of the farm-fox experiment provide a very powerful
insight  not  just  into  the  domestication  of  the  dog  but  into  domestication  more
generally.  In particular, that many of the traits comprising the domestic phenotype
may not have been directly selected-for themselves, but actually be the result of a
correlated cascade of effects following selection against aggression, which itself is
mediated by only a small number of genetic changes that influence neuroendocrine
regulatory systems.  However, despite the strength of this case there are,  I think,
reasons to suspect that it does not provide a full account of the evolutionary effects of
domestication.  Chief among these is that the farm-fox experiment says very little
about the concept of  buffering: the way that humans, and in particular the human-
made  environments  in  which  domesticated  species  live,  change  the  selection
pressures those species face (Price, 1999, 2002; see also chapters two  2.4.10, four
4.5.1.3 and five 5.1) 
One reason the role of buffering may have been neglected in discussions surrounding
the farm-fox experiment is that, cats aside, dogs (and now foxes) are the only large
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carnivore to have ever been domesticated (Diamond, 1997).  All other successfully
domesticated species have been herbivores.  The significance of this is that one of the
major selective pressures against which human-made environments act as a buffer is
predation, something of much less concern to a large carnivorous species.  Even so, a
careful reading of the literature on the farm-fox experiment provides some hints that
the concept of buffering is not entirely irrelevant.
For example, it has been repeatedly noted that many of the phenotypic changes seen
in the tame line of domesticated foxes have also been observed in the unselected,
control foxes (Trut, 1999; Trut et al., 2004; Kukekova et al., 2012), although at a
frequency lower by an order of magnitude (Trut et al., 2009).  It may well be, then,
that a regime of strong artificial selection against aggression is not necessary to bring
about the relevant phenotypic changes per se, but rather is necessary to cause those
changes to sweep across the population as a whole in just over fifty years.  Of course
it could be pointed out here, with some justification, that the control foxes are likely
to have been subject to a certain amount of indirect or unconscious artificial selection
against aggression, and there may be some truth in this point.  However, it will be a
recurring theme of the next two chapters, where I begin to explicitly consider the
idea of human self-domestication, that many aspects of the domestic phenotype can
be  directly  attributed  to  evolution  and  development  occurring  in  a  human-made
environment.
3.5 – Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the second of the preconditions identified in chapter one: the
emergence of the sensitivity to communicative intent.   Following much the same
approach  as  in  chapter  two,  the  possible  origins  of  this  precondition  were
investigated by means of a comparative example, the domestic dog.  The evidence
suggests that this capacity emerged in dogs as a consequence of the domestication
process.  Furthermore, as a result of the farm-fox experiment, we also have a strong
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hypothesis concerning how and why the domestication process might produce this
outcome.  Much like many aspects of the domestic phenotype (see 4.2), it seems that
the sensitivity to communicative intent in canids has emerged during domestication
as a result of a correlated cascade of effects following selection against aggression.
It  is  clear,  however,  from  studies  with  other,  non-domesticated  species  that
domestication does not constitute a  necessary condition for the emergence of this
capacity.  Rather, it seems that domestication may have 'primed' dogs such that they
are able, from a very young age, to comprehend the communicative nature of cues, at
a level that other species—including their ancestor, the grey wolf—only begin to
approach following significant training and exposure to humans.  
There are, then, two significant points to be taken forward from this chapter and the
last.   The  first  is  that  there  is  good  comparative  evidence  that  shows  both  the
preconditions  identified  in  chapter  one—an  increased  role  for  traditional
transmission, and the sensitivity to communicative intent—emerging in the context
of  domestication.  The second is that each chapter identified an important factor in
accounting for the outcomes of domestication.  In chapter two this was the role of
environmental buffering, in which the environment of domestication caused a range
of selective pressures to be relaxed.  In the present chapter a strong case was made
that  many  of  the  outcomes  of  domestication  can  be  related  to  selection  on
temperament,  in  particular  to  a  correlated  cascade  of  effects  following  selection
against aggression.  In the next two chapters the focus turns explicitly to humans and
the idea that we might represent an example of self-domestication.  This discussion
will be informed by both the points identified above.  Firstly, if both preconditions
could  emerge  in  the  context  of  domestication  in  other  species,  might  that  same
context not explain their emergence in humans?  Secondly, the two factors identified
above—relaxed selection in a buffered environment, and selection against aggression
—will  both be considered as possible mechanisms that might account for exactly
how such self-domestication might possibly have happened at all.
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Chapter 4
Humans as Domesticates: The Very Idea
In chapter one it was argued that cultural accounts of language structure, such as the
ILM,  implicitly  assume  certain  preconditions that  themselves  stand  in  need  of
explanation.   The  first  of  these  preconditions  concerned  an  increased  role  for
traditional transmission, with the cultural dynamic this make possible.  The second
related to aspects of social cognition, in particular the  sensitivity to communicative
intent, with its capacity to support the acquisition of large numbers of signal-meaning
pairs.   Chapters  two  and  three  each  focused  on  one  of  these  preconditions  and
explored a comparative example in which an analogous capacity or trait could be
seen emerging in another species.  In both cases the analogous precondition appeared
in  the  context  of  domestication.   On  first  sight,  however,  this  leaves  us  with
something of a problem.  The power of evolutionary analogies lies in their providing
separate data points, which can then serve to illuminate the selective environment in
which traits of a certain kind are likely to emerge.  But the task of this thesis is to
think about how those preconditions could have emerged in humans.  In what sense,
then, is the context of domestication relevant to human evolution? 
Fringe elements of the UFO community aside, nobody thinks that humans are being
'farmed' or 'controlled'  by another species.   If domestication is relevant to human
evolution then it must be a kind of self-domestication, in which the circumstances of
that evolution—some of them likely the result of humans' own actions (Odling-Smee
et  al.,  2003)—have  resulted  in  similar  outcomes  to  those  seen  in  domesticated
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species.  Just  to be clear, the idea under discussion here is not the possibility of
making  vague,  metaphorical  links  between  humans  and  other  domesticates,  but
rather that similarities in the traits seen in domesticated species and humans reflect
evolution occurring in similar contexts, with similar selective pressures.  In other
words, that it makes literal sense to say that humans are domesticated, in the same
way that you might describe dogs or cows as domesticated.  If something like this is
the  case,  then  the  parallels  drawn  in  the  previous  two  chapters,  regarding  the
preconditions  for  the  ILM,  would  have  considerably  more  force  in  terms  of
explaining how they might have emerged in humans.
In this chapter and the next, the question of human self-domestication will be dealt
with in considerable detail.  This discussion will be highly exploratory in nature and
will have two main aims.  The first aim, which forms the focus of this chapter, will
be to consider the  coherence of the notion of human self-domestication.  This will
entail  a  look  at  the  typical  outcomes  of  domestication,  and  how many of  these
outcomes can also be seen in humans, together with a review of the various selective
processes  that  contribute  to  those  typical  outcomes   It  will  also  require  an
examination of what the term 'domestication' means, together with a brief review of
the history of the idea of self-domestication in humans.  The second aim, dealt with
in chapter five, will be to try make the notion of self-domestication more concrete.
In  particular,  through  a  critical  discussion  of  three  accounts  of  how self-
domestication might have actually happened.
4.1 – A brief history of 'self-domestication'
The idea that humans are in some sense self-domesticated is one with a very long
intellectual pedigree.  One feature of this history has been the regrettable blending of
scientific  hypotheses  regarding  the  emergence  of  'humanness'  with  unfortunate
political  or ideological  agendas regarding the supposed superiority of one human
group over another.  The aim of this section is to acknowledge the former while
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dispensing with the latter.
Two main contradictory threads run through the historical misuse of the concept of
self-domestication.  The first is the idea that the more domesticated, and therefore
'civilized', groups or races were somehow more 'advanced' or 'evolved' than other so-
called wild groups.  The second is the view that the domesticated state represented a
'weakening' or 'moral degeneration' brought on by the trappings of civilization, in
contrast to the virtuous state-of-nature exhibited by wild-living human.  Both views
can be found in the writings of the ancient Greeks, who had a single term—hemeros
—to  refer  to  domesticated  animals  and  civilized  people  (by  which  they  meant,
unsurprisingly,  Greeks); and another term—agrios—to describe both wild animals
and 'savages'  who failed to till  the land (Peck, 1965; Powell,  1938, both cited in
Leach, 2007).   In contrast,  other  writers in antiquity can be found lamenting the
'softening' effects of civilization (Lovejoy & Boas, 1935, cited in Leach, 2007).  
More recently, of course, the notion of the 'noble savage' and the corruption linked to
civilized living has been associated with Rousseau (1755).  Similar contradictions
can also be seen in the various eugenics movements in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth  centuries,  for  which  the  effects  of  self-domestication  were  explicitly
invoked  as  a  rationale  (Brüne,  2007)22—most  notoriously,  of  course,  in  Nazi
Germany, but also in the preceding Weimar period (Weindling, 1985), Great Britain
and the United States (Allen,  1997).  Although brief,  this  survey should serve to
make the point that the idea of human self-domestication has picked up some pretty
unpleasant political, ideological and pseudo-scientific associations.
This thesis is not a political document.  Fortunately, the kinds of ideas just described
can be dispensed with on purely scientific grounds.  All these views share a common
error:  the assumption that  there is  some kind of  'evolutionary hierarchy',  atop of
22 For  example,  writing in  1914,  Eugen  Fischer—who would  go  on  to  become a  leading  Nazi
eugenicist—listed  blond  hair  and  blue  eyes  amongst  the  domestication-induced  variants  that
should be eliminated.  Of course, during the Nazi period itself, these same characteristics came to
embody the strong, healthy, natural Aryan 'master race'.  
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which sit species or groups that are 'more advanced' or 'more evolved'.  This way of
thinking goes back to the ancient Greek, and later mediaeval, concept of the Great
Chain  of  Being—or Scala naturae—progressing  from stones  and minerals  at  the
bottom, up through various plants and animals, and capped off with God and the
angels (see Mayr, 1982 for a historical perspective).  Humans sat just below these
immortal beings, with, one presumes, more domesticated, 'civilized' humans being
somewhat closer to the angels, and less domesticated, 'wild' humans somewhat closer
to the beasts, or vice versa depending on your viewpoint.
From the  perspective  of  modern  evolutionary  biology—in  which  species  are  the
result of a shared history of common descent and subsequent adaptation to various
environmental niches—this whole way of thinking is complete nonsense.  One can
reasonably  ask  whether  species  X or  Y is  better  adapted  to  life  in  a  particular
environment, but to ask which species or population is 'better' per se—let alone 'more
evolved'—is nonsensical.  More fundamentally, evolution is blind and directionless,
in multiple senses.  Natural selection can be characterised as a mindless, foresightless
'algorithm' searching a design-space for solutions (Dennett, 1995).  These solutions,
which are often far from optimal (Marcus, 2008), have been likened to the work of a
'tinkerer'  (Monod,  1977)  cobbling  together  pre-existing  resources  in  novel  ways.
Finally, the overall trajectory of evolution has itself been shaped by such a range of
contingent influences and events that if the 'tape of life' were re-run there is little
reason to assume the outcome would be the same as we see today (Gould, 1989).
Evolution has no goal, no direction, no ladder or hierarchy along which species and
groups could be placed as being more or less 'evolved'.  It should be clear, then, that
anyone suggesting that a particular trait or collection of traits represents some 'higher'
or  'more  evolved'  stage  is  imposing  an  external  value  judgement  that  has  no
connection with the evolutionary biology itself.  Such value judgements, needless to
say, have no role to play in the present discussion, the focus of which is whether the
human  species—Homo sapiens  sapiens—as  a  result  of  its  own  adaptive  history,
shows signs of similar evolutionary changes to species more conventionally thought
of as domesticated.
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Others,  however, have approached the question of  human self-domestication in  a
genuinely scientific fashion, exploring it as a hypothesis that might explain some
aspects of human biology and behaviour.  Charles Darwin's views on the possibility
of human domestication are somewhat inconclusive.  At times he appears to accept
the idea, albeit expressed in a way that shows not even Darwin could entirely escape
his own time:
We  might,  therefore,  expect  that  civilized  men,  who  in  one  sense  are  highly
domesticated,  would  be  more  prolific  than  wild  men.   It  is  also  probable  that  the
increased fertility  of civilised nations would become, as with our domestic animals, an
inherited character...
(Darwin, 1871: pp. 45-46, emphasis in original)
Elsewhere, however, Darwin seems to cast doubt on the whole idea:
It is, nevertheless, an error to speak of man, even if we look only to the conditions to
which he has been exposed,  as 'far  more domesticated'  (Blumenbach 1865) than any
other animal. ... In another and much more important respect, man differs widely from
any strictly domesticated animal; for his breeding has never long been controlled, either
by methodical or unconscious selection. No race or body of men has been so completely
subjugated  by  other  men,  as  that  certain  individuals  should  be  preserved,  and  thus
unconsciously selected, from somehow excelling in utility to their masters.  Nor have
certain  male  and  female  individuals  been  intentionally  picked  out  and  matched...
(Darwin, 1871: 29, emphasis in original)
Darwin's  central  objection  here,  it  would  seem,  is  that  humans  cannot  be
domesticated  because  they  have  not  had  a  domesticator,  who  controlled  and
intentionally directed their breeding.  This, then, is a form of the 'human mastery'
model of domestication discussed below (section 4.4).
Darwin's views can be contrasted with those of the anthropologist Franz Boas, whose
work, although sometimes couched in terms that would be unacceptable today, shares
with  Darwin  an  overriding  interest  in  the  potential  explanatory  significance  of
domestication in understanding the development of the human species as a whole,
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rather than a desire to exult his own particular group or denigrate others.  
Boas (1938) cited a range of parallels between humans and domesticated species,
including de-pigmentation, the shortening of the face, excessive length of the hair,
and the loss of reproductive periodicity.  He also discussed the kinds of conditions
that  are  likely  to  produce  these  effects,  ascribing  the  changes  following
domestication  to  three  causes: changes  in  environment  and  diet;  processes  of
selection; and  crossing.  I shall consider the first two of these in more detail here,
because many of the themes raised by Boas will be important in the next chapter,
where I consider possible accounts of  how humans may have come to share some
domesticated traits.
In  relation  to  dietary  and  environmental  changes,  Boas  suggested  that  both
domesticates and humans had experienced a dietary shift to more softened, processed
food,  citing the “artificial  change of  foodstuffs  by means  of  fire” as  particularly
important (cf. chapter five, section 5.2).  Boas also discussed the impact of the built
environment and its role in providing protection from both climactic extremes and
potential predators, in terms which are reminiscent of the discussion of the Bengalese
finch in chapter two:
...artificial means of protection against climate and enemies are important features in the
process of domestication because they modify the essential conditions of propagation
and the course of individual development.  Under protecting influences the chances of
survival of  varying  forms  and  hence  the  composition  of  the  population  may  be
materially altered.
(Boas, 1938: 81)
With regard to what he terms 'conscious selection' Boas admitted it was unlikely to
have had that  great  an influence  on human evolution.   Intriguingly, however, he
suggests that various 'social laws' and customs, such as those regulating marriage and
the various prohibitions and prescriptions surrounding infanticide may have had an
unconscious selective effect.   This is  an idea that will  be returned to in the next
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chapter, particularly section 5.3.
By invoking an important role for the environmental conditions under domestication,
Boas can be seen as advocating a somewhat different model of domestication than
Darwin.  The tension between these two models will be discussed in much greater
detail in section  4.4, below.  For now, however, it is important to realise that what
motivated  Boas  to  consider  the  idea  that  humans  might  be  grouped  with  other
domesticated species was the range of traits typically seen in other domesticates that
could also be seen in humans.
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4.2 – The domestic phenotype
It has long been known that many phenotypic similarities can be seen across a wide
range of domesticated species (Darwin, 1868; Price & King 1968).  This suite of
phenotypic changes has come to be known as the domestic phenotype, defined as:
...that cadre of phenotypic traits that facilitates the adaptation of captive animals to their
environment. 
(Price, 1999: 247)
As  shown  by  the  tables  below,  it  is  possible  to  split  aspects  of  the  domestic
phenotype into two broad categories: those that involve hard tissue, and those that
involve soft  tissue and behaviour.  These tables  should be read in  terms of  how
domesticated species typically differ from their wild equivalents, and  are based on
overviews by Leach (2003),  Price (1984; 1999;  2002),  Clutton-Brock (1999) and
Trut et al. (2009).
Hard Tissue
Skeletal Cranial
Reduction in body size Reduced cranial robusticity
Decreased skeletal robusticity Reduced brain size
Reduced sexual dimorphism Shortened facial region
Greater diversity size/shape horns
Reduced tooth size
Tooth crowding/malocclusion
Juvenile shape retained in adulthood
Table 4.1: Hard tissue changes under domestication
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Soft Tissue and Behaviour
Physiological Sexual and Life History Environmental
Responsiveness
Increased variation in coat 
colour
Earlier sexual maturation Reduced motor activity
Increased variation in hair 
structure














Table 4.2: Soft tissue and behavioural changes under domestication
Of course, not all of these characteristics are found in all domesticates, but nearly all
domesticated  species  exhibit  a  significant  subset  of  these  characteristics  (Price,
2002).   Indeed,  some  of  the  hard  tissue  characteristics  are  actually  used  by
archaeologists as diagnostic of domestication having occurred (Zeder et al., 2006).
4.3 – The domestic phenotype in humans
As noted above, it was the observation that humans also shared many of these typical
characteristics that motivated Boas' suggestion that humans might also be thought of
as domesticated.  More recently, this theme has been taken up by Leach (2003), who
provides an extended discussion of the parallel changes in skeletal robusticity, cranial
thickness and dentition that can be seen in humans and their domesticated species.
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This section begins with an overview of the arguments made in Leach (2003), and
references therein, regarding changes to the skeleton, cranium and teeth.  I then build
on the template provided by Leach and extend it to several of the other aspects of the
domestic phenotype, as listed in tables 4.1 and 4.2, above.
The approach taken here  has,  however, one  major  problem.   In  chapter  two the
domesticated  Bengalese  finch  was  compared  with  its  wild  ancestor,  the  white-
rumped munia.  In chapter three the domestic dog was compared with its ancestor,
the  grey  wolf.   In  discussions  of  the  domestic  phenotype  more  generally  the
comparison is  usually drawn between domesticated strains  and either  their  direct
wild-living ancestor or close relatives if  the ancestor  is  no longer  extant.   In the
human case, however, there is only one present-day species, Homo sapiens sapiens,
and there is no 'wild' comparator available.  The solution to this problem taken here
—and  in other similar discussions  (e.g. Leach, 2003; Bednarik, 2011a)—is either to
compare trends over the course of human evolution, where this is possible, such as
can be done for changes in hard tissue.  Or, where this is not possible, to compare
humans with their closest living relatives, the great apes.
4.3.1 – Reduced skeletal and cranial robusticity
In skeletal terms, robusticity is usually identified with thickness of long bones, such
as the femur, and the degree of development shown in areas for muscle attachment.
In cranial terms, too, robusticity relates to bone thickness, but also to the size and
prominence of ridges, like those across the brow of the eyes, known as tori (singular
torus) (Lahr & Wright, 1996).  Skeletal and cranial robusticity have both consistently
declined over the course of human evolution.  Skeletal robusticity, as measured by
changes  in  the  thickness  of  the  midshaft  of  the  femur,  has  shown  a  long-term,
exponential  reduction  over  the  course  of  the  last  one  million  years  of  human
evolution (Ruff et al., 1993).  This decline has followed a log-linear pattern, such that
the overwhelming majority of the reduction has occurred in the last 100,000 years.
Cranial robusticity has also shown a marked decline.  In Europe, the continent with
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the most available data, cranial robusticity has been declining by an average of 10%
every  10,000  years  for  the  last  50,000  years  (Bednarik,  2011a).   The  available
evidence also suggests that a similar decline has occurred in most other regions of
the world.
The explanations for this decline in robusticity have included the effects of increased
sedentism  and  reduced  activity  due  to  changes  in  lifestyle  and  the  impact  of
technology (Ruff et al., 1993), changes in climate (Pearson, 2000), and changes and
stressors on diet (Cohen & Armelagos, 1984).  In particular, shifting to a softer, more
processed diet has been shown to significantly reduce the thickness of the cranial
vault (Lieberman, 1996).  As Leach (2003) has argued—and this point is relevant to
many of the phenotypic characteristics discussed in this section—many of these same
explanations have been invoked to explain similar changes in other species, where
they are seen  as  linked to  the wider  phenomenon of  domestication.   In  humans,
however, this link is not made, possibly because of too narrow an adherence to the
'human-mastery' model of domestication, discussed below.
4.3.2 – Changes in dentition
Domestication is usually associated with a reduction in tooth size, often combined
with an increase in the prevalence of malocclusions and tooth crowding.  Here, too, a
similar pattern can be observed over the course of human evolution.  For the last
100,000 years human tooth size has been continually reducing.  Between 100,000
and 10,000 years ago this reduction proceeded at a rate of 1% every 2000 years;
since 10,000 years ago the rate has doubled to 1% every 1000 years (Brace et al.,
1987).  It should be noted that tooth-size is under greater genetic control than bone
thickness  (Larsen,  1995),  suggesting  that  these  reductions  have  likely  proceeded
through cumulative genetic changes in favour of smaller teeth, rather than changes in
diet or lifestyle.  In contrast, malocclusion and tooth-crowding have been shown to
follow from switching to a softer, more processed diet in both humans and other
species  (Larsson  et  al.,  2005;  Leach,  2003).   The  explanations  for  the  parallel
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changes  seen in  both  humans and domesticated  species  have  been fairly  similar,
including sedentism, dietary changes, and the effects of food processing techniques;
and,  again,  only in  the  case  of  other  species  has  this  been seen as  indicative  of
domestication (Leach, 2003).
4.3.3 – Retention of juvenile characteristics
A  common  theme  of  many  instances  of  domestication  is  that  physical  and
behavioural traits that once characterised juvenile individuals come to be retained
into adulthood (Trut et al., 2009), a phenomenon known as  paedomorphosis  (Shea,
1989).  Indeed, many of the characteristics listed in tables 4.1 and 4.2, above—such
as the shortening of the face and reduced levels of aggression—can be linked to this
wider phenomenon of juvenilization.  This was seen very clearly in the discussion of
the farm-fox experiment in chapter three, where various traits such as floppy ears,
extended socialisation periods, piebald coat colouration and changes to the shape of
the  skull  seem to  be  the  result  of  retaining  a  juvenile  stage  into  adulthood.   As
indicated in  tables  4.1 and 4.2,  this  is  also a  pattern seen amongst  domesticated
species  more  widely.   There  have  long  been  suggestions  that  humans  present  a
similar instance of juvenilization.
In discussions dating from the early to mid- twentieth century (Bolk, 1926, 1929; de
Beer 1958, Ashley Montagu, 1955, 1960) this phenomenon was variously discussed
under the headings of, 'paedogenesis', 'foetalization', 'neoteny' and a range of other
terms (see de Beer, 1958: 63 for an overview).  Differences in terminology aside,
however,  all  these  authors  agreed  that  humans,  and  in  particular  their  anatomy,
represented  the  retention  of  typically  juvenile  ape  characteristics  into  adulthood.
There was also relatively broad agreement amongst these authors about which human
traits represented such juvenile retentions, as indicated in table 4.3, below.
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Juvenile Characteristics Retained in Adult Humans
(according to authorities in the early to mid- twentieth century)
Retention of cranial flexure Absence of brow ridges
Long slender neck Absence of cranial crests
Forward position of foramen magnum Thinness of skull bones
Orbits under cranial cavity Globular form of skull
Flatness of face Hairlessness of body
Retarded closure of cranial sutures Lack of pigment in some groups
Large volume of brain (relative to body) Thin nails
Small face and large braincase Non-rotation of big toe
Roundheadedness Incomplete rotation of thumb
Small teeth Prolonged dependency period
Late eruption of teeth Prolonged growth period
Table 4.3: Juvenile characteristics retained into adulthood
(Based largely on Ashley Montagu, 1960)
The contemporary discussion of paedomorphosis in humans begins with Stephen Jay
Gould's  (1977)  book  Ontogeny  and  Phylogeny.   Gould  made  three  key  points
regarding the role of paedomorphosis in human evolution.  The first was that the data
of those working on this question in the early twentieth century (as listed in table 4.3)
could be divorced from their specific theories of evolution.  In particular, some, such
as Bolk (1926), insisted that humans were characterised by a global paedomorphosis,
a  position  owing  to  his  adherence  to  a  view  of  evolution  emphasising  'internal
consistency' and his rejection of adaptation and natural selection.  From a modern
perspective, as Gould notes, the idea that instead we might see a  mosaic pattern—
with  some  features  being  juvenile  retentions  and  others  not—is  entirely
unremarkable.  Gould's second point was that distinction needs to be made between
two different  aspects  of  the  argument.   The  first  is  the  fact  that  humans  have  a
188
relatively retarded developmental trajectory—with a long interval between birth and
maturation, a very late adolescent growth spurt and an extended post-reproductive
lifespan—a pattern which has been described as distinctive a human trait as a large
brain  or  language  (Leigh,  2001).   The  second  aspect  is  the  paedomorphic
characteristics themselves, for which this retarded developmental trajectory acts, in
Gould's phrase, as an 'enabling condition'.  Finally, Gould argued that the relevant
comparator in seeking to establish human paedomorphosis is not other apes, who
after all are not our ancestors, but  human foetuses (as the ape foetus most likely to
resemble the foetal condition of our ancestors), with the relevant question being 'how
far do humans depart from their foetal condition in comparison with other primates
from  theirs?'.   Gould's  answer  was  that  humans  are  “essentially”  neotenous,  a
conclusion based largely on the retarded human developmental trajectory.
This conclusion has since been challenged on a number of grounds (see Shea, 1989
for  an  overview).   One  objection  is  that  discussions  of  paedomorphosis  have
conflated various different process, these include: neoteny, the dissociation between
size and shape; rate hypomorphosis, the slowing of growth rates with no change in
the duration of growth; and time hypomorphosis, the reduction in the duration of the
growth period with no change in rates of growth (Shea, 1989).  While important, this
objection need not concern us further here because the focus of the present section is
simply the fact that paedomorphic traits are typically seen following domestication
and  the  extent  to  which  humans  might  also  exhibit  such  paedomorphic
characteristics.  As such, I shall remain agnostic regarding the underlying processes
that produced those traits.
Another  major  objection focuses  on the fact  that  many human characteristics,  in
particular the size of the brain, are actually the result of an extension of growth, or
hypermorphosis, beyond its ancestral endpoint—a process known as peramorphosis
—rather than a retardation-based 'juvenilization' (McKinney, 1998).  More recently,
however, it has come to be seen that these objections are the result of conflating two
different processes: slow development and fast growth (Zollikofer & Ponce de León,
189
2010),  which  together  account  for  the  paedomorphic  appearance  of  the  modern
human skull.  The combined effect of these two processes produces a skull that is
both large (as a result of an extended period of growth) and has a juvenilized shape
(as a result of slowed development).  Data are now available on the ontogeny of
cranial shape across various species during human evolution, as illustrated in figure
4.1 below:
Figure 4.1: Cranial shape-change during development of human ancestors
(Taken from Zollikofer & Ponce de León, 2010)
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The data in figure 4.1 should be viewed in light of Gould's argument that the relevant
comparison is the extent of change seen in human adults as compared with human
foetuses, relative to the extent of change over ontogeny in other, related species.  As
can be seen, the overall trend in human evolution has been towards adult crania that
more closely resemble the shape of their foetal state (Zollikofer & Ponce de León,
2010).   It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  this  overall  picture  is  complicated  by
species-specific aspects of morphology that are unrelated to heterochronic processes.
For example, the comparison between modern humans and Neanderthals seems to
involve prenatal changes related to differential patterns of bone-growth activation,
followed by a shared post-natal pattern of developmental (Zollikofer & Ponce de
León, 2010).
In  making  his  case  for  humans'  essential  neoteny Gould  (1977)  argued  that  this
paedomorphic condition was also  adaptive.  Gould's claim, echoing several earlier
authors (e.g. Cohen, 1947; Jacobson, 1969; Lorenz, 1971), was that the process of
retarded development,  by projecting  juvenile  flexibility into adulthood,  interacted
synergistically with increasing brain size and the hyper-socialisation and dependence
on learning seen in humans.  This has much in common with perspectives on human
life history that view the long human developmental trajectory as relating to the time
needed  to  acquire  the  full  set  of  cultural  skills  necessary  to  function  in  human
societies (Bogin, 1999); and to the 'embodied capital' which can be built-up during
the  long  developmental  period  and  subsequently  'cashed  in'  during  adulthood,
including the post-reproductive period (Kaplan et al., 2000).  Of course, there are
also a variety of other views on the significance of human life-history (see Leigh,
2001 for  a  review).   However, in  recent  years  a  range of  evidence  has  emerged
suggesting that the physical basis of humans' extreme behavioural flexibility may lie
in the paedomorphic retention of juvenile neural plasticity.
Somel et al. (2009) compared the developmental timing of gene expression in the
human and chimpanzee prefrontal cortex.  While there was a mosaic pattern overall,
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the  dominant  trend,  as  seen  in  two  areas  of  the  cortex,  was  a  neotenic  shift  in
humans, such that the gene expression profiles of adult humans resembled those of
juvenile  chimpanzees.   In terms of brain tissues,  the human neotenic genes were
significantly  more  likely  to  be  expressed  in  areas  associated  with  grey  matter.
Functionally, they were also more likely to be associated with processes of growth
and development.  Somel et al. argue that this delay in grey matter maturation relates
to an extension of juvenile plasticity, thus providing humans with a longer period
during which to acquire knowledge and skills.
Similar findings have been reported regarding the major period of synaptogenesis—
the creation of synaptic connections between neurons, which are known to underlie
the formation of memories and thus learning (Bufill et al., 2011).  Liu et al. (2012)
found  that  the  majority  of  gene-expression  profiles  in  the  human,  macaque  and
chimpanzee prefrontal  cortex followed similar  overall  trajectories,  but  in  humans
those  trajectories  were  significantly  delayed.   Many  genes  that  reached  peak
expression levels during the first  year in chimpanzees and macaques didn't  reach
peak  expression  until  around  five  years  in  humans.   This  extension  of  synaptic
plasticity may partially account for the great metabolic cost of human brains, which
use 20-25% of total metabolic energy while at rest, in comparison to the 11-13% in
apes  and 2-8% in mammals  (Bogin,  2006;  Mink et  al.,  1981).   Such heightened
metabolic costs, combined with greater plasticity they enable, are both typical of the
juvenile period during which most learning and neuronal remodelling takes place
(Bufill et al., 2011).  Again, the pattern observed in adult humans resembles that seen
in juvenile chimpanzees (Bufill et al., 2011; Somel et al., 2012).  It seems, then, that
there is good evidence that humans are paedomorphic in terms of both many aspects
of their anatomy and morphology, and in terms of the development of neural systems
thought to underlie behavioural flexibility.
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4.3.4 – Changes in temperament
Many of the behavioural aspects of the domestic phenotype relate to a reduction in
aggression  and  a  concomitant  set  of  changes  in  temperament  that  alter  how
domesticated species  engage with their  environments  (Price,  2002).   Réale  et  al.
(2007) suggest that temperament can be usefully broken down into five major trait
categories:  (1)  shyness-boldness,  (2)  exploration-avoidance,  (3)  activity,  (4)
sociability, and (5) aggressiveness.   Domesticated species  typically show reduced
levels of exploration and activity, together with reduced levels of aggression (Künzl
et al., 2003).
Herrmann  et  al.,  (2011)  compared  the  first  two  of  Réale  et  al.'s  dimensions  in
humans,  chimpanzees,  bonobos  and orangutans.   They found that  human infants
avoided novel items, whereas other apes, particularly chimpanzees and orangutans,
were attracted towards novel items.  Bonobos were intermediate between humans
and other apes, showing a largely indifferent response.  This is especially intriguing
given the discussion of bonobos in the next chapter.  To anticipate, evidence seems to
be accumulating that bonobos, but not chimpanzees, might also share aspects of the
domestic  phenotype.   In  particular,  that  selection  against  aggression  might  have
resulted in commonalities between bonobos and domestic dogs (discussed in chapter
three) on the one hand and bonobos and humans on the other (Hare et al., 2012).
These parallels  include the similarities  in  temperament—increased shyness in  the
face of novelty and reduced exploration—investigated by Herrmann et  al.   Work
comparing human temperament with that of other apes has really only just begun, but
early indications suggest that at least some aspects of human temperament may also
be in line with that found in the domestic phenotype.
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4.3.5 – Sexual changes
Sexual dimorphism is often reduced in domesticated species compared to their wild
ancestors.   The  evidence  suggests  that  modern  humans,  too,  are  less  sexually
dimorphic  than  both  present-day  apes  and  our  hominin  ancestors.   It  should  be
understood that sexual dimorphism is not a single characteristic, but rather refers to a
variety of comparators between males and females.  Compared to present-day apes,
humans  have  relatively  low  sexual  dimorphism  across  a  range  of  these
characteristics.  For example, tooth-size is typically around 10% greater in males
than females, placing humans at the lower end of the primate range (Plavcan, 2012).
In terms of overall body size, humans are also towards the low end of the primate
range (Plavcan, 2012).  This point is tempered by the fact that humans appear to
exhibit  a  dimorphism in  body-fat  accumulation  not  seen  in  other  primates,  with
females having much more body-fat proportionally than males (Puts, 2010).  Our
knowledge of the relative muscle and fat compositions of other primates is, however,
relatively poor (Plavcan, 2012).  Nevertheless, once body-fat is taken into account,
humans  fall  squarely  in  the  middle  of  the  primate  range.   Humans  also  show
relatively low levels of dimorphism in their cranial and skeletal dimensions, with
both these placed somewhat intermediate between the figures for overall size and
size adjusted for body fat (Plavcan, 2012).  Overall, then, humans are very much at
the low end of the range of sexual dimorphism seen in present-day apes.
Sexual dimorphism can also be compared between modern humans and their now-
extinct  hominin  ancestors.   These  comparisons  are,  of  course,  restricted  to
dimorphism in  hard  tissue.   There  is  also  the  problem of  the  small  number  of
specimens, and determining whether those specimens represent two distinct species
or a male and female difference within a species (Plavcan, 2001).  The available
evidence indicates, however, that there has been an overall trend towards reduced
sexual dimorphism over the course of human evolution.  A reduction in canine tooth-
size dimorphism can be seen from early in the evolution of hominins, with species
such  as  Australopithecus  afarensis and  Australopithecus  anamensis—dating  from
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4.2-2.9 Mya (Ackermann & Smith, 2007)—showing little sign of substantial canine
dimorphism (Plavcan, 2012).  However, analyses of some of these same early species
indicate substantial skeletal dimorphism (Harmon, 2006; Gordon et al., 2008; Kimbel
& Delezene, 2009), which approaches that seen in gorillas today (Plavcan, 2012).
These findings have, however, been contested (e.g. Nelson et al., 2011).  The data for
other species of the genus Australopithecus and for early Homo (e.g. Homo habilis,
3-2 Mya, Ackermann & Smith, 2007) are too limited to make any clear judgement
(Plavcan, 2012).  Although also limited and uncertain, the available data for Homo
erectus  (from c1.8 Mya,  Rightmire, 2008) suggest a greater degree of dimorphism
than seen in modern humans, while that for more recent species of Homo, including
Homo  heidelbergensis,  the  Neanderthals  and  early  Homo  sapiens suggests
dimorphism broadly in line with present-day humans (Plavcan, 2012).
Sexual  dimorphism is  a  particularly interesting  trait  from the  perspective  of  this
thesis because not only does it fossilise (at least in terms of hard tissue), but it is also
reliably correlated  with  aggression.   More  precisely, it  is  correlated  with  mating
systems in which there is substantial intra-male competition for access to females
(Plavcan,  2012).   As  discussed  at  length  in  chapter  three,  many  aspects  of  the
domestic phenotype seem to follow as the result of a correlated cascade of effects
following selection against aggression.  In the next chapter, we will discuss the case
of  the  bonobo,  which  represents  a  possible  parallel  example  to  the  human  one
discussed  here,  where  selection  against  aggression  may  have  changed  both  the
mating system and reduced sexual dimorphism.  For now, however, it should also be
noted that changes in sexual dimorphism have also been associated with a range of
non mating-related factors (Plavcan, 2001), and that while high levels of dimorphism
are  reliably  associated  with  a  particular  kind  of  mating  system,  low  levels  of
dimorphism are not (Plavcan, 2012).
One further sexual change often found in domesticates is the extension, or complete
loss, of seasonal patterns of breeding.  For many years it was thought that humans,
too, had lost all traces of seasonality of breeding (e.g. Symons, 1979).  In particular,
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that  human  females  lacked  a  distinct  'fertile'  phase  in  their  reproductive  cycles,
known as  oestrus.  This parallel between humans and other domesticates has been
noted  (e.g.  Bednarik,  2011a),  together  with  the  possibility  that  both  might  be
explained  in  similar  terms.   In  recent  years,  however,  studies  of  how  female
preferences and behaviour change across the cycle have found that human females
actually do have a distinct, fertile phase that corresponds to oestrus (Gangestad &
Thornhill, 2008).  It still remains the case, however, that human females exhibit what
has been termed extended sexuality (Rodrııguez-Gironés & Enquist, 2001), in which
they remain sexually receptive across their entire cycle. 
This is something seen across a variety of bird and mammal species, where the best
supported explanation seems to relate to  the material  benefits  females can obtain
from males  through  this  strategy (Rodrııguez-Gironés  & Enquist,  2001).   Firstly,
through  females  being  able  to  both  control  paternity,  but  also  sow  sufficient
confusion  over  paternity  to  mitigate  against  dangers  such  as  infanticide.   And,
secondly, through more immediate benefits that might accrue through the granting of
sexual  access  (Gangestead  & Thornhill,  2008).   This,  then,  seems a  more  likely
account of the evolution of extended sexuality in human females than one rooted in
the  nature  of  the  domesticated  environment,  where  it  is  accounted  for  by  a
combination of better nutrition, artificial selection for early maturation and relaxed
selection on male mate-competition (Price, 1985).
4.3.6 – Brain size: The glaring exception?
Domestication is typically associated with a reduction in brain size.  The long-term
trajectory  of  human  evolution,  however,  has  been  one  of  increasing brain  size
(Rightmire,  2004),  with hominin brains  tripling in  size over the last  four to  five
million  years  (Henneberg,  1998).   This  increase  is  reflected  in  the  high
encephalization quotient (EQ)—the relationship between body size and brain size—
seen in humans (Jerison, 1973).  By this measure, humans have a brain about seven
times as large as would be expected for a mammal of our size.  It is important to
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note, however, that this size increase has not been uniform across all brain areas.  In
particular, the neocortex—part of the telencephalon, or forebrain—is enlarged to a
far greater extent than other sub-cortical areas, such as the striatum (Deacon, 1990,
1997).  This point will be important later.
The evolution of the human brain has not,  however, been one long uninterrupted
increase in size.  The last 50,000 years has actually seen a  decrease in brain size
(Henneberg, 1998), from a peak cranial volume of about 1500cc to the present-day
volume of around 1350cc.  Interestingly, this decrease occurred at the same time as
the reductions in robusticity and teeth-size discussed above.  Could it  also be an
indicator  of  domestication,  as  some  (e.g.  Allman,  2000)  have  suggested?   It  is
tempting, too, to suggest that this reduction was enabled as a result of the support
provided by  complex cultural productions (Tobias, 1971), the creation of which have
been argued to extend and enhance human cognition beyond what is possible with
the  brain  alone  (e.g.  Clark,  1997).   Might  this  have  enabled  the  emergence  of
individuals who had to rely less on their own brains, and could thus afford smaller
ones?  In short, could the buffering provided by the human-made environment have
relaxed selection on human brain size, in a similar way seen in other domesticates?
Tempting as this line of reasoning is, there are three arguments that make it unlikely
to be true.
The first  is  that brain-size variation in present-day populations  is  no greater, and
perhaps smaller, than the variation seen in fossil hominins (Henneberg, 1998). This is
not what would be expected if  brain size had reduced in response to a relaxation of
selection, as the resulting drift should produce an increase in variation.  The second is
that virtually all the reduction in brain size seen over the last 50,000 years can be
explained in relation to a concomitant reduction in body size (Ruff et al., 1997).  The
parallel reductions in robusticity and brain size may not, then, be two signs of the
same trend—human self-domestication—but  rather  one  (reduced robusticity)  may
actually account for the other (reduced brain size), at least if a Jerison-like analysis of
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EQ is accepted23.  The final objection concerns the scale and pattern of brain-size
reduction  under  domestication.   The  scale  of  brain-size  reduction  seen  amongst
domesticates  typically reflects  the  degree of  encephalization in  the  wild  ancestor
(Kruska,  2005),  with  more  encephalized  species  such  as  pigs  showing  greater
reductions (34%) than less encephalized species such as mice (no change).  Humans
are significantly more encephalized than pigs, and yet the recent reduction seen in
humans  is  significantly  less than  that  seen  in  pigs.   The  pattern of  brain-size
reduction under domestication is also not uniform, with the greatest reductions seen
in the telencephalon (or cerebrum) and the diencephalon, which together constitute
the mammalian forebrain (Kruska, 2005).  Recall, however, that is just these areas
that have shown the greatest increase over the course of human evolution.
It seems, then, that a reduction in brain size is one aspect of the domestic phenotype
that humans do not share.  Although recent human evolution does involve a reduction
in brain size, it seems likely that this can be attributed to a parallel reduction in body
size.  But even in the absence of a body-size link, the details of brain-size reduction
under domestication simply do not fit the human case.  It may be that this is one trait
where the fact that domestication, in this instance, is  self-domestication is actually
important, with humans, as both constructors and inhabitants of their environment,
not  subject  to  the  same  reduction  in  stimulation  and  opportunities  for  sensory
exploration (Price,  2002) experienced by other species living in that environment
(Leach, 2003).
4.3.7 – Build-up of deleterious alleles
The main focus of this section so far has been on the typical  phenotypic effects of
domestication.  However, one further outcome seen in many domesticated species is
the build-up of deleterious alleles24, something that has been described as the 'cost of
23 It should be noted that Jerison's measure of brain size is now considered somewhat simplistic (see
Deacon, 1997 for a wide-ranging discussion of the topic).  However, for present purposes these
complications can be ignored.  
24 Some mutations have their effects conditionally, such that a given allele might be neutral in one
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domestication'  (Lu et al., 2006).  This build-up has been documented across a wide
range of domesticated species, from dogs (Björnerfeldt et al., 2006; Cruz et al., 2008)
to domesticated strains of Yak (Wang et al., 2011).  I will explore this topic in more
detail in chapter five (section 5.1.1.7), for now, however, the key point is that similar
observations have long been made for humans.
From the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century  onwards,  there  have  been  a  range  of
warnings  about  the  damaging  accumulation  of  deleterious  alleles  in  human
populations (Haldane, 1939; Muller, 1950; Mayr, 1963), as a result of those alleles
no longer being eliminated by natural selection, at least in industrialized societies.
Post  (1971)  presented  data  showing  higher  rates  of  colour  blindness,  myopia,
deformities of the nasal septum, and other conditions with a known genetic cause in
industrialized populations than in 'primitive' peoples.  There have continued to be
periodic warnings of the dangers of this mutational accumulation for the future of
human health (e.g. Crow, 1997; Lynch, 2010).   In the case of both humans (Crow,
1997) and domesticated species (Lu et al., 2006; chapter five, 5.1.1.7), the build-up
of deleterious alleles has been linked to the 'buffering' provided by the nature of the
human-made  environment.   Again,  much  as  with  many  of  the  phenotypic
characteristics, a parallel can be drawn between humans and domesticates not simply
on  the  presence  of  similar  changes  but  in  terms  of  the  explanations  invoked  to
account for those changes.
4.3.8 – Summary
There  are,  then,  a  range  of  parallels  that  can  be  drawn  between  humans  and
domesticated species, as regards a number of the features of the domestic phenotype.
This  section  started  with  the  arguments  made by Leach (2003) that  humans and
domesticates show similar changes in skeletal, cranial and dental morphology.  This
environment,  deleterious in  another  and beneficial  in  a  third.   Other  mutations,  however,  are
described as  unconditionally  deleterious, because they negatively impact the functioning of an
important  biological  system,  such  as  respiration,  which  is  deleterious  regardless  of  the
environmental situation (Elena & de Visser, 2003).  Throughout this thesis the phrases 'deleterious
allele' or 'deleterious mutation' should be read as being unconditionally deleterious.  
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approach was then extended to other aspects of the domestic phenotype, where a
range of further similarities were also found.  It is important to note, however, that
there are some clear exceptions.  The most obvious of these relates to the changes in
brain size, which in humans fit neither the direction or pattern of that seen in other
domesticated  species.   This  may reflect  one  area  where  self-domestication  might
differ  from  domestication  as  normally  understood,  because  the  former  may  not
involve the loss of opportunities for mental stimulation and activity often associated
with the latter. 
Nevertheless, in many of those traits that do show a parallel, two points made by
Leach can be seen to hold.  The first is simply that humans exhibit many aspects of
the domestic phenotype.  The second is that many of the explanations for why those
characteristics  might  have  appeared  in  both  cases—human and  domesticate—are
often of a similar kind, relating to changes in climate or diet, or to the effects of
selection  on  temperament.   Despite  this  latter  similarity,  these  changes  are  only
usually viewed as indicative of domestication when seen in other species.  Leach
argues  that  this  is  a  result  of  how  the  process  of  domestication  has  often  been
conceived.  If domestication is defined as a process that is driven and controlled by
conscious selective control over breeding and living conditions, then it would seem
impossible for it to apply to humans.  The possibility that humans might in some
sense  be  self-domesticated  requires,  therefore,  that  we  examine  the  concept  of
domestication itself.
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4.4 – What do we mean by 'domestication'?
The  various  conceptions  of  domestication  fall  along  what  we  might  call  the
exploitation-mutualism continuum.  As an example of the exploitation end of this
continuum, consider the following two definitions:
[a domestic animal is] bred in captivity for the  purposes of subsistence or profit, in a
human community that  controls its breeding, its organisation of territory and its food
supply. 
(Clutton-Brock, 1992: 41, my emphasis) 
The essence of domestication is the capture and taming by man of animals of a species
with particular behavioural characteristics, their  removal from their natural living area
and breeding community, and their maintenance under controlled breeding conditions...
(Bökönyi, 1989: 22, my emphasis)
As  the  added  emphasis  makes  clear,  these  definitions  very  much  focus  on
domestication as the human 'mastery'  of nature, through the capture, removal and
control of other species, by humans, for our own conscious purposes.
It should be noted, however, that these definitions can be given two readings.  On the
first reading they describe the conditions of many present-day domesticated species.
To some degree at least, this reading is clearly correct: for example, domesticated
cattle  and dogs  are kept  in  controlled territories,  with regulated breeding,  and to
serve human needs, whether those needs be food, companionship or something else.
On  the  second  reading,  however,  the  definitions  might  be  taken  to  describe  the
process whereby wild-living species came to take on their current domesticated form.
As such, this second reading might be taken to suggest that the typical characteristics
of  domesticated  animals—the  domestic  phenotype—are  predominately,  or  even
entirely, the result  of the choices and purposes of their  human domesticators,  the
result, that is, of artificial selection and selective breeding.
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The difference between these  two readings  also raises  a  further  question:  should
domestication  be  defined  in  terms  of  its  conditions—being  kept  in  captivity  by
humans—or by its outcomes, the emergence of that constellation of phenotypic traits
known as the domestic phenotype?  Furthermore, while there is something to be said
for both definitions, it  is worth asking to what extent they can be divorced.  For
example,  while  a  tiger  cub  raised  in  captivity  might  well  be  tame,  it  wouldn't
necessarily  be  considered  a  domesticated animal  (Driscoll  et  al.,  2009),  despite
qualifying under  a  purely conditions  model.   Conversely, the presence of  certain
aspects of the domestic phenotype is often used by archaeologists as part of their
assessment as to whether domestication had occurred at a particular point in time
(Zeder  et  al.,  2006).   Of  course,  these  two approaches  to  domestication  are  not
necessarily mutually exclusive; however, the tension between them lies behind much
of the discussion in the rest of this thesis.  Those who entirely reject an outcomes-
based view of domestication are unlikely to accept humans as being domesticated.
To return to the current discussion, however, it is far from universally agreed that this
'human mastery' model provides a full account of the process of domestication.  In
such a model, other species are relegated to the role of passive 'victims' of human
exploitation; or, to put it another way, views on the exploitation end of the continuum
conceive of domestication largely as a human cultural activity (Zeder, 2006).  Others
who have considered the nature of domestication, particularly those coming from the
perspective of evolutionary biology, have argued that it is best viewed as an example
of a mutualism (O'Connor, 1997; Morey, 1994), in which two species engage in co-
operative  behaviour  that  is  evolutionarily  beneficial  to  both  parties  (West  et  al.,
2007).  For the domesticated species the evolutionary benefit can be measured in
terms  of  its  dramatically  increased  biomass,  and  the  occupation  of  geographical
ranges far in excess of what would be possible in the absence of human involvement
(Budiansky, 1994).  This mutualistic perspective is well captured by the following
quotation, which stands in contrast to the two above:
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People did not take sheep into domestication: rather people and sheep entered into a
particular interaction by behavioural adaptation on the part of both species...The benefits
of  domestication  need  to  be  examined  explicitly  from  the  sheep's  point  of  view.
(O'Connor, 1997: 152)
There  is  a  case,  then,  for  domestication  to  be  seen  as  a  form  of  evolutionary
mutualism.  However, to assess the strength of this case, it is useful to compare the
domestications  undertaken  by  humans  with  similar  examples  in  other  species.
Perhaps  the  most  illuminating  available  comparisons  concern  the  'agricultural'
practices that have evolved in three different orders of insects: ants, termites and
beetles (Schultz & Brady, 2008).  These examples of insect agriculture show striking
parallels with the practice of domestication and agriculture in humans.  Ants, for
example, 'capture' an area of the environment, which is then transformed through the
selective  tending  of  favoured  fungal  species  into  a  something  of  a  monoculture
(Mueller et al., 2005).  Much like the monocultures created by humans, these ant-
made  monocultures  are  prone  to  devastating  outbreaks  of  disease,  which  the
cultivating insects control through the management of a range of microbes (Mueller
et al., 2005).  This agricultural arrangement also clearly benefits both parties.  For
example, the fungal species tended by leaf-cutter ants benefit from the ants exclusion
of other species, while the ants benefit from the actions of the fungus in degrading
their harvested plant material (Kooij et al., 2011).
In light of these parallels it is tempting to view human agriculture and domestication
as another example of such a mutualism—as an instance of a natural evolutionary
process,  rather  than  the  exploitation  of  other  species  by  human  beings  who  are
somehow 'outside'  the  natural  world.   There  is,  however,  a  limit  to  how far  the
parallels between ant and human agriculture and domestication can be taken.  In
particular, there is a fundamental equality in the ant example that is missing in the
human  case.   In  the  ant-fungus  mutualism  both  parties  adapt  to  one  another
genetically  (Mueller  et  al.,  2005).   In the human-domesticate  case,  however, one
party  to  the  mutualism—the  humans—can  also  adapt  culturally through  the
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transmission of learned behaviours, a process that typically operates much faster than
genetic adaptation (Mueller et al., 2005; Mesoudi, et al., 2004).  In addition, humans
are able to plan ahead, operating with foresight, which is also not possible in the
realm of genetic adaptation.  This is not to deny the fact that humans have adapted
genetically to the presence of domesticated species.  For example, lactose tolerance
is found mainly in those populations with a history of dairy farming (Bersaglieri et
al., 2004).  Rather, the point is that while domesticated species have only been able to
adapt  to  humans  genetically,  humans  have  had  other,  faster  means  to  adapt
themselves to the presence of domesticated species.  As a result, although the link
between  humans  and  their  domesticates  is  an  evolutionary  mutualism,  it  is  an
atypical  and unbalanced  mutualism,  in  which  one  partner,  the  human,  is  able  to
adapt, direct and respond to the relationship to a much greater extent that the other.
Some  of  the  tension  between  the  mutualistic  and  'human  mastery'  views  of
domestication  can  be  resolved  by  the  realisation  that  the  two  models  apply  to
different  stages  of  the  same  historical  process,  rather  than  as  competing
characterisations  of  one  stage.   Conventionally, the  single term 'domestication'  is
applied  to  the  entire  process,  spread  over  tens  of  thousands of  years,  which  has
resulted in the domestic species we know today.  This hides a much more complex
reality,  however,  because  many  of  the  phenomenon  that  we  associate  with
domestication today, such as the goal-directed breeding of 'pure' varieties or 'types'
are of relatively recent origin, and played little to no role in most of the history of
domestication.  Leach (2007) argues that domestication is better seen as a multi-stage
process, which began with humans and other species adapting to each other and to
the  human-made environment,  and today includes  the  direct  manipulation  of  the
genome.  Leach's four stages are set out below:
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1. Adaptation to the human-made environment—beginning with the very first
associations between humans and other species.
 
2. Adaptation to human agricultural or farming operations—beginning c.10,000
years ago, this includes all such activity and carries no implication that those
operations are carried out with the purpose of bringing about desired changes
in the other species, although some may have been directed at the general
preservation of 'good' lineages.         
3. Methodical selection by humans—the deliberate attempt to improve or 'fix'
particular breeds, based on the increasing understanding of hereditary in the
eighteenth century.
4. Genetic  engineering—favoured  traits  are  manipulated  at  the  level  of  the
genotype rather  than  the  phenotype,  and even the  barrier  of  cross-species
mating  is  removed  as  genes  can  be  transferred  directly  between  highly
unrelated species. 
It is important to realise, of course, that each stage does not replace the previous one,
but  rather  introduces a new process that operates alongside the earlier  processes.
Despite living in the age of genetic engineering, methodical selection is still very
much in operation,  as  is  the pressure to  adapt  to  both human actions and to  the
human-made environment.  Historically, too, the traits characteristic of the domestic
phenotype have emerged in response to all four of Leach's stages, with the first two
having been in operation for by much the longest period.  Finally, while all  four
stages have the potential to influence human evolution, the first two would seem to
be the most likely to have had a significant impact.
Related to Leach's multi-stage model of domestication is Zeder's (2012) account of
their being multiple 'pathways' to domestication, in terms of how domesticates might
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have ended up in close association with humans.  One possibility is what Zeder terms
the  commensal  pathway,  in  which  the  association  begins  with  the  would-be
domesticate coming to frequent or exploit human settlements and habitations.  The
domestic dog (Morey, 1994) and cat (Driscoll et al., 2007) are both thought to have
originated via this kind of process.  The second potential route is the prey pathway, in
which species originally hunted for food, such as sheep, goats and cattle,  slowly
come under human management, eventually becoming bred and farmed by humans.
The third route is termed the  directed pathway, in which animals are intentionally
brought under human control for specific purposes, perhaps following the model set
by  earlier  'prey  pathway'  domesticates.   The  horse  and  donkey  are  thought  to
represent examples of this kind of domestication (Zeder, 2012).
This notion of different pathways is useful because it illustrates that there is not one
uniform process of domestication that must have been undergone by every species
exhibiting some aspect  of  the domestic  phenotype.   For  example,  domestications
proceeding along the commensal pathway would involve long periods in the first two
of Leach's stages of domestication.  In contrast, those following the directed pathway
would enter stage three much earlier in the domestication process, putting them on
what Zeder terms the 'fast track' to domestication.  Zeder's pathways, then, can be
seen as describing different 'entry points' into the stages of domestication outlined by
Leach.  It is tempting to ask at which of these stages a species can be said to be
'really domesticated'.  The trouble with this question, of course, is that we are dealing
with a continuum, so that any answer will be somewhat arbitrary.  It is more fruitful,
as  Zeder  (2012)  argues,  to  talk  about  the  various  distance  along  the  road  of
domestication travelled by different species, with some travelling further and faster
than others.  I shall return to these considerations in the next chapter.  To anticipate
that  discussion,  however,  humans—together  with  some  other  examples—might
represent instances of domestication having progressed along the first  two of the
stages outlined by Leach.
Domestication  is,  then,  a  biological  phenomenon—a  mutualism,  grounded  in
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evolution—and a human cultural activity (Clutton-Brock, 1999; Zeder, 2006).  The
two kinds of definitions considered above each emphasise one of these two facets of
domestication, with those on the exploitation end of the continuum emphasising the
cultural aspect, and those on the mutualism end emphasising the biological aspect.  It
is  also more fruitful  to  view domestication as a multi-stage process along which
different  species  might  progress  at  different  rates,  rather  than  a  single  process
undergone identically by all.  The key point for present purposes, however, is that it
is  inadequate to characterise domestication as solely a human cultural  activity, in
which  our  conscious  choices  exploit  and  alter  other  species.   As  a  result,  it  is
important  to  consider  the  different  ways  in  which  domestication  can  have
evolutionary  effects,  aside  from conscious  selective  breeding  on  the  part  of  the
domesticator.
4.5 – The evolutionary processes involved in domestication
Evolutionary processes can be divided into those that produce random changes in
gene frequencies, such as inbreeding and genetic drift, and those that produce non-
random changes,  such  as  selection  (Price,  2002;  Griffiths  et  al.,  2004).   As  my
concern here is with the typical outcomes of domestication, the domestic phenotype,
I am only going to focus on those evolutionary processes that are non-random.  This
is not to say that inbreeding and genetic drift are not operative; indeed the small,
'founder-like'  populations  often  seen  in  relation  to  domestication  (Price,  2002)
provide optimal conditions for both inbreeding and genetic drift to have the greatest
evolutionary impact (Griffiths et al., 2004).  However, the similarities seen across a
wide  range of  domesticated species  cannot,  by definition,  be accounted for  by a
random process.  As a result, I will focus on the various selective processes that have
contributed  to  the  domestic  phenotype.   I  will  also  discuss  the  role  that
developmental  plasticity  might  play in  the  creation  of  the  domestic  phenotype—
through what  has  been termed  ecophenotypic  responses  (Leach,  2003)—in  which
similar  phenotypic  traits  appear  in  every  generation  as  a  result  of  development
occurring in a similar environment (West-Eberhard, 2003).
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4.5.1 – Selective processes
There are three selective processes that play a role in the production of the domestic
phenotype (Price & King, 1968):
(a) Artificial selection
(b) Natural selection in the domesticated environment
(c) Relaxation of selection 
It should be noted, of course, that, strictly speaking, (c) is really a component of (b):
the fact that certain selective pressures are relaxed under domestication—such as the
risk of predation—is simply one aspect of the environment in which natural selection
operates following domestication.  However, the inclusion of relaxed selection as a
separate  process  here  serves  to  emphasise  that  the  evolutionary  impact  of
domestication  comes  not  only  from  the  novel  things  it  adds  to  an  organism's
environment, such as human-controlled artificial selection, but also what it removes,
in the form of various selective pressures that were important in the wild but not in
captivity.  In the remainder of this section I will discuss each of these three processes
in turn.
4.5.1.1 – Artificial selection
At its  broadest,  artificial  selection  refers  to  the  human  intervention  in  plant  and
animal reproduction in order to ensure the spread and maintenance of desirable traits
—desirable to humans, that is.  It has been suggested (e.g. Price, 2002) that artificial
selection differs from natural  selection in  that  it  is  applied prior  to  reproduction,
rather than measured after reproduction, by an individual's contribution to the next
generation.   However,  while  this  may  be  true  for  the  paradigmatic  example  of
artificial selection—selective breeding—artificial selection can operate in a variety
of other ways too.  This is reflected in the two major distinctions that have been
made in relation to artificial selection.
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The first  distinction is  between what  has been termed  strong  and  weak forms of
artificial selection (Driscoll et al.,  2009).  In the strong form the selection is pre-
zygotic—it  is  applied  before  breeding  has  occurred—and  consists  in  the  pairing
together of individuals that exhibit favoured traits.  This is probably what Price had
in mind, and is also what accounts for the close identification of artificial selection
with selective breeding.  In the weak form the selection is post-zygotic, and involves
the elimination of individuals who fail to exhibit favoured traits.  Of course, such
post-zygotic selection also has pre-zygotic consequences, in the obvious sense that
all future matings will only involve those allowed to survive.  However, this effect is
considerably less  precise than true pre-zygotic  selection as  it  doesn't  involve the
pairing together of specific individuals, hence the designation weak.
The  second distinction,  which  traces  back to  Darwin  (1868),  is  between human-
initiated  selection  that  is  inadvertent  (unconscious)  and that  which  is  intentional
(conscious).  Unconscious selection occurs when humans, for whatever reason and
however subtly, favour certain individuals over others, without any knowledge or
intent regarding the long-term effects of their  actions (Ryan, 2009).  By contrast,
conscious selection occurs when humans intentionally set out to produce change in a
particular trait.  Artificial selection can, therefore, take four possible forms:
Pre-zygotic Post-zygotic
Conscious Belgian Blue cattle Culling herd
Unconscious ???? Coonstripe shrimp
Table 4.4: Forms of artificial selection
Moving clockwise through  table 4.4, a startling example of conscious pre-zygotic
selection can be seen in cattle, most famously the Belgian blue.   Since the 1950s
breeders  have  been  selecting  for  the  'double-muscled'  phenotype,  which  had
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previously been an infrequent aberration in the breed (Arthur, 1995).  Such cattle are
not only strikingly large, with multiple ripples of inflated muscle tissue, but are also
virtually incapable of giving birth  unaided,  generally requiring Caesarean section
(Vandenheede et al., 2001).  Conscious post-zygotic selection might be exemplified
by the culling of disfavoured animals from a herd.  An example of unconscious post-
zygotic selection comes from experimental work on the coonstripe shrimp, and the
nature  of  its  escape  responses.   Frequent  handling  by experimenters  meant  that
individuals with violent escape responses were often injured—an inadvertent culling
of the herd—resulting in a population with much reduced escape responses (Marliave
et al., 1993).  Finally, I am unaware of any example of the unconscious mate-pairing
of specific individuals that resulted in a directional evolutionary trend, although such
an effect seems logically possible.   All  four forms are capable of bringing about
evolutionary  change,  although  conscious  pre-zygotic  selection  probably  has  the
greatest potential to produce powerful, rapid effects (Driscoll et al., 2009); of course,
in  recent  decades  these  selective  processes  have  also  been  augmented  by  the
techniques of IVF and genetic engineering.
The four-way distinction made in  table 4.4 is important when considering human
self-domestication.   While  all  four processes are  theoretically possible,  they have
very different implications.  Conscious pre-zygotic selection in humans might require
something like a systematic program of eugenics (Leach, 2003); whereas conscious
post-zygotic selection could occur through a process of selective infanticide.  I am
unaware of any evidence that either of these kind of phenomena have played a major
role in human evolution.  The situation is very different when considering the two
unconscious forms of artificial selection.  Such unconscious selection might proceed,
much like in the coonstripe shrimp, from the circumstances in which an organism
lives and the manner in which it is treated.  This should recall Leach's first two stages
of domestication.  The possibility that something like this might have played a role in
human self-domestication will be explored in the next chapter.
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4.5.1.2 – Natural selection in the environment of domestication
Any selection faced by organisms under domestication that is not ascribable to one
form or other of artificial selection, must be natural selection (Price & King, 1968;
Price,  1999).   Like  natural  selection  in  any environment,  natural  selection  under
domestication reflects differential reproductive success (Griffiths et al., 2004)—or,
more correctly, differential contributions to the gene pool of subsequent generations,
in terms of inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964; Dawkins, 1976; Grafen, 2009)—in this
instance,  differential  reproductive  success  in  the  environment  of  domestication
(Price, 1999).
Natural selection does not cease once a population is in a domesticated environment.
Indeed, even if artificial selection is in operation there is no reason to assume that the
traits selected by humans  will be those with the greatest potential to survive and
reproduce  in  a  domesticated  setting,  as  such  natural  selection  always  has  an
important explanatory role (Price, 2002).  This point can be vividly illustrated by
long-term experimental  work carried  out  on the  prairie  deermouse  (Price,  1967).
When an initial,  wild-caught population of deermice was placed in captivity only
60% of  females  managed to produce a  litter.  However, after  seventeen years  of
captive breeding, 90% of the females in the 25th generation successfully produced a
litter.  This change occurred in the absence of any conscious selection for fertility or
any other reproductively related traits, and represents an adaptation by the deermice
to the conditions of the domesticated environment itself,  something that has been
seen in  a  wide variety of other  species (Price,  2002).   Of course,  this  raises  the
question of  the nature of  the domesticated environment,  and in  particular  how it
typically differs from wild environments.
The environment of domestication
The first point to note is that wild and domesticated environments are really two
poles on a continuum, ranging from completely free-living, through semi-wild but
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managed, and on to captive environments, which themselves may range from safari
parks to laboratory cages (Carlstead, 1996).  Nevertheless it is possible to point to a
number  of  dimensions  along  which  the  environment  of  domestication  typically
differs from wild environments.  The following list is taken from Price and King
(1968) and Price (1999; 2002).
(a) Shelter
(b) Space
(c) Type and availability of food
(d) Predation risk
(e) Social environment
It should be readily apparent that many of these dimensions are closely interrelated.
For example, the space required by an individual animal in the wild is in large part
determined by the availability of food and shelter, combined with the nature of their
species'  social  interaction.   The  famously  solitary  lifestyle  of  the  orangutan,  for
example,  is  likely  a  result  of  the  scarcity  of  ecological  resources  in  its  habitat
(Whiten & van Schaik, 2007), and can be seen to change in the presence of abundant
food supplies (Sugardjito et al., 1987).  In contrast, animals in a domesticated setting,
in which food and shelter are provided, are usually kept in conditions in which both
the  quantity  and quality of  space  is  reduced (Hediger, 1964;  Price,  2002).   This
change  in  the  availability  of  space  can  also  have  implications  for  the  social
environment of the species.   Population densities are often higher than would be
found under natural conditions (Dawkins, 1980), and the age and sex structure of
domesticated populations is often more uniform than seen in the wild (Zohary et al.,
1998), as it becomes inconvenient to have a large number of potentially aggressive
males, say, in a relatively small space.
Predation under domestication is vastly reduced—and sometimes eliminated entirely
—as a result of animals living in enclosures, shelters and other aspects of the built
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environment  (Price,  2002).   In the wild,  rates of predation can be very high;  for
example,  in some years predation from wolves can account for up to 60% of all
deaths amongst European red deer (Jedrzejewski et al., 2000), and thus constitutes an
extremely strong selective pressure.  The kinds of food available in captivity may
also differ significantly.  In the wild a great deal of time may be required to obtain
food and that food may vary seasonally.  Under domestication food and water is
usually provided, often at a fixed location, with little effort needed to acquire it, and
no seasonal variation (Price, 2002).  The type of food available may vary, too, with
animals often fed softer foods than in the wild (Lieberman et al., 2004).
4.5.1.3 – Relaxation of selection
The concept of selection being 'relaxed' has already been encountered in chapter two,
as part of Deacon's (2009) account of the differences between the Bengalese finch
and  its  wild  ancestor,  the  white-rumped  munia.   In  order  to  prevent  confusion,
however, it will be useful to pause here and consider what exactly is meant by the
term  relaxation of  selection,  because it  can be interpreted in two different  ways,
which we might call radical and conservative.
On the radical  interpretation,  the term might  refer  to  a situation in  which it  was
selection itself that was being relaxed, in the sense of selection no longer playing a
major evolutionary role.  An argument of this sort is sometimes seen in relation to
humans,  in  particular  that  the  products  of  culture,  technology  and  especially
medicine have, in effect, stopped or massively reduced the action of natural selection
in our species, causing us to be 'buffered' against the action of natural selection per se
(e.g. Varki et al., 2008).  There are, however, two reasons why I will not be using the
radical interpretation in the discussion that follows (see also chapter 5, section 5.3 for
further discussion of this issue).  The first is that this position, which in relation to
humans has been dubbed the  human evolutionary stasis argument, is both doubtful
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theoretically (Powell,  2011) and seemingly contradicted by the evidence of recent
selective sweeps in the human genome (Nielsen et al., 2007).  The second is simply
that this radical interpretation constitutes a far bolder and more sweeping claim than
is required for present purposes.
On the conservative interpretation, what is relaxed are particular selective pressures,
rather than selection in general.  For example, the greatly reduced risk of predation in
domesticated  environments  might  mean  that,  relative  to  the  wild,  the  selective
pressure  from predation could be said to  be relaxed.   Of course,  this  in  no way
requires that selection itself has been relaxed or somehow ceased to be an important
evolutionary force.   Indeed,  the  previous  section  described some of  the  ways  in
which the environment of domestication typically differs from the wild environment,
differences which can introduce new selection pressures.  As we shall see, these new
pressures  may  themselves  contribute  to  the  production  of  the  domestication
phenotype.    It  is  in this  conservative sense that  the term  relaxation of selection
should be understood here.
It  should be clear, then,  that natural selection continues once a species enters the
domesticated setting.  This continuation occurs in relation to a changed pattern of
selective  pressures,  part  of  which  is  explained  by  some  previously  important
selective pressures coming to be relaxed.   Many of the selective pressures  faced
under domestication stem from the systematic differences between domestic and wild
environments.  These include the effects of living in a built environment, changes to
the nature and availability of food and alterations to the social systems that follow
from aspects of the domesticated environment.  In the next chapter (section  5.1) I
present an extended discussion of the role that continued natural selection, and the
relaxation of selection play in creating the domestic phenotype.  For now, however, it
is enough to note that natural selection is clearly a process that is also applicable to
the human case.
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4.5.1.4 – What about sexual selection?
There has, of course, been one very obvious omission from the above discussion of
selective  processes,  sexual  selection.   The  authoritative  modern  survey of  sexual
selection  by  Malte  Andersson,  in  agreement  with  Darwin's  (1871)  original
formulation, describes sexual selection as:
...a shorthand phrase for differences in reproductive success, caused by competition over
mates, and related to the expression of the trait. 
(Andersson, 1994: 7)
I will say very little about sexual selection specifically, an omission for which there
are two interrelated reasons.  The first is that sexual selection is actually a subset of
natural selection (Andersson, 1994: 8).  It is true, of course, that sexual selection can
result in traits that, from the point of view of survival, appear to be maladaptive, with
the peacock's tail being the classic example.  However, as discussed above (4.5.1.2),
the  ultimate  currency of  natural  selection  is  not  survival  per  se,  but  differential
reproductive success, a point echoed in Andersson's definition above.  Survival only
matters because the dead tend not to reproduce.  Equally, the possession of traits that
attract mates only matters because, in sexually reproducing species, those who fail to
attract  mates  tend  not  to  reproduce.   Sexual  selection  is  not,  then,  a  different
evolutionary process to natural selection that I need to consider on its own.  
The second reason relates to the notion of sexual selection as a shorthand.  There are
certainly some traits such as ornate plumage and intricate displays that only make
sense as the result of selective pressure arising from competition for mates.  As such,
sexual selection picks out an interesting subset of natural selection.  However, the
picking out of this subset is of limited utility in the present discussion (although see
5.3  for  one proposal  relating self-domestication to aspects  of  mate choice).   The
literature  on  the  domestic  phenotype  makes  little  reference  to  sexual  selection.
Indeed, when I do refer to sexual selection it is usually in the context of selective
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pressure on mate competition having been relaxed in the domesticated environment,
and requires no difference in approach to any other instance of relaxed selection.
These observations regarding sexual selection have implications for how we should
think about selection in general.  In particular, it is important to distinguish between
the  overall  concept  of  selection  per  se—the  evolutionary  process,  or  'design
algorithm'  (Dennett,  1995),  in  which  randomly  generated,  heritable  variation  is
'sifted' with respect to fitness consequences—and terms which pick out a subset of
that process relating to specific aspects of the selective environment, such as 'sexual
selection' or 'social selection'.  These last two do not designate different evolutionary
processes,  rather they serve as a shorthand for selection occurring in response to
pressures  stemming  from mate-choice  or  the  need  to  function  in  social  groups,
respectively.   We might  just  as  easily  refer  to  'climatic  selection'  or  'geological
selection',  if  we  thought  that  shorthand  terms  picking  out  instances  of  selection
related to, say, changes in temperature or volcanic activity might serve a similarly
useful purpose.  
It will be noted that in this section I have not referred to 'natural selection'.  This is
because  I  believe  that  a  similar  analysis  can  be  made  regarding  the  difference
between  'natural'  and  'artificial'  selection:  both  pick  out  a  subset  of  selective
pressures.  Natural  selection, considered broadly, designates selection occurring in
response to selective pressures with a non-human origin.  Artificial selection refers to
selection  relating  to  pressures  stemming  from  human  actions,  whether  they  be
conscious or unconscious.  Humans are part of the natural world.  If the balance of
selective pressures faced by another species is changed by our actions, this is no
different—in principle at least—to that balance being changed by the behaviour of
some other species.  Of course, in practice the outcomes may be very different to
those expected under any other kind of selective backdrop: double-muscled cows that
are  unable  to  give  birth  unaided  are  unthinkable  outside  a  selective  context
profoundly influenced by humans.  But this does not mean that artificial selection
constitutes a different process to natural selection, any more than the impossibility of
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the peacocks' tail outside the context of mate-competition renders sexual selection a
different process25.  As was the case with sexual selection, these arguments do not
deny the frequent  utility of the distinction between natural and artificial selection.
Indeed, this distinction is repeatedly called upon in the current thesis.  The point here
is simply that we shouldn't confuse the  evolutionary process of selection with the
nature and origin of the background conditions under which selection happens to be
operating in any given instance.  I shall return to this point in chapter five (5.1.4),
when I compare one view regarding how self-domestication might have occurred to
the perspective that has come to be known as niche construction.
4.5.2  –  Ecophenotypic  responses:  development  under
domestication
The domesticated environment is not just the context in which selection occurs, it is
also  the  context  of  development.   Once  domesticated,  each  generation  undergoes
development in an environment of the kind described above: free from predation,
within  a  species-atypical  social  structure,  with  the  available  food  determined  by
humans, etc.  The power of developmental plasticity to respond to environmental and
other changes is only recently coming to be appreciated (West-Eberhard, 2005).  This
raises the possibility that some aspects of the domestic phenotype are found in each
generation as a result of similar plastic responses to the domesticated environment,
which both lacks certain 'key stimuli' found in the wild (Price, 1999), and introduces
new stimuli the species would not normally encounter (Price, 2002).
This developmental perspective on the influence of the domesticated environment is
yet another process that is equally applicable to the human case.  Humans and other
domesticates both develop in a human-made environment, which buffers them from
25 It makes no difference to this point that artificial selection can be 'intentional' or 'directed'.  The
capacity  to  engage  in  such  foresight-driven  action  is  a  characteristic  of  our  species.   If  the
selective environment of another species is altered by humans engaging that particular capacity,
this is no different—at least considered abstractly  as a process—than it being altered by some
other species engaging its own peculiar capacities.  Nothing is changed either by invoking the
techniques of genetic engineering, as this is not a selective process at all, but rather involves the
directed production and alteration of variation itself, thus bypassing the selective process entirely.
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some selective  pressures  and  exposes  them to  others.   It  should  perhaps  not  be
surprising, then, if the protection from climatic extremes or eating of softer foods had
some similar developmental effects on humans as it does in other species.
4.6 – Discussion
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the coherence of applying the concept of
'domestication' to humans; and, furthermore, to explore reasons why we might be
motivated to do so.   Across  species,  domestication is  associated with a  range of
typical outcomes, which have come to be known as the domestic phenotype.  Many
of these same changes, from the reduction in skeletal and cranial robusticity, through
an  overall  neotenous  shift  in  development,  to  the  domestication-associated
accumulation  of  deleterious  alleles  can  also  be  seen  in  humans.   It  is  these
similarities that have led many to argue that humans, too, should be considered a
domesticated  species.   The  arguments  of  chapters  two and  three  can  be  seen  as
adding two further parallels between humans and domesticated species, in the form
of the two preconditions identified in chapter one.  Of course, the parallels discussed
in  those  chapters  have  not  been  seen  in  domesticated  species  as  a  whole.
Furthermore,  the  key point  in  humans  is  that  both  these  preconditions  appeared
together.   Both  these  points  need to  be addressed,  and I  shall  return to  them in
chapter six, where I consider some  potential questions thrown up by the argument of
this thesis.     
The argument regarding parallel changes has often been hampered, however, by a
'conditions' view of domestication, as something that, by definition, is consciously
done  by  humans  to another  species  living  under  our  control.   This  view can be
contrasted  with  the  'outcomes'  view  of  domestication,  in  which  a  species  is
considered  domesticated  to  the  extent  that  it  exhibits  aspects  of  the  domestic
phenotype.   The  degree  to  which  one  accepts  the  possibility  of  human  self-
domestication  will  likely  be  governed  by  the  weights  one  places  on  these  two
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different views of domestication.  Under a conditions view, the similarities between
humans and domesticates cannot possibly indicate that both have been domesticated,
as  this  simply cannot  apply in the human case.   Under  an outcomes view, these
similarities,  together  with  similarities  in  the  more  precise  explanations  of  how
specific changes occurred, indicate that a parallel process is likely to have been in
operation (see also chapter five, particularly  5.1.2  and  5.1.3).  A great deal of the
tension between the conditions and outcomes views of domestication can be relieved,
however, once we realise that domestication is best characterised as a multi-stage
process,  along  which  different  species  proceed  at  different  speeds  via  differing
pathways, rather than a single uniform process.
Related  to  the  conditions  view  of  domestication  is  the  idea  that  changes  under
domestication can be identified with the operation of artificial selection.  There are,
however, a range of processes involved in the emergence of the domestic phenotype.
Some of these, such as artificial  selection,  would seem to have limited scope for
operation in humans (although see chapter five, section 5.3, for a possible counter-
example).   Others,  such  as  natural  selection,  the  relaxation  of  selection  and
ecophenotypic responses during development, are clearly process that could easily
produce similar outcomes in humans.  It is important to note, too, that the first two of
Leach's  stages of domestication and the commensal pathway identified by Zeder,
only require these processes to explain the changes associated with domestication.  If
this is the case, then the conceptual barriers to viewing humans as domesticates may
well  be considerably lowered.  The idea,  then,  that humans are self-domesticated
does not require that human life and breeding have been controlled by some external
domesticator.  Instead, taking a sufficiently outcomes-based view of domestication, it
is simply the suggestion that human evolution has occurred in sufficiently similar
contexts to domesticated species, via sufficiently similar processes, such that similar
evolutionary outcomes have occurred.  With its coherence as a concept now in place,
the  next  chapter  turns  to  the  question  of  how self-domestication  might  have




Humans as Domesticates: How Might it have
Happened?
The conclusion of the last  chapter  was that  the concept  of  domestication can be
coherently applied to humans.  This possibility depends on the extent to which one
accepts  an  outcomes-based  view  of  domestication—in  terms  of  the  domestic
phenotype, much of which is shared by humans—as distinct from a conditions-based
view, with  its  focus  on  external  control  by a  domesticator.  This  still  leaves  us,
however, with the question of  concreteness: what are we saying actually happened
when we claim humans are self-domesticated?  One might object, after all, that it is
the  conditions of  domestication—with  evolution  occurring  in  an  environment
controlled  by  humans—that  are  responsible  for  the  outcomes typically  seen  in
domesticated species.  If similar outcomes in humans are also to be seen as a sign of
domestication, then they would require a somewhat different explanation, given that
humans have not been controlled by some outside agency.  The focus of this chapter,
then, is to critically assess a number of the possible accounts of how humans might
have become self-domesticated.
Three such accounts will be discussed below.  Each of these relate directly to the
selective processes involved in domestication discussed in chapter four (4.5.1) and to
aspects of one or both the case studies discussed in chapters two and three.  The first
account  links  self-domestication  to  a  process  of  adaptation  to  the  human-made
environment.  Crucially, this is an environment in which  humans  have lived longer
than  any other  species.   The  second  account  links  self-domestication  to  humans
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having undergone selection against aggression.  This relates to the discussion of the
domestic dog and the farm-fox experiment in chapter three, where many features of
the domestic phenotype appeared as part of a correlated cascade of effects following
selection on temperament.  Finally, I will consider the possibility that a process with
effects analogous to artificial selection may have also been in operation in humans.
In particular, the idea that  culturally mediated constructs of mate-choice may have
resulted in humans applying something akin to artificial selection to themselves.
5.1 – Adaptation to the human-made environment
In this section I will review a range of evidence suggesting that many aspects of the
domestic  phenotype can  be  explained as  the  result  of  organisms  adapting  to  the
nature of the human-made environment.  As discussed in chapter four (4.5), there are
three  ways  in  which  aspects  of  this  environment  can  contribute  to  the  typical
outcomes of domestication:
• Continuing natural selection
• The relaxation of previously important selection pressures
• Development occurring in the human-made environment
All three of these processes are equally applicable to the human case.  Indeed, as
argued above,  may be  particularly applicable to  humans,  given that  they are the
species that has lived in the human-made environment longest of all.  Given this, the
fact that humans might exhibit some of the evolutionary consequences of living in
such an environment should not really be all that surprising.  The first aim of this
section, then, is to examine a range of evidence linking the domestic phenotype to
the effects of the human-made environment, rather than necessarily as a result of
consciously applied artificial selection.  The second aim is to explore some parallel
cases, not typically thought of as domestications, that also show a link between the
domestic  phenotype  and  the  human-made  environment.   Finally,  I  will  briefly
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compare this account of self-domestication with niche construction theory (Odling-
Smee et al., 2003), as they appear, superficially at least, to share some similarities.
5.1.1 – The domestic phenotype as an adaptation to the human-
made environment
In this section I will discuss a number of the aspects of the domestic phenotype—as
listed in chapter four, figures 4.1 and 4.2—with an eye to the role played by the
adaptation  to  the  human-made environment  in  explaining  their  emergence.   This
section is inspired by, and constitutes an expansion of, arguments put forward by
Leach (2003) and references therein.
5.1.1.1 – Reduced body size
A reduction in overall body size is a very common consequence of domestication, as
is the concomitant reduction in robusticity (Price, 2002).  Some of the explanations
for  these  anatomical  changes  have  focused  on  the  active  role  of  the  human
domesticator.  For example, Grigson (1969, cited in Leach, 2003) suggested that the
reduction  of  body-size  in  cattle  was  a  result  of  selective  breeding  to  facilitate
handling.  More recently, however, there has been a shift towards explanations that
emphasise the role of the environment of domestication itself, following a similar
move in attempts to understand plant domestication (e. g. Heiser, 1988).  
Tchernov and Horwitz (1991) argue that body-size reduction constitutes an adaptive
response to the novel,  human-created environment,  and can be conceptualized in
terms of a shift from  K- to  r-selection.  K- and  r-selection represent two different
evolutionary  reproductive  strategies.   In  simple  terms,  K-selection  involves  the
direction of energy and resources into a small number of offspring, thus ensuring the
maximal fitness of those offspring.  This strategy is typical of organisms with a large
body size, slower growth and lower fecundity.  In contrast, an  r-selection strategy
involves the production of larger numbers of offspring, but with less energy invested
in  each individual.   This  strategy is  usually  associated  with  species  with  greater
222
fecundity, faster growth and smaller body size.
Of course, these two strategies really sit on a continuum, along which it is possible to
shift given changing ecological conditions.  Tchernov and Horwitz argue that just
such  a  shift  was  encouraged  by  the  ecological  circumstances  following
domestication.  The key components of which include: the reduction in predation
risk;  the  decrease  in  inter-specific  competition;  the  change  in  the  type  and
predictability of food availability; the unpredictable patterns of culling; and the fact
that mate-choice was partially taken over by humans.  This set of new, unpredictable
conditions,  combined with increased intra-specific  competition encouraged a shift
towards an r-selection strategy, together with a concomitant reduction in body size.
It is worth noting that many of the sexual changes discussed below—for example,
increased litter sizes and extended breeding seasons—fit nicely into this picture.
Zohary et al. (1998), in a discussion of domesticated sheep and goats, have argued
that  the  breakdown  of  ancestral  patterns  of  alpha-male  dominance  has  reduced
pressure for larger male body and horn size.  And, furthermore, that both male and
female skeletal robusticity was reduced as a result of no longer needing to navigate
precipitous terrain.  In a similar vein, Tchernov and Valla (1997), in relation to early
domesticated dogs, found not only a reduction in overall body size, but a particular
reduction in certain limb dimensions, which they attribute to the reduced mobility
required of those dogs living with humans.
5.1.1.2 – Reduced sexual dimorphism
Reductions in the size differences between the sexes is also a frequent outcome of
domestication (Price, 2002).  Polák and Frynta (2009) examined sexual dimorphism,
as measured by overall body mass, in domesticated sheep and goats.  They found that
domesticated breeds exhibited significantly reduced sexual dimorphism as compared
with their wild relatives.  Polák and Frynta attribute this difference to the relaxation
of sexual selection under domestication.  However, a similar study of domesticated
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cattle breeds found no such reduction in sexual dimorphism (Polák & Frynta, 2010).
Interestingly, when Polák and Frynta substituted shoulder-height for body mass as
their measure of sexual dimorphism, domestic cattle came out as significantly less
dimorphic than their wild counterparts.  This might possibly represent something of a
trade-off  between  the  reduced  sexual  selection  typical  of  the  domesticated
environment and the artificial selection for increased size.
5.1.1.3 – Reduced cranial robusticity and dental changes
Changes  in  cranial  robusticity  and  dentition  are  also  common  following
domestication.   Some  explanations  for  these  changes  emphasise  their  genetic,
heritable  nature.  for  example,  the  deliberate  selection  of  hornless  cattle—a  trait
associated with reduced cranial thickness—in order to make them easier to handle
(Zeuner, 1963), or the reduction of horn size and cranial thickness as a result of the
breakdown of dominance patterns amongst males in the domesticated environment
(Zohary et al., 1998).  
Cranial thickness, face size and the crowding and malocclusion of teeth have all also
been  related  to  development occurring  within  the  domesticated  environment  (see
4.5.2), in particular to the reduced scope for physical activity and changes in diet.
Lieberman (1996) reports experimental findings from a study on pig siblings raised
in high- and low-exercise conditions.  Those raised in the high-exercise condition
had cranial vaults nearly 30% thicker than those raised in the low-exercise condition.
Lieberman argues that this difference is likely mediated by higher levels of growth
hormone being released in the high-exercise pigs.
A similar developmental account can be given in the case of changes to facial shape
and the crowding and malocclusion of teeth.  Studies on rats (Yamada & Kimmel,
1991) and squirrel monkeys (Courruccini & Beecher, 1982) have shown that both
facial shape and problems relating to dentition are deeply influenced by the kinds of
available  food.   In  particular,  diets  of  soft  food are  associated  with  thinner  and
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shorter jawbones, and teeth that are displaced, rotated, crowded and maloccluded.
Similar results have also been found in minipigs (Ciochon et al., 1997), in which
those fed on a soft  diet  also showed shorter jawbones and malocclusions; and in
(non-mini) pigs (Larsson et al., 2005), with those fed on soft-diets also having more
malocclusions.   Most of these studies compared hard food with near-liquid food,
however Lieberman et al.  (2004) found a similar result in hyraxes fed either raw
(hard) or cooked (soft)  food, with those fed a cooked diet  exhibiting shorter and
narrower faces than those fed on a raw diet.
5.1.1.4 – Reduced brain size
As noted in chapter four, domestication has been associated with a decrease in brain
size across a wide variety of species (Price, 2002).  These reductions are not uniform
across all areas of the brain, with the greatest size reductions generally found in the
telencephalon  (or  cerebrum)  and  diencephalon,  which  together  constitute  the
mammalian  forebrain,  the  seat  of  'higher'  processing  functions  (Kruska,  2005).
Domestication is also often associated with a marked decrease in the size of brain
areas related to sensory functions, especially those involved in stimulus processing
(Kruska,  2005).   In  addition,  domesticates  also  exhibit  size-reduction  of  the
cerebellum, which is involved in the integration of motor and sensory inputs, and in
parts  of the limbic system, which has a role in emotion and motivation (Kruska,
2005).  Finally, there is evidence that the sense organs of domesticated species show
a reduction in  size and cell  count  that  broadly parallels  those reductions  seen in
sensory brain areas (Kruska, 2005).
The mammalian brain has, then, responded to domestication by reducing in total size,
with particular size-reductions in those areas related to 'higher' cognitive processes,
motor  and  sensory  processing  and  integration,  and  emotional  and  motivational
control.  What might explain this pattern of brain-size reduction?  One possibility is
that  they  relate  to  the  reduced  'environmental  reactivity'  (5.1.1.7)  seen  in  many
domesticates,  and  may  well  have  been  actively  favoured  by  humans  during  the
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domestication process (Kruska, 2005), perhaps with a view to making animals easier
to handle.   An alternative is that these same changes reflect something about the
nature of the domesticated environment itself, which is often associated with very
much reduced sensory, motor  and cognitive  demands,  as  relates  to  finding food,
avoiding predators, competing with rival species, etc. (Price, 2002).
Reductions  in  brain-size  following  domestication  are  not,  however,  restricted  to
mammals.  Hatchery reared salmon also have significantly smaller brains than their
wild counterparts (Marchetti & Nevitt, 2003).  Intriguingly, the most reduced areas—
the  telencephalon  and  sensory  regions—closely  parallel  those  in  mammals
(Marchetti & Nevitt,  2003).  These brain regions relate to traits, such as predator
avoidance, that are known to become deficient under domestication even without any
direct  artificial  selection  (Gross,  1998).   The  mammalian  pattern  of  brain-size
reduction under domestication is also paralleled in domesticated birds, which also
show brain-size reductions proportional to the encephalization of their wild ancestors
(Price, 2002).
5.1.1.5 – Increased variation
The  greater  variability  of  domesticated  species  as  compared  to  their  wild
counterparts is something that has been noted from Darwin (1868) onwards.  In this
section I will primarily focus on the variability observed in coat colour, while also
briefly discussing variation in hair structure and skull shape, particularly in dogs.
Fang  et  al.  (2009)  compared  the  variation  in  coat  colour  between  wild  and
domesticated pigs, finding that domesticated strains exhibited significantly greater
variation.  The differing pattern of mutations in domesticated and wild pigs suggests
that this difference is likely down to artificial selection, as it doesn't fit the pattern
expected for relaxed selection.  In line with this conclusion, Ludwig et al. (2009)
present  data  from  horses  suggesting  that  the  coat-colour  variations  typical  of
domestic horses appeared in the last five thousand years, and are likely the result of
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selective breeding.  A recent review of the coat colour under domestication (Cieslak
et al., 2011) presents broad agreement with these two studies.  Coat colour is a highly
visible trait and so easy to selectively breed, even in the earlier, less advanced stages
of domestication.  Patterned, visible coat colour is also, as Fang et al. note, prized
both  aesthetically  and  as  making  stock  easier  to  manage  than  the  less  visible,
camouflaged coats typically found in the wild.
Turning now to hair  structure,  Cadieu et  al.  (2009) conducted a genetic  study of
eighty breeds of domestic dog to identify the genes associated with different coat
types.   The  vast  majority  of  the  variation  could  be  accounted  for  as  a  result  of
mutations in just three genes, shared by many breeds of long-haired dog.  None of
these mutations were observed in grey wolves or in short-haired breeds, suggesting
that these two groups carry the ancestral form.  For present purposes, however, the
key point is that most breeds are of very recent origin (Cadieu et al., 2009), and thus
this wide variety of hair types is, like the variation in coat colour, probably the result
of artificial selection.
One further interesting point is the apparent relationship between genes associated
with coat colour or hair consistency and a wide variety of other characteristics.  In
any given case this association might be the result of linkage—different genes being
close together on the same chromosome, and thus tending to be inherited together—
or the result of pleiotropy, a single gene having multiple effects (Cieslak et al., 2011).
The best known example of this phenomenon is the farm-fox experiment (Trut, 1999;
this thesis, chapter 3), in which changes in both coat colour and hair-form appeared
following  selection  for  tame  behaviour.  Changes  in  pigmentation  has  also  been
found in Norway rats that were selected for tameness in a similar way (Gulevich et
al., 2010).
Turning finally to skull shape, Drake and Klingbergen (2010) compared the diversity
of skull shapes amongst domestic dog breeds with that found in grey wolves, coyotes
and golden jackals, (see also Wayne, 1986).  They divided dogs into companion and
227
working groups and found that diversity of skull shape was highest for companion
dogs, with working dogs intermediate between companion dogs and the wild species.
The  authors  point  to  the  reduced  need  to  process  hard  or  tough  foods  under
domestication and, more recently, to the active creation of breeds partly marked by
their head shape as the two likely interacting causes of this great diversity.
5.1.1.6 – Sexual changes
Some of the changes relating to sexual behaviour, such as the decrease in sexual
dimorphism, have already been discussed.  However, domestication is also associated
with a range of changes affecting reproductive efficiency.  These changes including
accelerated sexual maturation, the breakdown of seasonal breeding patterns, and an
increase in litter sizes (Setchell, 1992).
The accelerated sexual maturation associated with domestication is seen in a wide
variety of domesticated birds and canids (Price, 2002), in many agricultural species
(Price, 1999), and in rats (Clark & Price, 1981).  Several explanations have been
advanced for this acceleration.  It may be related to ecophenotypic factors such as
improvements in  diet  (Price,  1985),  or a response to  changes  in  photoperiodicity
(Andersson et al., 1998).  Of course, it might be related to artificial selection directed
towards maximising the return from stock (Price, 1985).  It has also been suggested
that  accelerated  maturation  might  relate  somewhat  more  indirectly  to  the  human
control of breeding and population structure (Zohary et al., 1998; Price, 1985), which
creates  a  situation  in  which  dominance  hierarchies  breakdown,  and  so  selective
pressure for  competitive,  aggressive behaviour  between males  is  relaxed.   Under
such conditions,  young males no longer have to compete for females with older,
more dominant males, but can potentially begin to reproduce as soon as they are able
to copulate (Price, 2002). 
The breakdown of seasonal breeding patterns could in some cases also be the result
of selective breeding for year-round production of young (Price, 1985).  However,
228
Price also argues that this breakdown should be seen in the context of why such
patterns were adaptive in the wild.  In particular, that seasonality in breeding makes
sense as an adaptation to a harsh environment in which it is advantageous to produce
young at the time of year that food is most abundant and the climate most favourable.
Given this, it's reasonable to suggest that the breakdown may in some cases relate to
the more favourable conditions under  domestication (Price,  1999).   Domesticated
species tend to have larger litter sizes than their wild relatives.  Again, this shift is
seen across a wide variety of species (Price, 2002; Clark & Price, 1981).  It, too,
might be related to differences in nutrition, selective breeding (Clark & Price, 1981),
or adaptation to the domesticated environment (Price, 1999; Tchernov & Horwitz,
1991).  
One notable point about all three of these changes in sexual behaviour is that they tie
very neatly into the shift from  K-  to r-selection discussed above.  Recall that this
shift is essentially the move from a strategy based on producing a small number of
heavily  invested-in  offspring,  to  producing  a  larger  number  of  less  invested-in
offspring,  and  was  argued  to  have  occurred  as  a  response  to  the  nature  of  the
domesticated environment (Tchernov & Horwitz, 1991).  These three sexual changes
—earlier puberty, year-round breeding and larger litter sizes—all fit logically into
this  shift,  enabling  as  they  do  the  production  of  a  larger  number  of  offspring
(Tchernov & Horwitz, 1991).
5.1.1.7 – Changes in temperament and environmental reactivity
Populations of captive-reared fish differ markedly from their wild counterparts in a
range of physiological and behavioural traits (Gross, 1998).  Farmed fish show a
reduced wariness in the face of novel objects and diminished anti-predator responses
(Huntingford, 2004).   Hybrids produced between farmed and wild fish exhibit anti-
predator responses intermediate between the two, indicating this difference has some
heritable  component  (Houde  et  al.,  2010).   These  differences  can,  however,  be
reduced  during  development  by  the  use  predator-like  stimuli  in  hatcheries
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(Huntingford, 2004; Brown et al., 2003).  Similar findings have been reported in the
Chilean scallop, which is reared in hatcheries and also shows reduced anti-predator
responses (Brokordt et al., 2006).  In neither case have these reduced responses been
selected by humans.  Rather, they are the result of adaptation to the predator-free
conditions of captivity, and the impact of developmental experience (Gross, 1998;
Huntingford, 2004).  
Similar  kinds  of  temperamental  changes  have  also  been  observed  in  birds  and
mammals.  Domesticated White Leghorn chickens show significantly reduced levels
of  fear  on  exposure  to  novel  spaces  and  objects,  aerial  predators  and  humans,
compared to  their  wild ancestor  the  red  junglefowl (Campler  et  al.,  2009).   The
domesticated  birds  also  exhibited  reduced  levels  of  activity,  less  intense  social
behaviour and reduced exploratory behaviour (Jensen, 2006).  Again, this attenuation
has been shown experimentally to follow simply from breeding multiple generation
of red junglefowl in captive conditions,  explicitly without any attempt at artificial
selection (Håkansson & Jensen, 2008).  The authors' suggest that a combination of
genetic  drift,  following  the  relaxation  of  selection,  and  possible  unintentional
selection on stress-coping systems could explain their results.    
Predator vigilance in cattle is also known to decline under domestication, with freely
ranging domesticated cattle exhibiting significantly lower levels of vigilance than
wild ungulates (Kluever et al., 2008).  It is interesting to note that the few studies that
have  attempted  to  examine  the  adaptive  significance  of  temperament  in  wild
populations have found significant links between levels of fearfulness and the risk of
predation (Dingemanse & Réale, 2005; Archard & Braithwaite, 2010), suggesting a
link between declining vigilance and the predator-free nature of the domesticated
environment.
Domestication  is  also  associated  with  reductions  in  aggression.   Domesticated
Norway rats exhibit an attenuation of aggression both to humans and conspecifics
(Blanchard et al., 1986 ; Price, 1999), with their thresholds for defensive aggression
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seemingly raised.   One explanation  is  that  aggression has  reduced as  a  result  of
selection  for  ease  of  handling  (Blanchard  et  al.,  1986;  Plyusnina  et  al.,  2011).
However, there is also evidence that the impact of the domesticated environment on
dominance  relationships  can  also  affect  the  level  of  intraspecific  aggression.   In
particular,  that  rats  raised  in  cages  have  reduced  dominance  hierarchies,  higher
thresholds for defensive behaviour, and continue juvenile-like play-fighting longer
into adulthood than do rats living in more open conditions (Adams & Boise, 1989).
These differences possibly relate to the frequencies with which the two populations
encountered  unknown  intruders.   Similar  findings  have  also  been  reported  for
domesticated mice (Blanchard et al., 1998).
The influence that development under domestication can have on aggression is well
illustrated by work on salmon and other farmed fish.  The intensity of that aggression
can be heavily influenced by altering feeding regimes (Ruzzante, 1994).  If food is
delivered  in  such a  way as  to  maximise  competition  then  domesticated  fish  can
actually end up being  more aggressive than their  wild counterparts  (Huntingford,
2004);  whereas  other  feeding  regimes  can  lower  aggression  levels.   A similar
argument has been made in relation to reductions in aggression among domesticated
sheep  and  goats,  with  the  breakdown  of  normal  population  structure  following
domestication  resulting  in  reduced  competition,  particularly  male-to-male
competition for  females,  and so less  aggressive  behaviour  overall  (Zohary et  al.,
1998).
It  has  been argued that  this  general  attenuation  of  reactivity, responsiveness  and
aggression  constitutes  the  single  most  important  effect  of  domestication  (Price,
2002).  More broadly, this reduction in 'reactivity'  also involves reduced levels of
motor  activity  (Price,  1999)  and  a  diminution  of  the  sensory apparatus  (Kruska,
2005).  Price (2002) points to four factors about domestication likely linked to the
reduction in reactivity:  (1) It being biologically 'safe' with few predators; (2) The
limited  opportunities  for  perceptual  or  locomotor  stimulation;  (3)  The  reduced
personal space, with limited ability to escape from conspecifics; and (4) Artificial
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selection for more tractable individuals.  It should be clear from the above discussion
that  even  if  artificial  selection  were  minimal  or  absent—as  indeed  it  is  in  the
experimental work with red junglefowl—that we should still expect many of these
same kinds of changes under domestication, as a result of Price's first three points.
5.1.1.8 – Build-up of deleterious alleles
There are two major proposals for how domestication can result in the build-up of
deleterious  alleles  (Lu et  al.,  2006).   The  first  involves  the  relaxation  of  certain
selective pressures that were present in the wild environment, meaning that those
alleles  are  no  longer  eliminated  under  domestication.   The  second  involves  the
interaction between artificial  and natural selection and is an example of the Hill-
Robertson  effect  (Hill  &  Robertson,  1966),  which  shows  that  selection  is  most
effective (at eliminating deleterious alleles) when the various alleles involved can
freely recombine (Lu et al., 2006)—that is, when there is no genetic linkage (Slatkin,
2008).  However, when strong artificial selection is applied to a selected variant other
associated alleles can also increase in frequency through the phenomenon of genetic
hitchhiking  (Barton,  2000).   Of  course,  such  hitchhiking  is  possible  under  wild
conditions as well, but as artificial selection is often so extremely strong the scope
for  such  linkage  greatly  increases,  as  does  the  number  and  magnitude  of  the
deleterious mutations that are able to hitchhike upon it (Lu et al., 2006).
There is emerging evidence from a range of species that domestication is very often
associated with a build-up of deleterious alleles, in the sense discussed in 4.3.7.  Cruz
et al. (2008) found a higher frequency of non-synonymous substitutions—mutations
that  alter  the  amino  acid  sequence  of  a  given  protein—in  the  nuclear  DNA of
domesticated dogs than in their ancestors, the grey wolf.  The authors consider both
of the mechanisms described above as likely to have contributed to this difference.
Björnerfeldt et  al.  (2006) describe a similar result  following a comparison of the
mitochondrial DNA of domestic dogs and wolves.  
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Wang et al. (2011) compared the mitochondrial DNA of wild and domesticated yaks,
and  also  found  a  higher  frequency  of  non-synonymous  substitutions  in  the
domesticated strain.  In this case the authors explicitly argue for an explanation in
terms of the relaxation of selective pressure, particularly as relates to efficiency of
energy metabolism, 95% of which is carried out by mitochondria in eukaryotic cells.
Wild yaks live at high altitude and often travel great distances putting a selective
premium on efficient metabolism.  In contrast, domesticated yaks generally live at
lower altitudes and are far less mobile (Wang et al., 2011).  Similar findings have
been reported in comparisons of domesticated and wild rice (Lu et al., 2006), where
the Hill-Robertson effect seems the most likely candidate, and in yeast (Gu et al.,
2005), where the authors cite relaxed selection as the most likely cause.
5.1.2 – The domestic phenotype in inadvertent domesticates
The phenomenon of 'inadvertent domestication' among endangered species in captive
breeding programs (O'Regan & Kitchener, 2005) constitutes another parallel example
linking the domestic phenotype to aspects of the environment of domestication.  This
phenomenon  is  particularly  interesting  in  terms  of  this  first  account  of  self-
domestication, because artificial selection is not at all the aim of those involved in
such programs.  Indeed, the emergence of the domestic phenotype is increasingly
seen as  a  serious problem in terms of  successfully returning animals to  the wild
(Frankham, 2008).      
Softer diets in captivity have been found to increase the rate of malocclusion in both
cheetahs (Fitch & Fagan, 1982) and Asian elephants (Fagan et al., 2001).  A number
of  cranial,  skeletal  and muscle-related changes  have also been observed across  a
range of species in response to captivity (O'Regan & Kitchener, 2005).  Other species
show signs of inadvertent domestication in terms of changes in brain size.  One such
example  is  the  Przewalski's  wild  horse,  the  population  of  which  is  now  totally
derived from captive-bred individuals (O'Reagan & Kitchener, 2005).  These horses
have been bred with every effort to maintain their genetic diversity and to prevent
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anything resembling selective breeding.  Yet despite these efforts, the brain-weight of
these captive-bred horses is now 16% lower than that of wild-born individuals, and
their cranial volume has decreased by 14%, bringing them broadly into line with
conventionally domesticated horses (Rohrs & Ebinger, 1998, cited in  O'Regan &
Kitchener, 2005).
The build-up of deleterious alleles is also coming to be recognised as a problem for
captive-breeding programs (Frankham, 2008).  Work with drosophila indicates that
this build-up can occur surprisingly rapidly (Woodworth et al., 2002) and can be very
difficult to prevent.  The inter-breeding of wild and escaped domesticated members
of the same species is also a problem.  Kidd et al. (2009) report the growing concern
for wild populations of American mink as they breed with domestic escapees and
thus absorb a large body of deleterious alleles into the wild gene pool.  One of the
major examples of this phenomenon is that of farmed and wild salmon, the hybrids
of which show reduced survival and fitness, and decreased predator avoidance in
comparison to their pure-bred wild counterparts (McGinnity et al., 2003; Hutchings
& Fraser, 2008).
5.1.3 – The domestic phenotype in commensal species
In chapter four (4.4) the concept of there being various 'pathways' to domestication
was discussed.  One of these was the  commensal pathway, in which domestication
began through other species coming to live in and exploit human environments.  As
discussed there, many species, including the domestic dog, are thought to have begun
the domestication process in just this manner.  There are, however, several species
that have become commensal but have not then gone on to become conventionally
domesticated.  Intriguingly, however, these species have also come to exhibit aspects
of the domestic phenotype.
The two major examples of these are the various subspecies of the house mouse and
the  house  sparrow  (Leach,  2003).   In  comparison  to  sympatrically  living  wild
234
species, the house mouse has a shorter face, reduced molar row, longer tail and a
possible reduction in overall size (Tchernov, 1984).  Similarly, the house sparrow has
seen an overall reduction in size, as compared with its wild relative, especially in
relation  to  those  parts  of  the  body  involved  in  food  processing  and  terrestrial
locomotion (Morales Muñiz et al., 1995; Leach, 2003).
Commensal species represent an intriguing middle ground, because although they
live  with  us they  are  not  controlled  by  us.   This  relates  to  the  two  different
approaches to thinking about domestication discussed in chapter four.  If we take a
'human  mastery'  approach  to  domestication  and  define  it  in  terms  of  certain
conditions—i.e.  being  kept  in  captivity  and  managed  by  human  beings—then
commensals cannot be understood as domesticated in any way.  Indeed, some who
have taken this approach have ruled them out on just this basis (e.g. Hemmer, 1990).
On the other hand, if we take an outcomes view of domestication—emphasising the
domestic phenotype—then it is no great leap to also include commensals (Leach,
2003).   This  is  especially  true  given  the  more  nuanced  understanding  of  the
domestication process, with its various stages and pathways, outlined in chapter four.
5.1.4 – How does this account relate to niche construction?
The  account  of  self-domestication  being  explored  in  this  section  suggests  that
humans may have come to share aspects  of the domestic  phenotype because the
environment we created for ourselves shares much in common with that we created
for our domesticated species.  As such, this account seems very similar to the body of
theoretical work known as niche construction (Odling-Smee et al., 2003).  On closer
inspection, however, this similarity is only superficial.  Indeed, the approach taken to
self-domestication in this section (5.1),  and indeed the next (5.2),  can actually be
seen as the inverse of the niche construction perspective.
The key to understanding this inversion lies in the different ways of characterising
the role of human action in evolution.  For advocates of niche construction, the active
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role of organisms’ own behaviour has been left out of evolutionary thinking, and
constitutes a ‘neglected’ evolutionary process (Odling-Smee et al., 2003).  This view
derives from the idea that the fit between organism and environment, conventionally
ascribed to the process of natural selection, is actually better explained as a result of
two processes:  natural  selection,  in  which  organisms  adapt  to  better  ‘fit’  their
environments; and niche construction in which organisms modify their environments
so as to better fit them (see Lewontin, 1983).
This  two-process  view  is  associated  with  the  concept  of  ‘reciprocal  causation’
(Laland et al.,  2011), in which niche constructing behaviour and natural selection
interact  in  a  cyclical  fashion.   An oft-cited  example of  this  kind of  causation in
humans concerns  the spread of alleles for the continued production of the enzyme
lactase in adults—and thus the capacity to digest dairy products throughout life—in
populations engaged in dairy farming (Bersaglieri et al.,  2004).  The evolutionary
conditions  favouring lactase persistence were set  up by a cultural  practice (dairy
farming), which in turn was further supported by selection for lactase persistence.  A
key component of the niche construction view, therefore, is the claim that changes in
selective pressures deriving from an organism’s own actions, rather than from some
abiotic source such as change in the climate, require a different theoretical approach,
because they represent a distinct evolutionary process, i.e. niche construction.
In the account of self-domestication just considered, however, the argument is that
the origin of the environment of domestication is not, in itself, particularly important.
It doesn't matter whether the environment was made by the organism in question (as
in the case of humans),  for the organism (as in the case of other domesticates) or
simply  adopted as  a  habitat,  like  any other  might  have  been  (as  in  the  case  of
commensals).  What matters, rather, is that because all three of these groups shared,
to a greater or lesser extent, the same kind of environment, they also faced similar
selective conditions, and thus came to exhibit similar responses, as reflected in the
domestic  phenotype.   Indeed,  the  argument  would  remain  the  same  even  if  the
domesticated environment had sprung forth from the earth entirely through physical
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processes.   This  is  important  because  niche  construction  has  been  criticised  on
exactly this point of difference.
It  is  helpful  to  view these criticisms in light  of arguments  made in  the previous
chapter  (4.5.1.4),  regarding  the  distinction  between  the  process  of  selection—in
which  heritable  variation  is  'sifted'  with  respect  to  fitness  consequences—and
shorthand terms, such as 'sexual selection', that pick out a subset of this process in
relation to particular aspects of the selective environment.  In a similar vein, critics of
niche construction have argued that it, too, simply picks out a particular subset of the
selective  process.   In  this  case,  that  subset  relating  to  aspects  of  the  selective
environment previously influenced by an organism's behaviour (Dickins & Dickins,
2008).  As such, it no more warrants the title of a distinct evolutionary process26 than
does  sexual  selection,  social  selection,  or  the  hypothetical  'climatic  selection'
discussed in 4.5.1.4.  
Following  this  parallel,  the  dairy  farming  case  might  better  be  described  as  an
example of ‘own-action selection’, in which selection occurs in response to pressures
deriving from an organism’s own behaviour.  The evolutionary process responsible
for the adaptive phenotype—continued lactase production in adulthood—is natural
selection, acting on variation in the population in response to certain aspects of the
selective environment.  The fact that this instance of selection occurred in response to
selective pressures deriving from the organism’s own behaviour in no way changes
the nature of this process (Scott-Phillips et al., 2011), any more than the peacocks’
tail requires a new process to explain its emergence because the relevant selective
pressure derived from competition for mates.  
26 The term  evolutionary process  has a precise meaning.  Biological evolution  is change in gene
frequencies.   For  something  to  qualify  as  a  process  of  evolution,  thus  conceived,  requires
therefore that it be a process whereby gene frequencies change.  This can either be through the
introduction of new variants or by changing the relative frequency of existing variants.  In this
sense there are four evolutionary processes: mutation, gene flow, drift and selection.  Of course,
many other factors can influence the course of evolution, but they do so at one remove, through
the effect they have on one or more of these four processes.  For example, a change in the climate
can have profound evolutionary consequences, but it does so because it alters the circumstances
under which selection and other processes operate. 
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It is interesting to note what would be required for niche construction to constitute a
novel evolutionary process.  To return once more to the example of dairy farming.  If
niche construction, in the form of dairy farming behaviour, really were to constitute a
distinct evolutionary process then it would have to do something like the following:
directly cause the emergence of alleles underlying lactase persistence, thus bypassing
the  standard  neo-Darwinian  account  whereby  randomly generated  mutations  and
standing  variation  are  sifted  by  selection  (Dickins  &  Dickins,  2008;  2.4.4,  this
thesis)27.  Instead, dairy farming simply introduced a new source of nutrition into the
environment—dairy products  such as  milk and cheese—thereby altering selective
conditions,  such  that  variation  underlying  lactase  persistence,  and  thus  lifelong
access to this new nutritional resource, came to be favoured through the process of
selection (Scott-Phillips et al., 2013).
Much more could and has been said regarding the niche construction perspective
(Laland  et  al.,  2001;  Laland  & Sterelny, 2006;  Scott-Phillips  et  al.,  2013).   For
present purposes, however, what matters is that the account of self-domestication just
discussed avoids the criticisms that  have been levelled at  niche construction.   In
particular, it avoids having to make the claim that there is something ‘special’ about
selection  in  response  to  pressures  stemming  from  an  organism’s  own  actions.
Special, that is, in comparison to those  same pressures stemming from some other
source.  This problem arises as a result of  conflating  evolutionary processes,  like
selection, with the nature and origin of the pressures that characterise the selective
environment in any given case.  
Changes in the climate, the need to compete for mates, and alterations brought about
by an organism’s own behaviour are not evolutionary processes in themselves, but
aspects  of  the  adaptive  landscape  against  which  process  such  as  selection  occur
(Scott-Phillips et al., 2013).  Thus in order to sustain the theoretical claims made for
niche  construction,  it  is  not  enough  simply  to  point  to  examples  of  'reciprocal
causation', like the impact of dairy farming.  Such examples, although fascinating—
27 Niche construction would thereby cause an alteration in gene frequencies, through the generation
of new variation, independently of the four processes identified in footnote 18.
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and real—from the viewpoint of  descriptive  natural history, are, from a theoretical
perspective,  something  of  a  red  herring,  because  they  entail  the  additional,  and
unsupportable,  claim  that  selection  pressure  stemming  from  an  organism's  own
actions  constitutes  a  novel  evolutionary  process28.   This  claim  is  a  fundamental
category error, which the present account of self-domestication manages to avoid.
Indeed,  as  argued  above,  it  is  premised  on  the  opposite  position:  similarities  in
environmental circumstances will have similar evolutionary effects regardless of how
those environmental circumstances came into being.
5.1.5 – Summary and criticisms
This  first  account  relates  human  self-domestication  to  similarities  in  the
environments of humans and their domesticated species.  Despite the obvious power
of artificial selection, much of the domestic phenotype can be attributed to evolution
and development occurring in a particular human-made environment, which relaxes
and alters selective pressure across a range of domains.  The key point here is that
humans  and other  domesticates  have  long shared this  environment,  with  humans
living in it longest of all.  As such, it should really be no surprise that similar changes
might have occurred both in humans and domesticates.  This also allows sense to be
made of the parallel  changes seen in commensal  species and in  captive breeding
programs in which huge effort is put into  avoiding domestication.  This account of
self-domestication  has,  therefore,  much  to  recommend  it,  not  least  the  range  of
convergent examples illustrating that aspects of the domestic phenotype can emerge
as a result of evolution and development occurring in a human-made environment.  
There are, however, some important problems with this account.  The first concerns
the time-frame over which it might possibly have been in operation.  Leach's (2003)
discussion of the parallel physical changes in humans and their domesticates focused
on the last 20,000 years or so of human evolution.  Yet the evidence discussed in
28 It  is  also necessary to  explain  why  this kind of  change  in  selection  pressures  constitutes  an
evolutionary process,  while alterations in selective pressure from other sources, such as climatic
shifts, do not.
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chapter four (4.3.1) suggests that the domestic phenotype has likely been emerging in
humans over a much longer time-scale.  The focus placed on the role of sedentism
and  the  human-made  environment  is  also  problematic,  because  of  the  relatively
recent  origin of  herd management  and more formal  agricultural  practices  (Zeder,
2011) that make this kind of sedentism a possibility.  Finally, it  remains an open
question  whether  the  very  possibility  of  permanent  settlements  in  human-made
environments,  and other such complex cultural  activities actually  presupposes the
very changes in temperament, co-operative behaviour and communication—and even
language (e.g. Gil, 2008)—that self-domestication itself is being invoked to explain.
These  problems do not  rule  out  some kind of  role  for  the  parallel  adaptation of
humans and their domesticates to the human-made environment.  They do, however,
show that if humans are to be seen as self-domesticated—particularly if that self-
domestication is to be linked to major changes in temperament or the role of cultural
transmission—then the kind of account described in this section cannot be the whole
story.  In order for self-domestication to have served that kind of role it must have
had a much greater time-depth in human evolution.  The next section will examine a
second account of self-domestication that meets just these criteria.
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5.2 – Natural selection against aggression
In chapter three we discussed the case of the domestic dog, as illuminated by the
farm-fox experiment, and saw how many aspects of the domestic phenotype resulted
simply from selecting against aggression.  In that example, the selection involved
was  artificial:  the  source  of  the  selective  pressure  was  the  decisions  of  human
breeders.  However, as discussed in chapter four (4.5.1.4) and above (5.1.4), there is
nothing inherently special about the origins of selection pressures that changes either
the processes involved or the likely outcomes.  It should be expected, therefore, that
selective pressure for reduced aggression from  any source should result in similar
phenotypic changes.  To the extent that selection against aggression is likely to play a
role  in  human  self-domestication,  it  seems  unlikely  to  be  the  result  of  artificial
selection.  After all, humans are not being bred by some external agency (although
see  5.3 for the claim that we might be doing it  to ourselves).  Rather, changes to
temperament would have to occur through natural selection.  
One example where something like this may have occurred is the bonobo, which
may also share many aspects of the domestic phenotype (Hare et al., 2012).  Natural
selection is thought to have acted against aggression in bonobos as a consequence of
aspects  of  their  feeding  ecology,  which  in  turn  have  influenced  bonobo  social
structures (Hare et al., 2012).  The bonobo, then, has the potential to act as a 'bridge'
between the artificial selection in dogs and foxes and the natural selection required
for a similar argument to be made in relation to humans.  Once the bonobo example
has been sketched in some detail, I will turn to the question of how a parallel process
might have occurred in humans.
5.2.1 – The self-domesticated bonobo: a model for humans?
Humans have two equally close relatives among living primates:  the well-known
chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and its less famous cousin the bonobo (Pan paniscus).
Both  Pan species share a common ancestor with humans around 5-7 Ma (Ruvolo,
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1997), and diverged from each other some 1-2 Ma (Won & Hey, 2005).  Bonobos,
originally known as 'pygmy chimpanzees' (Coolridge, 1933), were only recognised
as a separate species in the 1930s, while chimpanzees have been known to science
for hundreds of years.  In the wild, bonobos are only found south of the Congo river
—in what is today the Democratic Republic of Congo—whereas chimpanzees are
found in a range of habitats across central and western Africa.  This relative isolation
has contributed to their continuing status as the 'forgotten ape' (de Waal & Lanting,
1997).  Such a status is unfortunate because bonobos and chimpanzees differ from
each other in their anatomy, social organisation and even cognitive skills.
It has long been argued that bonobos, particularly in terms of the size and shape of
their  crania,  are  paedomorphic  with  respect  to  chimpanzees  (Shea,  1983,  1989;
Lieberman et al., 2007), although see Mitteroecker et al. 2005 for a dissenting view.
As  discussed  in  chapters  three  and  four,  such  paedomorphism  is  typical  of
domestication,  with  many  aspects  of  the  domestic  phenotype  being  correlated
expressions of this underlying developmental shift.  More recently, a strong argument
has been put forward that as well as exhibiting cranial paedomorphism bonobos also
display a range of other aspects of the domestic phenotype (Hare et al., 2012).  These
include smaller crania (Coolridge, 1933; Cramer, 1977), reduced teeth size (Zihlman
and Cramer, 1978; Pilbrow, 2006) and reduced sexual dimorphism (Cramer, 1977).  
The physical differences between the two Pan species mirror the differences between
wild  and  domesticated  dogs  (as  discussed  in  chapter  three)  and  wild  and
domesticated  species  more  generally  (as  discussed  in  chapter  four  and  5.1).
Furthermore, the discussion in chapter three shows that they form part of a correlated
cluster of changes that follow from selection against aggression.  In what follows, I
will sketch the outline of how natural selection has been argued to have acted against
aggression  in  bonobos.   With  that  in  place,  I  will  then  discuss  some  of  the
behavioural,  cognitive  and  hormonal  differences  seen  between  chimpanzees  and
bonobos, many of which mirror those seen in dogs and domesticated species more
generally.
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5.2.2 – Why are bonobos less aggressive than chimpanzees?
The  differing  temperaments  of  bonobos  and  chimpanzees  have  been  linked  to
differences  in their  social  organisation,  which in  turn reflects  differences  in  their
feeding ecology.  In brief, bonobo societies are structured such that there is simply
less 'reward' for aggression, and this structuring is, in turn, a consequence of aspects
of their feeding ecology that reduce the requirement for intense competition for food.
In the rest of this section I will unpack both the social and ecological aspects of this
explanation.
5.2.2.1 – Bonobo social organisation
In  proximate  terms,  the  temperamental  differences  between  bonobos  and
chimpanzees have been related to differences in their social organisation.  One key
difference concerns the composition of foraging parties.  Bonobo parties are more
stable, usually formed of a greater proportion of the whole community (25-51%) than
in  chimpanzees  (9-30%),  and  contain  a  higher  proportion  of  females  (Furuichi,
2011).  The role of females in bonobo society also differs markedly from that seen in
chimpanzees.   Bonobo females  are  much more  gregarious,  and form more  close
social  associations  (Furuichi,  2011),  than  do  chimpanzee  females  (Muroyama  &
Sugiyama, 1994).  Female bonobos also have very high social status, and appear to
be  dominant  over  males  in  certain  situations,  particularly in  the  context  of  food
competition (Furuichi, 2011), while the reverse appears true in chimpanzees (Boesch
& Boesch, 1989).  Bonobo females also play an important role in determining their
sons' social status.  In chimpanzees, males usually achieve high social status during
prime adult age, whereas male bonobos typically achieve the same status during late
adolescence or early adulthood, at precisely the time their mothers are of prime adult
age (Furuichi, 1997).  Finally, female bonobos exhibit a prolonged period of pseudo-
oestrus (Kano, 1992), in which they are sexually receptive but not fertile, something
not seen in chimpanzees (Furuichi, 2011).
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These aspects of bonobo social organisation form a nexus in which male aggression
is less beneficial.  The high status of females, frequency of female-female coalitions,
high proportion of females in foraging parties, and the influence of mothers on the
social status of males combine to create a situation in which male harassment of
females and male aggression more generally is reduced (Furuichi, 2011).  The period
of pseudo-oestrus also reduces the need for males to compete for access to females,
by rendering it harder for high-ranking males to monopolise females.  With greater
numbers  of  receptive  females  available,  the  challenge  for  males  is  not  so  much
winning access in fights with other males,  but gaining the preference of females
(Furuichi,  2011).   In  other  words,  non-aggressive  strategies  such  as  forming
affiliative  bonds with  females  or  exploiting  ties  to  high-ranking mothers  become
much more important (Kano, 1992, Surbeck et al., 2012a).
5.2.2.2 – Bonobo feeding ecology
In ultimate terms, the contrasting social organisations of chimpanzees and bonobos
have been related to differences in the feeding ecology of the two species.  Bonobos,
recall, are entirely restricted to an area south of the Congo River, this habitat has
been argued to differ from that of chimpanzees in three systematic ways.  Firstly, the
size of available food patches is much greater.  Secondly, those food patches include
a much greater proportion of terrestrial plants (White & Wrangham, 1988).  These
two differences reduce the cost of travel between patches and of competition for food
at any given patch (Furuichi, 2011), both of which costs are often higher for females
than males.  These reduced costs may be what permits higher proportions of females
to join foraging parties, together with the range of other differences this leads to.
Finally,  gorillas  are  completely  absent  from  the  territorial  range  of  bonobos
(Malenky  &  Wrangham,  1994),  thereby  eliminating  another  potential  feeding
competitor, particularly in relation to terrestrial plants.  The relationships between
aspects of social organisation and feeding ecology are illustrated in figure 5.1:
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Figure 5.1: Relationships between bonobo feeding ecology and social organisation 
(Taken from Furuichi, 2011)
5.2.3 – Behavioural, cognitive and physiological differences
In  this  section  I  will  consider  four  interrelated  ways  in  which  bonobos  and
chimpanzees have been found to differ, in  addition to  the hard-tissue differences
already referred  to  above.   The first  is  evidence  showing higher  levels  of  social
tolerance and co-operation in bonobos than in chimpanzees.  The second concerns
differences  in  their  social  cognition.   The  third  relates  both  these  cognitive  and
behavioural differences to shifts in developmental timing.  Finally, I will consider
some of the neural, hormonal and genetic underpinnings of these differences.
5.2.3.1 – Differences in social tolerance and co-operation
In recent years a range of studies have compared chimpanzees and bonobos on their
ability to engage in co-operative behaviour and their levels of social tolerance.  On
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one  view—the  hunting  hypothesis—chimpanzees  should  have  an  advantage  as  a
result of their engaging in co-operative hunting (Boesch, 2002, 2005).  On another
view—the  emotional  reactivity  hypothesis  (Hare  &  Tomasello,  2005)—bonobos
should have an advantage because, like dogs, they have experienced selection for
reduced levels of aggression.  
Hare et  al.  (2007) compared the willingness of  chimpanzees  and bonobos to  co-
operate on various feeding tasks.  When the task required the retrieval of food that
was  difficult  to  monopolise  there  was  no  significant  difference  between  the  two
species.  However, when the task involved food that could easily be monopolised,
bonobo dyads were more willing to co-operate than chimpanzee dyads.  Hare and
Kwetuenda (2010) examined the conditions under which bonobos were willing to
voluntarily share their own food.  They presented bonobos with a situation in which
they could either eat a food pile by themselves or open a door to another bonobo, and
therefore share the food.  Bonobos exhibited a significant preference for opening the
door,  even  though  this  meant  missing  out  on  some  food  they  could  have  had
themselves.  This result stands in marked contrast to findings with chimpanzees in
the wild (Gilby, 2006) and under experimental conditions (Jensen et al., 2006), in
which their choices seem to be entirely self-focused, and where they display little
regard to the welfare of unrelated individuals (Silk et al., 2005).
The bonobos in Hare and Kwetuenda's study could, of course, have been motivated
by selfish considerations, such as a desire to engage in social interaction.  Tan and
Hare (2013) conducted a series of follow-up experiments, which produced four key
findings that together illuminate the question of motivation.  Firstly, they found that
bonobos, when presented with a choice of two doors, preferred to open the door for a
stranger,  with  whom they then  shared  the  food,  rather  than  a  co-group member.
Secondly, they also found that the remaining, unopened door, which would allow the
admittance of the original subject's co-group member, was then usually opened  by
the stranger, rather than the original subject.  The strangers were, therefore, willingly
permitting themselves to be outnumbered by members of another group, something
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to which chimpanzees  are  known to be particularly averse (Wilson et  al.,  2001).
Thirdly,  they  found that  bonobos  were  willing  to  pull  a  rope  to  release  another
individual—whether a stranger or a group-mate—to allow them access to food that
they themselves could not access.  This willingness to make an effort on behalf of
another individual with no obvious self-reward is something not seen in chimpanzees
(Jensen et al., 2006).  Finally, they found that bonobos were unwilling to help another
individual  when a lack of social  interaction was combined with having to  forfeit
some food of their own.
It seems, then, that not only do bonobos exhibit greater levels of social tolerance and
co-operation than chimpanzees, particularly in relation to co-feeding, but that they
also show a much higher willingness to be actively pro-social, especially with regard
to  unknown  individuals.   Bonobos  seem  to  not  only  be  more  tolerant  and  co-
operative but also less xenophobic than chimpanzees, a difference also reflected in
the nature of the two species' inter-group encounters in the wild (Furuichi, 2011).
These differences resemble those seen between dogs and wolves, and provide further
evidence that selection has acted on temperament in bonobos.
5.2.3.2 – Differences in social cognition
The differences between the two species as regards social tolerance also seem related
to differences in social cognition.  In comparisons across a range of tasks, bonobos
have been found to outperform chimpanzees on theory of mind-related tasks, while
chimpanzees outperformed bonobos on tool-use tasks (Herrmann et al., 2010).  No
significant  differences  were  found  on  other  tasks,  such  as  the  understanding  of
physical causality.  These findings relate to work discussed in chapter four (4.3.4)
concerning temperamental differences between humans and the great ape species,
which found bonobos to be intermediate between humans (who were more wary) and
other apes (who were less wary) in terms of their reactions of novelty.  Research with
human children has shown that temperament at age three—particularly the exhibition
of a shy-withdrawn stance to the world—together with perceptual sensitivity to faces
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and other stimuli, predicts performance on theory of mind tasks at age five (Wellman
et al., 2011).  Wellman et al.'s (2011) interpretation of shy-withdrawn temperament in
this study is not one of fearfulness but of a watchful, observant 'standing back', much
like the aversion to novelty seen more in bonobos than chimpanzees.
The  influence  of  perceptual  sensitivity  also  parallels  findings  with  dogs,  whose
willingness to look back at human faces plays a role in their outperforming wolves in
the object choice task (see 3.1.2.1).  Such tasks do not assess theory of mind itself,
but do investigate the related, if simpler, sensitivity to communicative intent.  It is
interesting, then, that work with dogs, bonobos and human children is all pointing to
a similar kind of relationship between temperament and aspects of social cognition
relating to intention reading.  It should be noted, of course, that Wellman et al.'s work
examines the relationship between temperament and theory of mind during ontogeny,
whereas in the bonobo-chimpanzee case the relationship is a  phylogenetic  one, but
the parallel remains intriguing nevertheless.
5.2.3.3 – These differences are related to shifts in developmental timing
In chapter three we saw how selection against aggression in a population of foxes
resulted in the emergence of many aspects of the domestic phenotype, and that it did
so as a result of changes in hormonal and other systems that regulate the rate and
timing of development.  In this section I will explore some parallels to this in the
bonobo.
Wobber et al. (2010a) tested adult and juvenile bonobos and chimpanzees on various
tasks  to  compare  the  two  species  over  the  course  of  development.   Juvenile
chimpanzees were found to co-feed significantly more than adult chimpanzees.  In
contrast, bonobos exhibited no difference between juveniles and adults.  In a social
inhibition task, chimpanzees were able to successfully inhibit their response in order
to gain food at a much younger age than bonobos, who only achieved parity with the
chimpanzees when significantly older.  Finally, the two species were tested on a
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reversal-learning task, in which they first learnt which of two experimenters would
provide food, and then had to adapt when the experimenters switched roles.  Again
the same pattern emerged, with younger chimpanzees outperforming bonobos, and
bonobos only coming to match chimpanzee performance when older.  Rosati and
Hare  (2012)  also  found  similar  evidence  of  developmental  delays  in  relation  to
aspects of bonobo spatial cognition.
These findings of developmental differences are particularly interesting in the present
context, because they suggest a mechanism that might account for the differences in
temperament and social cognition, discussed above: bonobos and chimpanzees start
out as juveniles with similar temperaments, but bonobos retain that temperamental
disposition into adulthood (Wobber et al., 2010b; Brosnan, 2010).
5.2.3.4  –  Hormonal,  neural  and  genetic  foundations  of  chimpanzee-
bonobo differences
The behavioural differences between bonobos and chimpanzees are underpinned by
differences in their hormonal responses.  Wobber et al. (2010c) presented bonobo and
chimpanzee dyads with a competitive food task.  Males of both species exhibited a
hormonal surge before the task began, but this surge took the form of a  different
hormone in  each  species.   Bonobo  males  experienced  an  increase  in  the  stress
hormone cortisol;  whereas chimpanzee males experienced a surge in testosterone.
The authors argue that this difference relates to how the two species responded to
competitive  situations,  with  bonobos  viewing  them  as  social  stressors  and
chimpanzees viewing them as contests to determine status.  
These  experimental  results  have  also  been  mirrored  by  work  with  wild-living
bonobos.  In the majority of vertebrate species, including chimpanzees (Muller &
Wrangham, 2004), mate-competition between males is related to heightened levels of
testosterone, with the highest ranking, and therefore most successful, males showing
the greatest increases (Hirschenhauser & Oliveira, 2006).  The relationship between
mate-competition, testosterone levels and dominance has been termed the 'challenge
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hypothesis'  (Wingfield  et  al.,  1990).   This  hypothesis  does  not  seem to  hold  in
bonobos (Surbeck et al., 2012a).  While bonobo males do show increased aggression
in the presence of fertile females, it is inversely correlated with rank.  Furthermore,
the  rate  of  grooming  between  males  and  unrelated  females  is  also  negatively
correlated with their  level and rate of increase of testosterone,  with high ranking
males grooming unrelated females most often.  In many species, cortisol levels are
also  related  to  dominance,  particularly  if  rank  is  maintained  through  aggressive
behaviour (Goymann & Wingfield, 2004).  Surbeck et al. (2012b) found that cortisol
levels  in  bonobo  males  did  not  generally  correlate  with  rank.   The  hormonal
responses  in  bonobo  males  seem  to  be  determined,  then,  more  by  the  need  to
maintain  friendly  relationships  between  the  sexes  rather  than  by  aggressive
interactions between males (Surbeck et al., 2012a, 2012b).  These hormonal changes
should recall those seen in both the Bengalese finch (2.4.10) and domesticated foxes
(3.4.5), both of which show reductions in levels of stress hormone relative to their
wild ancestors.
In addition to these hormonal differences there is work suggesting that the brains of
bonobos and chimpanzees differ, with bonobos having more grey matter in brain
systems associated with both the control of aggression and empathetic responses to
others (Rilling et al., 2012).  Finally, there is also some early indications that many of
these changes in bonobos may be underpinned by some of the same genes that are
typically associated with domestication (Pennisi, 2011).  These neural and genetic
findings are, of course, quite preliminary and await further confirmation.  However,
given  the  striking  hormonal  parallels  between  bonobos  and  all  the  cases  of
domestication discussed in this thesis, it is possible that the mechanisms underlying




The bonobo presents an example, then, where natural selection against aggression
has possibly resulted in a similar set of outcomes to those described for domesticated
dogs and foxes in chapter three.  This relates to arguments made above (5.1.4) and in
the last chapter (4.1.5.4) that it is not where the selective pressure  originates that
matters,  but  what that  selective pressure  actually  is.   If  there is  selection against
aggression, then it doesn't matter whether that takes the form of artificial selection
stemming from human breeders or natural selection stemming from environmental
conditions.  This is an important expansion of the argument made in chapter three,
because if the dogs and foxes were considered alone it might be possible to object
that  the  outcome  was  the  result  of  'strong,  directional  artificial  selection',  and
therefore irrelevant to humans.  The bonobo example, together with the theoretical
arguments,  should  indicate  that  this  objection  is  premature.   If  selection  against
aggression can produce the outcomes it has in dogs—and seems to have in bonobos
—then it can also produce those outcomes in humans.
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5.2.5 – Selection against aggression in humans
In this section I will consider some hypotheses concerning how a similar process of
selection against aggression might also have occurred in humans.  The main focus of
this section will be on one hypothesis that links selection on temperament in humans
to  aspects  of  their  feeding  ecology,  particularly  the  role  of  cooking in  human
evolution.
5.2.5.1 – The cooking hypothesis
In focusing on feeding ecology, the cooking hypothesis has much in common with
the account of self-domestication in bonobos.  The logic of the cooking hypothesis,
as set out in Wrangham (2009), can be summarised as follows:
i. Humans  are  biologically  adapted  to  eating  cooked  food;  we  are  obligate
cooks
ii. This shift to obligate cooking is reflected in many aspects of our physiology
iii. This  same shift  fundamentally alters  the  social  challenges  associated with
feeding, with significant implications for selection on temperament
iv. This shift in feeding ecology created a situation in which more co-operative
individuals were favoured over aggressive or competitive individuals
For present purposes, one final point can be added to this summary.
v. Such selection against aggression would have produced a similar correlated
cascade of effect in humans to those seen in dogs and foxes (chapter three)
and bonobos (above),  resulting in humans coming to exhibit  many of  the
same aspects of the domestic phenotype
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This  fifth  point  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  part  of  the  cooking  hypothesis  itself—
although it is sometimes hinted at by its proponents (e.g. Wrangham, 2009: 184-185)
—it does, however, follow directly from many of the arguments presented in this
thesis, especially chapter three, and so will not be further discussed in this section.
Points i-iv, however, require a more detailed examination.
I will deal with  points i and ii in combination, as together they represent the basic
foundation of the cooking hypothesis, and form the prime reason it deserves to be
taken seriously.  The evidence supporting these two points can be summarised as
follows (taken from Wrangham et al., 1999; Wrangham & Conklin-Brittain, 2003;
Wrangham, 2009; Organ et al., 2011):
• There are no current or past examples of human populations or individuals
surviving for an extended period of time on raw food alone, this includes all
recorded hunter-gatherer groups, including the Inuit.
• Members of modern 'raw-foodist' movements experience very high rates of
energy  deficiency  (30%)  and  female  raw-foodists  also  have  a  very  high
incidence  of  amenorrhea  (50%) and disordered  menstrual  cycles.   This  is
despite  their  access  to  the  nutritionally  enriched  products  of  modern
agriculture.
• Humans are the  only species known to be unable to survive on raw food.
Although other species typically  prefer cooked food when presented with a
choice, only humans seem to consistently suffer ill health on raw-only diets.
• The  human  digestive  system  is  small  compared  to  many  other  primate
species.  Humans have a smaller gut volume, caecum and colon, together
with a much faster passage of material through the system.  Together, these
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features suggest an adaptation to a diet of very high caloric density.
• Human teeth are much smaller than would be expected given a primate of our
size, furthermore this difference cannot be accounted for solely in terms of
correlated changes in body-size.
• Humans  spend a  much smaller  portion  of  their  day chewing (4.7%) than
would  be  predicted  (48%)  for  a  primate  of  our  size,  and  yet  manage  to
consume sufficient calories to power a large body.
• Cooking  and  other  non-thermal  processing  techniques  enhance  the
palatability  of  food,  make  chewing  much  easier  and  increase  the  energy
provided by both plant matter and meat.
There is, then, a strong argument that modern humans are adapted to eating cooked
food.  Firstly, humans are large-bodied mammals, with the high caloric requirements
that  entails,  whose  digestive  systems  and  teeth  seem  ill-equipped  to  deal  with
processing large amounts of food and who spend a tiny fraction of the expected time
actually chewing and consuming that food.  Secondly, human health fares badly on
uncooked diets, with no population—outside some modern, urban subcultures—ever
being known to survive entirely on raw food.  And, finally, cooking greatly increases
the calories that can be extracted from food.  Cooking, therefore, renders food into
the calorically dense, more chewable form to which human guts seem adapted and
which small human teeth can easily chew in a relatively short period of time.
These considerations give rise to two further questions, that relate to points iii and iv,
above.  Firstly, what effect has this unusual dietary niche had on other aspects of
human evolution, such as social organisation and reproductive behaviour?  If you
grant that humans are obligate eaters of cooked food, then you must also grant that
this  is  likely  to  have  had  other  far-reaching  implications.   The  second  question
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concerns when this shift to obligate cooking might have occurred.  If eating cooked
food is a relatively recent phenomenon then many aspects of human physiology and
social organisation are likely to pre-date it.  If, however, reliance on cooking had a
more distant origin, then it becomes much more plausible to ascribe it a powerful
shaping role in human evolution.
5.2.5.2 – Evolutionary effects of eating cooked food 
The  arguments  relating  cooking  to  human  social  evolution  proceed  from  the
observation that when food has to be cooked, as opposed to eaten raw when found, it
becomes far more vulnerable to  theft  (Wrangham et al., 1999).  The act of cooking
requires  that  food  collected  from  a  wide  area  be  brought  to  a  single  point  for
processing, where heating and other techniques are applied.  Such a processing point
is, therefore, a highly vulnerable target for raiders or scavengers.  In the literature on
the cooking hypothesis, two inferences have been drawn from this observation.  In
many discussions these two inferences are blended together.  For present purposes,
however, it is important to tease them apart.
The  first  inference  relates  to  the  implications  of  cooking,  and  particularly  the
vulnerability of cooked food to theft, for temperament:
If the first cooks were temperamentally like chimpanzees, life would have been absurdly
difficult for females or low-status males trying to cook a meal. Cooked food would have
been intensely valuable. Even the act of gathering creates value merely by assembling
raw foods  into  a  pile.  Cooking only increases  its  attraction.  Subordinate  individuals
cooking  their  own  meals  would  have  been  vulnerable  to  petty  theft  or  worse.
(Wrangham, 2009: 158)
The argument here, then, is that a typically ape-like temperament is simply untenable
in a species that had become an obligate eater of cooked food.  Under this view, a
shift  in  human  feeding  ecology  precipitated  a  shift  in  the  selective  pressures
surrounding temperament, much like in the bonobo.  This inference is also supported
by the strong aversion to anything like competition surrounding cooking and feeding
in modern hunter-gatherer societies (Wrangham, 2009).  
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The second inference relates cooking to the typical human pattern of  female-male
bonding.   This  phenomenon  has  been  addressed  by  two  major  theoretical
perspectives.  The male-provisioning hypothesis (e.g. Lovejoy, 1981), which relates
bonding  to  the  benefits  females  gain  from  being  provisioned  by  males;  and
bodyguard-type  hypotheses  (e.g.  Mesnick,  1997)  in  which  males  protect  females
from violence,  sexual  or otherwise,  from other  males.   The logic of  the cooking
hypothesis  combines  aspects of both these approaches  to  produce what  might  be
termed the food guarding hypothesis:
Our proposal is that females formed bonds with males to protect themselves from food
thieves,  with the result  that to a large extent  females provisioned males. Pressure on
females to form effective bonds then selected for extended and intensified female sexual
attractiveness. 
(Wrangham et al., 1999: 575) 
This inference can be seen as a more specific subset of the temperament inference.
Females, being physically weaker than males, would be the primary targets of food
theft and so would benefit from forming bonds with males to protect stores of food,
or food in the process of being cooked.  Such bonds would be cemented by females
provisioning males with food and becoming sexually receptive for longer periods of
the year.  It is notable, however, that while the first inference follows fairly directly if
you  grant  the  'theft  premise',  this  second  inference  makes  a  raft  of  further
assumptions.
The distinction between these two inferences becomes very important when we come
to consider some of the criticisms of the cooking hypothesis.  One major criticism
focuses on the assumption that tubers and other underground storage organs served
as major sources of nutrition over human evolution (see Wrangham et al., 1999).  In
comparison to the evidence for meat,  however, there is little evidence that tubers
formed  an  important  part  of  the  diet  of  early  hominins  (Shipman,  2009).
Furthermore,  the  archaeological  remains  identified  as  'digging  sticks'  in  order  to
support  this  position  bear  little  resemblance  to  those  used  by  modern  hunter-
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gatherers (Bunn, 1999).  
Considered alone, however, these objections are far from fatal.   After all, there is
now evidence that  cooking increases  the digestibility and caloric  quality of  meat
(Carmody  et  al.,  2011)  as  well  as  plant  matter.   Underground  tubers  also  only
represent  one  potential  type  of  food  to  which  cooking  might  have  been  applied
(Wrangham et al., 1999).  Furthermore, it is only to be expected that fewer traces
remain of the processing of soft plant matter than of the readily fossilisable bones of
animals.  The core of the cooking hypothesis remains intact, then, even if there is
little evidence for the importance of underground tubers.  This is because none of the
inferences relating to temperament require cooking to involve any specific food type.
If cooking makes food easier to steal, and if humans had become obligate cooks, then
the associated selection on temperament could happen regardless of whether the food
involved was tubers, other vegetable matter or meat.
This 'tuber objection' becomes far stronger, however, if the cooking hypothesis has to
account  for  the  human  pattern  of  female-male  bonding.   If  females  gain  male
protection  by provisioning  them with  food,  then  this  has  to  involve  food which
females would have controlled.  But on comparative grounds with modern hunter-
gatherers, this rules out meat.  As Wrangham et al. (1999: 576) concede, 'It is likely
that females never controlled meat and therefore it could not be stolen from them.'  It
is important to note, therefore, that the temperament inference and the female-male
bonding inference are separable, despite the fact that they are often run together in
many of the published discussions of the cooking hypothesis.  Of course, for the
purposes  of  the  present  thesis  there  is  no need to  account  for  the  emergence  of
female-male bonding in humans.  Rather, the cooking hypothesis is presented as a
plausible explanation as to why selection on temperament may have occurred during
human evolution.
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5.2.5.3 – When did cooking begin?
Even if we accept the basic premises of the cooking hypothesis, there still remains
the question of when the shift to obligate cooking might have occurred.  Is cooking
an evolutionarily ancient enough behaviour to plausibly account for the many effects
ascribed to it?  The answer to this question depends on which way it is approached.
The advocates  of  the  cooking hypothesis  take  what  might  be  termed a  'physical
inference'  approach.  This begins with the observation,  detailed above, that many
aspects  of  human biology and physiology reflect  our  status  as  obligate  eaters  of
cooked food.  The next stage is to ask at what point in human evolution these tell-tale
signs of obligate cooking first become apparent.  The answer, based on the anatomy
of the digestive system, the size of the teeth and the estimated chewing time required
if earlier hominin species didn't cook their food, is that Homo erectus/ergaster must
have had a diet that included cooked food (Organ et al., 2011; Gowlett & Wrangham,
2013).  This dates the origins of cooking to c1.8 Mya, judging by remains showing a
broadly modern pattern of physiology from Africa (Finlayson, 2005) and Eurasia
(Pontzer et al., 2010). 
However,  to  argue  that  humans  ate  cooked  food  is  to  argue  that  humans,
opportunistically or systematically, used or controlled fire.  This is a problem for the
cooking  hypothesis,  because  there  is  little  archaeological  evidence,  in  Europe  at
least, for the control of fire prior to 400 Kya (Roebroeks & Villa, 2011).  This lack of
evidence is especially troubling because, in archaeological terms, Europe is by far
the most thoroughly explored region of the world.  Referring to sites dating prior to
400 Kya, Roebroeks and Villa (2011: 5212) conclude that the 'number and quality of
these early sites are significant, and this absence of evidence cannot be ignored'.  The
archaeological evidence points, therefore, to a significantly later date for the control
of fire than is required by the cooking hypothesis.
There have, however, been numerous claims for evidence of much earlier control of
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fire  at  various Asian and African sites,  some dating from 1.6 Mya or older  (e.g.
Bellomo & Keen, 1997; Rowlett, 1999, 2000; see Gowlett & Wrangham, 2013 for
broader survey).  The problem with interpreting many of these early sites, especially
if  open-air,  is  that  evidence  of  prehistoric  fire  is  not  necessarily  evidence  that
humans controlled it.  Other explanations such as wildfires can never be ruled out.
This  is  especially  true  given  that  these  early  sites  lack  the  hearths  or  other
'combustion structures' that appear in many of the more recent sites (Roebroeks &
Villa, 2011) and which serve to confirm that the fire was under human control.  As a
result,  the  archaeological  consensus  has  tended  to  view the  control  of  fire  as  a
relatively recent phenomenon in human evolution, restricted to  Homo sapiens, the
Neanderthals  and  perhaps  their  shared  ancestor  Homo heidelbergensis (Shipman,
2009; Roeboecks & Villa, 2011).
This  consensus  is,  however,  being  challenged  by  a  range  of  recent  discoveries,
particularly from Wondewerk Cave in South Africa (Beaumont, 2011; Berna et al.,
2012),  which  provide  the  strongest  evidence  yet  for  a  much earlier  date  for  the
control  of  fire.   Berna et  al.  (2012) conducted  a  micromorphological  analysis  of
sediment, stone and organic remains found deep within the cave site.  Their findings
provide strong evidence that bones and plant matter were burned at the site around
1.0 Mya, in close association to evidence of human occupation.  They also note that
wildfires or lightening strikes are unlikely given the deep (30m) cave location, and
that  other  possible  sources  of  naturally  combustible  material,  such as  guano,  are
largely absent.  These findings strongly link the control of fire to Homo erectus for
the  first  time,  although  not  at  the  very  earliest  dates  suggested  by  the  physical
inference  approach.   They  also  support  the  need  to  supplement  archaeological
evidence,  which  by  its  very  nature  becomes  sparser  and  less  representative  the
further back in time we go, with other approaches such as the physical inference
approach (Gowlett & Wrangham, 2013), together with work in genetics, primatology
and broader evolutionary theory (Dunbar, 2009).
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5.2.6 – Summary and criticisms
It is important to remember that the account of self-domestication discussed in this
section is not dependent on the eventual empirical fate of the cooking hypothesis.
The cooking hypothesis is simply one possible account of why selection may have
acted  against  aggression  in  humans.   Others  have  proposed  that  selection  on
temperament  could  be  related  to  the  fact  that  humans  engage  in  co-operative
breeding (Burkart et al., 2009; Burkart & van Schaik, 2010), or to the phenomenon
of cultural group selection (Richerson & Boyd, 2005).  There will not, however, be
space in the present thesis to discuss these alternative accounts.    
This  second  account  of  human  self-domestication  has  a  range  of  strengths  and
weaknesses.   On  the  positive  side,  an  account  of  self-domestication  rooted  in
selection against aggression has significantly more evolutionary time-depth than one
rooted  in  the  nature  of  the  human-made  environment.   This  makes  this  second
account a more plausible explanation for how self-domestication could have come to
have  far-reaching  effects  on  humans  evolution.   In  the  bonobo,  there  is  a  well-
evidenced example of natural selection against aggression resulting in many of the
same  outcomes  as  was  seen  in  the  dogs  and  foxes,  discussed  in  chapter  three.
Together  with  some theoretical  considerations,  this  removes the  concern  that  the
findings with dogs and foxes cannot be applicable to humans because they involved
directional, artificial selection.  
The  weakness  of  this  selection-against-aggression  account,  however,  lies  in  the
evidential support for how and why something similar to that seen in bonobos could
have occurred in humans.  The cooking hypothesis represents the most fully worked-
out scenario of how selection may have come to act on temperament in humans.  It
presents a very strong case that humans are obligate cooks, and that a reliance on
cooked  food  has  contributed  to  the  shaping  of  human  biology  and  physiology.
Where it is less strong, however, is in terms of the evidence that cooking necessarily
has the social, and therefore temperamental, implications imputed to it, and evidence
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that  humans  have  been  cooking  for  long  enough  for  it  to  have  had  as  wide  an
evolutionary effect as claimed.
5.3  –  Culturally  mediated  mate-choice  as  an  analogue  of
artificial selection
Throughout this chapter and the last there has been something of a tacit assumption
that artificial selection is not relevant to humans, and therefore cannot account for
human self-domestication.  This assumption was based on the idea that humans have
not  been  bred  or  controlled  by any external  species,  that  while  humans  may be
domesticated,  they  certainly  don't  have  a  domesticator.   There  is  a  possibility,
however, that this rejection of artificial selection has been too hasty.  Humans have
obviously not been selected by some external agency, but  perhaps we have been
artificially  selecting ourselves.   More  precisely, there  remains  the possibility that
human breeding practices have come to be directed in a way that presents a much
closer analogue to artificial selection than we might normally assume.  If this is the
case, then human self-domestication may have taken a much more directed (although
still unconscious) form.
5.3.1 – Bednarik's hypothesis
In terms reminiscent of arguments made by Franz Boas (see 4.1), Bednarik (2011a,
2011b) has suggested that self-domestication proceeded through a process somewhat
analogous to selective breeding, with mate-choice becoming increasingly driven by
cultural determinants, particularly a preference for neotenic features: 
It is suggested that around 40 ka ago, cultural practice had become such a determining
force in human society that breeding mate selection became increasingly moderated by
cultural  factors,  i.e.,  by  factors attributable  to  learned  behavior.  These  could  have
included the application of a variety of cultural constructs in such choices, such as social
standing, communication skills, body decoration (which becomes notably prominent 40
ka ago, although existing earlier), and most especially culturally negotiated constructs of
physical attractiveness. 
(Bednarik, 2011b: pp. 20-21, emphasis in original)
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According to Bednarik,  it  is  this  culturally mediated preference that  accounts for
humans having becoming increasing gracile and neotenous over the course of their
evolution,  and especially over  the last  50,000 years.   Bednarik (2011a)  considers
three possible explanations for this pattern of evolution:
1) Replacement hypothesis: in which more robust populations of hominids on all
continents were replaced by more gracile, modern humans in a second 'Out of
Africa' event
2) Gene-flow hypothesis: in which gene flow and introgression cause the spread
of more gracile phenotypes, but without any mass movement of population.
3) Cultural  moderation  of  breeding  patterns:  in  which  human  mate-choice
becomes increasingly moderated by culturally derived norms and preferences
favouring more gracile and neotenous forms.
The first two hypotheses represent two sides of an ongoing debate in archaeology
and other disciplines concerned with human origins (e.g. Stringer & Gamble, 1993;
Templeton, 2002).  There is no space in the present thesis to evaluate the merits of
each side in this complex debate; nor is there any need, as my aim is simply to assess
Bednarik's proposed account of self-domestication29.  I will focus, therefore, on the
third  of  these  hypotheses.   To  bring  this  hypothesis  into  focus,  however,  it  is
necessary to briefly consider Bednarik's reasons for rejecting the first two.
Bednarik  (2011a)  presents  a  survey  of  the  skeletal,  archaeological  and  genetic
29 Indeed, it is somewhat puzzling why Bednarik chose to contrast these three hypotheses.  The first
two assume the emergence of gracility, and then provide differing accounts of how that gracility
might spread.  In contrast, the third represents an attempt to account for why that gracility itself
might have emerged.
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evidence, concluding that there is no evidence for the replacement hypothesis, thus
placing himself at odds with the archaeological consensus of the last few decades
(e.g. Stewart & Singer, 2012).  He concedes, however, that the evidence is much
more supportive of the gene-flow hypothesis.  If he stopped here, Bednarik would
place himself within a minority, but nevertheless significant, group of scholars on
human evolution (e.g. Templeton, 2013).  Why, then, does he go on to reject this
hypothesis, and endorse an account of domestication driven by culturally mediated
constructs of mate-choice?  The answer lies in the nature of the changes seen in
recent human evolution:
...the changes that did occur  contradict all  canons of Darwinian evolution.  Without a
significant  change  in  their  environmental  mega-niche,  these  humans  experienced
numerous deleterious physiological changes to become gracile. The thickness of their
skulls decreased radically, as did the general robusticity of their skeletons. The traces
of muscle attachments indicate that physical strength declined markedly, perhaps by as
much as 50%. On top of that,  their brain shrank by around 200 cc (~13%), and that
occurred during a time when the demands on their mental abilities are thought to have
increased exponentially. 
(Bednarik, 2011b: 18, emphasis in original)
Hyperbolic  talk  of  'contradicted  canons'  aside,  it  is  clear  that  Bednarik  invokes
hypothesis three—in which culturally mediated mate-choice sees humans selectively
breeding themselves—because he considers the observed changes to be maladaptive,
and therefore inexplicable in terms of natural selection.
5.3.2 – Initial problems with Bednarik's hypothesis
This way of framing the hypothesis immediately brings out some problems.  Firstly,
traits are not adaptive or maladaptive per se, but rather  in relation to a particular
environment.  The claim, therefore, that something like reduced cranial thickness is
definitionally maladaptive  is  difficult  to  accept.   Secondly,  the  claim  that  these
changes occurred in the absence of any alteration to the 'environmental mega-niche'
ignores the possibility, discussed at  length in this thesis,  that such changes might
represent  adaptive  responses  to  much  more  subtle  environmental  shifts,  such  as
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aspects of the human-made environment or changes in feeding ecology.  Finally, as
argued in chapter four (4.3.6), the reduction in brain size cited by Bednarik can be
explained  entirely  as  a  correlated  effect  of  reductions  in  body  size.   These
considerations alone should cast doubt on Bednarik's hypothesis.  Even if we ignore
these  initial  concerns,  however,  there  are  other  problems  that  affect  not  just
Bednarik's account, but any account of a similar type.
5.3.3 – Bednarik's proposal as sexual selection
Bednarik's proposal, in its claim that cultural constructs came to direct mate-choice,
is  clearly  appealing  to  sexual  selection.   What  is  less  clear,  however,  is  the
mechanism Bednarik has in mind in making that appeal, in particular whether he is
appealing  to  a  condition-dependent  or  condition-independent  model  of  sexual
selection (Jones & Ratterman, 2009; Kokko et al., 2003).  This distinction matters.
On occasion,  Bednarik appears to be making a condition-dependent argument,  in
which the criteria  of  mate-choice function as indicators  for  some aspect  of mate
quality.  In terms of the discussion in chapter two (2.3.3 and 2.3.4), this represents a
three-factor mechanism, with a  preference, a favoured  trait and some difference in
viability of which the trait serves as an indicator.  In comparing humans to other
species, Bednarik claims:
Other  primates (indeed, all other animals) exhibit no preferences in mate selection of
youth or specific body ratios, facial features, skin tone or hair;  yet in present humans
these are deeply entrenched, perhaps “hardwired”. Facial symmetry, seen to imply high
immunocompetence, is also of importance, and in female humans neotenous facial and
other features are strongly preferred by males. 
(Bednarik, 2011b: 20, my emphasis)
The  implication  here  is  clearly  that  the  criteria  of  mate  choice—such  as  facial
symmetry—reflect mate quality.  This is difficult to square, however, with the more
radical idea that mate-choice had come to be directed by cultural constructs.  If those
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constructs merely reflect indicators of mate-quality, then this is just another instance
of standard sexual selection, which as we saw in 4.5.1.4 is simply a subset of natural
selection.  Alternatively, they might represent examples of 'evoked culture', in which
cultural  mating  preferences  and  strategies  co-vary  with  ecological  conditions
(Gangestad et al., 2006).  Here, too, there is no sign of the radical argument Bednarik
sometimes appears to be putting forward, as such 'evoked' constructs simply reflect
current  adaptive  circumstances.   The  condition-dependent  reading  of  Bednarik's
argument, therefore, renders it fairly trivial.  Rather than cultural constructs coming
independently to drive human evolution in a manner akin to artificial selection, we
simply have cultural  constructs that  are  reflective of  mate  quality and ecological
conditions.
At other times, however, Bednarik appears to be arguing for a condition-independent,
two-factor  mechanism, in which culturally constructed  preferences and biological
traits,  such  as  more  gracile  crania  and  other  aspects  of  neotenous  appearance,
interact with no link to viability:
When breeding mate selection becomes moderated by cultural factors (such as cultural
constructs of attractiveness, along with perhaps social position, communication ability,
body adornment), the laws of evolutionary theory become suspended, and are supplanted
by Mendelian laws of inheritance, the basis of the discipline of genetics: evolution by
natural  selection  is  replaced  by  breeding,  or  artificial  selection,  resulting  in
domestication. 
(Bednarik, 2011b: 18, emphasis in original)
This condition-independent reading chimes much more clearly with the earlier talk of
'suspended evolutionary canons',  it  would also,  if  shown to be correct,  provide a
genuine explanation as to how humans might have domesticated themselves in a way
analogous  to  artificial  selection.   Unfortunately,  this  more  radical  reading  of
Bednarik's  position  has  two  major  problems.   The  first  concerns  its  partial
resemblance to the concept of a Fisherian runaway (see 2.3.3).  The second concerns
the supposed suspension of natural selection.
265
5.3.4 – Culturally constructed mate-choice as Fisherian runaway
The first thing to note, of course, is that the process proposed by Bednarik is not
completely identical with Fisher's runaway process.  The major difference is that in
the  Fisherian  case  both  preference  and  trait  are  genetically  encoded,  whereas  in
Bednarik's  hypothesis—at  least  on  the  condition-independent  reading—only  the
resulting traits have a genetic basis, with the preferences being culturally constructed.
However, both processes share a certain similarity of structure, in positing only two
factors—preference and trait—with no link to any aspect of viability.  As many of the
problems with Fisher's process stem from the limitations surrounding when this two-
factor account is feasible (Andersson, 1994), it seems likely that they may also apply
in the present case.
The  principle  problem  is  that  all  the  conditions  under  which  a  pure  Fisherian
runaway can  work  involve  the  assumption  that  there  is  no cost involved  in  the
choice-making  process  (Maynard  Smith,  1991)30.   This  problem  is  further
exacerbated  if  we  assume,  as  Bednarik  appears  to  do,  that  the  favoured  trait  is
detrimental  to  fitness.   A system which  combines  a  detrimental  trait  with  costly
choice can only be stable when that detrimental trait also functions as an indicator of
some other aspect of mate quality (Maynard Smith, 1991), in the sense of a Zahavian
handicap (Zahavi, 1975).  Of course, in this situation we have moved away from the
kind of two-factor model proposed by both Fisher and Bednarik towards a three-
factor model of trait, preference and viability differences.
The conditions under which a purely two-factor model of mate-choice can work are,
therefore, very limited.  Although Fisher's and Bednarik's proposals are not identical,
30 Fisherian runaways can function given a cost to mate-choice, if we assume a mutational bias in
relation to the favoured trait.   That is,  if  we assume that  mutations have a greater chance of
reducing the overall  functioning of  a  trait  than enhancing it.   In  these  situations it  may pay
females to choose males with an exaggerated form of the trait, even if that exaggerated form is
detrimental.   However,  this  only  functions  to  maintain  an  already  existing  trait  and  doesn't
account for how such a cycle might initially get started (Maynard Smith, 1991).  
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they both take a two-factor form.  The common theme connecting the limitations on
that kind of two-factor account is that it is untenable in situations where there is a
selective cost to that trait-preference link, whether that be in terms of choice itself
being costly, or in terms of the favoured trait being detrimental but without it also
functioning as an indicator of broader mate-quality.  These objections might ease,
however, in a situation in which natural selection was no longer in operation.  As
indicated in the above quotes,  Bednarik appears to be proposing that just  such a
situation is in operation in humans.
5.3.5 – Culturally constructed mate-choice as 'natural selection is
over for humans'
The idea that natural selection has ceased to be of importance in human evolution is
one that is often in the news and has received discussion in a number of prominent
publications (Balter, 2005; Stock, 2008; Ward, 2009).  The following quote, from the
geneticist Steve Jones, nicely illustrates this line of thinking:
The central  issue is  what  one means by 'evolving,'...Most  people when they think of
evolution mean natural selection, a change to a different or better adapted state. In that
sense, in the developed world, human evolution has stopped. 
(quoted in Balter, 2005)
The intuition driving this idea is that humans are 'buffered' from natural selection,
through a combination of our extreme behavioural plasticity, our ability to modify
the environment, and our capacity to adapt culturally, and then transmit those cultural
adaptations to subsequent generations (Varki et al., 2008; Crabtree, 2013a, 2013b).
There has been much talk of buffering in this thesis, so it is important here to revisit a
point made in the previous chapter.  This is the distinction between the claim that a
given  culturally  transmitted  practice  or  environmental  modification  might  buffer
humans from a particular selective pressure, and the claim that the cumulative effect
of human culture and environmental modifications have buffered humans from the
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action of  natural selection per se, rendering it irrelevant as an evolutionary force.
Given  the  range  and scope of  changes  under  consideration,  Bednarik's  argument
clearly requires some form of this second claim.  Furthermore, his proposal requires
that this not only be the case today, but across tens of thousands of years.  Regardless
of the time scale in question, however, this kind of position is both empirically and
theoretically unsupportable.
Turning first to the empirical evidence, there are a range of reasons to reject Jones's
claim that  'human evolution has stopped'.  Firstly, there is increasing evidence of
recent selective sweeps in the human genome (Voight et al., 2006; Sabeti et al., 2007;
Barreiro et al., 2008), a strong sign of positive natural selection.  Secondly, many of
the supposed 'buffering' factors, such as the human capacity to adapt through cultural
means, actually introduce new selection pressures (Powell, 2011; cf. Deacon, 2009).
The link between dairy farming and selection for lactose tolerance discussed above
(5.1.4) is just one such example.  There are also arguments to suggest a much broader
link between phenotypic plasticity—of which cultural behaviour forms a part (see
2.4.6)—and  the  introduction  of  new  selection  pressures  (West-Eberhard,  2003,
2005).  Furthermore, many of the outcomes of domestication, as discussed in  5.1,
also relate to the human-made environment introducing new selective pressures.  Of
course, the exact balance between buffering old pressures and introducing new ones
remains an open question (Powell, 2011), which the discussion of deleterious alleles
(see  4.3.7 and  5.1.1.8)  forms  one  approach  to  addressing.   It  should  be  clear,
however, that simply pointing to potential buffering processes does not settle this
question.
On the theoretical side, the problems arise from Jones's conflation of 'evolution' with
'natural selection', and 'natural selection' with 'change to a different or better adapted
state'.   Taking the second conflation first,  it  is  simply not the case that selection
always, or even mostly, acts to produce 'directional'  change to some 'better state'.
Selection can, of course, act like this, but it can also work in a variety of different
'modes', including stabilising selection, which acts to reduce the genetic diversity of
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a population,  through favouring intermediate trait  values; and  purifying selection,
which eliminates deleterious alleles (Barton et al., 2007).  This leads us back to the
first conflation, because the absence of natural selection does not result in a situation
in which evolution per se no longer occurs—a kind of stasis—but instead a situation
in which evolution is characterised by  genetic drift, with its associated build-up of
(usually)  deleterious  mutations.   As  a  result,  the  only  way  to  prevent  currently
adaptive structures and behaviours from being eroded through the process of genetic
drift,  is  for  selection—specifically  purifying  selection—to  eliminate  deleterious
mutations as they arise (Powell, 2011).  
Ironically, this last point also applies to preserving the cognitive, behavioural and
cultural capacities that are often cited as undermining the role of natural selection
(Powell, 2011).  Without the action of purifying selection, the genetic bases of these
capabilities would be eroded through drift.  Similar considerations also apply to the
whole range of basic physiological processes and structures such as the respiratory
system  and  vital  organs  (Powell,  2011).   In  many  cases  the  genetic  variation
underpinning these basic functions is highly conserved across species (Shubin et al.,
1997, 2009), indicating that it has been successfully preserved against the impact of
deleterious mutations for a very long time indeed.  This process continues today in
humans, as in all species (Powell, 2011).  The key point, then, is that once the false
equivalence  of  'natural  selection'  with  'directional  change'  is  broken  down,  it
becomes theoretically untenable to claim that natural selection is no longer important
in humans.
5.3.6 – Summary
Bednarik's  account  of  self-domestication  is  both  intriguing  and  superficially
plausible, but fails to stand up on closer inspection.   In its two-factor, condition-
independent form it  represents a radical account of how self-domestication might
have occurred.  Unfortunately, this two-factor approach to sexual selection severely
limits the conditions under which the process might occur.  One of those conditions
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is that natural selection no longer be in operation in humans.  This is something that
can be rejected on both empirical and theoretical grounds for humans today, and
these problems are only exacerbated by Bednarik's need to project this selection-free
situation tens of thousands of years into the past.  Taken in its three-factor form, the
argument becomes more plausible, but also more prosaic, as it essentially collapses
to a story of adaptation and sexual selection.
5.4 – Discussion
This  chapter  considered  three  possible  accounts  of  how self-domestication  might
have occurred in humans.  The first focused on the idea that similarities between
humans and other domesticated species might relate to both living in similar, human-
made environments.   One  strength  of  this  account  lies  in  its  evolutionary logic:
similarities  in  environments  will  produce  similar  selective  pressure and therefore
similar phenotypic outcomes.  A second strength is the wide-range of evidence that
living in the human-made environment actually has contributed to the emergence of
the domestic phenotype in conventional domesticates, such as livestock, and more
unusual instances such as commensal species and the inadvertent domestications in
captive breeding programs.  The weakness of this account lies in the available time-
frame in which it could have occurred.  If living in a human-made environment is the
key to self-domestication, then this requires that such an environment already exist.
This immediately restricts the discussion to the last few tens of thousands of years of
human evolution.  Such a restriction, together with the capacities it seems required to
assume, make this account difficult to accept as the full story of self-domestication.
The second account examined the idea that selection on temperament, particularly
aggression,  might  explain  self-domestication.   This  approach has  a  much greater
potential evolutionary time-depth, thereby avoiding the major problem with the first
account.   It  also  supported  by  the  considerable  evidence  that  such  selection  on
temperament does indeed result in many of the typical outcomes of domestication, as
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seen following artificial selection in foxes and natural selection in bonobos.  The
weakness of this account lies in pinpointing and providing evidence for how this kind
of  selection  on  temperament  could  have  occurred  in  humans.   The  cooking
hypothesis represents the most fully worked-out candidate of this process, but not all
its aspects are equally well supported by the evidence.    
The third account explored the possibility that something akin to artificial selection
could have occurred in humans, as a result of cultural constructs coming to direct
mate-choice.  This represents by far the least plausible of the three accounts, as it
requires  a  range  of  assumptions  that  are  completely  unsupportable  on  closer
examination.  It is worth noting that the problems with this third account are of a
different kind to those of the first two.  For the first two accounts the problem is one
of whether they actually occurred in humans.  In both cases, however, there is little
doubt that they could have occurred; and, furthermore, there is good evidence that if
they did, they would result in humans coming to share many similarities with other
domesticates.  For the third account, however, there are strong reasons to think that
the scenario it outlines is not possible  in principle.  We have, then, two plausible
accounts  of  how  human  self-domestication  could  have  occurred.   The  problem,
therefore, lies not in finding an account of self-domestication, but rather in picking
between those on offer.  Of course, there is nothing mutually exclusive about these





The focus of this thesis has been on the relationship between two ideas.  The first is
that language is the product of an evolutionary process.  The second is that humans
are a self-domesticated species.  Each of these ideas has a long intellectual history,
and the present thesis is certainly not the first time they have been explicitly linked.
However,  the  specific  aim  of  this  thesis  has  been  to  consider  the  potential
relationship between self-domestication and cultural accounts of language evolution.
I  have  focused  on  one  particular  cultural  account,  the  Iterated  Learning  Model
(ILM).   The  ILM  describes  a  mechanism whereby  structured  language  emerges
through  a  process  of  repeated  instances  of  cultural  transmission.   However,  this
mechanism, unlike the entirely genetic mechanism advocated by Pinker and Bloom
(1990), itself stands in need of explanation.  How might this mechanism have come
to be possible in the first place?  The hypothesis explored in this thesis is that a
process of self-domestication might have produced the necessary preconditions for
that  cultural  mechanism.   The  exploration  of  this  hypothesis  over  the  last  five
chapters has surveyed a very wide range of evidence, arguments and theory.  In this
final chapter, I present a summary and discussion of that survey.  
This summary is divided into three main sections.  In the first section the focus is on
language evolution.  In particular, I summarise my discussion of the ILM, detailing
how it works and identifying its necessary preconditions.  In the second section, I
step  back  somewhat  to  consider  some implications  for  our  understanding  of  the
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relationship between culture, biology and evolution—implications that relate directly
to the discussion of the ILM.  Finally, in the third section I turn to self-domestication,
addressing its link to the identified preconditions,  its coherence as a concept and
some possible ways in which it might have occurred.
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6.1 – Language Evolution
6.1.1 – How the ILM works: internally and externally
The  examination  of  the  ILM  presented  in  chapter  one  had  two  broad  sets  of
conclusions.  The first  concerned the  internal  functioning of the ILM.  The ILM
account of compositionality depends on the interplay between two pressures.  The
pressure to be  compressible and the pressure to be  expressive.   Through repeated
generations  of  transmission,  language  adapts  itself  to  these  two  pressures.   The
outcome  of  that  adaptive  process—compositionality—represents  a  compromise
between  the  pressures,  such  that  language  compresses  in  such  a  way  as  to  not
sacrifice expressive capacity.
However,  this  internal  account  immediately  raised  a  second  question:  why does
language find itself having to adapt to those two pressures and not other ones?  This
new question has an external focus, relating to the origin of the compressibility and
expressivity pressures themselves.  This question of origin has revealingly different
answers for the two pressures.
The  pressure  to  be  compressible is  inherent  to  cultural  transmission.   It  simply
reflects the basic tendency of culturally transmitted systems to simplify—to become
more compressed—and thus easier to learn.  As we have seen, this is not restricted to
language, but is also true of birdsong and indeed any culturally transmitted system.
It represents, in other words, a kind of informational regularity.  It is plain, therefore,
why language should find itself having to adapt to a pressure for compressibility.  If
language is culturally transmitted, then it will inevitably face a pressure to simplify
and  compress,  and  will  do  so  unless  that  pressure  is  checked  by  some  other
influence.
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For the ILM, that other influence is the expressivity pressure.  Unlike the pressure to
compress, the expressivity pressure does not simply arise out of the nature of cultural
transmission.  It requires an explanation.  The bulk of the work on the ILM now
traces the origin of this pressure to the communicative function for which language is
used.   This  still  leaves  the  question  of  why language should have  to  adapt  to  a
pressure stemming from communication, rather than some other function.  The clear
evolutionary answer to this question is natural selection: language structure comes to
reflect its communicative function, because that is the function under selection (see
1.4.5.1).  The pressure for expressivity faced by the language, then, is a knock-on
effect  of  language  users  being  under  selection  for  communication.   This  bare
statement is expanded in the following two sections.
6.1.2  –  Structure  and  function:  the  role  of  natural  selection  in
cultural accounts
It  is  common  to  see  'cultural'  accounts  of  language  structure  contrasted  with
'biological' accounts (e.g. Kirby et al., 2008).  Often, however, the exact basis of this
distinction is not entirely clear.  Should biological accounts be distinguished from
cultural accounts in terms of whether they appeal to natural selection, or in terms of
the  role they ascribe it.   The conclusion of this thesis is the latter, specifically in
terms of  what is being selected.  To see why, it is necessary to reflect on what it
means to include natural selection as part of an explanation.
An appeal to natural selection is an appeal to function in order to explain form.  This
point requires two further extensions.  Firstly, it is necessary to identify the correct
function  in  any  given  case.   Secondly,  it  is  necessary  to  recognise  that  similar
functions  can  be  delivered  via  a  range  of  different  mechanisms.   For  example,
species  living  in  cold  climates  exhibit  a  range  of  different  mechanisms—from
blubber and fur in mammals to antifreeze-like liquid in the blood of certain fish—
that all serve the same ultimate  function, keeping the organism sufficiently warm.
Both these points are important when we compare cultural and biological accounts.
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First consider the biological account provided by Pinker and Bloom.  The function
they identify is communication.  However, 'communication' is an extremely broad
term,  and  Pinker  and  Bloom  had  a  specific  form  of  it  in  mind:  code-like
communication.  In their words, the “communication of propositional structures over
a serial channel.”  Turning now to the question of mechanism, Pinker and Bloom
argued  that  the  details  of  linguistic  structure  were  themselves  encoded  into  the
genome.   They argued,  in  other  words,  for  an  entirely  genetic  mechanism.   As
discussed in chapter one (1.4.5.6), it is this choice of mechanism that renders their
account  biological.   This  pairing of  a  code-like function with an entirely genetic
mechanism is no accident, because code-like communication is heavily dependent on
all involved sharing exactly the same set of encodings (see  1.4.5.3).  It is natural,
therefore,  to  link  code-like  communication  with  a  tightly  controlling  genetic
mechanism.  Indeed, the communication systems of many other species, including
our primate relatives, follow just this pattern (1.4.1): the system is code-like and the
full set of signals are present from birth, suggesting tight genetic control.
Pinker  and Bloom's views are internally coherent.   However, both aspects of the
argument just outlined face major problems.  Firstly, their identification of code-like
communication as the relevant function is simply unsupportable.  As argued at length
in chapter  one (1.4.5.3 and  1.4.5.4),  linguistic  communication is  simply not  well
characterised by the  code model,  and is  much better  described by the ostensive-
inferential model.  This point is amplified further by the recognition that, far from
being an isolated communicative code, language is deeply integrated into a wider,
fundamentally multi-modal system of inferential communication (1.4.5.4).  There are
also reasons to question Pinker and Bloom's appeal to an entirely genetic mechanism
(see  1.2.2).   There is  growing evidence that cultural  transmission has a powerful
mediating  influence  on  language  structure,  suggesting  that  the  structure  seen  in
language is not simply isomorphic with the underlying genetics.  In addition, there is
increasing evidence that universals of the sort expected under Pinker and Bloom's
picture simply do not exist.  
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These problems with Pinker and Bloom's account provide a useful starting point for
our discussion of the ILM.  Consider first the question of function.  For the ILM,
communication is also the relevant function—it is to this function that we can trace
the  expressivity pressure.   However, for  the reasons outlined above,  the form of
communication in question here cannot be code-like communication.  Furthermore,
as we saw in chapter one (1.4.5.3), the adoption of the code-model sees us inexorably
descending into the bootstrapping problem.  The escape from these difficulties lies in
the realisation that linguistic communication is  inferential in nature, and part of a
wider multi-modal system.  The expressivity pressure is the pressure on language to
be expressive enough to function as part of that wider system.  
Turning now to mechanism, the ILM appeals directly to the mediating influence of
cultural  transmission.   In  particular,  to  the  fact  that  cultural  transmission  is  an
inherently structure-creating process.  Indeed, it is this that accounts for the pressure
to be compressible.   Given that language structure emerges through the interplay
between both pressures, the complete mechanism here is a combination of inferential
communication and cultural transmission.  Both aspects of this mechanism have a
genetic  basis.   Once this  in  place,  the operation of  the mechanism can deliver  a
structured  language  as  described  in  the  ILM.   The  question  of  the  ILM's
preconditions, then, is the question of how this mechanism might come into being.
6.1.3 – Preconditions of the ILM
The summary of the ILM just presented is crucial in understanding why it has the
preconditions  that  it  does.   In  chapter  one  (1.3) five  such  preconditions  were
discussed.  It was argued, however, that these five really represent different aspects
of two underlying preconditions.  The first of these is that the communication system
be culturally transmitted.  The second is the emergence of particular skills of social
cognition underlying the capacity to infer communicative intent.  The most basic of
which is the simple awareness that a behaviour was meant communicatively at all.  
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The first precondition brings into existence the structure-creating process of cultural
transmission itself.  In doing so, it creates an new kind of informational regularity.
Once in place, this regularity should be thought of in similar terms to regularities
arising  from the  laws  of  physics.   It  stands  ripe  for  exploitation  as  a  source  of
structure 'for free'.  Any system that comes to be transmitted culturally will face this
pressure to compress, to become easier to learn, and will change—will become more
structured—to reflect this pressure.  However, this precondition on its own is not
enough, because while it will deliver a structured language, there is simply no reason
to  expect  that  structure  to  be  adaptive  for  language  users—adaptive,  that  is,  to
function effectively as part of a wider inferential system of communication.  This
was seen most clearly in Kirby et al.'s (2008) first experiment where the language
adapted to the pressure of transmission by becoming systematically underspecified.
This represented the structuring of a previously random language, but not in a way
that was adaptive for its users.  And, furthermore, not in a way that resembles any
real human languages observable today.          
The second precondition is important in two interrelated ways.  The first concerns the
need for the transmitted system to consist of signal-meaning pairs, rather than just
signals  as  in  birdsong.   Furthermore,  the system must  consist  of  a  large enough
number of such pairings in order to generate a bottleneck.  The capacity to infer
communicative  intent—to  infer  meaning—and  the  simple  awareness  of
communicative  intent  at  all, upon which  this  is  built,  is  what  enables  this  to  be
possible.
However, this very same set of skills also form the foundation for the capacity to
engage in any kind of inferential communication whatsoever.  Such communication
need not be linguistic, and can involve pointing, gesture and other modifications of
the  shared  environment.   Indeed,  these  forms  of  non-linguistic  inferential
communication, by virtue of their non-arbitrary nature, have the capacity to ground
the  subsequent  emergence  of  arbitrary learned  symbols.   Language  serves  as  an
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enhancement  of  inferential  communication,  and  it  is  selective  pressure  on  this
general  type  of  communication—rather  than  on  linguistic communication
specifically—that  forms the best  explanation for why language has  to  adapt  to a
pressure—expressivity—relating to communication and not something else.  Indeed,
as noted in chapter one, the inference of communicative intent is the inferential half
of ostensive-inferential communication.  The same capacities of social cognition that
permit  the  learning  of  signal-meaning  pairs  also  create  the  functional  context—
inferential communication—in which the expressivity pressure arises.      
What the ILM shows, then, is that compositional structure is the ineluctable outcome
of a union between a culturally transmitted communication system and a pressure to
be expressive in relation to inferential communication.  The effect of this is not to
falsify  an  account  of  genetically  encoded  language  structure,  but  to  render  it
unnecessary.  In an organism who's capacities have given rise to the informational
regularities inherent to cultural transmission, selective pressure for expressivity—that
is,  for  expanded  and  enhanced  ostensive-inferential  communication—will
automatically co-opt  and exploit  those  regularities.   The genetic  encoding of  the
details of language structure is as unnecessary, then, as the genetic encoding of the
details of the down-step in human locomotion.
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Intermezzo
Implications for thinking about culture and evolution
The  view  of  the  ILM  outlined  above  provides  a  worked  example  that  has
implications for how we might think about the role of culture in evolution more
generally.  These implications were considered in greater detail in chapter two, as
part of a wider discussion of evolutionary inheritance conducted under the banner of
Deacon's (2009) conception of epigenetic parsimony.  The key to understanding how
culture fits into this picture lies in maintaining a clear distinction between the process
of cultural  evolution—in which cumulative culture emerges through the differential
spread, reproduction and elaboration of cultural  variants—and the role played by
cultural  inheritance in  organismic  evolution  (see  2.4.7).   Most  importantly,  we
should not allow our increasing understanding of the power and complexity of the
former to cause us to misunderstand the role played by the latter.  To see why this is
important, both in general and for cultural accounts of language specifically, it helps
to view the arguments developed in chapter two in light of some other views of
culture and evolution, many of which have been touched on in this thesis.
One common approach,  particularly in  the literature  on evolutionary psychology,
emphasises the role of so-called 'evoked' culture, in which the variants that appear
constitute adaptive reflections of current ecological conditions (Tooby & Cosmides,
1992).  For example, some apparently cultural differences in mate preferences have
been  shown  to  co-vary  with  the  available  sources  of  nutrition  and  extent  of
parasitism (Gangestead et al., 2006).  This view of culture sees it as something of a
'jukebox', in which developmental experience 'selects' from a from a pre-stored set of
options (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).  
Pinker  and Bloom's  (1990) account  of  language evolution  can  also  been seen in
similar  terms  (Sterelny,  2006).   The  genome  stores  a  set  of  innate  linguistic
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principles, with culture relegated to switching the relevant parameters one way or the
other.   Under  this  conception  of  culture,  both  cultural  evolution  and  cultural
inheritance are rendered irrelevant.  Cultural variants are not seen as the product of
an  evolutionary  process;  rather,  they  reflect  a  given  genotype's  response  to  a
particular environment.  Nor is culture an additional form of inheritance, as observed
cultural variation simply reflects the differential expression of genetic inheritance.
Others, however, have focused on 'epidemological' or transmitted culture (Richerson
& Boyd, 2005).  They argue, quite correctly, that while some aspects of culture may
fit the evoked model, many others do not.  For example, Richerson and Boyd (2005:
46) imagine a scenario in which they are dropped in a remote, semi-desert location
and asked to survive:
...we certainly don't  command any practiced hunter gatherer-skills.   If such skills are
needed  to  survive  as  hunter-gatherers  in  deserts,  they  had  better  be  lying  quietly,
heretofore little used, in innate modules in our heads.  Give us the resources to survive a
few months in our new home before you take away our last steel tool and last can of
beans—a little time to see what comes naturally.
Richerson and Boyd's point, of course, is that such knowledge does not simply get
'evoked'  by  ecological  conditions.   It  is  passed  between  generations,  with  each
generation cumulatively building on the output of the last.  The resulting body of
tools, techniques and cultural knowledge becomes far more than any one individual
could invent during their own lifetime.  This process, of the differential spread of
variants  and  their  continued  elaboration,  is  the  process  of  cultural  evolution.
Richerson and Boyd are right to emphasise its importance, and spend a good deal of
their book elaborating on models and data that reveal some of the surprising ways in
which it operates.  This serves as a valuable counterweight to the jukebox model of
culture.  However, the emphasis which they rightly place on cultural evolution leads
them into potential confusion when they come to think about the place of cultural
inheritance in human evolution.
This confusion is exemplified by their notion of genes and culture forming a system
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of 'dual-inheritance'.  This term is ambiguous.  Should it be read weakly, as a simple
statement  that  both  genes  and  culture  are inherited;  or,  should  it  be  read  more
strongly, as the claim that they represent similar  kinds of inheritance, with similar
evolutionary  roles?   The  weaker  claim  is  uncontroversial;  plenty  of  things  are
inherited.  The stronger claim, however, is difficult to support given the discussion of
extrinsic inheritance and phenotypic plasticity in chapter two (2.4.6 and 2.4.7).
To recap  briefly,  cultural  inheritance  is  extrinsic  inheritance:  it  is  dependent  on
organisms being intrinsically structured in such a way as to be able to make use of it.
That intrinsic structuring takes the form of various learning capacities and biases.
Together, these capacities and biases constitute an aspect of  phenotypic plasticity.
They represent, in other words, a way in which phenotypes can be tailored during
development.   As  a  result,  they  function  statistically—on  average—to  deliver
adaptive  responses  to  challenges  faced  over  the  life-course.   This  puts  cultural
inheritance—as a form of extrinsically inherited, trans-generational plasticity—on an
entirely different  footing  from genetic  inheritance,  which  is  not  a  mechanism of
phenotypic plasticity at all, and indeed forms the heritable, intrinsic basis for all such
mechanisms.   To  speak  here,  then,  of  a  system  of  'dual-inheritance',  with  its
implication  that  the two forms of  inheritance rest  on a  similar  footing,  is  highly
misleading.
If this vital distinction between the two forms of inheritance is not recognised it can
bring us to some very mistaken conclusions.  The general basis of these errors lies in
making a contrast between adaptive outcomes that are the result of plastic responses
and those that are the result of natural selection.  This contrast is fallacious because
the  mechanisms  underlying  plasticity  are  themselves  produced,  maintained  and
adaptively adjusted  by natural  selection  (see  2.4.6).   If  we fail  to  recognise  that
cultural inheritance is an aspect of one of those mechanisms of plasticity, instead
viewing it as a form of inheritance akin to the genetic, then we can easily come to
believe that cultural inheritance has nothing to do with natural selection at all.
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In relation to language evolution, and particularly the ILM,  this kind of view only
serves to compound the difficulties of accounting for the expressivity pressure.  As
discussed above and in chapter one (1.4.5), the principle problem here is accounting
for why language should find itself having to adapt to a pressure, expressivity, arising
from communication rather than some other function.  Natural selection provides a
clear way of addressing just this kind of problem: the structure of a trait comes to
reflect the functions for which it was under selection and not other ones.  
However, there are two factors that seemingly prevent the ILM from drawing on this
explanatory  resource.   The  first  concerns  its  adoption,  if  only  implicitly  and
methodologically, of the code model of linguistic communication, and has been dealt
with  above.   The second concerns  the  view that  cultural  inheritance  and natural
selection should be seen as contrasting and competing explanations.  If this were
indeed true, then it would make it difficult to justify an appeal to natural selection to
account for the expressivity pressure, on the grounds that natural selection is only
relevant for genetic inheritance.  However, as we have just seen, this is not the case.
Like any other aspect of plasticity, cultural inheritance and cultural transmission are
enabled, biased and adaptively adjusted by natural selection.    
We can  see,  then,  that  a  dual-inheritance  view  of  culture  and  genetics  has  the
potential to lead us astray in our thinking about language evolution.  What is needed,
therefore,  is  a  way  to  retain  the  insights  regarding  the  importance  of  cultural
evolution without  also  committing  ourselves  to  a  picture  of  unsustainable
equivalence  between  genetic  and  cultural  inheritance.   The  account  of  the  ILM
explored  in  chapter  one  and  the  wider  discussion  of  evolutionary  inheritance
explored in chapter two allow us to see, in broad terms, how this might be done.  The
key to this solution lies in Deacon's conception of epigenetic parsimony.  Of which
the account of the ILM presented in 6.1 serves as an example.
What we might call the 'epigenetic parsimony' view of the ILM, and of culture more
generally, addresses both the potential problems identified above in relation to the
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culture-biology relationship.  Its focus on the informational regularities of cultural
transmission, together with their self-organising potential, allows us to recognise the
explanatory  significance  of  cultural  evolution.   The  dynamics  of  the  cultural
evolutionary process stand as something that most definitely needs to be understood.
However, this view is perfectly compatible with the fact that those regularities and
dynamics are part of a complex mechanism of phenotypic plasticity.  It is simply not
the  case  that  we  have  to  adopt  a  dual-inheritance  view  of  evolution—with  the
unsustainable equivalence between culture and genetics that it requires—in order to
give the process of cultural evolution its due prominence.  
Furthermore, once the informational regularities of cultural transmission are in place,
they  present—much  like  any  other  reliably  present  epigenetic  regularity—as
something that can be exploited by evolution.  In the case of the ILM, for organisms
engaged  in  a  particular  kind  of  communication—inferential  communication—the
regularities of cultural transmission can be harnessed to deliver a language structured
so as to function as an enhancement of that form of communication.  Of course, to
the extent that cultural  transmission presents such regularities, there is nothing to
restrict  this  viewpoint  solely  to  language.   We  might  call  this  the  regularity
exploitation  view of culture.  Certain mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity enable
cultural transmission.  In doing so they bring into being a dynamical system with its
own self-organising regularities.  These regularities can the be exploited in order to
bring about structural outcomes of various kinds.            
The view outlined here allows us to see that we are not faced with a binary choice
between a picture of culture as 'evoked jukebox', which totally disregards cultural
evolution, and a picture of culture as an independent, parallel system of inheritance
that should be seen as similar in kind to genetic inheritance and that has nothing
whatsoever  to  do  with  natural  selection.   Finally,  it  also  allows  us  to  place  our
analysis of the preconditions of the ILM in a much wider evolutionary context, as we
can  now  see  the  ILM  as  detailing  a  specific  instance  of  the  more  general
phenomenon of epigenetic parsimony.  
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6.2 – Self-domestication
6.2.1 – Importance for language evolution
The importance of self-domestication for language evolution, and in particular for
cultural accounts such as the ILM, lies in the comparative evidence showing the two
preconditions identified above emerging in the context of domestication.  Chapter
two presented a discussion of the first precondition—an increased role for traditional
transmission—emerging in the Bengalese finch.  The mechanisms accounting for this
emergence  centre  on  the  buffering  effects  of  the  domesticated  environment,  in
particular the absence of predators and sympatric, closely related species.  It seems
likely that female preference for complex song also had a role to play.  Chapter three
presented  a  discussion  of  aspects  of  the  second  precondition—the  sensitivity  to
communicative intent—emerging in the domestic dog.   A long-term experimental
reconstruction of this domestication process, the farm-fox experiment, pinpointed a
key role for selection on temperament, particularly selection against aggression, in
producing not just  this precondition itself,  but a much wider range of the typical
outcomes of domestication.  The task of the rest of the thesis, at least as far as self-
domestication was concerned, was to examine whether the concept of domestication
could be coherently applied to humans and, if so, to make more concrete how such a
process  might  have  occurred.   If  this  could  be  done,  then  the  findings  of  the
comparative studies could also shed light on the emergence of the preconditions in
humans.
6.2.2 – Coherence of the concept
The concept of domestication can be coherently applied to humans.  Domesticated
species  are  typified  by  a  shared  set  of  characteristics,  known  as  the  domestic
phenotype.   As  argued  in  chapter  four  (4.3),  humans  share  in  many  of  these
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characteristics.  It is these phenotypic parallels that form the basis for the view that
humans, too, might be domesticated.  
The acceptance of this argument from parallel changes depends on the perspective
one takes on domestication.  The 'conditions' view of domestication emphasises the
role of an external agency, a domesticator, controlling the life-cycle and breeding of
the domesticated species.  In contrast, an 'outcomes' view of domestication considers
the emergence of the domestic phenotype as its defining mark.  This view stems from
the observation that  domestication is  not  simply the  state of  living under  human
control, or of living in a human-made environment, but of having become adapted to
that  environment.   The  domestic  phenotype  is  the  outcome  of  that  process  of
adaptation.  
Both views have much to recommend them.  The conditions view clearly describes
the existence of many present-day domesticates.   It  also describes the manner  in
which many of those species likely entered the environment to which the domestic
phenotype can be seen as an adaptation.  The outcomes view allows us to make sense
of those cases which don't entirely fit the conditions view, but that do exhibit aspects
of the domestic phenotype.  These include commensal species (5.1.2), inadvertent
domesticates (5.1.2) and, indeed, humans (4.3).  These two views of domestication
can be reconciled when it is realised that domestication is not a single monolithic
condition, but a multi-stage process, with various entry points, along which different
species will likely proceed at different rates (4.4).  Not all those pathways and stages
will  necessarily  be  characterised  in  the  terms  of  the  'conditions'  conception  of
domestication, but aspects of the domestic phenotype would be expected to emerge
in all of them.    
The  domestic  phenotype  is  sometimes  identified  as  the  outcome  of  artificial
selection.   The  discussion  in  chapter  four  (4.5),  however,  shows  that  this
identification  is  overly  simplistic.   While  artificial  selection  is  undoubtedly
important,  the  domestic  phenotype  is  the  product  of  a  range  of  evolutionary
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processes—including continuing natural selection and the relaxation of selection—
together with development consistently occurring in the domesticated environment.
These  processes  are  perfectly  applicable  to  humans.   Furthermore,  the  strong
evidence  that  many  aspects  of  the  domestic  phenotype  are  the  outcome  of  a
correlated cascade following selection on temperament  (3.4)  is  also applicable to
humans,  at  least  in principle,  because the selection involved does not have to be
artificial in order to have this effect (see 4.5.1.4; 5.1.4; 5.2.1).
6.2.3 – Making the concept more concrete: possible mechanisms
Drawing on the discussion in chapters two, three and four, chapter five presented
three possible accounts of  how humans might have come to self-domesticate.  The
first of these focused on the role of adaptation to the human-made environment.  One
major  aspect  of  that  environment,  particularly  stressed  in  chapter  two  in  the
discussion of the Bengalese finch, concerns the way in which it buffers against some
selection pressures and introduces new ones.  The discussion in chapter five (5.1)
presented a range of evidence that much of the domestic phenotype emerges as a
result of adaptation to this human-made environment.  It was also stressed that it is
humans themselves  that  have been living longest  in  this  environment.   This  first
account, then, sees self-domestication as the result of humans having to adapt to a
similar  set  of  environmental  circumstances—human-made  ones—that  have  also
faced other  domesticated  species.   The  major  problem with  this  account  of  self-
domestication,  however,  concerned  the  relatively  limited  time-depth  in  human
evolution during which it could possibly have occurred.
The second account focused on the possibility that the domestic phenotype might be
explained as a result of a correlated cascade of effects following selection against
aggression.   This  derives  from the  strong evidence,  primarily  from the  farm-fox
experiment  (3.4),  that  many aspects  of  the  domestic  phenotype can  be  produced
simply through selection acting on temperament..  In the case of the farmed foxes
that  selection  was  artificial.   A range  of  theoretical  arguments  and  fundamental
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evolutionary reasoning indicate that selection of any kind against aggression should
have a similar set of outcomes (see 4.5.1.4; 5.1.4; 5.2.1).  This second account, then,
sees self-domestication as a correlated by-product of humans also having undergone
selection against aggression.  
This possibility was first explored in relation to bonobos, who appear behaviourally,
morphologically and physiologically to be relatively 'domesticated'  in comparison
with chimpanzees.  These differences seem likely to derive from bonobos having
undergone natural selection against aggression.  The origin of this pressure is likely
linked to bonobo social organisation, which in turn relates to aspects of their feeding
ecology.   The  most  fully  worked-out  account  of  why  humans  might  also  have
undergone a similar process of selection against aggression—the cooking hypothesis
—also  relates  to  feeding  ecology.   This  account  of  self-domestication  has
considerably more evolutionary time-depth, and thus a much greater scope to cause
far-reaching evolutionary effects.  However, some of the detailed support required by
the cooking hypothesis, such as evidence for the early control of fire, is somewhat
missing.
Finally,  the  third  account  considered  the  potential  role  of  culturally  constructed
preferences  coming to drive human mate-choice,  resulting  in  a  kind  of  'selective
breeding' that caused many aspects of the domestic phenotype to spread through the
human population.  While this account has an initial plausibility, it also has a number
of  pretty  insurmountable  weaknesses.    The  first  concerns  its  resemblance  to  a
Fisherian  runaway  scenario,  with  which  it  shares  many  of  the  same  operational
limitations.  The second concerns its assumption that natural selection is no longer an
important  evolutionary  process  in  humans.   This  assumption  is  untenable  on
empirical and theoretical grounds, and becomes even more so if it is supposed to
apply across tens of thousands of years of human evolution.
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6.3 – Conclusions
Work on the ILM describes a mechanism for the production of structured language.
That  mechanism consists  of  the self-organising dynamical  regularities  of  cultural
transmission,  together with the boundary setting influence of a particular form of
communication—inferential  communication.   The relationship  between these  two
factors—the  reliably  present  epigenetic  system  of  self-organisation,  and  the
genetically based boundary setting influence that exploits that self-organisation—is
captured in the concept of epigenetic parsimony.   The union of these two factors
causes  culturally  transmitted  language  to  not  only  become  progressively  more
structured,  but  to  do  so  in  such  a  way  as  to  function  effectively  in  inferential
communication.  The preconditions of the ILM can be seen, then, as the emergence
of these two aspects of the mechanism.
The comparative evidence shows both these preconditions emerging in the context of
domestication.   In  the  Bengalese  finch  we  have  learning,  and  the  traditional
transmission  it  enables,  taking  on  a  much  more  prominent  role  following
domestication.   In  the  domestic  dog  we  see  the  emergence  of  one  of  the  key
foundations underpinning both the inference of communicative intent and inferential
communication itself.  These serve as vital clues to the possible origin of the two
preconditions in humans.  The relevance of these clues to the human case is further
increased by the recognition that the evolutionary context in which they appear—
domestication—is one that can be coherently applied to humans.  Several possible
accounts of how self-domestication might have occurred in humans are available.
The eventual fate of these hypotheses depends, of course, on the empirical evidence.
However,  in  combination  with  the  discussion  of  the  domestic  phenotype,  they
present as a clear target for subsequent theoretical and empirical work.
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Coda
Expanding, refining and testing the argument
I. The chain of the argument
The argument presented in this thesis can be profitably conceived of as a chain, in
which  links  are  made  between  previously  disparate  findings,  theories  and
perspectives.   In  short,  the  argument  is  that  the  findings  of  those  working  on
domestication speak directly to the questions of those working on cultural accounts
of language structure.  It may be helpful here to lay out the chain of the argument in
its barest possible form:
1. The cultural  transmission of  language has  important  consequences  for  the
structure of language
2. This transmission is only possible for organisms with particular capacities
3. At a minimum, those abilities include the capacity to learn new signals—thus
allowing cultural transmission to influence the communication system—and
the capacity to make inferences regarding communicative intent
4. In order to account fully for language structure in cultural evolutionary terms
we need to also have an account of the emergence of those capacities
5. There exist comparative case studies in which both these capacities can be
seen emerging in the evolutionary context of domestication
6. Making  an  argument  from  evolutionary  analogy,  domestication  can  also
account for the emergence of these capacities in humans
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Like any chain, each of the links in this argument represents a potential vulnerability.
However, the first four links are all well-attested elsewhere and together form the
starting  point  of  this  thesis.   As  such,  I  will  say  no  more  about  them  in  this
discussion.  The final two links—or rather, the connection between the last two links
and the first four—is what forms the core of this thesis.  In the next two sections I
will take these two points in turn, and offer a set of conceptual clarifications, together
with thoughts about how these aspects of the argument might be testable and what
might constitute relevant sources of evidence.
II. A tale of two mechanisms: buffering and selection on 
temperament?
Throughout  this  thesis  two  mechanisms  have  been  discussed  in  relation  to  the
emergence of the domestic phenotype.  Each of these mechanisms was featured in
one of the two comparative case studies.  In the discussion of the Bengalese finch in
chapter two, the focus was mainly on the role of buffering and relaxed selection.  In
the discussion of the domestic dog in chapter three, the focus was mainly on the role
of selection acting on temperament.  The role of environmental buffering was also
explored in relation to humans (5.1), commensals (5.1.3), and endangered species in
captive breeding programs (5.1.2).  In addition, the role of selection on temperament
was explored in relation to humans (5.2.5) and bonobos (5.2.1).  For the most part,
these two mechanisms have been discussed separately.  In this section, however, I
want to consider how these mechanisms might be related, together with two further
issues that arise out of that discussion.
i. What is the relationship between the mechanisms?
It is helpful to begin with the role of selection on temperament, as exemplified by the
work on the farm-fox experiment.  The starting point of this work was Dmitry K.
Belyaev's hypothesis of destabilizing selection (see 3.4), in which he suggested that
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the  typical  outcomes  of  domestication  followed from the  breakdown of  the  pre-
existing, developmentally canalized systems underpinning temperament.  Over fifty
years later, work on the farm-fox experiment provides strong support for Belyaev's
initial hypothesis, and has even begun filling in some of the details regarding the
hormonal and other systems that are actually destabilized (3.4.5).
In terms of relating this mechanism to that of relaxed selection,  three key points
stand out from the work on the farm-fox experiment.  Firstly, it  identified  which
systems the key breakdown occurs in, those underpinning temperament.  Secondly, it
showed that a great many aspects of the domestic phenotype could appear as  side-
effects of  that  temperamental  breakdown31.   (Note,  however,  and  this  will  be
important below, that although they may initially be side-effects, once these various
traits start to appear they become visible to selection in their own right, in the sense
described in 2.4.1.  As such, if any of these traits turn out to be beneficial, we would
expect  them to  spread  further  through  the  population,  and  possibly  come  to  be
enhanced.)   Finally, it  also served to illustrate one way in which that breakdown
could  occur:  through  the  application  of  selective  pressure  on  temperament  that
caused a directional change in hormonal and other regulatory systems (3.4.5).
With these three points in mind, we are now in a  position to  relate  selection on
temperament to relaxed selection.  The key to this relationship is that the  kind of
breakdown of previously co-adapted and canalized systems that is so central to the
farm-fox experiment  does not require explicit selection in favour of anything.  The
reason for this is simple.  As noted in section  5.3.5, the majority of the action of
natural selection is in a stabilizing or purifying mode, in which it acts to  maintain
currently adaptive traits in the face of deleterious variation.  In other words, all that is
minimally required  for  a  previously co-adapted  set  of  traits  to  breakdown is  the
relaxation of stabilizing or purifying selection.  Indeed, an argument of just this kind
31 For example, that piebald coat colouration or the breakdown of seasonal mating patterns need not
have  occurred  because  they  were  themselves  adaptive,  but  because  they  formed  part  of  a
correlated  cascade  of  effects  that  followed  the  breakdown  of  previously  canalized  systems
underpinning temperament. 
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was presented in relation to both the Bengalese finch (2.4.10)  and a range of other
domesticated species (5.1).  There is no necessity, therefore, to invoke any positive,
directional selection in order to account for this kind of breakdown.
This kind of change, in which previously co-adapted sets of traits breakdown under
circumstances  of  relaxed  selection  as  a  result  of  environmental  buffering,  is  a
phenomenon  Deacon  has  termed  degeneration  (see  2.4).   Belyaev’s  concept  of
destabilizing selection and Deacon’s concept of degeneration following relaxation
have, then, a great deal in common.  In particular, they both describe conditions in
which  a  canalized  set  of  co-adapted  traits  might  breakdown.   The  first  of  these
involves directional selection—whether artificial  (e.g. 3.4) or natural (e.g. 5.2)—that
specifically served to  target  the systems underpinning temperament.   The  second
involves organisms finding themselves, for whatever reason (cf. the discussion in
5.1.4), in an environment in which they were buffered from stabilizing selection, that
had maintained those same temperament system in their previously canalized state32.
As such, they might both be seen as two routes to the same destination.
However, there are also some significant differences between Belyaev's destabilizing
selection  and  Deacon's  relaxation-induced  degeneration.   The  most  important  of
these is that while both can explain the  breakdown of a previously canalized state,
only Belyaev’s destabilizing selection can also explain the subsequent  directional
change in the population, such that not only does the earlier canalized state break
down, but a newly canalized state also emerges.  In the farm-fox experiment, this is
represented  by  the  shift  from the  initial  wild-type  temperaments  in  the  original
population,  to the total  spread of tame temperaments  in  later  generations  (3.4.2).
This  difference  derives  from  the  fact  that  Belyaev's  process  operates  through  a
32 Many of the examples in which buffering and relaxed selection have been implicated also involve
changes to the hormone systems that  regulate temperament,  similar  to those seen in cases  of
selection  against  aggression,  such  as  the  farm-fox  experiment  (3.4.5).   This  is  true  for
domesticates generally (5.1.1.7), as well as the Bengalese finch (2.4.10), and bonobos (5.2.3.4).
Indeed, following some recently published work, it seem likely true of humans as well (Cieri et
al.,  2014).   It  is  reasonable  to  conclude,  therefore,  that  one  of  the key 'relaxations'  concerns
selection pressures that maintain the systems underpinning temperament.  Of course, this does not
rule out other relaxation-effects—such as those related to sensory and motor systems (see 5.1.1.4)
—but it does suggest that the relaxation of pressures with an influence on temperament may be
particularly important.
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directional shift from one canalized state to another, while Deacon's process operates
as a 'random walk'—through a processes of drift—away from the initial canalized
state as pressures that once maintained it become relaxed.  
If the relationship between the two mechanisms outline above is right, then it has a
range  of  implications  for  what  we  should  expect  to  see  in  various  instances  of
domestication.  Firstly, we should expect that both selection against aggression and
the buffered relaxation of selective pressures—such as predation, food scarcity and
reduced necessity to be competitive (see  4.5.1.2  and  5.1 for further discussion)—
should produce similar phenotypic outcomes.  We should also expect, however, that
selection against aggression should produce those outcomes much more rapidly than
the relaxation of selection.  Indeed, this is exactly what was found in the farm-fox
experiment, in which domestication-typical changes swept through the population of
selected tame-line foxes in under 50 years, but also appeared at a frequency an order
of magnitude lower in the unselected, but still captive-living, control foxes (3.5.6).
Finally, regardless of mechanism, we should expect that some of the side-effects of
the  domestication  process  should  turn  out  to  be  beneficial  and  thus  themselves
become the object of selection.  Given this final point, we might ask whether the two
preconditions  identified  in  chapter  one  should  be  thought  of  as  side-effects  or
adaptations.
ii. Are the preconditions side-effects or adaptations?
The  first  preconditions  was  that  cultural  transmission  should  come to  take  on  a
greater role in influencing the communication system.  This was explored in chapter
two through a detailed examination of the Bengalese finch.  In this section, I will
recast the conclusions of that chapter (see 2.5) in terms of the above discussion.  The
argument advanced in chapter two was that, in being transplanted to the domesticated
environment,  the  ancestral  munias  were  buffered  from  selective  pressures—
particularly species recognition (2.4.10)—that had served to maintain their song in a
simple and stereotypic canalized state.  In the context of domestication, with these
pressures  relaxed,  this  canalized  state  broke  down.   In  other  words,  the  initial
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breakdown of  the  canalized  state  was  a  side-effect  of  the  buffered  environment.
Crucially,  however,  this  breakdown  of  canalized  simplicity,  together  with  the
increasing role for other influences, resulted in a greater phenotypic diversity—in
particular,  a  greater  diversity  of  song  complexities.   This  then  interacted  with
selective pressure stemming from female preference for more complex song.  The
result of this was that the descendent population of Bengalese finches came to have,
on average, more complex song than their wild munia ancestors.  
The  second  precondition  related  to  inferential  capacities,  most  fundamentally  to
recognising  that  something  was  meant  communicatively in  the  first  place.   This
precondition was explored in chapter three, through an extended examination of the
domestic  dog,  as  illuminated  by  the  farm-fox  experiment  (3.4).   The  farm-fox
experiment also shows the breakdown of a previously canalized state, although this
time the breakdown is attributable not to relaxed selection but to selection against
aggression.  Regardless of the initial cause of the breakdown, however, one of the
side-effects  was  that  domesticated  foxes  came  to  exhibit  a  sensitivity  to
communicative intent, thus indicating how and why that same capacity likely arose
in dogs (3.4.4).  Where this case differs from the first precondition, however, is that,
at least in the domesticated foxes, there seems to be no evidence that this ability has
subsequently been found to be evolutionarily beneficial.  In dogs, however, there is
some evidence of differences between breeds.  In particular, that while all breeds
exhibit this same basic sensitivity to communicative intent, some breeds, particularly
those that work closely with humans, also show enhancements over and above this
basic capacity (3.1.4).  
In both cases, then, the initial emergence of the precondition followed as a side-effect
of the domestication process.  The increased role for learning in the Bengalese finch
appears as  a result  of  the degeneration of  biases that  had previously canalized a
simple, stereotypical song.  Similarly, the sensitivity to communicative intent seen in
dogs  appears  as  a  result  of  the  breakdown  of  previously  canalized  systems
underlying  temperament.   In  both  cases,  too,  although  perhaps  more  so  for  the
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Bengalese finch, there is evidence that this initial side-effect was then found to be
beneficial  in  its  own  right.   For  the  Bengalese  finch,  this  involved  the
complexification of song in line with female preferences (2.5).  For the domestic
dog,  this  possibly  involved  the  capacity  to  work  with  humans  (3.1.4),  perhaps
facilitated by temperament-related changes in characteristics such as the willingness
to look back at human faces (3.1.2.1).  The parallel argument in the human case,
therefore, would see  both preconditions emerging as side-effects of domestication,
with  both  of  them—or  rather,  the  union of  both—coming  to  be  beneficial,
particularly as regards communication (see chapter one, section  1.4 onwards for a
full discussion).
iii.  Why  both  preconditions in  humans,  but  only one  in  each of  the
comparative examples?
The claim that domesticated species  typically exhibit  a range of similarities—the
domestic phenotype—has been a major theme of this thesis.  There is also a need,
however, to acknowledge the  differences  between domesticated species.  This is a
dimension that  requires  much deeper  consideration than it  has been given in  the
present  work.   This  is  particularly  the  case  given  that  there  is  no  comparative
example of domestication leading to both preconditions emerging together in another
species, and yet this is exactly what needs to be accounted for in humans.
One way this might be approached, is to focus on the specifics of the domestication
process in each case.  Might, for example, the particular 'pathway' to domestication
(see  4.4)  taken  by  a  species—whether,  for  example,  they  began  as  prey  or  as
commensals—influence the final outcome?  In addition, might this be an area where
the  distinction  between  domestication  and  self-domestication  is  important?   For
example, as seems to be the case in relation to the decline in brain size associated
with the former but not the latter (4.3.6).
A second approach might be to focus on the differing evolutionary histories of the
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species prior to domestication.  It has been argued, for example, that the evolutionary
history of many lineages makes them unamenable to domestication at all (Diamond,
1997).   Might  it  be  important,  for  example,  that  the  songbird  ancestors  of  the
Bengalese finch have long engaged in some form of cultural transmission, while the
wolf  ancestors  of  domestic  dogs  are  known  to  have  highly  sophisticated  social
cognition?   Might  these  differing  phylogenies  have  laid  the  ground for  different
outcomes following domestication?  In the human case, might the combination of
primate social cognition with, at least in the gestural realm, the capacity of primates
to learn new signals, explain why both preconditions could have emerged together?
But if this were the case, what explains the difference between humans and bonobos?
These are  hard questions  to  which I  do not  pretend to  have a  definitive answer.
Nevertheless, considered in light of the discussion above, we should be able to make
some tentative suggestions.  Firstly, that the phenotypic outcomes of any particular
process of domestication should be a function both of the mechanism by which that
domestication occurred and of the previous evolutionary history of the lineage.  This
would explain why, as noted in  2.2.2, domestication effects cannot account for the
emergence of vocal learning in the Bengalese finch—indeed, the wild munia is itself
a vocal learner—or the seemingly disparate33 collection of other species in which
vocal learning is found (see  1.4.1).  Rather, what we see is that domestication, by
relaxing selection, serves to unleash the potential inherent in vocal learning that had
previously  been  kept  in  check  by  selection  pressures  in  the  wild.   Similarly,
domestication can be seen to have unleashed the potential inherent in the advanced
socio-cognitive capabilities of wolves, that had previously been kept in check by
aspects of temperament (see 3.4.4).
While  many  of  the  effects  of  domestication  will,  therefore,  be  seen  across  all
domesticated species, some will only be seen in particular instances.  What these
more specific effects of domestication will be is likely determined by the potentials
33 Of course, I leave open the possibility that there is some unknown factor that connects all vocal
learners.  For now, however, I am unaware of any clear explanation of the currently observed
pattern of vocal learning.
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inherent in the evolutionary history of the lineage.  More precisely, by the potentials
that have thus-far been limited by aspects of temperament.  It should be possible,
therefore, to identify what these might be in particular instances, perhaps through an
examination of behaviour.  For example, Melis et al. (2010) found that chimpanzees
who were seemingly unable to solve a co-operative dyadic task could do so if dyad-
pairing was manipulated such that  individuals with mutually high tolerance were
paired together (see also 3.4.4).  The poor performance of chimpanzees, relative to
dogs, on tasks of co-operative communication (see chapter three, particularly 3.2.2.3)
stands, then, as something that might be remedied through a change in chimpanzee
temperament—exactly  the  kind  of  change  that  appear  to  underpin  the  domestic
phenotype.  Conducting a farm-fox like experiment on chimpanzees would obviously
face numerous practical and ethical difficulties.  The general point, however, is that
experimental manipulations exploring behaviour may have the capacity to identify
'potentials' that could be released by a domestication-like process.
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III.  Are humans domesticates, or are humans and domesticates
both something else?
Much of this  thesis,  particularly chapters four and five,  has been focused on the
question of whether it makes sense to think of humans as a domesticated species.
The conclusion, based on both the  outcomes view of domestication (see 4.4) and a
review of some of the various ways in which these outcomes might have come about
in humans (see Chapter 5), was that it does indeed make sense to think of humans as
domesticated.   If  accepted,  this  would  allow  us  to  move  from  the  view  of
domestication illustrated in figure 6.1, to the view illustrated in figure 6.2.
Figure 6.1: Conventional picture of domestication
Figure  6.1  depicts  what  we  might  think  of  as  the  conventional  picture  of
domestication: Domesticated species are those that are controlled in some way by
human beings.  This very much accords with what was termed the conditions view of









Figure 6.2: Expanded picture of domestication
In contrast, figure 6.2 depicts an expanded picture of domestication, largely based on
an outcomes view (see 4.4) and the shared domestic phenotype (see 4.2, 4.3 and 5.1).
In addition to the conventional range of domesticated species, this expanded view
brings in not only humans, but also commensal species (see 5.1.3), the ‘inadvertent
domesticates’ associated with captive breeding programs (see  5.1.2)  and bonobos
(5.2.1).  The advantage of this second picture over the first is that it allows us to
make  sense  of  a  range  of  similarities  that  would  otherwise  have  remained
unconnected.  In addition, this view also allows us to identify some falsifiable criteria
by which we can decide whether the description of 'domesticated' should be treated
literally in the case of humans.
The first  of  these criteria  concerns the domestic  phenotype itself.   If  it  could be
shown,  for  example,  that  humans  do  not in  fact  exhibit  the  typical  outcomes  of
domestication, then that would be grounds to reject the claim that humans are self-
domesticated.   The  second  concerns  the  mechanism  by  which  the  domestic
phenotype is produced.  If the domestic phenotype in humans were the result of an
entirely different evolutionary mechanism to that seen in other domesticates, then it
would  seem  perverse  to  describe  humans  as  domesticated.   Important  here,  for
example,  would  be  evidence  regarding  whether  humans  have  undergone  similar













those changes are linked to the domestic phenotype. Some recent evidence suggests
this may be the case (e.g. Cieri et al., 2014), but more is certainly required.  Outside
of  these  criteria,  the  concept  of  humans  as  'self-domesticated'  could  either  be
relegated to metaphorical status, or abandoned altogether.
However, the major problem with this way of looking at the issue is that the choice
between figure 6.1 and figure 6.2 is fundamentally dependent on the extent to which
one accepts the conditions or the outcomes view of domestication.  This is, at base, a
conceptual choice.  Indeed, it is a choice which, at its worst, threatens to descend into
an argument about definitions rather than anything substantial about evolution.  Once
this happens, the whole debate moves out of the empirically testable realm.  For
example, if you were to reject the outcomes view of domestication—and thus reject
the  picture  of  domestication  in  figure  6.2—it  is  difficult  to  see  what  kind  of
empirical findings might make a difference to your opinion.  If the debate is framed
as a choice between figure 6.1 and figure 6.2,  then it  seemingly comes down to
whether you are happy to use the same adjective—'domesticated’—in reference to a
wider or narrower range of examples.
Quite clearly, however, the substantive question at issue is not about the use of an
adjective,  but  about  the  evolutionary  circumstances  in  which  certain  phenotypic
outcomes are likely to occur.  Keeping this in mind, the arguments presented in this
thesis can be reformulated as shown in figure 6.3.









In figure 6.3, the range of species conventionally thought of as 'domesticated'—in
effect, the whole of figure 6.1—is contained within the area, labelled 'conventional
domesticates'.  Rather than attempt to expand the usage of the term ‘domesticated’,
this  way  of  framing  the  argument  notes  the  similarities  between  conventional
domesticates  and  many  of  the  other  species  discussed  in  this  thesis—humans,
bonobos, commensals, and animals in captive breeding programs—and takes that as
evidence  that  all  these  cases  belong  to  a  wider  set,  of  which  conventional
domesticates are but one major subset34.
This way of framing the issue also puts us in a much better position to think about
how the argument might be empirically tested.  In particular, rather than haggling
over the use of the term ‘domesticated’, we are now free to ask: What is it that all
these cases have in common that has lead to similar phenotypic outcomes?  With an
answer to this question, we are in a position to make testable predictions of the kind
found in historical-narrative science35 (sensu Mayr, 1982, 1997).  More specifically,
we would be in a position to predict that  if and when we find other examples that
share those same evolutionary conditions,  we should also see similar phenotypic
outcomes.
What, then, are the evolutionary conditions shared by all those species in figure 6.3?
As  discussed  above,  one  thing  they likely share  is  the  breakdown of  previously
canalized systems, particularly those relating to temperament.   In some instances,
this  relates  to  selection  acting  directly  on  temperament  itself;  in  many  others,
34 I would very much like to thank Terrence Deacon for the discussion that finally crystallised this
way of framing the topic.
35 These are, in evolutionary terms, predictions about the  kinds of things we will find, given our
understanding of natural history and the processes by which it has occurred.  One vivid example
of this is the oft-quoted riposte, usually attributed to J. B. S. Haldane, that the discovery of a
fossilised rabbit in Precambrian rock would shake his belief in, or even falsify, the theory of
evolution by natural selection.  Another famous example is Darwin’s (and, later, Alfred Russel
Wallace’s) prediction—upon finding a Madagascan orchid with a nectary nearly a foot in length—
that a pollinating moth with a similarly long tongue would also be found.  More generally, and
this is the logic being employed in the current instance, we can predict that organisms faced with
similar conditions—that is, with similar 'design problems' (Dennett, 1995)—will likely converge
on similar solutions (see also 2.1).     
302
however, the key conditions seems to relate to the effects of relaxed selection in a
buffered environment.  One point to note, however, is that many of the relaxation-
degeneration examples in 6.3 show no sign of direct selection against aggression.  In
contrast, however, even the most clear-cut example of selection against aggression,
the farm-fox experiment, shows signs that buffering also played a role (see  3.4.6).
Indeed, in the case of the bonobo, it seems likely that the (natural) selection against
aggression was itself enabled by the fact that the geography of their feeding ecology
buffered them, relative to chimpanzees, from the need to engage in aggressive and
competitive social behaviour (5.2.2.2).  These considerations suggest that buffering is
the  more  common  and,  possibly  the  more  fundamental,  of  the  two  mechanisms
discussed above, and should likely be considered what, at base, is shared by all those
in figure 6.3.  
Given this analysis, we can predict that there should be many other examples of the
same phenomenon.  Other examples, that is, of species exhibiting a similar set of
phenotypic  changes,  following  evolution  occurring  in  similarly  buffered
environments.   And, indeed,  other  examples can be found.  Palombo et al.  2008
report  palaeontological  studies  of phenotypic change in  a  number of now-extinct
ruminant species from the Mediterranean islands.  Although these changes are linked
to isolation on an island and not to domestication, the authors explicitly invoke the
comparison with brain-size reduction under domestication because, they argue, the
selective environment in both cases was fundamentally similar: including the near
absence of predators and much reduced inter-species competition (Köhler & Moyà-
Solà, 2004), all of which typify the environment of domestication (4.5.1.2).  Once the
arguments of this thesis are reformulated as shown in figure 6.3, it becomes clear that
many further examples should also be found. 
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